


SOROTAN DARAT

JURNAL TENTERA DARAT MALAYSIA

THE HOUSE JOURNAL OF THE MALAYSIAN ARMY



— artikel kulit muka

OPERASI
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KANDUNGAN

- | | |
|---|----|
| 1. Tailoring Weapon Systems And Equipments to Defence Strategy and Military Doctrine | 3 |
| YB Timbalan Menteri Pertahanan
Dato' Abang Abu Bakar Bin Datu
Bandar Abang Hj Mustapha | |
| 2. Great Power Relations In The Pacific And Their Impact On US - Malaysia Relations | 6 |
| Panglima Tentera Darat
Jen Dato' Seri Hashim bin Mohd Ali | |
| 3. The Impact of Counter-Insurgency Operations And 'Confrontation' on the Malaysian Regt of Artillery | 12 |
| Kol K.N. Zain | |
| 4. Operasi Polis Tentera | 19 |
| Mej Ibrahim Bin Hashim | |
| 5. WORLD WAR II - Secret Agent Infiltrations For The Liberation of Malaya | 33 |
| Kol Mohd Aros Bin Osman | |
| 6. Kepimpinan Tentera Yang Ideal | 44 |
| Lt Kol Mohd Safari Bin Abdul Hamid | |
| 7. Neutralization of Southeast Asia | 55 |
| Mej Harbhajan Singh s/o Jagjit Singh | |
| 8. Information Sharing By Computer Networking In The Armed Forces | 64 |
| Mej Mastimar Bin Hj Yusoff Hilmi | |
| 9. Dedication In The Performance of Military Duties - The Task of Managing A Modern Army | 78 |
| Mej Bhagwan Singh | |
| 10. Cigarette Smoking Among Soldiers in An Army Unit | 85 |
| Lt Kol (Dr) V Supramaniam | |
| 11. Ulasan Buku | 95 |
| 12. Berita | 93 |

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
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Dicetak
oleh
PERCETAKAN RINA SDN BHD

TAILORING WEAPON SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENTS TO DEFENCE STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE



Keynote address by YB Timbalan Menteri Pertahanan (Deputy Defence Minister) Dato' Abang Abu Bakar at the Shangri-la Hotel, Kuala Lumpur on Wednesday 19th February 1986.



Dato' Abang Abu Bakar

Before I proceed, allow me to set the topic in what I feel to be, its proper perspective. It is pertinent to note that we are specifically addressing problems that relate to the third world, comprising, in the main, of small states which have limited resources. Lest we lose sight of the trend of our deliberations in the next few days, may I suggest that the subject be amended slightly to read "tailoring weapon systems and equipment to defence strategy and military doctrine of the small states". In my mind, this will make it clear to all that there is a distinct difference between how small states address themselves to the problem because of the multitude of constraints, compared to that undertaken by major powers.

By virtue of their huge reservoir of resources, major powers tailor their weapons and equipment to suit their strategy and doctrine. This is not so in the case of small states. For the small states, the process is just the reverse. They acquire weapons to suit their defence strategy. They then formulate their military doctrine to maximise the use of the weapon systems acquired. As you will no doubt agree, small states have limited geopolitical interests and, because they lack resources and know-how, do not have the motive nor the capacity to tailor their weapon requirements to meet their specific needs.

Paradoxically however, there is a rising trend for small states to aspire to become self-reliant in defence. Self-reliance should

not be misconstrued to mean self-sufficient which lies at a very much higher plateau in the hierarchy of a nation's capability. With the accumulation of knowledge and the development of basic industrial infrastructure, there has been a trend for states to grow with technology. The demise of alliance politics, the increasing incidence of overlaps in country to country interests and the need to possess assured lines of support have motivated this drive towards self-reliance. The fact that import substitution also results in the saving of foreign exchange and generates economic activity within national borders, makes the proposal that much more attractive.

In their effort to be self-reliant, however, small states have tended to develop defence industries which duplicate each other. I am not sure as to the reasons behind this trend and can only surmise the pre-eminence of national interest and the outcome of the survival syndrome. The absence of a common perception of what contributes toward regional instability could be a contributory factor, and the not so encouraging results of experiences in defence collaborative efforts elsewhere too, might have influenced the apparent lack of co-operation in this field. Whatever the reasons, it is my belief that it would be in the best interest of like-minded small states to optimise their use of resources by pooling their efforts and developing industries that are complementary to one another.

At this juncture, let me refer to the relationship between manufacturers and end-users, for it is important that both parties appreciate each others position. At times, manufacturers, in promoting their products fail to appreciate the sensitivities of end-users. It is common knowledge that weapons and equipment being promoted were produced initially to meet the stra-

tegic and doctrinal requirements of the producing countries. Overseas markets are tapped as a logical extension of economic polity irrespective of the product's compatibility with the actual needs of the small end-users. I would urge for some ethical responsibility for, in the promotion of such products there is a disturbing tendency to shroud equipment performance behind a veil of deceit not through what is said but rather through what is left unsaid.

Honouring the terms of contract is perhaps another major consideration for suppliers. Many small end-users have found themselves in trouble over this issue particularly with reference to late delivery. One must appreciate the fact that small users are fairly helpless to bring matters to court as this would entail time and money, both of which are not easily available. Black-listing is the obvious answer but it does not solve the problem. For the sake of maintaining a lasting relationship, I would suggest a good measure of goodwill and sincerity on the part of the manufacturers.

After the purchase, the end-users sometimes face problems of after-sales support. With limited defence resources, small nations must have a high degree of operational efficiency. This can only be achieved if there is good after sales service in terms of spare parts, accessories and technical support. At times, these are not readily forthcoming for various reasons best known to be suppliers. This problem is of crucial importance to small users because of its relationship with assured pipeline support in times of crises. The existence of this problem suggests the need for greater emphasis to be accorded to the product support profile of companies during the process of evaluation. It also suggests a more discerning look at the export policies of manufacturing countries before decisions are taken.

Another major trend today is the often talked about subject of technology transfer. Taken in its widest sense, the transfer of technology means a total transfer of knowledge and the establishment of a duplicated production facility in the buying country. To expect such a transfer in all instances would, of course, be unrealistic. But, equally unacceptable, is a transfer that only encompasses assembly operations. Small countries expect more than just that and, in this regard, I would urge manufacturers to sincerely seek out with buying countries, the level of transfer that would optimise resources and prove to be of mutual benefit. At this point in time, in addition to assembly, we could perhaps consider also the manufacture of certain components locally as production cost can be reduced as a result of cheaper labour. I am of the opinion that small states today do possess the type of technical capability to undertake this form of technology transfer.

Malaysia does not want to be involved in an arms race. An arms race really belongs to the heavy-weights and not to those who are in the category of the bantam weight like us in the small states. Little nations like us neither have the desire nor the resources to embark on an arms race. Not all we seek to buy are weapon systems and equipment that are meant for the basic need to maintain peace and stability in a very volatile region, such as ours. Like any other nation we must be able to protect our freedom and our sovereignty. Such a goal is not the prerogative of only the big powers.

I also do not subscribe to the view that this conference, which is being held in conjunction with the defence exhibition, is untimely, considering the existing economic environment. A defence exhibition is like any other commercial exhibition. This is just as good a time as any to hold an exhibition of this nature and magnitude. We are not going to buy these items now. We are here to keep abreast with state-of-the-art technology which would otherwise entail us to go abroad and to many countries. Having them displayed at one place is perhaps one of the most economical steps. At the same time, having them in one place also provides an added advantage of comparative study. On many counts, such an exhibition is most beneficial to the host and the countries in this region.

More important is perhaps to show that Kuala Lumpur is the best venue for such an event. Malaysia is best located being in the epicentre of the region, geographically situated at the cross-road between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. Kuala Lumpur has all the facilities and the prerequisites for this and any other trade exhibition to make it a perfect choice.

Finally, on behalf of the government of Malaysia, I wish to warmly welcome all participants and guests to the conference and exhibition. I hope you will have a pleasant and memorable stay in our country. Most of all, I wish you all the best in your deliberations in the next few days. I have now the honour to declare the Asian defence conference open.

Quote:

"I would urge for some ethical responsibility for, in the promotion of such products there is a disturbing tendency to shroud equipment performance behind a veil of deceit not through what is said but rather through what is left unsaid".

— Unquote

— Dato' Abang Abu Bakar

GREAT POWER RELATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND THEIR IMPACT ON US—MALAYSIA RELATIONS

— JENERAL DATO' SERI HASHIM
MOHD ALI

Geostrategically Malaysia is located right in the centre of Southeast Asia controlling the sea lines of communications between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Politically, Malaysia could boast as being one of the few countries in the world that has been successful in containing communist inspired insurgency, to the extent that its government and people have till today gained the most anti-communist of them all. Economically, Malaysia possesses rich natural resources and subscribes to free market — oriented systems.

From the strategic standpoint, Malaysia's importance has been recognised by all the great powers. Both the US and the Soviet Union recognise that the control of Malaysia could be used both to monitor and to interdict ships moving between Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, just as one would be able to choke the other in the event that one dominates the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) sees Malaysia as a country that she traditionally

had its influence felt for ethnic as well as ideological reasons. Japan on the other hand views Malaysia as a country that is a source for its raw materials, good potential for investment, as well as markets for its finished products. Additionally Malaysia controls its sea passage through which its oil supplies from the Middle East move.

But, despite those important characteristics that Malaysia possesses, in the eyes of the great powers, US relations with Malaysia however seemed to have flourished only after the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea in 1979. Before this, US policy towards Malaysia was somewhat ambivalent and erratic, perhaps due to the following reasons:

Prior 1971, Malaysia was under the military umbrella of the Anglo-Malaysia Defence Arrangement (AMDA), and in the contexts of alliance politics, the US interest must have been cared by the British; after all both Britain were

members of SEATO and NATO.

The withdrawal of the British from East of Suez in 1972, caused Malaysia to reorientate its foreign policy in pursuit of non-alignment, and anticipating that a power vacuum would be created following US withdrawal, Malaysia proposed the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) concept for Southeast Asia as measure

Nevertheless, the signing of Soviet Vietnamese Treaty of November 1978, culminating in the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea in early 1979, had caused the US to reorientate its policy towards South-east Asia. Soviet involvement in the Indochina Conflict, and the subsequent access to base facilities at Cam Rahn Bay and Dan Nang not only established a new power configuration in the region, and the whole Pacific, but more important in context of



The last days of US ARMY in Vietnam 1975.

to free the region from great power rivalry for influence.

The wound as a consequence of US defeat in Vietnam in 1975 and subsequently the expulsion from Thailand in 1976, had influenced the US to pursue the "abandonment of Asia Policy" as matter of attempt to avoid embroilment in conflicts on mainland Asia.

larger global concern, Soviet presence in Vietnam was seen as a challenge to US predominance in the South China Sea as well as the Pacific Basin.

Soviet determination to establish a foothold in the warm waters of the Pacific basin started even as far back as 1954 when Khrushchev and Bulganin toured Burma and Indonesia. Failure to establish a client

regime in Indonesia in 1965, the Soviets had to turn to Vietnam who at that time needed every support to remove the US influence from Indochina. US withdrawal however saw Peoples Republic of China (PRC) establishing a foothold in Kampuchea. To the Soviets, this situation was obviously unacceptable considering that Kampuchea was a suitable jumping board for PRC to spread its influence into the whole of Southeast Asia. Incidentally the newly reunified Socialist Republic of Vietnam too had the same view, and hence the

Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea in early 1979. As far as Soviet Union is concerned, this establishment of Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina serves the Soviet's long term ideological interest perceived as far back as 1930 when the Indochinese Communist Party was formed with Soviet patronage. But Vietnam needed support to maintain its 1.2 million men under arms that are deployed in Kampuchea (170,000), Laos (40,000) and Northern Vietnam in the face of PRC's repeated rhetoric to teach Vietnam a lesson. The Soviets capitalise the Situation by pouring military and economic aids to the extent that Vietnam today falls deeper into Soviet embrace. In return Soviets are given access to base facilities at Cam Rahn Bay and Da Nang. Today the Soviet Pacific Fleet comprising of 720 ships, including 200 combatants and 65 nuclear powered submarines, is free to use Cam Rahn Bay for deployment into the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Additionally the Soviet naval forces are supplemented by some 2,200 land based combat aircraft, including 70 Turboprop Backfires with an operational radius of 3400 miles. The TU 95 Badger reconnaissance aircrafts are also known to be operating out of Cam Rahn Bay had reached 20 to 25 ships daily. Interestingly in April 1984, the Soviets staged amphibious forces landings on Vietnamese coast using Ivan Rogov and Carrier Minsk, while

Soviet reconnaissance aircraft and electronic eavesdropping ships from Vietnam penetrated the Gulf of Thailand to observe the Thai-US Cobra Gold exercise in the later part of the same year.

In the context of Sino-Soviet dispute, Soviet presence in Vietnam ensured the achievement of the former's objective to encircle PRC. In the effort to break out of this encirclement, PRC initiated rapprochement of relations with the Japanese through the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1978. A sort of Sino-Japanese - US entente was seen established. In Southeast Asia, PRC's policy over Kampuchean issue remains in congruence to that of ASEAN. Additionally, PRC pledged assistance to Thailand's defence in the event that Vietnam with Soviet backing launched offensive beyond Kampuchean border. Thailand in return allows its territory to be used as conduit for PRC's military supplies to the Khmer Rouge.

As at today, there is no end in sight over the Kampuchean issue. Present armed struggle is expected to prolong as long as Vietnam continues to obtain Soviet aids, and as long as the Kampuchean resistance forces continue to obtain aids from PRC and other sources. The situation serves the Soviets in terms of maintaining their leverage over Vietnam even to the extent of sacrificing their relation with ASEAN, as well as it serves PRC's policy to "bleed Vietnam white". Both these great powers perhaps prefer the situation to remain this way until such time that the core issues of their disputes are resolved.

US responses to Soviet presence and behaviour in the Pacific have to be gauged from its concern arising over global interest as a whole. Significantly, the Pacific basin has become the region with which the US has carried on plurality of international trade since 1978. In 1982, US trade with

the Pacific exceeded its atlantic counterpart by some \$15 billion. In 1983, Pacific trade accounted for approximately 30% of the total US trade. Concomitantly, US investment in Asia has also grown at a faster rate than investment in other world region. Pacific basin countries currently produce 60% of the world's GNP. For 1984, US exports were valued at \$114 billion. US investment in the Pacific are currently valued at over \$30 billion; Asia now accounts for more than 50% of the US global deficit. Asia is, then of prime importance to US prosperity, and the US Asian policy may in large part be explained by the desire to nurture these economic considerations.

An emphasis on close relations with market-oriented economies in Asia Congenial to American trade and investment and the development of military capabilities to protect sealanes of international commerce appear to be the primary components of Washington Pacific basin policy. The military capabilities required to achieve these ends are primarily air and naval, which in turn necessitate regional base facilities through formal alliances. While most of America's alliance commitments made in the 1950s (namely through US-Japan Mutual Defence Treaty, Philippines-US Bases Agreement, South Korean US Mutual Defence Treaty, ANZUS and US-Thailand within the framework of Manila Pact) remain in force, the nature of these commitments has been somewhat degraded since the end of 1975. In this regard it is highly improbable that the US will commit its ground forces in future Asian conflicts on the Asian mainland, with the exception of the Korean Peninsular which is characterised by uneasy armed truce of over 30 years duration. In essence the 38,000 US troops deployed in Korea are intended merely to serve as a political deterrent or tripwire comparable, say to US forces in Berlin. They constitute a guarantee that the

US would be involved in the early stages of the war on the peninsular of North Korea in the event of an attack.

Equally, ASEAN importance is multifaceted, comprising of economic, strategic and political dimension as well. The ASEAN states constitute precisely the kind of market-oriented, modernising politico-economic systems that the US hopes will characterise most of the Third World. An economically successful ASEAN is seen by Washington as both exemplar of the advantages in following international trade and investment-oriented development policies anti-dote to the failures of more radical autarkical systems such as Vietnam and North Korea. ASEAN as group is the US fifth largest trading partner. In 1985 direct US investment totaled \$4.5 billion, a 48% increase over the level of US investment in 1977.

On strategic dimension, the ASEAN states are situated astride Japan's most important trade route to the Persian Gulf. Accordingly Malaysia sits astride this trade routes the control of which is important to monitor and interdict all movements between Pacific and Indian Oceans. Pursuant to the Guam Doctrine, the US is interested in ASEAN's military growth, in which Malaysia is no exception. US foreign sales and credits to ASEAN are around \$4 billion for the acquisition of American hardware, while US military assistance is around \$300 million. The US also plays a leading role in staging joint exercises, being the dominant third country in the military manoeuvres of ASEAN states. US military assistance has been instrumental in providing Thailand with the fire power, that is the 155 mm howitzers to resist Vietnamese encroachments along the Thai frontier. US approval to supply the Thais with 12 F16 A's at an initial cost of more than \$300 million over a five year period is a manifes-

tation of US commitment to honour its Manila Pact agreement.

In view of the interests above, the US policy over Kampuchean issue seems to be in congruence with that of ASEAN's. Consequently the US was seen by the Soviets as establishing an entente made of PRC, Japan, US and ASEAN. To strengthen its position in Southeast Asia vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the US has to use the resources of its Seventh Fleet, operating from Philippines, Guam, Okinawa and contingently from Australia. Together with the Army and Air Force elements, military deployment in Asia-Pacific Basin are as follows:

Army

- (1) Infantry Division in Korea.
- (2) Infantry Division from Hawaii.

Marines

- (1) 1 Division (Okinawa).
- (2) 31 Air Squadron (Pacific).
 - (a) 2 attack helicopters.
 - (b) 31 Lift helicopters.
 - (c) 8 attack.
 - (d) 7 fighter attacks.
 - (e) 1 photo reconnaissance.

Navy Seventh Fleet

- (1) 7 aircraft carriers.
- (2) 86 surface combatants.
- (3) 31 amphibious ships.
- (4) 38 attack submarines.
- (5) 2 ballistic missile submarines.
- (6) Marine amphibious units.

Navy 75 Air Squadron Comprising Of:

- (1) 21 attack.
- (2) 10 tactical early-warning.
- (3) 7 early warning.
- (4) 14 fighter.
- (5) 13 patrol.
- (6) 2 fleet air reconnaissance.
- (7) 2 fleet logistic support.
- (8) 6 anti-submarine warfare.

Air Force

- (1) 1 strategic bomber wing.
- (2) 1 air reinforcement wing.
- (3) 15 squadrons comprising of:
 - (a) 10 tactical fighter.
 - (b) 2 tactical air support.
 - (c) 2 tactical air lift.

In addition to its own military deployments, the US also has urged Japanese to strengthen its defence force capabilities. Soviet deployments in the Kuriles in the north of Japan and the desire to protect strategic sea lanes have been used by the Nakasone government to inculcate defence consciousness among Japanese public so that increase defence spending becomes acceptable. Even then, Japan's defence policy remains dictated by its economic interest. Japanese attempt at rearmament stirs Southeast Asian concern mainly for emotional and psychological reasons. In this regard Malaysia too expresses similar concerns.

Malaysia as a consequence of its position in the heart of Southeast Asia cannot escape the ripples of these series of movements between great powers. To defend its interest, it develops a series of interlocking bilateral security arrangements with its neighbours to eliminate common enemies, along respective borders. The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) is as a fait accompli that it hopes will constitute a deterrent to potential aggressor. In the context of alliance politics FPDA's link to ANZUS and NATO cannot be dismissed.

The effects of these ripples have caused Malaysian and US leaders to react simultaneously together over security as well as economic matters. Malaysian Prime Minister's visit to the US in which he had talks with President Reagan and Casper Weinberger in February 1985 was a major turn-

ing point. The US seems to have understood Malaysian stand better in the context the latter's handling of international issues. In the words of Malaysia's Prime Minister, the US, as a superpower has at last able to recognise the difference between the "apparent" (which is more of rhetoric) and "real" pursued by Malaysia in its conduct of foreign policy. In terms of the "apparent", Malaysia advocates non-alignment stance while ZOPFAN remains its long term goal. In reality Malaysia as country, that is staunchly anti-communist subscribes to the western form of democracy and market-oriented economies, has to rely to the west support for its survival. The intensification of training activities and joint military exercises with the US is a manifestation of both sides' recognition of the reality of the relationship. The US too seems to recognise Malaysia's concern of US attempt to strengthen PRC's defence capabilities which could be regarded offensive by a small state like Malaysia. Additionally over the Kampuchean issue, the US has taken the necessary steps to strengthen Thailand's defence capabilities vis-a-vis Vietnam to prevent the latter's relationship from being too close to the PRC.

But unfortunately the US remains less sensitive to Malaysia's economic standpoint. In this period of economic recession, Malaysia's economic resilience depends on the price of its commodities of which the US is a major importer. In the second-quarter of 1984 for example, Malaysia's export of commodities to the US totaled \$754.52 million, second only to Japan who imported \$2167.43 million worth of Malaysian commodity products. This was followed by Soviet Union totaling 159.50 million and PRC totaling \$78.75 million. Failure by US to purchase sufficient quantity of these commodity products or on the other hand the US decides to release such products from its stockpile, could result in an economic situation detrimental to Malaysia's interest and subsequently US interest. Malaysia therefore seeks US understanding of this predicament, and hence urges the US to be more receptive to Malaysia's requirement that US continues to purchase Malaysia's commodity products. In this way, the US will be seen as assisting Malaysia to achieve its economic recovery thereby making the country a model to be followed by other Third World countries.


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Jeneral Dato' Seri Hashim Mohd Ali is Chief of Army. He is a graduate of OCS Eaton Hall, RMA Sandhurst, the Staff College at Camberley, and the National Defence College, India. Among his major appointments have been those of the RASCOM command in Sarawak and Brigadier General Staff and Chief of Operations Staff at the Ministry of Defence. The General has had wide contacts with the militaries of several countries.



— KOL K.N. ZAIN

INTRODUCTION

The Malaysian Regiment of Artillery had its humble beginnings in 1957. In the initial years the Regiment was involved in the provision of fire support for land operations against the remnants of the Malayan Communist Party in the closing stages of the First Emergency (1948 – 1960). Though organised and trained on conventional lines, it was soon realised that the Regiment had to operate in an environment and against an enemy that were unusually challenging. In conjunction with other services of the Army, the Regiment fought in support of a national policy of assisting an independent nation to subdue a well organised insurgent organisation and the might of the well trained and regular units of the Indonesian Army during CONFRONTATION. With the fall of Vietnam and the re-emergence of the insurgent threat with renewed vigour, the Regiment though to a large extent overworked and comparatively fewer units, has been able to provide the fire supremacy in the operational areas effectively.

The future for the Regiment is certainly more challenging than the past. While

cognizant that history never repeats itself exactly and that no army ever profited from trying to meet a new challenge in terms of the old one, the Regiment nevertheless stands to benefit immensely from a study of its experience, its shortcomings no less than its achievements. This study should help in developing future operational concepts for the gunners within the South East Asian environment and the relentless war of liberation waged by the outlawed Communist parties both in Peninsular Malaysia and Sarawak.

AIM

The aim of this article is to highlight the impact of Counter-Insurgency Operations and CONFRONTATION on the Malaysian Regiment of Artillery.

SCOPE

The scope of this article will be confined to a brief insight into the environment, the impact on Field Artillery organisations, Fire Support Co-ordination, Field Artillery Weapons, Field Artillery Mobility and the Fire Base.

THE MALAYSIAN ENVIRONMENT

The Malaysian environment more specifically and the South East Asian environment generally possess particular problems that plague all artillery activities. The artillery has to be organised and employed in counter-insurgency to meet requirements as there are no well defined battle areas. During the CONFRONTATION a certain degree of recognizable battle areas were in existant. However, by and large, the entire nation can be considered as an area of operations. The Malaysian terrain is such, that it has become a major concern along with the tactics and techniques of the enemy. The artillery had to adapt to the physical environment. The Malaysian environment — the human challenge as well as the elemental implications determined the employment of artillery in terms of geography and the enemy.

Geographically, Peninsular Malaysia can be divided into two main regions: the central mountainous range and the coastal plains. The mountainous range stretches from the Malaysia/Thai Border to Northern Johore. The peaks are higher in the north and the range is over three hundred miles long. It is thickly forested and offers ideal sanctuaries for the enemy. The coastal plains on either side of the peninsula are cultivated with rubber, palm oil coconut and paddy. Roads and tracks are abound in this region. Mangrove swamps are common especially in the west coast. The palms are well inundated by numerous rivers. In Sarawak, the First and Second Divisions are relatively flat whilst the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Divisions are very mountainous with many major rivers. The area apart from the coastal regions is virtually undeveloped and thickly forested. Sabah has hilly coastal areas with vast plains in the hinterland. Climatically, the whole region is in the Equatorial belt and receives

some of the heaviest rainfall. The Northeast and Southwest monsoons are regular and heavy rainfall is prevalent throughout the year.


The enemy not only operates in the deeper mountainous regions but also in the coastal plains. The enemy has the capability to attack ground forces or the local populace at times and places of his choosing. He is also indistinguishable from the populace and even from some of the irregular paramilitary forces. In the Borneo campaign however, where the enemy faced were regular troops, operating in specific battle zones, the identification problems were minimal. The tactics used by the insurgents emphasized security, silence and speed. The deployment of artillery in operational areas provided the preponderant firepower to the ground forces, thus maintaining the upperhand on the enemy. Positional defence had to be avoided. The insurgents attacked or ambushed even moving columns on roads and their weapon arsenal included light mortars, rockets and grenade launchers. With the Indonesian army, a more sophisticated array of weapons including heavy mortars and guns were faced as the war was fought on rather conventional lines. With this brief backdrop on the geography and the enemy it would now be pertinent to delve deeper into the subject at hand.

THE IMPACT ON FIELD ARTILLERY ORGANISATIONS

Since the enemy largely dictated how the war would be fought, it was necessary for the Malaysian Army to modify established operational doctrine considerably so as to be successful. These modifications had a major impact at all organisational levels. Because of the tactics employed by the enemy, the war is anything but conventional. Military ground operations are

characterized by numerous concurrent widely dispersed operations. To ensure that the maximum area was dominated by available troops, the terrain was divided into area of operations from the highest formation downwards. The size of the Brigade area of Operations and range limitations of the guns prevented the artillery from being employed en mas. Guns had to be deployed in Sections/Troops and sometimes even singly to provide maximum area coverage. The infantry battalion commander and the supporting Battery Commander were jointly responsible for the correct positioning of the guns to adequately cover all the company area of operations. The eight gun battery was difficult to handle when spread over a vast area and a six gun battery organisation had to be introduced. Fire direction could not be centralised at the Regimental level and had to be decentralized at Battery level, when the Battery was forced to occupy two or more positions.

Firing batteries were mostly isolated with their supported battalions. They did not have the freedom of movement which they enjoyed in the conventional battle field. Isolated gun positions deep in the mountainous regions were common sights and they depended for local protection and administrative requirements on the infantry. Radios were the only means of communication and Battery Commanders depended on availability of helicopters to visit their detachments. Since the infantry operated at platoon level, more artillery observers were required. The battery had to produce a minimum of three observers and even the Battery Commander had to do observer work especially as an air op. Small friendly units operating throughout area of operations were difficult to pin point and added to the problems of providing supporting fires to them. Terrain made navigation difficult and errors in map reading was always a possibility.



Infantry Coy and Gun Position – Sarawak.

At the higher level, the Divisional Commander had anything up to three field regiments, and limited medium batteries at his disposal but again mass employment was a problem as the target was fleeting and all too often out of range. The need to have less cumbersome guns arose and this requirement will remain a priority in the Malaysian terrain. Operational control had to be introduced to increase the principle of flexibility. A firing battery, if separated from its parent headquarters, was placed under the operational control of another regiment in the area in which the battery was employed. The battery continued to receive support from its parent regiment but its fire support and movement was controlled by the headquarters under

which it came for operational control. This at times resulted in one regiment from controlling two more batteries and infantry mortars (brigaded) apart from its own three batteries. Since the area of operations was large, the three gun batteries organisation was deemed inadequate and the four gun batteries organisation was introduced. This, though on the one hand increased fire power, was administratively cumbersome and overburdened the already stretched regimental resources.

FIRE SUPPORT CO-ORDINATION

With a large number of troops operating in the area of operations, the artillery, mortar fires had to be cleared for safety of not hitting own troops. Also the terrain demanded heavy use of helicopters for reconnaissance, troop movements, supply, casualty evacuation fire support (gunships), air op etc. Fixed wing transport aircraft was also used for airdrops to remote locations. Fighter bombers were used to destroy enemy in defended jungle positions. All these had to be done without jeopardising the intimate close support for the infantryman for the affiliated artillery and his own mortars. The task of co-ordinating the fire support was vested with the artillery and the fire co-ordinating centres had to be established at various levels. At the Battery level, the battery commander had to establish the Fire co-ordinating centre next to the infantry battalion HQ and had to give the necessary clearance in the area of operations. At the Regimental level, the Commanding Officer had to establish a more elaborate organisation in conjunction with his tactical HQ. This designated the Fire Support Co-ordination Centre and performed valuable task for which the Brigade Commander was grateful to the Artillery. Also since more types of fire support was available to the field commander, (including naval gun fire at times) the Artillery commander had to ensure that the most

appropriate ordinance available arrived at the right targets at a specified time and that all fires delivered complemented each other.

During joint operations (Malaysia/Thai, Malaysia/Indonesia), with Paramilitary forces – PFF, with Australian, British, New Zealand Forces as in CONFRONTATION, the Regiment of Artillery had to provide the fire support and this became an exacting task. Clearance from civil authorities to ensure that no innocent civilians were in the area where fire power was to be used had also to be done and the officers manning the fire co-ordinating centres had to be experienced, dedicated and possessed a sense of urgency. The Battery Commander of HQ Battery was utilised in the role of fire support officer. This was not a satisfactory arrangement as his Battery tasks were neglected. A definite case existed for an increment in the officer establishment of a Regiment. Moreover HQ Battery Commander has been a Captain. As a fire support officer, the rank of Major is a must to ensure experience, maturity and authority. This has since been rectified. Air space usage had to be co-ordinated with the Divisional and Brigade Air Support Officers. The establishing of Free Fire Zone, Restricted Fire Zone and No Fire Zone, was essential in this type of operations and the Fire Support Co-ordination centre was vested with this task. The organisation is now fully functional in the Regiment of Artillery and will remain as the primary co-ordinator of all fire support available in the area of operations.

FIELD ARTILLERY WEAPONS

The field artillery weapons used had to have certain characteristics to suit tactics employed. The guns had to be relatively light with low and high angle firing ability. The 25 pdr gun had to be phased out as it

did not meet the new requirements. In its place, 105 mm Pack Howitzer was introduced. This field gun was an ideal weapon because of its light weight, dependability, high rate of fire, easily transportable, has a lethal shell and a fairly good range. The weapon was widely used especially, in the Borneo campaign and is currently the main artillery piece in the Regiment. The American M102 gun also found itself useful especially with its extra range over the pack howitzer. Both guns had low/silhouette and the $\frac{3}{4}$ ton truck was the prime mover. The M102 had the added advantage of traversing 6,400 mils — a major advantage for the type of operations at hand. In the medium gun range, the British 5.5 inch gun saw useful service during the closing stages of the First Emergency and the Borneo Campaign. Though there is a long felt need for medium guns, the real problem is not the need for a heavier shell, but rather a longer range. This is to obviate the frequent deployment of guns to keep from getting out of range of ground troops on their search and destroy missions. The terrain often does not lend to suitable gun positions and much time and effort has to be expended to the preparation of gun platforms in the deeper jungle areas. More often than not, the helipads have served as platforms in many operations. Aerial rocket artillery has also proved extremely effective in augmenting and extending the range of field guns. Both the Royal Air Force and the Royal Malaysian Air Force have extensively used aerial rocket artillery over enemy targets over the years and the effect has been tremendous.

FIELD ARTILLERY MOBILITY

The importance of mobility in counter insurgency operations and the Borneo campaign cannot be too highly stressed. The operations carried out in Malaysia have been text-book reference to most wars

since then including the Vietnam war. The artillery had to be moved and by all means available — by road, air and water. Where the roads ended, the guns had to be towed over tracks and where no roads and tracks existed, the air effort had to be utilised. Both fixed wing aircraft and helicopters were widely used. For the fixed wing aircrafts, the guns were loaded with their prime movers and such aircrafts as the Herald, Caribou and Hercules C130 were extensively used in long hauls. Within the area of operations, the helicopters took over and these were the real workhorses. The Alouette, the Scout, the Wirlwind, the Wessex, Belvedere and Sikorsky helicopters were the most commonly used. The guns could be carried some in broken down loads internally or externally while the heavier helicopters could lift whole gun together with its detachment and some ammunition. The helicopters provided quick deployment facility and permitted planners to reduce the ratio of friendly to enemy troops. Also the Artillery units could move in convoys with their own vehicles to gun areas especially in Peninsular Malaysia. This was however not possible in most of the areas in Sarawak where the network of road communications was poor. Movement of guns by riverine craft especially in the Third Division of Sarawak (River Rejang) was common. In Sabah especially in the Tawau region, the guns had to be moved by air and seacraft.

The impact of air mobility on the regiment was that various scales for move had to be worked out. These were the normal scale, the light scale and light-light scale. The whole Regiment had to be trained to move by air and individuals were required to know how to rig the gun under a helicopter, prepare vehicles for aircraft/helicopter lifts, move tables, emplaning/deplaning drills etc. Each gun had to have within its schedule of items its own under-

slung equipment and nets. A certain percentage of the personnel had to be trained on air loaders tasks and the officers had to be proficient on air moves. Ammunition resupply was also by air and this meant storage and maintenance problems. The hot/wet climate had its effect also on the dial sights, binoculars, compasses and the like. The replacement/repair of items was again dependent of the air effort which was readily available in most cases.

THE FIRE BASE

Infantry commanders fully appreciated the value of field artillery support. When planning their operations, they worked closely with their supporting artillery commanders to ensure that the plans could be fully supported by the artillery. If plans required sub units to operate on a sidely dispersed basis and these could not be supported by their direct support artillery, additional artillery was requested and was made available. If additional artillery was

not available, the direct support batteries were split to occupy several gun positions, thereby increasing area coverage even though the fire power was reduced. Once field artillery was positioned to provide supporting fire, it was extremely vulnerable to the enemy, who could attack from any direction. Firing batteries had neither the personnel nor the expertise to defend their positions against determined enemy attacks. Accordingly, infantry units provided the defensive troops. This position which was jointly occupied by supporting artillery and defending infantry was referred as a fire base or fire support base and were a common sight in the operational areas throughout the country. From this fire base, the artillery fire unit could shoot in any direction to its maximum range and would provide immediate fire support to ground troops operating under its protective umbrella. The fire bases were jointly selected to ensure overlap and to provide indirect fire in defence of the fire base. The gun pits were well fortified to



Fire Base - A typical gun position.

withstand direct fire rocket attacks and the crew and ammunition had underground shelters.

To enhance the defence of the fire base, the infantry established a tight perimeter using barbed wire, claymore mines, trip flares and panji pits etc. The infantry defended the fire base with their rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers and mortars. They also did intensive and aggressive patrolling around the fire base to frustrate the enemy attempting to assault the base. In many instances a forward operational base was also established to mount specific operations of a shorter duration. The enemy usually tried to come within three to four hundred meters and used their light mortars to launch a few bombs at the fire support base. These attacks were quickly repulsed by counter motor fires executed with great speed. The fire base has proved its worth and is still currently used by the Regiment. It can be quickly constructed (common materials being sandbags, ammunition boxes, heavy timber corrugated zinc sheets roofing etc) to withstand determined assaults that an insurgent enemy could bring against it and it permitted the field artillery to provide the fire support of the same high quality as in a conventional war.

LESSONS AND PROSPECTS

Whilst the Regiment of Artillery recog-

nizes the need to train and employ its fire power on conventional lines (because even in an insurgency war, the enemy in the final stages has to come in large conventional formations to destroy our forces), the impact made by the First Emergency, the CONFRONTATION and the present low intensity insurgent activities on the Regiment of Artillery have been tremendous. Many lessons have been learnt. The more noteworthy ones being target acquisition and survey problems. These two needed an indepth study and the procurement of suitable equipment and expertise. Organisational changes appear to merit attention especially when the enemy and tactics employed may remain predominantly of the form as seen in Vietnam. Fire support co-ordination has been recognized as a task that will essentially remain with the artillery arm. A high density of aircraft on the modern battlefield can be expected and the air space usage has to be carefully co-ordinated. The need for longer range guns to offset frequent deployments, provide mass fires and increased area coverage is evident. All these have to be achieved without loss of mobility. The fire base concept has proved its worth and will remain as a permanent requirement in the Malaysian environment. Finally, it can be said that inspite of the many odds the Regiment of Artillery has performed admirably throughout the period discussed. It has certainly contributed significantly to the success of the Army's mission.



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OPERASI POLIS TENTERA

Mejar Ibrahim Hashim

(Jabatanarah Polis Tentera Malaysia)

PENDAHULUAN

Kor Polis Tentera mempunyai satu peranan yang teristimewa di dalam mana-mana Angkatan Tentera yang moden. Semasa aman, semua Pasukan Tempor berlatih dengan keras untuk berperang, Polis Tentera juga tidaklah terlepas dari tanggungjawabnya tetapi jauh berlainan. Mereka menguatkuasakan undang-undang dan peraturan-peraturan di kalangan masyarakat tentera. Tanggungjawab mereka meliputi berbagai tugas, dari tugas penyiasatan dan mencegah jenayah, hinggalah kepada tugas-tugas seperti mengiringi orang-orang kenamaan, keselamatan jalanraya, dan bermacam-macam lagi. Seorang anggota Polis Tentera, sama ada anggota lelaki atau wanita dikehendaki boleh menyesuaikan diri di dalam semua keadaan, oleh yang demikian, mereka mestilah mengetahui tugas-tugas yang bakal dilaksanakan. Pada keseluruhannya, mereka mestilah mampu bertindak cepat dengan tepat di dalam keadaan-keadaan di luar dugaan.

Semasa perang pula, semua pasukan Tempor menggunakan kemahiran atau kepakaran mereka yang telah mereka per-

olehi semasa aman. Di masa ini kemampuan Polis Tentera adalah diuji. Yang paling utama sekali, Kor Polis Tentera akan melaksanakan tugas mengawal lalulintas di jalanraya dari pengkalan-pengkalan di barisan belakang, hinggalah ke tempat lepasan 'release point'. Sesungguhnya, tugas seperti ini amatlah memerlukan daya inisiatif, ketahanan, dan kesabaran. Selain daripada itu, semasa perang juga, tugas-tugas kepolisian adalah memainkan peranan yang sama pentingnya dengan tugas kawalan lalulintas untuk menyelenggarakan semangat 'morale' dan kemampuan ber tempor bagi pasukan-pasukan Tempor di barisan hadapan.

Keperluan-keperluan seperti mengadakan rondaan tatatertib mestilah dilaksanakan bagi menentukan taraf tatatertib yang memuaskan di sebilang masa. Di antara fungsi Polis Tentera semasa itu untuk membantu Pasukan-Pasukan Tempor yang berada di Medan pertempuran adalah seperti berikut:

Mengawal lalulintas:

- Mengimplementasi perintah pergerakan yang telah ditetapkan oleh Staff.

- Merancang, menanda dan mengawal jalan-jalan yang berkenaan.
- Memilih jalan lencong dan mengarahkan lalulintas ke jalan berkenaan semasa berlakunya serangan udara.
- Menentukan keselamatan peralatan.
- Tugas-tugas khas di pelabuhan atau di lapangan terbang.
- Mengiringi orang-orang kenamaan.
- Tugas-tugas kepolisian seperti mengawal pos keciciran perang, mencegah kecurian 'anti-looting' dan sebagainya.

Mengikut sejarah ketenteraan, Operasi Polis Tentera telah mula dilaksanakan sejak perang dunia yang pertama dan kedua dahulu di mana di negara-negara Eropah Polis Tentera telah dari masa ke semasa mengubahsuaikan tatacara operasi mereka mengikut keperluan keadaan untuk meningkatkan lagi keberkesanan mereka. Di negara kita Malaysia, pada bulan Jan 1984, Marsyal Polis Tentera¹ sekarang telah menyedari akan kepentingan operasi Polis Tentera. Dengan berpanduan kepada statistik, menyedari akan kelemahan Polis Tentera, beliau telah mengkaji jenis-jenis kesalahan jenayah dan perbuatan-perbuatan melanggar tata tertib am yang biasa dilakukan oleh anggota-anggota ATM kita. Setelah mengubahsuai doktrin Polis Tentera, pada mulanya beliau telah memperkenalkan dua operasi iaitu OP SERKAP dan OP MEMPEDU. OP SERKAP ialah operasi khas untuk menangkap anggota-anggota ATM yang telah meninggalkan tugas dan yang telah tidak hadir tanpa cuti (THTC). OP MEMPEDU pula ialah operasi khas terhadap anggota-anggota ATM yang terlibat dengan kegiatan menyalahgunakan dadah.


Setelah mendapati kedua-dua operasi tersebut berjalan lancar dua bulan selepas-

nya, iaitu dalam bulan Mac 1984, Provo Marsyal telah memperkenalkan 7 jenis operasi lagi. Operasi-operasi yang dimaksudkan adalah seperti berikut:

- Op Jementah
 - Operasi Khas bagi kes-kes jenayah.
- Op NYATUH
 - Operasi Khas bagi kes-kes menipu, menyalahgunakan catuan dan peralatan ATM.
- Op POLLY
 - Operasi Khas bagi kes-kes mencuri dan menyalahgunakan minyak (POL) ATM.
- Op TERATAI
 - Operasi Khas bagi mencegah pelanggaran tata tertib Am.
- Op PELANGI
 - Operasi Khas bagi mencegah perbuatan maksiat seperti berkhalwat, bersekedudukan, perbuatan/tabi'at luar tabie dan lain-lain kelakuan 'anti sosial'.
- Op MURNI
 - Operasi Khas bagi mengesan dan menangkap mereka yang terlibat di dalam ajaran sesat fanatik dan kepercayaan songsang.
- Op TUGAT
 - Operasi Khas bagi menentukan langkah-langkah keselamatan, tata tertib dan tinjauan jalan bagi tugas-tugas istiadat-istiadat resmi seperti mengiringi orang-orang kenamaan dan mengawal penonton semasa Hari Perayaan yang melibatkan ATM.
- Op PENGKES
 - Operasi Khas bagi penghematan penggunaan kenderaan, tata tertib dan keselamatan di jalanraya.

Dari masa ke semasa, tatacara operasi diperbaiki, konsep operasi diubahsuaikan dan akhirnya keberkesanan operasi telah dapat diukur dan dipertingkatkan lagi sehingga sekarang.

lah anggota Polis Tentera hendaklah mampu mengesan, mencegah dan menyiasat kes-kes jenayah dan tatatertib am. Di samping melaksanakan tugas-tugas harian kepolisian, Rejimen-Rejimen Polis



Mesyuarat Pertama Koordinasi Pelancaran Operasi Polis Tentera yang diadakan di Jabatanarah Polis Tentera yang di Pengerusikan oleh Marsyal Polis Tentera Kol Hussin bin Haji Awang Senik.

KONSEP OPERASI

Di dalam tahun lapan puluhan ini, tugas dan tanggungjawab Kor Polis Tentera kian bertambah dan amat mencabar sekali. Oleh yang demikian, segala pelaksanaan tugas hendaklah dirancang secara 'action Orientated'. Di dalam keadaan sekarang, didapati tugas-tugas Polis Tentera yang dijalankan adalah lebih condong kepada peranan Polis Tentera semasa aman. Ini bermakna, keperluan yang timbul sekarang ia-

Tentera dikehendaki melancarkan operasi-operasi Polis Tentera di kawasan tanggungjawab masing-masing secara berasingan atau bersama-sama dengan agensi-agensi penguatkuasaan tentera dan awam mengikut keadaan dan penglibatan kes-kes berkenaan. Berkaitan dengan aspirasi Kor Polis Tentera pula, iaitu "Professionalisma dan Kredibiliti", pelaksanaan operasi Polis Tentera telahpun ditetapkan mengikut keutamaan atau penekanan seperti berikut:

Keutamaan	Yunit Probos	Yunit Pengkalan	CPK
Pertama	Op TERATAI	Op TERATAI	Op MAMPEDU
Ke dua	Op SERKAP	Op PENGKES	Op SERKAP
Ke tiga	Op PENGKES	Op MEMPEDU	Op JEMENTAH
Ke empat	Op MEMPEDU	Op SERKAP	Op PELANGI
Ke lima	Op POLLY	Op NYATOH	Op PELANGI
Ke enam	Op NYATOH	Op POLLY	Op NYATOH
Ke tujuh	Op JEMENTAH	Op JEMENTAH	Op PENGKES
Ke lapan	Op PELANGI	Op PELANGI	Op TERATAI
Ke sembilan	Op MURNI	Op MURNI	Op MURNI
Ke sepuluh	Op TUGAT	Op TUGAT	Op TUGAT

Hasrat Kor Polis Tentera ialah supaya anggota-anggota tentera tidak takut kepada anggota Polis Tentera yang menjalankan tugasnya, tetapi mereka berasa segan atau malu kepada Polis Tentera. Oleh yang demikian, pelaksanaan tugas oleh anggota Polis Tentera hendaklah dengan taraf pro-

fessionalisma yang tinggi dan teliti. Demikianlah, sekiranya diinginkan ianya berkekalan, anggota-anggota Polis Tentera hendaklah sentiasa menjunjung tinggi cogan-kata yang tercatat di lambang Polis Tentera iaitu "Sedia Berkhidmat".



Anggota Polis Tentera dan Polis Tentera Wanita memeriksa kenderaan awam di pintu masuk KEMENTAH.



Anggota Polis Tentera dan Polis Tentera Wanita memeriksa pas pelawat di dalam kawasan KEMENTAH.

PERLAKSANAAN

Ekoran dari tindakan operasi oleh Polis Tentera di sepanjang tahun 1984, maka telah dikenalpasti akan cabaran dan ancaman-ancaman yang membawa kepada kemerosotan tatatertib yang melanda Angkatan Tentera kita. Kejadian-kejadian yang ketara adalah meliputi:

- Penyalahgunaan dan pengedaran dadah.
- Meninggalkan tugas dan tidak hadir tanpa cuti.
- Kemunduran tatatertib am.

Untuk mengawal keadaan tersebut dari menjadi bertambah buruk Kor Polis Tentera telah melancar dan memperkemas lagi operasi-operasinya secara menyeluruh. Selain dari menyelaraskan tindakan-tindakan bersama di kalangan semua yunit Polis Tentera dan agensi-agensi awam, Pemerintah yunit-yunit ATM juga telah dihubungi untuk mendapatkan kerjasama, agar mereka akan memainkan peranan masing-masing dengan lebih giat lagi. Segala tindakan Polis Tentera di dalam operasi-operasi yang telah ditetapkan adalah sejajar dengan keadaan semasa.

OP TERATAI

Dari statistik-statistik kesalahan tata-tertib yang telah dilaporkan adalah didapati biasanya kesalahan yang terbanyak sekali dilakukan oleh anggota ATM. Kesalahan-kesalahan yang dimaksudkan adalah seperti berikut:

- Berambut panjang.
- Memasuki kawasan larangan.
- Berpakaian seragam tidak betul.
- Keluar kem dengan tidak melapor di Balai Pengawal.
- Berpakaian awam dengan tidak berperaturan.
- Tidak memakai pakaian kepala (head gear) semasa di dalam kenderaan.
- Menghisap rokok semasa berjalan kaki atau memandu kenderaan.


Tindakan. Situasi tatatertib ATM tidak mungkin dapat diperbaiki lagi tanpa perhatian dan tindakan tegas oleh pihak tertentu, terutama sekali dari ketua-ketua pasukan, termasuklah ketua-ketua di peringkat bawahan. Usaha dari mereka pasti akan memperbaiki keadaan tatatertib di yunit masing-masing.

Tindakan Polis Tentera. Semua yunit-yunit Polis Tentera telah mengembeling tenaga mengambil tindakan-tindakan berikut:

- Memperhebatkan lagi rondaan berkenderaan dan rondaan berjalan kaki di kawasan-kawasan larangan, stesyen keretapi, stesyen bas dan stesyen teksi.
- Pada masa tertentu rondaan di pusat-pusat membeli belah dan di lain-lain tempat hiburan akan diutamakan.
- Mengintip dan menggelidahkan berek-berek bujang untuk menghindarkan berlakunya perjudian.
- Memperketatkan pemeriksaan anggota dan kenderaan di yunit/Depoh yang dikawal oleh Polis Tentera dan di jalan-jalan raya.
- Menjalankan pemeriksaan mengejut di kawasan-kawasan yang selalu dikunjungi oleh anggota-anggota tentera.

OP SERKAP

Kesalahan tinggal tugas dan tidak hadir tanpa cuti sentiasa berlaku. Semua yunit Polis Tentera telah berusaha untuk mengatasi masalah ini, tetapi kesalahan meninggalkan tugas dan tidak hadir tanpa cuti (THTC) terus berlaku juga. Setelah disemak kembali, 97% daripada mereka yang THTC adalah terdiri daripada pegawai dan anggota LLP yang berumur di antara 18 ke 20 tahun. Mereka masih muda dan tidak



Tugas pemeriksaan kenderaan ATM yang dilaksanakan oleh anggota Polis Tentera.

matang untuk menghadapi cabaran-cabaran kehidupan. Setelah melarikan diri, mereka akan bekerja sebagai buruh kasar, berniaga dan lain-lain kerja sambil untuk menyara kehidupan. Polis Tentera mendapati sukar untuk menangkap mereka kerana mereka berpuak-puak dan menjadi 'protective'. Ada juga di antara mereka yang dilindungi oleh keluarga sendiri atas sebab-sebab tertentu. Mereka senang ditangkap apabila terlibat dengan kegiatan-kegiatan seperti penyalahgunaan dadah, merompak, mencuri, memecah rumah dan bersekedudukan dengan perempuan-perempuan tertentu.

Tindakan. Polis Tentera terpaksa mengambil tindakan positif bagi menentukan kejayaan di dalam operasi ini. Tindakan yang perlu diambil adalah seperti berikut:

- **Rekod THTC.** Mengemaskinikan rekod-rekod dan gambar-gambar anggota-anggota THTC secara menghubungi pasukan, Jabatanarah atau Markas Formasi yang berkenaan.
- **Tim Operasi.** Tim Operasi akan memperhebatkan lagi tindakan penangkapan mereka tanpa mengira tempat dan masa. Anggota Detektif akan membuat tinjauan awal. Meminta bantuan dari Polis Awam atau Ketua Rukun Tetangga bagi sesuatu kawasan untuk melicinkan tugas penangkapan.
- **Pemeriksaan.** Memeriksa nama-nama anggota THTC di pejabat Pendaftaran Kad Pengenalan di peringkat negeri. Memeriksa nama-nama anggota THTC di Balai Polis di kawasan tanggungjawab untuk memastikan yang mereka tidak memiliki Kad Pengenalan awam sementara.
- **Meminta Bantuan Dari Pasukan.** Tim Operasi akan menghubungi pasukan untuk mengetahui perkara-perkara seperti berikut:

- Alamat waris yang terakhir atau saudara mara yang paling rapat sekali.
- Sebab-sebab THTC.

OP PENGKES

Keadaan sekarang. Statistik kemalangan jalanraya dan kesalahan tatatertib di jalanraya yang diselenggarakan di Jabatanarah Polis Tentera ada menunjukkan iaitu jumlah laporan kesalahan tatatertib didapati telah tidak seimbang dengan jumlah kemalangan jalanraya yang telah berlaku. Data itu telah jelas membuktikan bahawa mutu tatatertib memandu tidak boleh dijadikan ukuran kecakapan memandu. Keadaan itu telah berlaku mungkin disebabkan oleh:

- Ada pemandu yang mempunyai sikap negatif dan tidak bertanggungjawab kerana mungkin mereka berpendapat bahawa kenderaan yang dipandu bukanlah hak miliknya sendiri.
- Terdapat sebilangan kecil pemandu yang terlibat dengan penyalahgunaan dadah dan juga terlibat dengan kegiatan menjual minyak.
- Ada pemandu yang tidak mempunyai perasaan tanggungjawab atau megah dengan penugasannya.
- Kurangnya pengawasan oleh ketua-ketua terutama sekali semasa 'First parade and last parade tasks'.
- Ramai daripada mereka adalah pemandu yang masih muda dan kurang mempunyai pengalaman memandu.

Tindakan Polis Tentera. Untuk menentukan keberkesanan Op PENGKES, yunit-yunit Polis Tentera telah diarah mempergiatkan lagi tindakan-tindakan berikut:

- Mengadakan perangkap lari laju bersama-sama dengan Polis DiRaja Malaysia Cawangan Trafik di lebuhraya-lebuhraya dan di kawasan-kawasan di mana had laju telah ditetapkan.

- Menjalankan pemeriksaan rapi terhadap kenderaan-kenderaan yang dipandu keluar dari kawasan kem.

- Mengujudkan organisasi kawasan lalu-lintas bagi sesuatu pergerakan yang besar.

- Mengadakan kawalan lalulintas di Majlis-Majlis tentera.

- Membuat aduan Polis Tentera terhadap kesalahan-kesalahan kecil tatatertib di jalanraya seperti:

- Tidak membawa lesen memandu dan dokumen kenderaan.
- Tidak mematuhi Perintah Tetap Pasukan.
- Tidak mematuhi undang-undang jalanraya.
- Merokok semasa memandu.
- Membawa penumpang tanpa kebenaran yang sah.
- Muatan yang berlebihan.

OP JEMENTAH

Keadaan Sekarang. Kes-Kes jenayah didapati masih terus berlaku di dalam ATM. Walau bagaimanapun, ianya masih boleh dikawal. Mengikut statistik jenayah yang diselenggarakan di Jabatanarah Polis Tentera, adalah didapati 25% daripada kes-kes yang disiasat, adalah merupakan kes-kes seperti memecah rumah, mencuri dan mencebong, manakala 25% daripadanya adalah

merupakan kes-kes seperti menyamar diri, menipu dan melarikan diri. Kes-kes seperti ini sangatlah mengecewakan kerana sangat bertentangan dengan tatasusila ketenteraan.

Tindakan Polis Tentera. Setelah mengkaji keperluan masa kini, bagi meningkatkan lagi keberkesanan Op JEMENTAH, tindakan-tindakan berikut telah dipergiatkan.

- Penyelenggaraan rekod tatatertib sentiasa dikemaskini supaya maklumat yang terperinci dapat diteliti untuk membuat 'assessment' terhadap 'Modus operandi' penjenayah berkenaan.
- Sentiasa mengadakan rondaan mengejut di tempat-tempat tertentu di kawasan tanggungjawab untuk mencegah berlakunya jenayah.
- Membuat intipan, menjejak dan mengesan sebarang perbuatan jenayah yang berlaku.
- Mengenalpasti punca-punca dan unsur-unsur jenayah mengikut kawasan dan tempat kejadian.
- Menjalankan penyiasatan dengan teliti terhadap sebarang kes yang dilaporkan.
- Supaya lebih berwaspada dan bersiap sedia menghadapi ancaman-ancaman berikut:
 - Social crime.
 - Moral crime.
 - Commercial crime.

OP MEMPEDU

Keadaan sekarang. Disegi statistik, sebanyak 242 kes penyalahgunaan dan pengedaran dadah melibatkan 730 anggota telah ditangkap oleh Cawangan Penyiasatan Khas di sepanjang tahun 1985. Dipercayai



Tugas meronda di stesyen keretapi Kuala Lumpur.

bekalan dadah semakin hari semakin berkurangan. Salah satu strategi yang penting untuk membentaras penagihan dadah ialah memotongkan pengaliran dadah. Melalui soalsiasat, anggota-anggota penagih dadah didapati telah menggunakan bahan alternatif apabila keadaan memaksa mereka berbuat demikian. Mereka-mereka telah bertindak seperti berikut:

- Meminum minuman keras serta menelan pil seperti Roche 10.
- Menelan pil seperti panadol bersama-sama minuman jenis coca-cola secara berlebihan.
- Meminum ubat batuk jenis likat yang mengandungi 'phansady'.
- Menghidu gam.

Tindakan Polis Tentera. Di antara tindakan yang telah diambil bagi meningkatkan lagi keberkesanan Op MEMPEDU ialah:

- **Ujian Air Kencing.** Dijalankan secara individu oleh Sel Cerakinan Khas dengan menggunakan EMIT mesin terhadap anggota yang ditangkap kerana disyaki sebagai penagih atau pengedar dadah.
- **Pencegahan Kemasukan.** Menasihatkan pasukan-pasukan melalui Markas-Markas Formasi supaya mengharamkan kemasukan ke dalam kem anggota-anggota ATM yang telah diberhentikan kerana terlibat dengan penyalahgunaan dadah.
- **Memotong Pengaliran dan Bekalan Dadah.** Ini dilaksanakan secara:
 - Membuat observasi di tempat-tempat yang disyaki dadah ada dijual.
 - Melancarkan projek-projek khas untuk memberkas pengedar dan penagih dadah di dalam ATM.
- **Mengenal Pasti.** Tindakan mengenal

pasti pengedar dan penagih dilakukan secara berikut:

- Mengumpulkan maklumat daripada sumber-sumber tertentu termasuklah dari Cawangan Anti Dadah.
- Mendapatkan nama-nama penagih daripada mereka yang telah ditangkap melalui soalsiasat.
- Melalui ujian air kencing.
- Pengakuan sukarela.

OP PELANGI

Keadaan sekarang. Operasi Khas ini adalah terhadap kegiatan maksiat yang meliputi berkhawat, bersekedudukan, berzina, menayang video lucah, mencabul kehormatan, merogol dan lesbianism. Dari segi statistiknya kesalahan yang terbanyak sekali dilakukan ialah mencabul kehormatan, berkhawat dan perhubungan sulit. Hasil dari penyiasatan, adalah didapati punca-punca kejadian maksiat tersebut adalah atas sebab-sebab berikut:

- Anggota-anggota yang beragama Islam yang terlibat di dalam kes tersebut mempunyai pengetahuan agama yang cetek, walaupun berpengetahuan agama, tetapi tidak bertakwa.
- Di pengaruhi oleh filem lucah.
- Mengamalkan pergaulan yang bebas dengan tidak mempunyai batasan.
- Suasana sosial yang dipengaruhi oleh Kebudayaan Barat yang berunsurkan hiburan, material dan kemewahan.

Tindakan Polis Tentera. Untuk mengurangkan perbuatan maksiat dan menentukan keberkesanan Op PELANGI, tindakan-tindakan berikut hendaklah diambil:

- Mempergiatkan tugas-tugas tinjauan oleh anggota-anggota detektif untuk menangkap mereka yang terlibat dengan perbuatan maksiat.
- Merapatkan lagi hubungan baik di antara Pegawai-Pegawai Agama baha-gian pencegah maksiat dan ketua-ketua kampung.
- Menjalankan pemeriksaan mengejut di berek-berek bersama-sama dengan Pegawai Bertugas Pasukan.
- Membuat pemerhatian ke atas anggota-anggota di pasukan tertentu mengenai pergaulan mereka dan kegiatan menayang filem lucah secara sulit.
- Memberi sokongan terhadap kuliah-kuliah agama supaya lebih ramai lagi anggota-anggota bersifat takwa.

OP NYATUH

Keadaan Sekarang. Operasi Khas ini diadakan adalah untuk menentukan tidak ada penipuan atau penyalahgunaan catuan-catuan ransum ATM di depoh-depoh, pasukan-pasukan dan pelatun-pelatun bekalan. Di sepanjang tahun 1985, sebanyak 18 kes telah disiasat. Hasil dari penyiasatan, beberapa kelemahan telah terbongkar. Op NYATUH perlu dipergiatkan lagi. Di antara kelemahan-kelemahan yang dimaksudkan adalah seperti berikut:

- Kurangnya pengawasan oleh Kuarter-master atau pihak atasan terhadap para anggota yang bertugas di tempat-tempat tertentu seperti Depoh, Setor Catuan, Rumah Masak dan Balai Pengawal.
- Ada kalanya unit memohon catuan yang berlebihan dari kekuatan anggota sebenar.

- Sengaja mengurangkan masakan pada hari Sabtu, hari kelepasan am dan semasa para perajurit keluar kem. Apabila ini berlaku maka catuan yang berlebihan akan diambil oleh orang yang menunggu kesempatan.
- Tidak memasukkan semula bekalan dan peralatan yang berlebihan ke dalam leher setelah diarah oleh pihak berkuasa.
- Pegawai Bertugas Pasukan atau anggota yang dipertanggungjawabkan untuk pemeriksaan bekalan pada setiap hari telah tidak menjalankan tugas-tugas mereka seperti yang dikehendaki.
- Para anggota yang bertanggungjawab ke atas keselamatan bekalan berkenaan didapati tidak beramanah dan terlibat di dalam penipuan atau rasuah.
- Anggota LLP di pasukan kurang memahami tentang perkara ini dan tidak tahu mengapa ianya patut dihapuskan.

Tindakan Polis Tentera. Berdasarkan kepada kelemahan-kelemahan di atas, keberkesanan Op NYATUH telah dapat dipertingkatkan lagi secara tindakan-tindakan seperti berikut:

- Menugaskan anggota-anggota detektif untuk mencari maklumat-maklumat mengenai penyelewengan.
- Mengumpulkan maklumat dan merancang masa yang sesuai untuk melaksanakan serang hendap ke atas mereka yang terlibat.
- Menyiasat dengan teliti semua kes-kes yang dilaporkan atau atas sesuatu penangkapan.

Memberi khidmat nasihat kepada ketua-ketua pasukan disegi pencegahan dari

merebaknya perbuatan jenayah yang sedemikian secara berikut:

- Pegawai-pegawai dilatih memeriksa setor dengan cara yang berperaturan.
- Menentukan arahan memasukkan semula bahan catuan yang berlebihan ke dalam setor dan membuat catatannya di dalam leher.
- Mempertingkatkan lagi keselamatan semasa penerimaan bahan-bahan bekalan.
- Menasihatkan pasukan supaya mengambil tindakan keras ke atas perkara ini.

OP POLLY

Kedadaan Sekarang. Di dalam operasi ini Polis Tentera akan memberi tekanan khas ke atas stesyen-stesyen minyak ATM, stesyen-stesyen minyak awam yang membekalkan minyak kepada pasukan-pasukan tentera dan tempat-tempat tertentu di mana dipercayai segala penyelewengan kerap kali berlaku. Mengikut statistik di Jabatanarah Polis Tentera, sebanyak 40 kes telah disiasat di sepanjang tahun 1985.

Tindakan Polis Tentera. Hasil dari penyiasatan yang telah dilaksanakan beberapa kelemahan pentadbiran telah didedahkan. Pihak Polis Tentera pula telah membuat kajian sendiri dan mengambil tindakan seperti berikut bagi meningkatkan lagi keberkesanan Op POLLY.

- Menugaskan anggota-anggota detektif untuk mencari maklumat-maklumat mengenai penyelewengan minyak ATM.
- Merancang serang hendap ke atas anggota-anggota tertentu yang dimaklumkan telah kerap kali terlibat di dalam penyelewengan minyak ATM.



Anggota-anggota Dari Cawangan Penylasatan Khas Kor Polis Tentera sedang membuat serbuan ke atas anggota-anggota tentera yang menjual minyak petrol ATM secara haram,

- Memberi khidmat nasihat kepada pasukan-pasukan seperti berikut:
- Yunit-yunit hendaklah mengawasi dengan lebih rapi ke atas anggota-anggota yang telah diamanahkan memandu kenderaan dan yang menjaga setor minyak.
- Pemeriksaan mengejut hendaklah dijalankan oleh pegawai-pegawai yang bertanggungjawab ke atas setor PMP.
- Pegawai-pegawai dan PTT Kanan hendaklah dinasihatkan tentang perlunya bersikap tegas, selalu menegur dan jangan dibiarkan mereka dipengaruhi oleh perasaan 'obligated'.
- 'Dip Check' mestilah sentiasa dilakukan dan BAT J 7 diperiksa setiap hari oleh Pegawai Angkut Bermoto.

- Pembekalan POL oleh kontraktor tidak boleh dibenarkan di antara jam 1830 hingga jam 0630, melainkan semasa dharurat.

OP TUGAT

Arahan mengenai penugasan Polis Tentera di majlis-majlis istiadat resmi tentera telahpun dikeluarkan melalui Perintah Am Tentera Darat keluaran No 2 Bilangan 43/83. Walau bagaimanapun, ada ketikanya terdapat percanggahan di antara arahan tersebut dengan arahan-arahan tempatan yang dikeluarkan oleh Markas Formasi berkenaan. Di dalam keadaan demikian, adalah diserahkan kepada budibicara Komander tempatan berkenaan membuat 'option' tindakan setelah dinasihatkan oleh Pegawai Memerintah atau Ketua Kompeni Polis Tentera yang berkenaan. Apa yang ditekankan ialah tatacara pengendalian tugas-tugas tersebut oleh anggota Polis Tentera. Disebabkan ianya dilakukan di khalayak

ramai, pengendaliannya mestilah menunjukkan kecekapan dengan 'turn out' yang terbaik sekali.

OP MURNI

Dewasa ini di negara kita terdapat beberapa ajaran agama Islam yang telah sesat atau menyeleweng. Anggota-anggota tentera juga tidak terlepas dari ajaran sesat seperti itu. Polis Tentera juga telah bertindak untuk mencegah dari merebaknya ajaran sesat di kalangan anggota-anggota tentera. Tindakan-tindakan seperti berikut telah diambil:

- Dengan menggunakan anggota-anggota detektif yang dibimbingi oleh guru-guru agama pasukan untuk mencari maklumat mengenai penglibatan anggota-anggota tentera di dalam ajaran sesat.
- Berhubung rapat dengan Jabatan Agama tempatan sebelum mengambil tindakan menangkap mereka yang terlibat.
- Memberi amaran kepada Pemerintah-Pemerintah Pasukan tentang adanya pengikut-pengikut ajaran sesat di pasukan-pasukan yang berkenaan supaya tindakan balas dari awal lagi dapat diambil oleh pasukan sendiri.

RUMUSAN

Operasi Polis Tentera seperti yang dijelaskan di atas tiada lain dari satu sistem perlaksanaan bagi mengatasi sesuatu kelemahan tata tertib yang perlu diperbaiki. Di dalam konteks ini, keperluannya telah timbul sejak Angkatan Tentera diwujudkan. Di segi sejarah, sekiranya kita meninjau kembali kepada 'Articles Of War Charles I' maka kita akan dapati bahawa Kor Polis Tentera amat memerlukan kelengkapan asas seperti kenderaan dan anggota-anggota yang berkebolehan untuk melaksanakan segala tanggungjawab yang telah diamanahkan. Selain dari itu, Kor Polis Tentera juga

amatlah memerlukan sokongan kuat dari pihak-pihak berkuasa atasan supaya anggota-anggota tentera sedar akan kepentingan peranan Polis Tentera dan akan patuh kepadanya, kerana Polis Tentera adalah ditugaskan khas untuk menguatkuasakan segala perintah dan peraturan yang telah ditetapkan di dalam Angkatan Tentera. Anggota-anggota tentera juga perlu tahu yang mereka adalah dikehendaki menghormati anggota Polis Tentera yang telah diamanahkan dengan tanggungjawab yang rumit itu. Sekiranya keadaan ini tidak ujud, maka Angkatan Tentera akan bertukar menjadi lemah dan bertambah lemah dari semasa ke semasa. Jenis tugas Polis Tentera seperti yang dijelaskan di dalam artikel ini, adalah memerlukan Polis Tentera mestilah sentiasa bergerak membuat tugas rondaan dari satu tempat ke satu tempat lain di mana adanya anggota tentera dan akan menentukan yang mereka tidak akan melanggar undang-undang atau menimbulkan kekacauan.

Dengan adanya operasi-operasi Polis Tentera seperti yang diperkenalkan, adalah diperhatikan bukan sahaja taraf profesionalisma sebahagian besar daripada anggota-anggota Polis Tentera didapati telah kian meningkat sejajar, atau yang lebih penting dari itu ialah, kejadian kemerosotan tata tertib telah dapat dibendung dengan jayanya bagi mengekalkan kekuatan Angkatan Tentera kita sekarang. Selaras dengan apa yang telah diperkatakan oleh Jeneral Napoleon Bonaparte dari Negara Perancis lebih kurang 15 dekad yang lalu, yang berbunyi, "We cannot have a strong Army without a good Police Force within it," maka amatlah jelas dan adalah diharapkan agar semua peringkat anggota ATM kita akan dapat memberikan sokongan dan bantuan yang ikhlas kepada Kor Polis Tentera dan demikianlah diharapkan semoga Angkatan Tentera kita akan menjadi lebih kuat dan akan dapat mengekalkan kekuatannya itu.

"The Provost must have a horse allowed him, and some soldiers to attend him, and all the rest commanded to obey him, or else the Service will suffer; for he is but one man must correct many, and therefore he cannot be beloved. And he must be riding from one Garrison to another to see that the soldiers do not outrage nor scathe about the country".

(Articles of war – Charles I)

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Meji Ibrahim B Hashim telah ditauliahkan ke dalam Kor Polis Tentera pada tahun 1972. Beliau telah mengendalikan pelbagai tugas-tugas Staf dan Pemerintah di dalam Kor Polis Tentera. Beliau juga telah menjawat jawatan PS 2 Tatatertib DTD – Tadbir. Kini beliau sedang menghadiri kursus Diploma In Law di Institut Teknologi Mara (ITM) Kuala Lumpur.

WORLD WAR II



SECRET AGENT INFILTRATIONS FOR THE LIBERATION OF MALAYA

— KOL AROS MOHD OSMAN

INTRODUCTION

The Japanese invasion force of 120,000 men⁽¹⁾ took only two months to capture Singapore and Malaya from the time they first landed on the shores of Kelantan in December 1941. The Allied forces numbering 100,000 men were shocked in disbelief at this phenomenon. To British tactical appreciation, it was inconceivable that the Japanese would venture into choosing the Malayan jungle as their approach to Singapore; the British expected them to come via the South China Sea and over the Malayan air space (see Fig. 1).

The British concentration of defence

was on Singapore,⁽²⁾ not Malaya, because to them, Singapore was their vital ground, which if lost to the Japanese, would not only result in the loss of the peninsula but also the loss of their political and economic interests in South East Asia. But in February 1942, the Japanese Imperial flag was securely hoisted and flown in Singapore. The island was already lost to the Japanese.

The liberation of Malaya and Singapore was, therefore, subsequently, planned by the British. Operating from India and Ceylon under the guise of "Force 136", they launched several operations by sea and





Fig. 1: The Japanese Invasion

air to infiltrate secret agents whose tasks were to organise resistance groups and subsequently harrass and attack the Japanese forces in the occupied territory to weaken them prior to the landing of the Allied liberation forces in an operation code-named "Op Zipper". This operation was

planned to be an unopposed landing on the west coast of Malaya between Morib and Port Dickson (see Fig. 2). The aim of this article is to highlight the seaborne and airborne operations in which secret agents were infiltrated into Malaya by Force 136 during World War II.



FORCE 136: ORGANIZATION AND ROLES

During World War II, the British created an organization called "Special Operation Executive" (SOE) under the aegis of the "Ministry of Economic Affairs", an intelligence service fiction.⁽³⁾ The SOE was created to:⁽⁴⁾

- investigate the possibility of attacking enemy targets by means other than the use of military force.
- train agents to operate behind enemy lines.
- sabotage the enemy, gather intelligence and organise resistance groups.

The SOE India mission was established in September 1941 with its headquarters at Meerut, India. It was responsible for Burma, Thailand, China, Indo-China, Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia. The SOE India mission was later renamed as "Force 136" in 1944 and the headquarters moved to New Delhi temporarily, later to Kandy, Ceylon (Sri Lanka). The area of responsibility was subdivided into three areas i.e. A, B and C. Area A covered Burma and Thailand and was the responsibility of Force 136(A); area B included Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia and was the responsibility of Force 136(B), area C included China and Indo-China and was the responsibility of Force 136(C). At about the same time as when the headquarters of Force 136 moved to Kandy, Sri Lanka, the headquarters of South East Asia Command (SEAC) was also established in Colombo, Ceylon. This facilitated communications between personnel of SEAC and Force 136.

The first Commander of Force 136(B)

was Col. C.J.P. Hudson. Force 136(B) was divided into "country sections", viz, Malaya country section and First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY). The first leader for Malaya Country Section was Basil Goodfellow who was later replaced by Innes Tremlett.

Force 136(B) was given the following tasks:⁽⁵⁾

- To form and train resistance groups and prepare them for supporting tasks in Op Zipper.
- To establish contact with local resistance groups and set up wireless telegraphic (W/T) transmission stations and establish base camps.
- To subvert and sabotage the enemy, spread propaganda among the population and supply arms, ammunition, food and money to local resistance groups.

The Country Section was further divided into smaller areas. A number of British officers were designated to each area. These officers were called Group Liaison Officers (GLO) and were normally holding the rank of Lt Col. with the deputy as Majors. For instance, Lt Col. Peter Dobree was the GLO for the Askar Melayu Setia in Ulu Perak while his deputy was Major J.M. Clifford. In Pahang the GLO for the Wataniah Group was Lt Col. J.D. Richardson. Every other group had its own GLO. These GLOs acted under the direct command of headquarters Force 136 in Sri Lanka. Among the earliest to lead Force 136(B) Malaya Country Section were Richard Broome, John Davis and later Tengku Mahmud Mahyuddin who was nominated to lead the Malay group. John Davis was an

ex-police officer in Malaya while Richard Broome was an ex-Malayan Civil Service officer. Both of them were ex-trainers of the STS in Singapore. Before Singapore fell to the Japanese both of them succeeded in escaping to Sumatra in a small boat named "Hin Lee". From Sumatra, they sailed in a 30-ton sailing boat named 'Sederhana Djohannis' to Sri Lanka. It took them 42 days to arrive.



Lt Col P.J.G. Dobree.

Tengku Mahmud Mahyuddin was the Crown Prince of Patani (Southern Provinces of Thailand). He was the second son of Sultan Abdul Kadir, who was the last Malay Sultan of Patani. At the time of the Japanese invasion, he was residing in Kota Bahru, Kelantan, and worked as Inspector of Schools for the state. He had earlier joined the Kelantan Volunteer Force and withdrew with the British to Singapore after the Japanese had landed in Malaya. Later he escaped to India in a ship named "S.S. Kuala". Unfortunately the ship was bombed by the Japanese and sank. However, Tengku Mahmud Mahyuddin succeeded in drifting to Sumatra on a piece of plank. From Sumatra he went to India where he worked in the propaganda and

recruitment division of the Ministry of Information at New Delhi. He was assigned to All-India Radio. In 1943 and 1944, he was active in many places in India as well as outside India such as Cairo, Mecca, Rejaz and London for the purposes of recruiting Malay youths into Force 136(B).⁽⁶⁾ Apart from volunteers from outside India, there was also a number of ex-servicemen (who had served the British navy and the British Volunteer forces) in Force 136(B).

As soon as they were recruited, members of Force 136 were trained in physical training, commando training, sabotage training, weapon training, drill, map-reading, seamanship and para training. Training was carried out in Bombay, Poonah, Jubbulpore, Madras, Jessore, Trincomalee, Rawalpindi, Banggala, Colombo, Calcutta and also at the foot of the Himalayas. The trainees were divided into small groups and separate training was given to them at different places for security reasons.

The aim of this training was to prepare for Op Zipper. Before the operation was launched the plan was for Force 136(B) to send the GLO's and their groups (which were already trained) to establish guerilla forces in Malaya for the purposes of ambushing, demolishing bridges, destroying communications equipment and to sabotage the Japanese forces. This meant that time was needed in order to send the members of Force 136(B) to organise the resistant movement and also to organise the guerilla forces in Malaya. It was planned such that the members of Force 136(B) should comprise the three major races in Malaya i.e. the Malays, Chinese and Indians.

SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

From May 1943, Force 136 entered a

new era. From then on until March 1944 a series of submarine operations was launched (see Fig. 3). The main mission of these operations was to establish communications between South East Asia Command and Force 136(B) groups. Secondly it was aimed at procuring information regarding Spencer Chapman (writer of the best seller "The Jungle is Neutral") and Pat Noone, two British officers who were believed to be still alive and operating in the jungles of Malaya.

In the beginning Force 136(B) was supported by the Chinese; a well known member was Lim Bo Seng who was said to have been recruiting volunteers from Chung King, China, as intelligence personnel for Force 136. Force 136 also obtained support from Tengku Mahmud Mahyuddin who was extremely successful in recruiting Malay volunteers.

The first submarine operation began on 11 May 1943 under the codename of Op Gustavus I. Those who took part in this operation were Captain (later Lt. Col) John Davis with five Chinese agents. The submarine used belonged to the Dutch, type 024, under the command of W.J. Vries. The team landed on 24 May 1943 in the area of Tanjung Hantu, north of Pulau Langkor, Perak. This was the first British landing in Malaya since they lost to the Japanese 15 months previously. The mission of Op Gustavus I was to establish contact with local resistance groups for future operations.

The success of Gustavus I was followed by a series of other submarine operations viz: Gustavus II to VII which were launched between December 1943 and January 1944. Op Gustavus II was launched on 15 June 1943 and landing was made at the same area as Gustavus I. Gustavus II mission was to pick up John Davis and bring him back to Ceylon. In his

report, Davis wrote that "there were active underground movements in Malaya willing to fight the Japanese." (7)



Major Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddeen.

Gustavus III was launched on 24 July 1943 where Maj Davis together with three Chinese agents landed at Sitiawan, Perak. Soon after his return to Malaya, Davis was visited by Chin Peng, the second-in-command of the Communist organization, and good relations were now established between them. Davis had no difficulty in proving his bona fides because the resistance movement concerned had originated directly from the 101 STS trained Chinese Communists whom Broome and Davis had met before. After Broome's arrival at Sigari (Op Gustavus IV), Chin Peng arranged for the whole party to move up into the main range near the Perak resistance headquarters and they established a permanent camp at Blantan in the jungle east of Bidor. This camp was sufficiently far from the main resistance camps to permit free access to the Gustavus Chinese agents, but security was looked after by a fifteen strong guard of Chinese guerillas under Ah Yang, a young, extremely politically motivated Chinese who had some education in English.

Thus Davis and Broome were able to establish relationships with the Communist guerillas — the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) and at the same time maintain contact with their own Kuomintang Chinese who by now were mainly operating in the open. Nevertheless they were unsuccessful in one thing: they were not able to establish W/T contact with Sri Lanka.

Harrison and at the same time to bring back Capt Richard Broome. They arrived at the predetermined rendezvous (RV) and again to communicate with a sailing boat which was waiting for them. Because of the presence of Japanese forces in that area Chin Peng, who represented the groups from the mainland, advised that there should not be a landing of any white man. The plan to bring back Richard Broome



The MPAJA or 'Pasukan Bintang Tiga'.

In August 1943, on his return from operation Gustavus II, Claude Fenner (an ex-Police Officer who later became the Federation of Malaya Police Commissioner) reported that agents in touch with the Gustavus mission had, during the previous month, contacted the 'Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Society'. The MPAJS claimed to have an organization favourable to British and offered personnel for operations and sanctuary in exchange for arms and medical supplies.

Gustavus V was launched on 24 July 1943 to land Lim Bo Seng and Capt F.P.W

was also cancelled because the situation was not safe for him to sail by boat. Only Lim Bo Seng was allowed to land with Chin Peng.

Gustavus VI was launched on the 2 September 1943 using the British submarine "HMS Tally-Ho". Gustavus VI should have landed Capt Harrison and one Chinese agent but the junk that was supposed to pick them up, did not turn up. After waiting for three days, Harrison and the Chinese agent went ashore at Pulau Lalang. Failing to make any contact, the two returned to Sri Lanka.

Gustavus VII, which was also known as "Gustavus Emergency", once again used the British submarine Tally Ho. It was launched on 28 December 1943 and its mission was to land two British officers, Claude Fenner and Jim Hannah together with eight Chinese agents. They arrived at the rendezvous (Pulau Jarak) on 5 January 1944. However, the group received information regarding the activities of the Japanese in the area, and accordingly the plan to land the British officers was called off and the group returned to Ceylon.

After the last Op Gustavus (ie Op Gustavus Emergency), contact between the local resistance groups in Malaya and Force 136(B) in Sri Lanka was lost for about one year. This was a period of hunger, illness, anxiety and frustration. It was a blessing in disguise, however, for it brought about closer cooperation between the local resistance groups and members of Force 136(B) in the jungle.

Force 136(B) tried once more to launch a submarine operation in August 1944. This operation was codenamed "Op Likewise I". Five Malays commanded by Capt Ibrahim bin Ismail (who was trained at the Indian Military academy at Dehra Dun and who later became Malaysia's Chief

Armed Forces Staff) left Trincomalee, Sri Lanka, in "HMS Severn" submarine. They were tasked to land in Perak but due to an Out Board Motor failure at the landing area, the operation was called off and the party returned to Sri Lanka. (8) This was the last known operation using the submarine.

Apart from the submarine operations launched by Force 136, there were also submarine operations launched by other organizations such as Inter-Service Liaison Department (ISLD) which was an intelligence organization independent of force 136. This operation was nicknamed "Remarkable" and was launched five times

between February to May 1944. Submarine Remarkable V was sunk by the Japanese and all the crew were forced to abandon the operation because it was discovered by the Japanese who later stepped up their operations in controlling the Straits of Malacca.

AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

Very little success was achieved in submarine-borne operations. Hence the British had to change their strategy in infiltrating agents into Malaya. The aircraft was considered and so the first airborne operation was mounted on 28 October 1944. Codenamed "Op Oatmeal-Violin", it was commanded by Capt Ibrahim Ismail and with him were three other Malays, one of them (Zain Jaafar) was with him in the abortive Op Likewise I (see Fig. 3). The party left Ceylon in two amphibious aircrafts – the Catalinas P and S – for Malaya where they landed near Perhentian Islands off the east coast state of Trengganu. However, due to the presence of fishing boats in the area, it was decided for security reasons to call off the operation. The party then returned to Trincomalee, Sri Lanka on 29 October 1944.



Capt Ibrahim Ismail (Retired as Chief Of Armed Forces).





Fig. 3: Operation Likewise 1/Op Gustavus

Op Oatmeal-Violin was re-launched on 31 October 1944. There was no change in the composition of the party. Unfortunately, in less than 48 hours after landing, the whole party was captured by the Japanese. All four were brought to the Kempitai headquarters in Kota Bharu, Kelantan, interrogated and tortured for the next ten days. The torturing ceased when the group faked defection. Convinced that they have

its mission. But subsequent events that developed proved to be useful. Since Capt Ibrahim was still in radio contact with his home base in Sri Lanka (after convincing the Japanese captors not to destroy his W/T set), he was able to deceive the enemy about British intentions to invade Malaya via the Isthmus of Kra in southern Thailand. This was about 1,000 kilometres away from the landing beaches of Op Zipper.



Senior Officers of Force 136: From left:- Claude Fenner, John Davies, Richard Broome and Basil Goodfellow. 

won over the loyalty of their prisoners, the Japanese captors then treated the group with some respect and allowed them to move freely "to procure intelligence" for them.

The original mission of Op Oatmeal-Violin party was to establish contact with known sympathisers and supporters in Trengganu and Kelantan with a view to developing a secret agent network there. In this regard, the party had failed to achieve

In September 1945, after several months "collaboration" with the Japanese, Capt Ibrahim returned to Sri Lanka via Penang through the help of Force 136 agents. Later he returned to Malaya as a British Liaison Officer with Wataniah, a Malay resistance group in Pahang, taking over from Major Richardson.⁽⁹⁾

Although Op Oatmeal failed it was followed by a series of airborne operations with effect from 16 December 1944 until

the Japanese surrendered. The airborne operations did not use any more Catalina aircrafts but used a new type, ie, the Consolidated Liberator Mark VI, which could fly from Sri Lanka/India to Malaya to and from without refuelling.

CONCLUSION

The objectives of secret-agent infiltration operations were to recruit and train local resistance groups. Force 136 was to some extent, successful in achieving these objectives for, by the time the Japanese surrendered to the Allied Forces, in September 1945 there were about 6,500 armed guerillas in the country.⁽¹⁰⁾ However, the

guerilla harrassments on the Japanese forces planned as preliminary operations prior to the Op Zipper landing were abortive because of the unconditional surrender of the Japanese.

One significant bi-product of the secret agent infiltrations was the development of the MPAJA into a well armed, well equipped and trained guerilla force. Instead of fighting the Japanese, the MPAJA later turned their gun muzzle at the very people who gave them the arms, equipment and training the British—resulting in the 12 year Emergency (1948–1960). This is a lesson one can learn from playing games with the Communists.

NOTES

- (1) Louis Allen, "Singapore 1941–1942", Davis Polynter, 1977.
- (2) Frank Owen, "The Fall of Singapore", Michael Joseph, 1960.
- (3) General Tan Sri Ibrahim, "Have You Met Mariam?", Westlight Sdn. Bhd, 1984.
- (4) Group B Course II MTAT, "History of Force 136 Malayan Theatre", unpublished Kajimatan Report, 1982.
- (5) Ibid.
- (6) Wan Hashim, "Force 136 Pejuang Yang Dilupakan," Utusan Malaysia, Mac 12, 1982.
- (7) Ian Trenowden, "Operations Most Secret", William Kimber, London, 1978.
- (8) General Tan Sri Ibrahim, "Have You Met Mariam?".
- (9) Ibid.
- (10) Ian Trenowden, "Operations Most Secret", William Kimber, London, 1978.



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KEPIMPINAN TENTERA YANG IDEAL

LT KOL MOHD SAFARI HAMID



PENDAHULUAN

Angkatan Tentera adalah tunjang kemakmuran, kedaulatan dan keselamatan negara. Menjadi seorang pemimpin di dalam Angkatan Tentera merupakan satu penghormatan besar untuk individu berkenaan. Pemimpin di dalam Angkatan Tentera disanjung tinggi oleh masyarakat kerana nilai profesionalisma menunaikan bakti untuk bangsa dan negara. Di samping melaksanakan tugas khusus ketenteraan demi kedaulatan negara, pemimpin dan anggota tentera juga mencurahkan bakti untuk kemajuan serta keutuhan masyarakat/rakyat. Sumbangsih ini tiada tolok bandingannya oleh lain pertubuhan atau agensi kerajaan.

Setiap pemimpin dan anggota tentera hidup penuh cabaran tiap masa di segi lahiriah dan rohaniah. Tentera hidup di dalam dua masyarakat — masyarakatnya yang tersendiri dan masyarakat umum di luar. Kedua-duanya mempunyai nilai, kehendak, tekanan dan kesan terhadap setiap pemimpin dan anggota tentera. Trend masyarakat umum dan pergolakannya

hanya memberi kesan di segi aspek bersabit kehidupan seharian, sosial dan kekeluargaan. Ini perlu diambil kira oleh setiap pemimpin tentera. Yang lebih mencabar adalah pergolakan kehidupan dalam masyarakat tentera itu sendiri. Ini mestilah diambil kira dalam kepimpinan ketenteraan untuk kejayaan merancang dan memerintah.

Artikel ini meliputi perbincangan bersabit aspek memerintah, memimpin, menggalak, prestasi dan misi serta cabaran yang perlu diatasi. Artikel ini juga akan memperitakai kemerosotan tatatertib dan sikap ketenteraan masakini. Rujukan kepada beberapa kejadian bersabit kepimpinan dalam sejarah negara luar dan sendiri akan ditonjolkan demi mencari jawapan sifat kepimpinan yang membawa kebaikan.

DEFINISI

Kepimpinan mempunyai hubungan yang tidak dapat dipisahkan daripada pemerintahan (command) yang mana mem-

punyai makna dan implikasi seperti berikut:

"Berdasarkan pangkat dan jawatan adalah dilimpah kurniakan tanggungjawab untuk merumus, merancang, mengelola, melaksana, mengawas dan melatih anggota bawah perintah. Tanggungjawab ini juga merangkumi pentadbiran, kesihatan, kebajikan dan kesejahteraan anggota bawahan".

KONSEP MEMERINTAH DAN MEMIMPIN

Tanggungjawab seorang Pemerintah (Pemimpin) ialah merancang, mengawal serta menguruskan yunitnya dalam setiap aktiviti di masa aman dan perang. Pemerintahan adalah satu proses di mana setiap anggota dan peralatan digunakan sepenuhnya untuk mencapai satu tujuan (missi) yang telah ditetapkan. Aspek keanggotaan, kelengkapan dan missi adalah elemen penting dalam pemerintahan dan kepimpinan dalam Angkatan Tentera. Amat sah jika dikatakan, memerintah dan memimpin begitu intim sekali sehingga boleh dikatakan juga memimpin itu adalah memerintah (to lead is to command). Memimpin adalah satu kebolehan atau seni, di mana seseorang pemerintah itu dapat mempengaruhi anggota bawahan, untuk menerima dan melaksanakan apa jua tugas yang diberi dengan sempurna. Maka tidak dapat dinafikan, konsep memerintah dan memimpin tertumpu penuh pada geraklaku dan personaliti setiap pemerintah untuk menjayakan missi yang ada. Pemerintah adalah pemimpin. Pemimpin yang mengetuai dengan tauladan akan mengukuhkan lagi kepimpinannya.

PEMERINTAH DAN MISSI

Asas kepimpinan adalah mengapa mesti ada pemimpin. Jawapannya ialah melalui pemimpin serta kepimpinannya missi yang ditugas dapat dilaksanakan dengan jayanya.

Pemimpin bertanggungjawab untuk mengolah serta menyatupadukan tenaga/kepandaian anggota, peralatan dan masa untuk menjayakan missi. Pemimpin memimpin anggotanya untuk berperang dengan musuh di mana akibatnya adalah membunuh atau dibunuh. Inilah keunikan pemimpin dan kepimpinan dalam tentera. Kesediaan menggadai nyawa dan kepentingan peribadi demi bangsa dan negara inilah letaknya kepimpinan tentera. Itulah keunikan dan maha sucinya kepimpinan tentera.

Tugas utama pemerintah adalah terlaksananya missi dengan jayanya. Missi yang diberi adalah mengikut saluran pemerintahan yang menyatukan pemerintahan dan pemimpin. Ini perlu untuk mengawal, mengkoordinasikan dan membantu. Perlaksanaan missi mempunyai risiko kecederaan atau kematian. Adalah tanggungjawab tiap pemerintah/pemimpin membuat perhitungan teliti dan kajian mendalam agar missi tidak gagal. Keputusan samada untuk menerima risiko kecil atau besar terserahlah pada pemerintah/pemimpin. Pertimbangan utama menentukan darjah risiko boleh diterima adalah hubungan antara missi diberi dan peralatan/keupayaan yang ada. Oleh itu tiap pemimpin mestilah pakar menilai risiko.

Ingatlah satu keputusan yang silap oleh seorang Pengurus syarikat hanya boleh mengakibatkan kerugian wang dan kehilangan kepercayaan para pelabur. Di sebaliknya, keputusan demikian oleh pemimpin tentera akan mengakibatkan ramai jiwa tentera terkorban, membawa kesengsaraan pada keluarganya serta masyarakat.

ANGGOTA DI BAWAH PIMPINAN DAN MISSI

Di mana yang boleh, pemerintah/pemimpin barulah memenuhi kehendak missi dan anggota dengan seimbang tanpa

menjejaskan pencapaian misi. Namun demikian di masa perang dharurat atau operasi keutamaan adalah kepada misi dan kejayaannya.

Setiap pemimpin mestilah mengetahui sepenuhnya anggota di bawah pimpinannya. Di segi lahiriah soal peribadinya, kecekapan/kepakaran dan kebolehan fizikalnya. Di segi rohaniah pula kesanggupannya, semangatnya, pendiriannya dalam kumpulan serta keberaniannya. Setelah mengetahui anggota dipimpin, pemimpin dapatlah mengolah imbalan antara ke-
hendak misi dan kehendak/kebolehan anggota. Terpenuhnya kehendak/kepuasan diri anggota ini akan meninggikan semangat dan moralnya. Lantas beliau sanggup membuat apa jua tugas yang diberikan dengan sebaik mungkin. Kejayaan pula akan meninggikan lagi semangat dan nama yunit.

SIFAT KEPIMPINAN

Tiap pemimpin mestilah memiliki ciri kepimpinan yang tertentu. Statusnya pula di kalangan anggota yang dipimpinnya adalah sebagai:

- Pemerintah/Pemimpin
- Ketua
- Guru
- Bapa

Sikap Pemimpin. Para pemimpin mestilah mempunyai keperibadian dan pekerti yang menjadi cermin kepada anggota bawahan. Keperibadian dan pekerti ini semestinya mempengaruhi anggota bawahan agar timbul penghormatan, ketaatan dan kerelaan bertugas di bawah perintahnya.

- Mengetahui kondisi jiwa dan aspirasi hidup dalam sanubari anggota dipimpin.
- Berkebolehan menilai dan menghargai pendapat, pendirian, kehendak dan sikap anggota bawahan.

- Bijaksana dalam membangkitkan semangat, kerelaan dan kerjasama di kalangan anggota bawahan.
- Sentiasa menjadi contoh tauladan dalam amal perbuatan dan tutur kata.
- Mampu memberi bimbingan, asuhan, tuntutan dan pimpinan.
- Memiliki dan dapat memelihara kewibawaan pimpinan atas dasar kepercayaan, kerelaan dan ketaatan yang dipimpin.

Sikap Ketua. Setiap pemerintah mestilah mengamalkan sifat/sikap berikut:

- Berpendirian teguh, tegas dan bertanggungjawab.
- Keberanian moral dan fizikal.
- Pakar (profesyenal) dalam tugas dan tanggungjawabnya.
- Mampu membuat keputusan dan memberi perintah.
- Dinamik, inisiatif dan bijaksana dalam menggunakan kuasa demi mencapai misi dalam melaksanakan tugas.

Taat setia kepada pemerintah/pemimpinnya.

Sikap Guru. Kepimpinan juga menuntut kita menurunkan pengetahuan akademik dan profesionalisma kepada anggota bawahan. Di samping menentukan kemampuan tidak menjadi statik ia juga memaksa kita terus menimba ilmu. Pemimpin sebagai guru, pendidik dan jurulatih perlu:

- Sentiasa meningkatkan pengetahuan sesuai dengan perkembangan semasa serta pelaksanaan tugas.
- Merancang, merumus, melaksanakan dan mengawasi latihan.

- Sentiasa mengajar, menunjuk ajar, mendidik serta mencurahkan pengetahuan profesional dan pengalaman, perkhidmatan untuk meningkatkan lagi prestasi anggota bawahan dan yunit.
- Memiliki kesabaran dan ketenangan yang tinggi di dalam mendidik dan melatih.
- Dapat mendorong seluruh tenaga dan semangat anggota bawahan mencapai matlamat yang tinggi.
- Ibarat pelita yang menerangi hati, fikiran dan semangat anggota bawahan.

Sikap Bapa. Kepimpinan juga meletakkan kita mengambil peranan sebagai bapa kepada semua anggota bawahan. Kita juga sebagai penghulu kepada anak buah kita (anggota bawah perintah dan keluarganya). Di sinilah kewibawaan kita tercabar. Kita dikehendaki menyelesaikan masalah ketenteraan, kekeluargaan dan hubungan umat. Ini memerlukan pengetahuan mendalam dalam aspek keagamaan, kebudayaan/susila serta komunikasi selain dari profesionalisma ketenteraan. Kita perlu ketegasan dan keberanian menegur dan membina menyelesaikan masalah serta kelakuan sumbang tanpa takut hilang populariti. Untuk berbuat demikian kita perlu:

- Mengenal benar setiap anak buah.
- Meningkatkan kesejahteraan, kebajikan serta ketenteraman anggota bawahan di segi kebendaan, jasmaniah dan rohani.
- Mengetahui, memahami serta menyelesaikan masalah anggota bawahan.
- Bersifat terbuka, sedia menasihati, menolong dan membantu.
- Bijaksana, tegas, adil dan saksama.

PIMPINAN YANG BAIK

Pemimpin/pemerintah mestilah mengawasi dan mengetahui mereka ini. Tindakan mengembalikan mereka ke teras dan kehidupan ketenteraan sebenar mestilah diambil. Janganlah kepimpinan kita dicabar, bertindak positif menyedarkan mereka. Jika difikirkan mereka tidak juga dapat mengubah sikap berhentikan/tamatkan perkhidmatan mereka. Untuk menghindarkan kemasukan "sampah" berkhidmat dalam Angkatan Tentera, tim pengambilan mestilah menumpukan kepada potensi dan mutu bukan bilangan memenuhi quota. Jika ini dilakukan masalah disiplin dapat dihindarkan lebih awal lagi.

CIRI-CIRI YANG MEMBAWAKAN KETEGASAN

Pembinaan rohani. Memperkuatkan taqwa pada Tuhan Maha Esa. Secara tidak langsung melatih anggota berkekuatan iman. Ianya adalah kepercayaan dan keyakinan kepada segala ajaran agama — terhadap kudrat dan iradatNya, taat kepada perintah Tuhan dan menjauhi segala laranganNya, menjauhkan diri dari kemunafikan dan syirik. Petunjuk-petunjuk yang resmi atau realistik adalah cara pendekatan yang sesuai. Matlamat pembinaan rohani ini adalah keinsafan dan kesedaran — bahawa pemimpin dan perajurit adalah pejuang. Bagaimana perjuangan RASUL dan khalifah menentang musuh menegakkan agama ISLAM, bangsa dan negaranya begitulah juga kita. Amalan sekarang — tahlil, doa selamat, ceramah dan acara keagamaan yang lain perlulah lebih teratur, sistematik dan mempunyai arah/motif. Ini perlulah dirancang dan di selaraskan sesuai dengan matlamat negara, Angkatan Tentera dan batalion.

Pembinaan/Peningkatan Professionalisme. Ini meliputi segala bentuk latihan yang mana matlamatnya kemahiran pe-

ngendalian senjata, teknik dan taktik peperangan serta tugas sampingan demi kedaulatan negara. Cara latihan dijalankan pula haruslah menentukan segala pelajaran diamati dan diterima bukannya lebih mendera (buggering). Deraan (buggering) hanya akan menimbulkan kejelekan, sikap negatif dan pemberontakan akhirnya. Kejujuran, keikhlasan, sikap yang positif, tekad yang gigih serta penuh kesedaran pula akan membuahkan pejuang profesionalisma yang sebenar.

Pembinaan/Peningkatan Tradisi. Tradisi adalah sumber/inspirasi gerak laku, semangat, tatatertib, kebangsaan dan kehormatan. Tradisi membawa nilai positif kepada pertubuhan. Kebanyakan tradisi dalam Kor RAMD tidak tertulis, maka jika tidak diamalkan akan luput begitu sahaja. Adalah baiknya tradisi yang ada ini dibukukan, mana yang tidak sesuai masakini diluputkan dan yang menjadi amalan RASUL dan Nabi-Nabi diperkenalkan. Tradisi yang bersifat regimental — upacara perbarisan, mengarak panji-panji, penghormatan, perbarisan kenaikan pangkat hendaklah diamal biasakan seperti warisan dulu. Amalan melafaz Ikrar Kesatria, menyanyikan lagu Kor RAMD dan batalion sebelum memulakan kegiatan harian pada perbarisan pertama dapat menimbulkan suasana semangat bangga serta cintakan Kor RAMD dan batalion (sense of belonging). Doa selamat sebelum dan sesudah latihan kelompok menimbulkan taqwa serta restu dan keredhaan Tuhan. Penerimaan dan pengalaman tradisi oleh semua mengukuhkan lagi ketahanan mental, rohani dan semangat perjuangan.

- Tidak tegas serta tidak dapat membuat keputusan.
- Menyalahkan orang lain.
- Penekanan/memutarbelitkan perkabaran konon demi untuk moral dan keselamatan.
- Kepercayaan kepada yang bidaah.

Etiologi disebalik kes ini adalah disebabkan oleh interaksi antara organisasi militer dan personaliti pemimpin. Aspek pembaziran tenaga tentera sudah cukup membuktikan betapa pemimpin perlu membuat pengurusan, pertimbangan dan keputusan yang sah. Contohnya:

Malapetaka Walcheren Expedition

1809. Missi ekspedisi ini adalah menakluki Antwerp. Namun itu serangan tidak dilancarkan tetapi bala tentera telah menunggu/berlabuh di Walcheren Island di Zeeland. Penantian oleh pemerintah tentera darat Lord Chatham dan pemerintah Tentera Laut Sir Richard Strachan, mengakibatkan 7,000 anggota mati, 14,000 mengidap penyakit seumur hidup dan beribu yang lain demam kerana malaria dan dysentery. Hanya 217 mati dalam peperangan. Tiada pengurusan baik untuk yang sakit dan cedera diberikan kerana falsafah — anggota sakit/cedera ibarat barang pakai habis.

Malapetaka Peperangan Crimea. Kematian bala tentera yang sia-sia dalam peperangan tersebut tidak seharusnya berlaku. Dalam kempen ini tentera British mengalami 30 peratus kekurangan kekuatan bala tentera kerana luka, penyakit, kurang makan dan pendedahan.² Ini tidak masuk kematian sia-sia "The Charge of the Light Brigade". Bala tentera British terhapus dalam serangan ini kerana perintah yang samar, saluran pemerintahan yang tidak

- Pembaziran tenaga tentera (manusia) bertentangan dengan prinsip penjimatan tenaga.
- Tidak mempelajari dari kesilapan.
- Memandang rendah kebolehan musuh.

betul, perancangan tiada bernas, tiada pengetahuan muslihat serta kurang kerjasama dan iri hati di kalangan pemimpin. Malapetaka serupa berlaku di Sebastopol dan Redan. Faktor yang amat ketara adalah kejahilan, kurang daya usaha dan inovasi, tidak mengendahkan kebajikan anggota bawahan serta takut menyinggung perasaan pegawai lebih atasan. Pemimpin berkenaan adalah Lord Raglan dan Lord Lucan.


Kematian dari tindakan musuh kerana ketidakcekapan (incompetent) peperangan. Mereka yang mati dalam serangan ke atas Fort Rooyah ketika Pemberontakan India, penggunaan gas dalam Perang Dunia Pertama 1915, 138,000 kematian tentera dalam kejatuhan Singapura³ dan kematian 17,000 tentera bersekutu dalam operasi Market Garden di Arnhem⁴, jatuh dalam kategori ini.

Kematian Kerana Kepentingan Diri Pemimpin. Fenomena ini terdapat dalam kempen peperangan Nazi Germany melalui kata-kata Hitler "Orang seperti saya tidak perlu memperdulikan nasib sejuta orang". Falsafah ini jelas menunjukkan nyawa dan diri manusia lebih rendah keutamaannya dari kriteria (nilaitara) lain yang mempengaruhi tindak-tanduknya.

Analisa di atas jelas menunjukkan bahawa dalam abad yang lalu terdapat pemimpin yang cuai, tidak cekap mempergunakan/mengolah bala tentera di bawah perintahnya. Kesemua pemerintah di atas seperti Lord Raslan, Percival dan Hitler boleh mengelakkan malapetaka yang menimpa bala tenteranya. Apa yang perlu adalah perancangan, inisiatif, nilai tulin pemimpin, kebajikan anggota bawah perintah dan tidak mabok pangkat atau minat yang tidak sihat.

MOTIVASI


Setiap insan perlukan motivasi untuk bertindak, samada tindakan itu positif (kebaikan) atau negatif (keburukan) terpujanglah samada kehendaknya tercapai atau tidak. Kehendak ini pula berbagai dan timbul dari desakan lahiriah (fizikal) dan batiniah (spiritual). Teori bersabit motivasi yang paling popular adalah dari kacamata A.H. Maslow dalam buku "Motivation and Personality".⁵ Kehendak manusia bertingkat (hierarchy of needs) seperti berikut:



Rajah 1: Perkembangan Motivasi

Rajah 1 menunjukkan bahawa perkembangan motivasi akan meningkat dari bawah ke atas. Peningkatan ini hanya akan berlaku setelah kehendak di bawah telah dipenuhi dan dicapai. Perkembangan struktur motivasi individu tidaklah rigid, malah ia berterusan dan sering berubah mengikut suasana kehidupan dan alam keliling.

Tiap pemimpin mestilah menyedari hakikat anggota bawahan adalah manusia (perajurit) bukan robot atau mesin. Mereka ini ada harga diri, fikiran dan kehendak. Persepsi dan tindakbalas mereka tertakluk kepada kalibar kepimpinan pemerintah. Adalah lebih manfaat bagi tiap pemimpin memahami jiwa fikiran bawahannya. Gambar rajah di bawah jelas menggambarkan betapa pentingnya demikian.



Rajah 2: Persepsi Individu

Persepsi individu lihat rajah 2 dan reaksinya terhadap alam sekitar sebahagianya ditentukan oleh mutu dan kekuatan motif, kehendak, sikap dan emosinya.

Motivasi berunsur biologi amat senang diadakan samada ketika suasana aman atau perang. Motivasi berunsur spiritual agak sukar diketengahkan — ia memerlukan isu yang membangkitkan semangat di jiwa anggota. Motivasi Tentera Russia ketika perang merupakan negara mereka telah dirubohi dan anak isteri mereka dalam bahaya. Sumber motivasi bagi tentera Jepun pula dalam Perang Dunia Kedua adalah tugas untuk negara, raja dan agama.⁶


Mempadukan semangat (morale) dalam tentera adalah melalui disiplin/tatatertib. Rangkaikata "tatatertib/disiplin konboi", disiplin medan dll jelas menunjukkan tugas serta tanggungjawab individu untuk keselamatan kumpulannya. Konsep ini digunakan untuk meinggikan lagi morale, keselamatan, kesihatan, kepuasan dan mutu tempur kumpulan. Morale yang tinggi adalah seperti "social glue" yang menyatupadukan anggota kumpulan dan bertindak bersama menghadapi apa jua ancaman.

Pemimpin mestilah pandai mengolah tema/motif untuk menjadi sumber motivasi dan kebangkitan anggota bawahan. Tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa kita sebagai pemimpin tidak akan dapat memenuhi segala kehendak tiap individu di bawah perintah kita yang sentiasa berubah. Apa yang penting adalah mewujudkan suasana dan alam keliling yang menjamin ketenteraman jiwa kepada majoriti. Tiap tindakan insan ada motifnya, motif ini pula didorong oleh sebab suasana yang mempengaruhi dirinya — bersabit tubuh badan, alam keliling, hubungan dengan masyarakat dan diri sendiri. Carta di bawah boleh menjadi panduan kepada pemimpin memahami motif tindak tanduk individu dan motivasi yang diperlukan.⁷

TEMPUR

Disiplin adalah teras ketenteraan, ia juga pembina semangat. Tidak ada tolak ansur yang mesti diamalkan oleh pemimpin dalam kepimpinannya bila menghadapi masalah disiplin. Adalah tugas utama pemimpin mempersiapkan anggota bawahan untuk misi tempur. Dalam pertempuran bilangan saja tidak cukup — yang maha penting ialah mutu. Mutu merangkumi segalanya — kepimpinan yang baik dan perajurit yang terlatih serta "motivated".

Teras ketenteraan iaitu Amalan Militerisma, dogma, tradisi dan Rukun kesopanan perlu dipertingkatkan lagi tetapi dengan penuh bijaksana oleh pemimpin. Perbuatan "buggering", mendera dan keterlaluan akan menyebabkan kehilangan minat atau semangat lantas mencetuskan nilai negatif di kalangan anggota. Kepimpinan yang baik akan mengadun teras ketenteraan dengan baik tak ubah seperti santapan rohani dan jasmani anggota bawahannya. Perajurit pejuang bersedia untuk tempur dengan penuh semangat dan keyakinan.



Rajah 3: Peranan Ketenteraan

Tempur (A) menyebabkan berbagai kebimbangan utama (B). Bagi mengurangkan kebimbangan ini dan meningkatkan efisiensi serta prestasi teras ketenteraan (C) diamalkan. Tetapi amalan teras ketenteraan ini jika tidak dikawal/guna dengan bijaksana akan menyebabkan nilai negatif (D). Ini akan menyebabkan peningkatan nilai tidak cekap, negatif dll (E), serta meningkatkan lagi kebimbangan utama (A). Ia juga akan menimbulkan kebimbangan sekunder (F). Kedua akibat ini (E) dan (F) akan menyebabkan peningkatan amalan (C).

Rajah di atas jelas menunjukkan bahawa amalan yang akan mengakibatkan sikap negatif anggota bawahan mestilah di-

hapuskan. Selain dari yang telah dibincangkan terdahulu amalan negatif berikut perlu dihapuskan:

- Pilih kasih — dalam apa jua perbuatan pemimpin mestilah adil pada semua.
- Pentingkan diri sendiri.
- Tidak mengakui dan mempelajari dari kesilapan.

KESIMPULAN

Memerintah dan memimpin amat intim sekali. Memimpin adalah seni (art) memerintah mempengaruhi anggota bawahan untuk menerima serta melaksanakan tugas dengan sempurna. Konsep memerintah tertumpu

pada geraklaku dan personaliti tiap pemerintah. Pemerintah adalah pemimpin. Kepimpinannya akan lebih kukuh dan berjaya dengan tauladan yang baik.

Pemerintah memimpin anggotanya untuk melaksanakan misi. Kesediaan menggadaikan nyawa dan kepentingan peribadi demi bangsa dan negara adalah satu keunikan dan maha sucinya kepemimpinan dalam tentera. Kepimpinan ini mewajibkan pemimpin menjadi seorang yang pakar dalam menimbang risiko dan kesanggupannya membuat keputusan.

Pemerintah di mana boleh harus memenuhi kehendak misi dan anggota dengan seimbang. Di masa perang, darurat serta operasi keutamaan adalah pencapaian misi. Pemerintah mesti mengetahui sepenuhnya kebolehan anggota bawahan dan peribadinya untuk mengolah imbalan kehendak misi dengan kebolehan anggota untuk menentukan pelaksanaan misi.

Kepimpinan tentera mewajibkan memiliki serta mengamalkan sifat kepemimpinan mengikut statusnya di kalangan anggota sebagai — pemerintah, ketua, guru dan bapa.

Keamanan secara tidak langsung mempengaruhi cerdas pandai tidak memilih kerjaya ketenteraan tetapi bidang yang lebih membawa pendapatan kewangan. Gejala ini mengakibatkan mereka yang kurang intelek masuk berkhidmat dalam tentera. Jika tidak diasuh secukupnya kepemimpinan mereka adalah diragukan. Pengawasan dan tindakan positif perlu mengatasi masalah ini. Mutu mestilah diutamakan dari bilangan.

Tidak perlu teori atau prinsip baru kepemimpinan diperkenalkan kerana yang sedia tetap utuh hingga akhir zaman. Yang penting ialah peningkatan rohani serta penerapan nilai Islam, cintakan bangsa, agama dan negara untuk mengatasi kelemahan.

Peningkatan profesionalisma dilakukan dengan suasana kondusif pembelajaran bukan deraan (buggering). Peningkatan tradisi dilakukan untuk mengujudkan semangat cintakan batalion, kor RAMD dan Angkatan Tentera.

Motivasi menyebabkan anggota (individu/kesatuan/kumpulan) bertindak. Samada tindakan itu positif (kebaikan) atau negatif (keburukan) bergantung kepada kepuasan kehendaknya. Suasana keliling (suasana pekerjaan dll) mempengaruhi motivasi dan tindakbalas (reaksi) anggota. Kepimpinan mewajibkan pemimpin mengolah tema/motif untuk sumber motivasi anggota bawahannya.

Mutu dan kewibawaan ketua rendah masakini amat rendah bila dibandingkan dengan ketua rendah zaman darurat dan konfrantasi dulu. Kepimpinan memerlukan kita “re-educate” dan “merevolusi mental” mereka ke tahap yang dikehendaki. Mereka yang tidak dapat memperbaiki diri mestilah disingkirkan/tamatkan perkhidmatannya.

Teras ketenteraan perlu dipertingkatkan lagi untuk mempersiapkan anggota untuk tempur. “Dosage”nya mestilah diawet dengan bijaksana oleh pemimpin.

KEPIMPINAN MASAKINI

Pemimpin/pemerintah organisasi ketenteraan adalah berlainan dari ketua parti politik, pengurus badan berkanun atau pengarah urusan firma swasta.

1. Pertama, ia dilantik/tauliah bukan muncul atau bangkit. Keperluan soldadu langsung tidak memainkan peranan menentukan corak pemimpin yang akan mereka perolehi. Oleh itu adalah baiknya pemimpin mendapatkan gambaran dan keadaan sebenar organisasi yang diperintahnya, sebelum mem-

buat tindakan yang radikal atau memaksa (enforce) polisi kepimpinannya. Olahlah pemerintahan dengan bijaksana. Kita tidak ada "incentives" berupa wang dll untuk motivasi anggota bawahan, yang ada hanyalah kursus kenaikan pangkat, jawatan dan "charisma" kita sendiri. Oleh itu adunlah kepimpinan agar dapat diterima oleh semua.

- b. Kedua, Pemimpin/pemerintah mempunyai bidang kuasa perundangan yang luas, melebihi dari pemimpin kelompok manusia yang lain. Timbang rasalah upah/anugerah dan hukuman (reward and punishment) dengan seadilnya. Matlamat bidang kuasa mestilah menyedarkan atau menginsafkan bukan seksaan. Dalam pemberian anugerah pula mestilah atas dasar yang adil dan tidak pilih kasih. Perubahan di sini boleh dilakukan bersabit keutamaan. Pada saya keutamaan adalah kepada mutu dan kebolehan dan bukan "seniority" (kekanan) saja.
- c. Ketiga, kepimpinan tentera lebih mirip kepimpinan "autocratic". Lebih ditekankan kepada kepimpinan melalui tauladan. Saluran pemerintahannya adalah dari pemimpin kepada ketua rendah. Saluran maklumat penting untuk tugas khusus adalah dari pemimpin kepada ketua rendah dan dari ketua rendah kepada pemimpin. Perubahan perlu dibuat kerana keadaan masa kini disegi pentadbiran dan kebajikan anggota. Dialog dan pertemuan mata ke mata ada satu yang mesti dilakukan untuk mengetahui masalah dan kehendak anggota. Lawatan muhibah dll kepada anggota dan keluarga selaras dengan masyarakat Melayu dan kampong akan membawa nilai positif. Ular menyusur akar tidak akan hilang bisanya dan intan berlian jatuh ke lumpur tetap gemerlap cahayanya.

Peranan pemimpin masakini terbahagi kepada dua:

- a. Pakar dalam tugas (task specialist).
- b. Pakar dalam sosial (social specialist).

Pakar dalam tugas. Tumpuan utama tidak lain dari persiapan untuk/kejayaan membunuh musuh. Peranan ini mengeneipkan soal "popularity" tetapi lebih kepada kepakaran. Pemimpin mestilah lebih aktif, cergas, bijaksana dan pakar dari anggota dipimpin.

Pakar dalam sosial. Tumpuan adalah untuk mengujud/mengekalkan hubungan erat semua anggota di bawah pimpinan. Ini untuk menentukan ketinggian morale serta semangat untuk mendorong pelaksanaan tugas dengan sempurna. Kepakaran dalam peranan ini akan menghindarkan kejadian tidak diingini, mengurangkan gejala kerendahan morale serta semangat perjuangan, melarikan diri dari tugas, dahagi, engkar, penyakit dan jenayah.

Oleh itu, pemimpin yang ideal adalah yang berkebolehan mengolah, mengadun kedua peranan ini dengan baiknya. Pemimpin mestilah pakar dalam kerjaya/tugasnya di samping mempunyai charisma dalam pergaulan sosialnya. Mereka yang perlu dicontohi adalah Lord Wellington, Lord Nelson, Napoleon, Lawrence dan Field Marshal Lord Slim.

Kepimpinan kita juga tidak mesti terlalu belas ikhsan (compassion) bila menghadapi masalah disiplin — terutama dari mereka yang selalu melakukan kesalahan (habitual offenders), kaki ponteng dan penagih dadah. Amalan "disloyalty" dan "back stabbing" oleh pemimpin rendah mestilah dihapuskan. Bersikap tegaslah dalam soal ini — pertubuhan lebih penting dari mereka ini. Jangan biarkan penyakit merbahaya begini merebak. Antidiotinya hanya satu — singkirkan/tamatkan perkhidmatan mereka dari Angkatan Tentera.

Ketua rendah (ketua kompeni ke bawah) perlu di "re-educate" dan membawa "revolusi mental" mereka ke landasan kepimpinan yang tulen seperti kepimpinan di tahun 1933 hingga 1965. Mereka ini perlu lebih tegas, taat setia dan berwibawa. Mereka yang menjadi korban buruk perlulah ditamatkan perkhidmatannya.

Penerapan nilai Islam — taqwa kepada Tuhan, perajurit adalah pejuang untuk agama, bangsa dan negara mestilah dipertingkatkan lagi. Kuatkanlah perpaduan (patut mudah dilakukan kerana batalion kita semuanya bangsa Melayu) bukan berpuak atau kasta ikut negeri, taat setia kepada teraju yang memimpin, Insya Allah

RAMD akan gemilang semula. Peperangan Karbala membuktikan bahawa dengan bilangan bala tentera Islam yang lebih kecil tetapi bermutu dan lebih bersemangat/yakin dapat mengalahkan bala tentera orang Mushrikin/kafir yang lebih ramai bilangannya.

Sumber peperangan serta pelaksanaan misi bagi pemerintah batalion RAMD adalah anggota. Kepimpinan kita mewajibkan memahami sifat kemanusiaan untuk menguasai anggota. Untuk menguasai mereka kepimpinan kita mestilah dipercayai, diyakini dan disegani. Jawapannya pada kita, kepimpinan melalui tauladan dan jadikanlah kita sebagai cermin/pelita penerang hati sanubari anggota.

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NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mejar Harbhajan Singh

Although Southeast Asian countries are independent but the region has not been really free of super power domination. The withdrawal of the Americans from Vietnam caused anxiety amongst some Southeast Asian nations who felt they were vulnerable to the might of the Vietnamese. Hence the idea of neutralization came into being. This article discusses the reactions to this proposal, the obstacles and the prospects of it becoming a reality.

INTRODUCTION

The Malays have an old proverb "Gajah sama Gajah berjuang, pelandok mati di tengah-tengah", which when translated literally means that when two elephants fight, it is the mousedeer in the middle that dies. This proverb can appropriately convey the feelings of those who are small and who do not wish to be involved in the quarrels of those who are big and strong. The concept of neutralization portrays the same desire amongst some of the leaders of Southeast Asian states.

Countries of Southeast Asia except for Thailand have been under colonial rule for a long period. Today all of them are independent with some still retaining economic ties with their former colonial masters, while others have forged links with the Communist powers. Southeast Asia occupies an important space of the globe. It represents a potentially big market for consumer and investment goods. Strategically it is placed at the cross-roads of the modern world. It is a compulsory passage between China and Europe and between

Japan and the Middle East. The city that stands in the middle of it, Singapore is the world's busiest port and the third largest oil refining centre in the world. About 80% of the world's rubber, and 60% of tin ore is derived from this region, not to mention the oil rich deposits.

If it is for these reasons that big powers have taken a keen interest in this region and are competing to either defend or extend their interests here and there, interests are by no means being promoted through peaceful means. Competing interests have resulted in conflicts and smaller nations have been drawn into big power rivalry, sometimes with disastrous consequences as in the case of Indochina. The belief that courting big powers is harmful to the national interests led to the active promotion of the concept of neutralization amongst some of the states of Southeast Asia.

WHAT NEUTRALIZATION MEANS

Neutrality, neutralization, neutralism and non-alignment are related to the root

word neutral. Let us look at how some authors have defined neutralization. Marvin C Ott defines neutralization as "permanent and guaranteed neutrality, unlike neutralism and non-alignment, it entails a formal international agreement among other powers to recognize and guarantee the status. Inevitably then, neutralization severely restricts the scope for independence and initiative in the foreign policy of the neutralized state".¹ Bernhard Dahm and Werner Draguhn define neutralization simply as "the imposition of neutral status on a state by a group of powers".²

Under the International Laws of Neutrality a non-belligerent in war has certain rights and privileges not extended to the belligerents. These rules state for example that a neutral may not permit the use of its territory as a base for military operations by one of the belligerents and may not furnish military assistance to the belligerents. During peacetime too it must refrain from making military alliances with other states.

KJ Holsti says that a country can only be neutral in a state of war or crisis. He further states that "the major difference between a neutralized state and a non-aligned state is that the former has achieved its state by virtue of the action of others, whilst the latter chooses its orientation by itself and has no guarantee that its position will be honoured by the others".³ However in addition to this the guaranteeing powers undertake not to violate the territorial integrity and the rights of the neutral in both peacetime and war.

To sum it all up it is worthwhile quoting Cyril E Black, Richard A Falk, Klaus Knorr, and Oran R Young who after a recent scholarly work have given the following Conventional definition which seems most comprehensive.

"A neutralized state is one whose political independence and territorial integrity are guaranteed permanently by a collective agreement of great powers subject to the conditions that the neutralized state will not take up arms against another state except to defend itself and will not assume treaty obligations which may compromise its neutralized status".

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Southeast Asia's experience with the concept of neutralization dates back to time when Britain and France signed an agreement guaranteeing the neutrality and independence of the Thai Menam Valley. The next significant proposal for neutralization was from the Philippines in February 1942 at the height of the Japanese invasion of the island. Manuel Quezon, the then President of the Philippines Commonwealth, bitter over the failure of the United States to provide aid against the Japanese, formally proposed to President Roosevelt to grant independence and then would request for neutralization, with their forces demobilized and foreign troops withdrawn. However the United States turned down the proposal while the Japanese chose to ignore it. On 16 May 1961 there was civil strife in Laos and fourteen nations met in Geneva and subsequently on 9 Jul 1962 signed a declaration on the neutrality of Laos. This however failed. Hence there was a notable unimpressive record to date of neutralization in Southeast Asia.

During the defence debate in the House of Representatives on 23rd Jan 68 Malaysia's Tun Ismail suggested that in view of British withdrawal from this region the time was ripe to declare collectively the neutralization of Southeast Asia. To be effective this would have to be guaranteed by the United States, Russia and China. He also proposed that the countries of the

region sign a non-aggression treaty with one another. This call was again reiterated by Tun Abdul Razak at the Third Non-Aligned Summit Conference, held at Lusaka from 8 to 10 Sep^r 1970. It was again referred to during his inaugural policy statement when Tun Razak assumed office as Prime Minister of Malaysia on 22 Sep 1970.

FACTORS LEADING TOWARDS NEUTRALIZATION POLICY

Malaysia's initiative towards neutralization can be traced to the following factors:

- Military conflict within the region.
- Reduction of British and American military presence.
- China's interest in the region.
- Soviet Union's influence in the region.
- Domestic Politics.
- Economic requirements.

Military conflict within the region. The conflict in Indo-China was not the result of any indigenous dispute, but a manipulation of the region by external powers. The Vietnam experience has taught us that foreign intervention on behalf of any government, no matter how massive or destructive is no substitute for popular backing. It is at this time Malaysia began to believe that conflicts will be bigger than they need be when the elephants join the mousedeer. Regional peace can only be attained if Southeast Asia ceases to be an arena for great power rivalries and conflict. Also military alliances, bilateral or multilateral, were inclined to warfare than security and more beneficial to big powers than dependant states.

Reduction of British and American presence. Britain's troop reduction east of Suez and the United States apparent intent on reducing its military presence in the area gave rise to fears that the region would be left without economic assistance and could

become vulnerable to Chinese influence. The danger of regional hegemony by one of the major powers was ever present. Neutralization hence was designed to preclude this.

China's interest in the region. China has a special stake in the region because the region is at her doorsteps. The region also has a large Chinese migrant population. "China's attitude towards countries of the region has served as a yardstick for the formulation of the policies of the countries concerned".⁴ However the question remains whether China can be persuaded to accept the territorial integrity of the Southeast Asian States. One of the ways is by offering China the role of one of the guarantors in the regions' neutralization proposal.

Soviet Union influence in the region. After the Malaysian confrontation with Indonesia the Communist States began to move towards normal ties with Malaysia as evidenced by the establishment of the Soviet Embassy in Kuala Lumpur and by Malaysian-Chinese trade agreements. One of the principal initiatives undertaken by the Russians in the quest for influence in Southeast Asia was their collective security proposal for Asia. At the end of 1973 the position of the Soviet Union was aptly given by Ghazali Shafie when in a speech in Singapore he said "The Soviet Union appears to be moving in the Pacific region with a design and a purpose. This may be because she has never really played a role in the Pacific or because there is a clear and undivided focus of attention and interest brought about by the Sino-Soviet dispute".⁵

Regional development. In order to make the dream of neutralization come true, regional cooperation is essential. The success of ASEAN is conducive to neutralization. Tun Razak identified this organi-

zation as 'the solid foundation for the realization of the neutralization proposal'.⁶ There have also been a few favourable developments like the Philippine claim to Sabah, though not fully resolved has appeared futile and irrelevant to the concerns of the region. It is hoped that the new government of Corazon Aquino will resolve this in the interest of the region. Another has been the stabilization of Indonesia under President Suharto. Finally it is perceived that Thailand and the Philippines would disengage themselves from their alignment with United States, thus contributing towards the realization of neutralization.

Domestic Politics. When Tun Razak took over from Tunku Abdul Rahman he was anxious for some domestic policy to distinguish his government from the previous one. "Upon becoming Prime Minister he directed that a fresh look be taken at foreign policy and the neutralization concept was one of the results".⁷ Tun Razak was aware that his new policy would appeal to nationalist sentiments at home. China's acknowledged key role in the neutralization proposal promised to have an appeal for the large Chinese Community in Malaysia.

Economic Requirements. Finally, neutralization is clearly compatible with the governments' concern to obtain and maintain markets for Malaysian products. Commercial access to Soviet Union, Eastern Union, Eastern Europe and China assumes particular significance indicating a decline in importance of some of the more traditional markets for Malaysian exports.

REACTION WITHIN ASEAN COUNTRIES

For the realization of neutralization the commitment of any single state, no matter

how strong, is of course not sufficient. Malaysia has defined three steps towards its achievements as follows:

- The full commitment of ASEAN member states.
- The adherence of the rest of the South-east Asian States.
- The guarantees from China, the United States of America and the Soviet Union must be effected.

The Kuala Lumpur Declaration which emerged at the end of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting on 26/27 Nov 71 was a major milestone of the first step. "The Malaysian position on a neutralization, is one, clearly of unremitting approval; indeed, as the author of a glamorously attractive regional plan that has brought her name to world attention in a serious and flattering light".⁸ Let us now go on to see the reactions from Southeast Asian countries.

SINGAPORE

Despite its endorsement of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration Singapore has expressed serious reservations. Mr Rajaratnam has noted some surface similarities between guaranteed neutralization and colonialism, which, after all brought peace to the region through the dominance of external powers. In July 1972, Lee Kuan Yew told Newsweek "I would like the United States to maintain a sufficient economic and strategic presence in the area to prevent any other single power, or group of powers, from gaining complete hegemony over Southeast Asia". Singapore perceives China as a serious and continuing threat to the security of Asia and consequently viewed with uneasiness the partial American with-

drawal from the area. At this stage perhaps the following statement from S Dhanabalan may be in order. "The Island Republic would be prepared to tap big power interest, if it coincides with our own interest. We do not want to hitch our national policy to the promotion of any big power interest, but if our security is threatened, then our security and national interest will have to come before any puristic idea of non-alignment".⁹

THAILAND AND PHILIPPINES

These two countries share Singapore's apprehensions regarding China. Philippines still maintains American Military installations, which it regards as integral to its own security. For Thailand the conflict in Kampuchea remains of vital concern. Hence their defence agreement with the United States is of greater importance than the persuasion of peace. The Philippines stand on neutralization has not been consistent. One of the reasons is that a neutralized state can neither cede nor acquire territory, hence she would have to abandon its claim to Sabah. The new government while saying that it would like to resolve the matter has not taken any positive steps yet. Thailand's Tun Thanat Khoman said "Neutrality will work only if the countries can secure the respect of the other countries for their neutrality. International treaties are not necessarily the best guarantee, for international agreements and declarations are honoured only so long as it suits countries to honour them".¹⁰

INDONESIA

Indonesia's initial support was very encouraging. She believed that neutralization was worthy of support as long term concept. However like Singapore she had her own reservations about China. Indonesia was wary of the vacuum which will be created if American forces completely

withdraw from Southeast Asia. "At heart the Indonesia is not keen on the idea itself and would prefer that the countries of Southeast Asia move slowly but steadily towards a common front based on internal strength and a growing economic development in the region, a growing sense of meeting the needs of social development as well as economic growth, which would enable them to become simply less apprehensive about (and less vulnerable to) the intentions or potential disruption of the greater powers".¹¹ However Indonesia now seems to view neutralization more favourably.

JAPAN'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE REGION

This article would be incomplete if no mention is made of Japan the Economic Giant. This country definitely has a major role to play in the South-east Asian region. As the big powers move towards more aggressive policies day by day Japan will not remain unarmed for long. In fact in mid July 1985, the United States House of Representatives passed a bill calling on Japan to increase its military and defence built up to "fully carry out", its regional security responsibilities. In May 1983 during Mr Nakasone's visit to ASEAN countries, he emphasized the defensive nature of his countries military build-up and tried to gain support from all leaders of the ASEAN countries. He stressed that the expansion would be within the framework of the Japanese constitution and the Japan - US Security Treaty.

This expansion would also involve the intended responsibility for a sea-lane defense 1,000 nautical miles from Japan's coast, which would encroach into South-east Asia proper. Most ASEAN leaders while endorsing the Japanese build-up of its self-defense forces have also indicated it should not play an active military role in

the region. Japan can contribute to the defense of the region by indirectly assisting the economy, giving military aid, transferring military technology, and training. "It is not desirable however for Japan to involve its military forces directly either in protecting the sea lanes or patrolling the region".¹²

However it must be borne in mind that Japan's defense build up may easily fuel another arms race among the developing countries in the region either by presenting challenge to the Soviet - supported states or by providing military assistance to the ASEAN states. This would then be a major stumbling block for the aspirations of a neutralized South-east Asia.

PROSPECTS OF NEUTRALIZATION

The prospect of neutralization being successful has never been as dim as it is today. The downfall of South Vietnam and its reunification with the north has brought about changes in the foreign policies of Thailand and the Philippines. One of the obstacles to neutralization was the American bases in Thailand and the Philippines. Thailand had the American bases removed and established diplomatic relations with the Indo-Chinese states. Philippines whilst not removing the bases, have assured the Vietnamese that they will not be used against a foreign power. After a flurry of diplomatic goodwill the Philippines finally recognized Vietnam.

Recently the American bases in the Philippines came into the limelight when the Philippines in their new five year accord demanded a staggering US 1.5 billion dollars. However they finally settled for an increase from US 500 million dollars to US 900 million dollars. The Philippines Ambassador to US Mr Benjamin Romeldez had this to say eventually "The new com-

pensation package which has been negotiated represents a more realistic awareness of the real economic cost of the bases to us, and their value to the United States".¹³ The present government has not come up with any definite change in the foreign policy and it is envisaged that the situation of the American bases will remain unchanged for the time being.

The recent development in the Indo-Chinese states have made the neutralization prospects more dim. The Vietnamese supported by Russia are continuing their hostilities in the Indo-China region. These hostilities have extended to intrusion into Thailand by Vietnamese forces in their attempt to eradicate the Kampuchean Peoples National Liberation Front (KPNLF). These intrusions could spark off a large scale confrontation between the two countries.

Some of the other factors which will continue to hinder the prospects of neutralization as a working system are as follows:

- **Varying views of neutralization.**
Existence of perceived intra regional threats.
- **Insufficient regional co-operation and solidarity.**
- **Non-settlement of the Kampuchean problem.**
- **Financial and economic costs of neutralization.**
- **The presence of foreign troops in the region.**
- **Incomplete relations with all potential guarantors.**

Regional peace and stability is a precondition for making Southeast Asia a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. As an obvious prerequisite for such co-operation intra regional disputes must be defused lest they provide renewed temptation for the intervention by external powers.

OBSTACLES AND CURRENT CHALLENGES TO NEUTRALIZATION

With conflicts in the Indo-China states things have taken a turn for the worse. In the light of such hostilities around, the idea of neutrality is just a dream and at best premature. Russia is actively involved in Vietnam. On 20th Jan 1980 Singapore's then Foreign Minister Mr S Rajaratnam had this to say "Soviet support of Vietnam in Kampuchea and its military intervention in Afghanistan were part of Moscow's strategy for 'Global Domination'. The Kampuchean War would come to a grinding halt the day the Soviet Union switch off their supplies worth 2.5 million US dollars a day".¹⁴ America on the other hand has given strong guarantees to Thailand that it would come to its aid if its borders are violated by the Vietnamese. China had tried to teach the Vietnamese a lesson and a second lesson in the near future cannot be ruled out.

In Southeast Asia another form of insecurity is the rival territorial claims in the Gulf of Thailand and in the South China Sea. Coming nearer home, the potential for dispute exists amongst ASEAN countries. The Sabah claim by the Philippines has still not been resolved. There is also a nagging fear among the small ASEAN countries of Domination by a bigger country namely Indonesia. For the leaders of Southeast Asia the present situation is a source of concern. To them the prime concern is whether the new shape of forces can be utilized for their national good, regardless of consequences for other states or even the region as a whole. As a result the response of these statesmen to the current challenges is individualistic.

Thailand is fully alive to the changes in the region and the question that is foremost in the minds of the Thais is how to

make Thailand flourish in post Vietnam as it had during the Vietnam war. In anticipation of American pullout the Thais had laid the lines for communication with China. The Thais represent a tradition of pragmatism and realism and are keeping all their options open.

Mr. Lee Kuan Yew is usually up-to date with his assessment of the changing situation. His primary concern is how to make Singapore as secure in the near future as it had been in the past. He advocates an indefinite American military presence in Southeast Asia as he fears that an American pullout would expose the revolutionaries in the region towards greater violence. However he is presently more concerned with reviving the economy of the nation.

To the other national leaders, the necessity to safeguard national security is by no means unimportant and is definitely not overlooked. The late Tun Abdul Razak had felt that the various states ought not to float and drift along for another generation. The disengagement of the West from Southeast Asia and the change in Peking's posture towards its southern neighbours provided a unique opportunity to organize for peace and security.

CONCLUSION

For nearly four decades the states of Southeast Asia have been floating and drifting. At times, they have managed to avoid hitting each other, despite unpredictable political and economical conditions. On other occasions, the boats have collided in 'stormy' seas, often with gunboats from outside the region joining in. The experiences of these post war years have raised the question as to whether inter-state relations should be left entirely to chance and the whims and fancies of major powers for another generation. To those who are

aware of the terrible ordeal of the Indo-Chinese people the answer is "No". Governments must make a supreme collective effort to map out the seas, to set up traffic lights along passage ways, to build a control tower to advice on traffic directions, to discourage foreign gunboats from intruding and establish a machinery for resolving misunderstandings, disputes and conflicts.

Shakespeare in his famous book, JULIUS CAESAR wrote, "There is a tide in the affairs of men, which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune". In the perspective of modern history, it is evident that the tide for peace in Southeast Asia was reached immediately after the American withdrawal. However, lack of goodwill and suspicion against each other plus the near panic amongst some of the countries at the thought of the withdrawal sowed much enmity.

"The repercussions of the Indo-Chinese conflict may be manifested in three ways:

- That the conflict may escalate and lead to actual involvement of other actors within and without the region.

Even a containment of the conflict may effect the stability of the rest of Southeast Asia.

- That local insurrectionary movements in the non-communist Southeast Asia may feel compelled to be more active so as to be in harmony with other communist movements".¹⁵

The best bet for neutralization was detente between the superpowers. Today detente has taken a back seat and the atmosphere of the cold war has increased. Russia's action in Afghanistan and the American reaction to move in arms and men to the hot spots of the world, have

brought the two superpowers eyeball to eyeball towards an open confrontation. Under such circumstances neutralization is not likely to be pursued until greater calm returns to International politics.

Peace in Southeast Asia will never come as long as the Indo-China crisis continues. It is here that a solution has to be worked out. Failing this there would be no peace — not only for the Indo-Chinese states but for their ASEAN neighbours as well. Since the prospect of peace in Southeast Asia is very bleak in the immediate future, the prospect for neutralization is even more remote. "However it must be remembered that neutralization is not an end itself, it is a means towards the goal of a stable and peaceful region free of external interference".¹⁶

As long as there is instability and vulnerability of certain portions of Southeast Asia, it will constitute a serious problem and will generate perceptions of threat or opportunities for major power intervention. The conclusion is inescapable that whatever arrangements are made among the big powers, the critical requirement for the future of Southeast Asia is the construction of viable economics and politics — and regional cooperation is part of the concept.

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
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INFORMATION SHARING BY COMPUTER NETWORKING IN THE MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES ... a future reality



Mejar Mastimar Hj Yusoff Hilmi

The expansion of the Malaysian Army generally, and the restructuring of the Armed Forces as whole in the early 80's had more or less added extra responsibilities in terms of operations, training, administration and logistic to subordinate formation under their respective command. Due to the lack of informations in this field of knowledge, this article aims not only to inform but also give an overview, so that this vague subject becomes comprehensible to the layman.

The advancement of communication technology has come to a point, where human responses is taken over by machines. This, in a way, not only provides extra time and space for the common man, but also turns him into machine dependent. A future reality, there is hope, a possibility, it should be, since most western and Asian countries have not only used networking, but dwelled in more complex equipments. By comparison, if time is taken as the yard-

stick we are 27 years behind it.

What is information sharing? In layman's terms it should mean, one subscriber or more are able to exchange, retrieve and up-date records from computers, either by telephone, computer terminal or facsimile machine in graphic forms. This, is made possible by arranging and implementing networking in the respective area.

WHY NETWORKING

The reasons for this are many but only a few are quoted in the foregoing paragraphs.

Handling Arrestee. Changing environment had made the Armed Forces to change its warfare strategy from guerilla to conventional concept. The streamlining being done towards attaining that objective had, as a whole increased the work load in administration and movement of logistical resources from state to state either in the Peninsular Malaysia or in Sabah and Sarawak.

As it goes along the line of command, there are so many units interspersed within different geographical, topological and weather conditions. The flow and exchange of informations, from unit to formation, formation to formation, between the various corps, services and tri-services not only suffer misinterpretations, time-lapses, loss due to mishandling, not forgetting negligence, coersion and treacherous action by third parties, etc. Networking is the answer, a 'means' of arresting all the above-mentioned.

Medium of upkeeping measurement standards. The turnover rate of officers and other ranks either due to promotion, retirement, dismissal, demission or death is substantial. To upkeep their track records on individual achievement professionally past and present, the Armed Forces has not got a mechanised system, except manually. Professional standards are determined subjectively by officers whom the soldiers come in contact with to measure standards. The soldier's personal document is the only source of informations obtainable to gauge his professional achievement. That too, could be very tedious if done manually without the means of cross-referencing, to determine its authenticity. The responsibility of enhancing professional standards of soldiers has become more challenging.

Measurement standards to gauge professionalism is slowly being mooted, not only by the Army but also by the remaining services of the Armed Forces. Such standards would be a yardstick which would indicate the war-preparedness of individual soldiers and also the various subordinate formations.

Monitor Development. Formation at various levels of command would be able to monitor progress, training and the overall proficiency of units. Achieving this is a herculean task. There could be an effective system of planning, arranging, co-ordinating, directing and controlling of all projected programmes. Information sharing is beneficial in terms of professional development of soldiers and resources.

SYSTEM DEFINITION

Many, if not a few would be misinformed by such high sounding words as 'information sharing, networking, Data Communication etc'. To allay such fear of not understanding and then not wanting to complete the reading of this article, the writer would, in general term explain what is the system all about. Before information can be shared, there should first be a network which is mechanical in nature. The mechanical system is a computer based machine which can further be defined as, an electronic system designed to solve problems in the entirety at high speed by accepting data, performing prescribed operations on the data, and supplying the results of these operations in the form of useful informations. The computer is automatic and self-directing, once it receives a set of instructions specified in its programmes, it performs the job independently of direct human intervention.

In a nutshell, the above mentioned facts can be diagrammatically explained as follows, (see diagram 1).




Diagram 1: Projected Networking System

The host computer could be at the main terminal placed at higher formation which is further sub-divided into various service/corp departments headquarters. The host computer would be with an information centre. The information centre could be directly accessed by subscribers, either through telephone, facsimile or Video Display unit of a micro-computer. Security at this juncture, could be a question mark, detractors of this system but rest assured it would be dwelt with separately at a later stage. The host computer itself could be within an local area Network (Networking). It then branches out to other stations either through satellite, troposcatter or even normal ground stations which in general terms could mean a repeater or carrier station-facilitating information sharing. ATM (Automated Teller Machine) being utilised by Commercial Banking is a clear example of such a system.

WEAKNESSES OF MANUAL SYSTEM

Information sharers could overcome the labourious work load in the existing manual system, not only through easier cross referencing, but also through the 'push-button' resources at their disposal. As a keen observer, the writer identifies the following weaknesses inherited time and again without notice by most of us. The sub-paragraph heading could be seen in its own perspective either relationally subjectively and others probably might want to differ because as said earlier, the beholder sees most from a distance but notice none at his doorsteps. These weaknesses are diagrammatically explained by diagram 2, which are self-explanatory in 'bubble-gum' form. The arrows of the centre gum indicate as omnidirectional flow of these weaknesses common to any manual system without any preset.




Diagram 2: Bubble-Gum Flow of Weaknesses of a Manual System

PROCEDURES

SYSTEM OBJECTIVES

Networking could provide the following:

- Complete and up-to-date informations.
- An effective and efficient record search Mechanism.
- Provide machine generated activity listing, statistical summaries for all subscribers, etcetera.
- An inquiry system ON-LINE predetermined.
- Predetermined monitoring of subordinate formations by higher formation.

Computer Networking is classified according to Topology (locational position of a computer centre), control location, Type of Information carrier and usage of data connector. This system could be established to incorporate research work, administrative, bursary functions, library information, operational analysis, logistical analysis etc. The information sharers could utilise a move dedicated computerised-based files. As an added advantage subscribers without having to be trained 'ad hoc'. The Networking could be easily accessed through a 'menu system' operated by application programmes on Data Base Management System. These are other subsystem to this such as Management Information system. If it need be, the Armed Forces could go on software packages such as, Generalised Information System (Subscriber able to make new files, modify data

base, statistical accounting etc), Interactive Query facility and word processing, generally speaking the subscribers could share informations with a distant user on a 'REAL-TIME-ON-LINE' concept practically anytime even if the user is away by 'store and forward service' — informations stored is sent to a receiver when required or when a sender wants to convey information at specific time — at a press of button.

POPULAR NETWORK

Skeptics would cast doubt on the viability of this system mainly due to the large number of users. The system would get cluttered up with unnecessary delay and leaves the user frustrated in the long run defeating the aim of having such a system. That, could easily be overcome by the introduction of advanced telecommunication services which are already internationally marketed. Data Network using packet switch, has a maximum transmission speed of 64 kilo bits per second, is most apt to meet such needs.

It is also due to the nature of digital technology, that the more elements the Network uses in switching the more cost effective it is to install. With this system, the department where the user of subscribers come from, could either select to use facsimile in the morning and then perhaps computer link in the afternoon without leaving its communicating capacity idle. Suffice to mention the most popular Networks being used for information Networking are:

- a. Message Switch Network
- b. Packet Switch Network
- c. Local Area Network
- d. Circuit Switch Network

- e. Video Tax Network (e.g. PRESTEL System).

NETWORKING — A FUTURE REALITY

Networking among military establishments could be a reality in a few years to come. The situation is rapidly changing with the introduction of stored programme control (SPC) telephone exchanges. Already some percent of Malaysian network stored programme control exchanges, this is a step towards integrated service Digital Network (ISDN), to provide digital communications link for both voice and data networks. This is an attempt to give an overview of data communication service that are expected to be introduced in the immediate future.

Particular emphasis will be given to the packet switched data Network as it is expected to become the main vehicle for computer networking thus enabling wider sharing of information among users. The future trend would be enhancing communication services by integrating telephone, telex facsimile computers and other communication equipments. An example of this, being used is a system already developed by PERNAS NEC, called NEDIX — 510F which became an integrated computer and communication system.

SERVICE FEATURES

As a user the networking system could provide the following services:

- a. Digital Telephone Switching Service
- b. Voice and store and forward service
- c. Telex Switching service
- d. Teletype Message Switching service
- e. Facsimile Switching service
- f. Computer file transfer service
- g. Computer conversation switching service

h. Other additional major services are:

- (1) Retrieval of data
- (2) Broadcasting
- (3) Alternative receiving
- (4) Input/Output Sequential number control

SECURITY

There are problems obviously due to the nature of the competitiveness between departments, same information is not readily available for exchange. This may be used as an argument against the setting up of a computer networking.

Again, the question of information leakage and secrecy which has to be compromised at the expense of having computers between various departments. The chain of command functions has to be revised to accommodate networking.

There are various means of security measures to check all those mentioned above. Users could be given identification cards of number with the following alternatives to give access into colour-codes, passwords and the network. What you see in films and video shows where 'whiz kids'

manage to get access to host computer are more fantasy than truth. In actual fact, research which had been done proved that the probability of unauthorised accessibility to a host computer in terms of percentage is 0.0005 to a million.

CONCLUSION

It is hoped that the information provided will prove beneficial to those involved in the planning of communication facilities, to give a proper perspective for their respective organization and other prospective users of the Network. It is always a FALLACY AMONGST US, TO WAIT AND SEE THAT WE ARE GETTING WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT WE ACTUALLY WANT. Therefore it is hoped that prospective users especially military personnel would gear themselves in anticipation of the proposed network. There is optimism that much can be achieved in making computer networking on a national scale, reality in Malaysia and the military establishment in particular in the next few years, to come. There will be less duplication especially in terms of administration and personnel employment when informations could be readily shared.

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
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DEDICATION IN THE PERFORMANCE OF MILITARY DUTIES –

THE TASK OF MANAGING A MODERN ARMY



Mejar Bhagwan Singh

INTRODUCTION

Dedication can be defined as “to devote one’s time, strength or energies or even life to a special purpose”. In this context it would be devoting one’s time or life in the performance of military duties. This involves many aspects of human behaviour and attitude; and means different thing to different people. It is based on individual experience, upbringing, training and environmental exposure. Dedication or devotion, which can also be defined as genuine sincerity and sense of responsibility, is a state of mind and a product of strong convictions.

The Panglima Angkatan Tentera (then Panglima Tentera Darat) PAT has stated, “It is an honourable profession to be a soldier and every soldier must be made to feel proud of his profession”¹. The PAT has expressed the necessity to create an

attitude of genuine sincerity and the sense of responsibility in executing military duties. Hence the writing of this article.

LEADERSHIP AND COMMAND

The behaviour of an Army is a product of leadership and actions of its Officers Corps. It has also been said “There are no bad soldiers but only bad officers”. A military Unit, major or minor, is only as good as its Commander, because like a mirror, it reflects the total personality of its leader. All leaders cannot be military commanders but it is a primary requisite for all military commanders to be leaders.

Leadership is in many ways abstract but it can be quantified. The mechanics of leadership can be mastered. To quote Brig Gen Juan L. Raso of Philippines²:

"All good commanders have one common denominator: devotion to duty or dedication, which involves, more or less, full-time preoccupation with one's work. His leisure, his athletics, his home life are integral part of the commander's conditioning for the total employment of his efforts to accomplish his tasks and perform his responsibilities reposed upon him by his rank and position".

We have heard the expression, "A good commander is born, not made". This is not entirely true. By exercising certain principles, the vast majority of officers can become good commanders. In selecting potential commanders, some guidelines are provided in the "Twenty Questions³" reproduced at the end of this article. This, perhaps, should be our policy in selecting future commanders.

A good and efficient commander thinks big and in detail. He is the leader who sees beyond the horizons. He follows up "action taken". He who knows solving small problems can solve bigger ones. Problem areas are summarized under the 4Ms: Man, Methods, Materials and Money. He may not have all the perfect men in his command but he should have the ability to synchronize all to accomplish his mission. Such principles of management must be taught to our officers corps.

Speaking of the men, the commander's primary responsibility is their morale and welfare, their individual well-being, that of their families and last but not least, their physical and spiritual environment. Some adjuncts to morale³ are given as in Figure 1. Low morale, transfers, lack of discipline and the like are indicatives of poor leadership.

SOME ADJUNCTS TO MORALE

1. GOOD MANAGEMENT. We all like to be in a unit where things run smoothly, where things are planned, and where men do not have to "hurry up and wait".

2. ADEQUATE INFORMATION. Men like to be kept informed ahead of time of things that affect them or are apt to affect them. It is far better for the commander to keep his men informed than to have them seek to get such information from rumours.

3. HIGH STATE OF TRAINING. If a unit is not well-trained, its men know it. This fact shakes their confidence, especially if they anticipate the possibility of using that training in a critical situation.

4. CHANGES FOR ADVANCEMENT. Progress is morale-raising to all men. Knowing that advancement is possible and that excellent performance and preparation lead to promotion helps morale.

5. GOOD PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CONDITION. Good physical condition goes hand-in-hand with good mental condition. These two elements are basic to achieving good morale.

6. **GOOD ADMINISTRATION.** Men like to know that their pay accounts and individual records are correct and that their allotments are going through on schedule. These matters are very personal to a man and affect his confidence in his unit.

7. **CONFIDENCE IN EQUIPMENT.** Ours is one of the best equipped Army in the world. There is always better equipment under development than is in the hands of troops. Talking down our equipment as being obsolete and statements that we do not have the latest and best are detrimental to morale.

8. **CONFIDENCE IN COMMANDERS.** Men expect their commanders to know their jobs, to share the hardships with them, and to take a personal interest in their problems. You will not know whether a particular officer or soldier has a problem until someone has heard his case. A willing ear will gain much confidence.

9. **COMFORTABLE QUARTERS.** With a little encouragement, men will fix up comfortable quarters under almost any condition. They should always be made as comfortable as circumstances permit.

10. **MAIL SERVICE.** The soldier counts on his mail — he looks forward with anticipation to every mail that comes in.

11. **MEDICAL ATTENTION.** Confidence in the medical service is of tremendous importance to any unit, especially to a combat unit.

12. **PERNAMA FACILITIES.** The PERNAMA is a source of necessities and it should be run for the convenience of the troops, not its employees.

13. **LEAVES AND PASSES.** An effective policy in such matters provides beneficial breaks in routine. The leave program should be planned so that each individual knows approximately when he is going. He can then plan for it.

14. **RELIGIOUS SERVICES AND CHARACTER GUIDANCE.** It is especially important that an Army made up mostly of young soldiers be provided with facilities for religious services.

15. **AWARDS AND LETTERS OF COMMENDATION.** These means of recognition of good work play a most important part in achieving good morale.

16. **DIVERSIONS.** There are many spare-time activities that keep the soldier pleasantly and profitably occupied and add to his contentment. Among these are: Movies, well-equipped hobby shops, athletics, day-room and library facilities, tours and travel.

17. **STANDARDS.** Soldiers like to be in a "sharp" unit. They appreciate achievement of high standards in discipline, dress, house-keeping, police, maintenance, training, and athletics. The lift in morale that comes from impressive and well-executed military ceremonies is an important factor.

Fig. 1: Some Adjuncts To Morale

A good commander runs his unit not by fear for rank or position but by respect for and confidence in his competence. He exploits good psychology in handling men. He has a good intelligence or art of organizing common sense to solve a problem or accomplish a mission. He brings his logistics material as expeditiously as possible to wherever they are needed. His men, methods, money and material or portions of them, are employed at the correct time and space whenever and wherever needed. He has ingenuity in that he marshalls his forces with expertise within limited resources. He is pragmatic but flexible, imaginative and resourceful. His initiative is boundless, his dedication absolute and his competence tested. Such qualities must be developed into our training methods.

CONCEPT OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP

The concept of military leadership encompasses a leader who is aware of his responsibilities, capitalizes on his strong traits, corrects his weaknesses and is guided by the principles of leadership. He should employ these principles in the form of selected actions and orders to influence and direct his subordinates. Without undue harassment, he should supervise his unit by checking on its progress. He must evaluate his unit so that he may mould its members into a Combat Effective Unit. See figure 2.

LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE

The military leader is expected to set an example to his men in the performance of duty. He should share in the danger and hardships that they may be required to face and above all, his moral and ethical behaviour must be unquestionable. He is expected to possess certain permanent or inherent characteristics as traits or qualities. See figure 3.

A military leader also has a follower's role. As a subordinate commander he must repeatedly demonstrate the capability understanding his role and adjusting to requirements of his superior. However, this does not mean he should compromise at every opportunity just to curry favour. He must have the moral courage to speak his own mind when he finds himself in disagreement with his superior. It should not be a situation where senior officers resent criticism whilst their subordinates are reluctant to criticise. But sad to say, this seems to be a common syndrome amongst many of our officers.

"A good leader is one who has a strong sense of responsibility, who is committed to action and who is firm in implementing decisions".

— En. Mohd. Zaini Mohd Talha, Director of MAMPU⁵




Fig. 2: Concept of Leadership

S/No	US Marine Corps	RMC Canada	US Army	BRNC (Dartmouth)	RAF College	FM Lord Harding	FM Lord Slim	Gen. Dato' Hashim Ali
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
1.	Integrity	Loyalty	Bearing	Faith	Efficiency	Fitness	Courage	Bearing
2.	Knowledge	Professional Competence	Courage (physical and moral)	Courage	Enerby	Integrity	Willpower	Patience and Endurance
3.	Courage	Courage	Courage	Loyalty	Sympathy	Courage	Initiative	Personality
4.	Decisiveness	Perseverence	Decisiveness	Sense of duty	Resolution	Initiative	Knowledge	Dependability
5.	Dependability	Honesty	Endurance	Integrity	Courage	Willpower		Self-control
6.	Initiative	Commonsense	Initiative	Humanity	Tenacity	Knowledge		Justice and equility
7.	Tact	Good Judgement	Integrity	Commonsense	Personality	Judgement		Decisiveness
8.	Justice	Conficence	Judgement	Good Judgement	Personality	Team Spirit		Integrity
9.	Enthusiasm	Initiative	Justice	Tenacity				Knowledge
10.	Bearing	Tact	Loyalty	Fortitude				Intelligence and Initiative
11.	Endurance	Self-Control	Tact	Physical and Mental Fitness				Sence of Honour
12.	Unselfishness	Humour	Unselfishness	Self-Control				Loyalty
13.	Loyalty	Energy		Cheerfulness				Forward Looking Attitude
14.	Judgement	Enthusiasm		Knowledge				Tact and Unselfishness
	(Card MCS Form 719)	(Syllabus 1962)	(FM 22-100 Military Leadership)	(BR 2138)	(Amp 202)	(Address to RMAS Jul 1953)	(Address to RMAS 14 Oct 1953)	(Address to MAFSC 13 Oct 82)

Fig. 3: Qualities Of A Leader

An indecisive disposition is the mark of a weak leader who has no conviction, will not defend his own beliefs and will melt at the slightest pressure. There should be no "wax leadership" which would melt easily. Leaders must be responsible and committed to what they say and do. Officers must show competency, stability and consistency in performance of their duties.

Another quality which appears to be traditional in our leadership is the "feudal mentality", which is very conspicuous. For instance, the wives of the high — ranking officers are always elected to head the

various committees although their competency, leadership qualities, knowledge, experience and interest are questionable. Indirectly this feudal mentality creates obstacles to genuine leadership.

Officers must also have clarity of thought and determination to lead. This would enable them to determine the direction and objectives of the Army by mobilising and influencing thoughts and actions of the subordinates towards achieving set objectives. They must also have an open mind and be sensitive to strategic or environmental changes in the functioning of their units.

The above has got to be quantified and sorted out for different levels of the officer corps and included into our training programmes. Perhaps our training establishments can incorporate the above, and much more, into an Officers' Handbook to act as a constant reminder throughout one's career in the Army.

PRESTIGE OF ALL NCOs

Our Army is making advances in weapon systems to upgrade itself into a credible modern force. It is envisaged that by 1990, the Army will be highly mobile, have the right balance of forces, adequate firepower and punch to deter any would-be aggressor. This would require greater reliance than ever before upon our non-commissioned officers (NCOs).

Material improvements alone will not assure us of NCOs with initiative, aggressiveness, decisiveness and vitality necessary to respond to their increasing responsibilities and assume the burden of making immediate and accurate decisions on the battlefield. To fully develop the NCOs, a commander must place responsibility on him and permit NCOs to assume their place in command. Standards of performance need not be lowered. Honest errors must be expected and tolerated, but corrected. Senior personnel must not usurp responsibility which provides the experience needed in developing our junior leaders. Emphasis should be placed on the NCO's role as a LEADER, TRAINER and SUPERVISER.

A list of suggested action⁶ that may be taken by all officers at all levels of command to further the efficiency and enhance the stature of the NCO Corps is given as follow:

LIST OF SUGGESTED ACTIONS FOR NCO MANAGEMENT

AUTHORITY

- Prevent the use of non-commissioned officers for menial and degrading tasks.
- Ensure that non-commissioned officers are consistently addressed by their rank.
- Adhere to the chain of command through non-commissioned officer ranks.
- Reduce the requirement for officer supervision of mandatory presence at troop formations. Let the non-commissioned officer take charge.
- Avoid mass withdrawal of non-commissioned officer privileges, but take positive action against individuals concerned.
- When appropriate, permit key non-commissioned officers to attend staff conference and commander's briefing.
- Ensure that deserving, high-quality non-commissioned officers are commended for outstanding performance of duty by awarding them commendation, ribbons, letters of appreciation and commendation, or certificates of achievement.
- Refrain from over-supervising the non-commissioned officer after a task has been assigned. Issue mission-type instructions rather detailed orders.
- Whenever possible, place senior non-commissioned officer under the supervision of commissioned or warrant officers rather than civilians.

- Inform non-commissioned officers in advance of significant matters pertaining to the unit, such as maneuvers, field problems, training requirements, disciplinary matters, standards, etc., to avoid unfounded rumours and allow for necessary advanced planning at all echelons.

- Grant non-commissioned officers a greater voice in allowing privileges of awarding punishment. Consult with them on matters involving the reclassification and promotion of their subordinates. Let it be known that they greatly influence these matters.

- Use senior non-commissioned officers to assist in conducting inspections and in the planning, preparation and executing of the training, athletic, recreation, and social programmes.

- Ensure distribution of directives to non-commissioned officers so that they may have current information on military matters.

- Use senior non-commissioned officers as instructors to the maximum extent in training. Provide sufficient time, facilities, and reference material for the adequate preparation of instructional material for training.

- Back the actions of non-commissioned officers publicly when necessary.

- Refer to them as non-commissioned officers, not as NCO's or noncom's.

PRIVILEGES

- Pay troops alphabetically by pay grade, thereby allowing non-commissioned officers to report at a designated time before the remainder of the units is paid.

- Provide separate rooms for senior non-commissioned officers consistent with the efficient use of available troop facilities. The implementation of this privilege must be determined by local requirements and the facilities available.

- Within existing facilities, establish separate dining area or, at the minimum, separate tables within the mess for non-commissioned officers.

- Exempt qualified personnel from repetitive periodic training except as instructors and as required for supervision. For those excused from this training, conduct advance training of on-duty unit schooling.

RESPONSIBILITIES

- Insist on a thorough appreciation of the non-commissioned officer's full-time responsibility to his men and to his commander.

- Appoint senior non-commissioned officers councils at each level of command starting with battalion or separate company councils.

- Encourage non-commissioned officer participation in civic affairs.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Nothing can clothe with prestige a non-commissioned officer who does not know his job and does not play the part expected of him as a non-commissioned officer. Because of that, we should:

- Hold classes to insure that non-commissioned officers are thoroughly trained for their jobs and prepared to handle instructions or other duties when they appear before their subordinates.

- Encourage attendance at a non-commissioned officers courses designed to exchange the prestige and set the standards expected of non-commissioned officers.

- Encourage non-commissioned officers to take advantage of their many opportunities to increase their general level of education.

SOLDIER EXPECTATIONS AND MANAGEMENT

The Malaysian soldier is said to be simple and loyal human being. We as officers must understand his humanistic needs and behaviour. Soldiers expect their commanders:

- To satisfy requirements the service places on him.
- To be concerned with their needs.
- To be helpful to them in satisfying their personal goals.
- To be friendly in his approach towards them while maintaining some social distance.
- To have a strong influence in the unit and service.

The above expectations can be easily met if all officers:

- Show an interest in their men.
- Understand the men's needs.
- Be approachable and helpful to the men.
- Recognises the men's abilities.
- Be willing to back their men.

- Give the men a fair share of off-duty time.
- Have a fair promotion policy.
- Give talks on the importance of their unit's job or mission.
- Give personal talks on the men's progress.
- Keep the men informed always.
- Mete out punishment fairly.

The above can only be achieved by competent officers who practice sound administrative policies in their units and proper management of men under their command. Mediocre officers, without administrative abilities, when given the command will only produce mediocre units. If the aim is to create superior units, selection of commanders must be unbiased and the best men for the job must be appointed.

CREATING SUPERIOR UNITS

To create superior units, four basic principles apply. They are:

- a. The Superior unit must be created from the ordinary rung of personnel.
- b. Personnel must be classified according to ability. The men will fall naturally into three grouping — Upper Middle, Lower. The excellence of a unit depends upon the ability of the commander to bring the men of the lower group to a degree of proficiency which makes them an asset to his unit team.
- c. All men desire to do what is wanted of them. When they do not, it is because they have not been adequately motivated and instructed.

- d. The best unit in an organization is always the one which is excellent in ALL things.

A detail analysis of these principles and application can help the commander who is striving for a Superior Unit.

AN ANALYSIS

The problems of polishing ordinary units until they emerge as SUPERIOR are primarily the problems of raising individual performance levels and capabilities to a superior level. An analysis must first be made to divide the men into groups. This can be achieved either by taking the current qualifications of the men or by devising a Test for the various ranks and/or trades in a unit. Marginal personnel in the lower groups can be eliminated to facilitate training. Based on the qualifications (or percentage scores) the men can be grouped into Upper, Middle and Lower groups.

Those in the upper group are the best educated, are quickest to learn, can be well motivated, but need to be challenged to develop their full potential.

Those in the middle group are the average majority of the Malaysian soldiers. They are easily controlled, easily disciplined, learn easily, respond to good leadership, but are usually capable of more good work.

Those in the lower group are the ones who need special attention. The disciplinary problem is higher here. These individuals require special motivation and instruction. Their attitude constitutes a 'special barometer' of the esprit de corps of the unit. This group contains the many misfits, who, if they cannot assimilate, must be eliminated.

APPLICATION

A single section, platoon or company will probably contain men of all three groupings. This presents a practical problem in the handling and instructing of men and in perfecting them into a superior team.

The leader can afford to adopt only one approach into handling his men. He must assume that they all want to do what he wants done. When any number do not respond to this assumption, the fault is more probably his, not theirs. He should check his procedures, instructions and subordinate leaders to determine wherein lies the trouble. When only one or two individuals are involved, punitive action or elimination may be in order.

We now come to the fourth principle "The best unit in an organization is always the one which is excellent in all things". No Unit commander has enough time to make his unit superior in all things at all times. How, therefore, should he spread his effort? It is obvious that his unit must be proficient in marksmanship, communications, supply, administration, tactics, physical fitness, maintenance, etc. If his unit is not proficient in any one of these things, his team is not sound and will fail him when the test comes. How, then, must he manage?

First, he should avoid putting too much stress on any one thing so as to over-emphasize it in order to make a show of it. If he practices this method, he will do so at the expense of other important things. This is a common error and must be corrected.

Second, he must stress adequately all of the many facets of the training job. Even though he is not an expert in each, he must direct a subordinate to be an expert and the commander must then supervise and check this subordinate's work. This is an

important aspect of his responsibility.

MOTIVATION

Threads of motivation are woven into the entire pattern. This motivation is important because from it comes esprit de corps, enthusiasm, morale, effort, competition and accomplishment. The man in each of the upper, middle and lower groupings need to be motivated in different ways and in varying degrees.

In encouraging soldiers to learn, we motivate them by one or more of the following:

- a. Showing a need
- b. Developing an interest
- c. Maintaining interest
- d. Encouraging early success
- e. Giving recognition and credit
- f. Using competition
- g. Giving rewards
- h. Awarding punishments

These same things may be used to incite a body of men or a military unit into action. The real act in motivating men to accomplish a common mission is to reach each man in such a way that all men in the unit are incited to the extent of their several capabilities.

HONOURS AND AWARDS

Too often these go to the man in the top group. They provide no incentive for improvement to those in the lower group and little for those in the middle group,

because the men know that the awards are beyond their ability to achieve.

It is well to recognize the outstanding men. We do this through proficiency pay and promotions. However our system of awards must go beyond individuals and set the stage for awards to units, teams and crews in such a way that the efforts of the men of all groupings play a part in the winning.

Another method is to set a Standard of Excellence against which any man can compete and, upon attaining it, receive recognition. Marksmanship Badges, Expert Infantryman Award, Master Tank Gunner and Tanker Certificates, Excellent Driver Badges are example of this effective system, which would motivate others to strive harder in their respective trades. The effects must be felt by all men in the unit.

HUMAN BEHAVIOUR

In creating an effective functioning superior unit, the commander must always bear in mind the forces that influence human behaviour. The basic human needs of physical needs, learned needs, security, social approval and recognition must be constantly kept in mind when dealing with men. The outside or environmental influences from attitudes of civilians, the press, radio and TV, and the public at hometown do produce stress upon the soldiers.

The soldier should feel that he is needed and that his sacrifices are of immediate and long range benefits to his country, his home, his family and himself. He should feel that his unit is as important to him as his family that he is just as important to the unit. He will feel that importance as long as the people at home feel it. He is sensitive to public opinion and the treatment he receives from civil servants,

especially those in MINDEF.

This is where a programme should be introduced, as is done in Japan, to orientate all civilians to Army life, at the start for their careers, so that they would start appreciating the sacrifices we make and hardships we endure in the performance of our military duties in the service of the

nation and the people. If not all, the civilians employed by MINDEF must be orientated as here certainly is a case of showing "who is boss" and lack of rapport between the uniformed and non-uniformed staff. This is counter productive and affects the morale and well – being of the Army as a whole. Figure 4 illustrate the forces that influence human behaviour in the Army.⁷




Fig. 4: Forces That Influence Behaviour

PROBLEM AREAS

Almost everyone in the Army is both a superior and a subordinate, but it is the superior's leadership that is emphasized and given over-riding precedence. Many subordinates view the upward orientated behaviour of their superiors as intended to impress the boss and get a good confidential report.

Relations between superiors and subordinates present unique problems. Army emphasizes on getting the job done without too much concern as to how the human toll is extracted. This augurs ill for superior-subordinate relationships. This is the basis of much frustration in the lower ranks and either drives people out of the Army or become a latent reservoir of discontent.

RESEARCH STUDIES

A comprehensive study in the US Army by the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories concluded that junior officers relationships and experiences with senior officers are a major factor in career decisions. Where these relations are perceived as unsatisfactory, they leave the service. Where they are satisfactory, senior officer relationship become a motivation to remain in the service.

Other studies also echoed the Franklin Institute study. A study conducted by the Personnel Studies and Research Division, Dept of the US Army, states that resignees expressed intense dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the Army system. Singled out, it was a case of the senior officers who

forget about the mission and men and concentrated all efforts on "looking good and getting a high efficiency rating".

These studies are applicable to our Army as well. We are no exceptions and if similar studies are undertaken the same, if not more, weaknesses will surface. These frustrations leave a residue of bitterness and neither are psychologically sound way to cope with inter-personal relationships, which are heavily weighted in favour of superiors. The subordinates are expected to defer to those superior in rank and conform to their wishes.

Superiors pass judgement and rate the subordinates. No provisions are made for feedback from those rated concerning the leadership characteristics of the rating officers, though allowed to comment or seek redress on adverse reports. Except for administrative errors, confidential reports are difficult to challenge and even discouraged.

EVALUATION SYSTEM

Army leadership concepts expound the theory that superior-subordinate relationships are a two way street — that leaders are not only responsible to their superiors for their actions, but also have obligations to their subordinates. However, this is only in theory. In practice, the system only communicates forward how well subordinates took to their superiors. The subordinates never gets a routine opportunity to communicate his views on the quality of leadership received. If the Army recognizes that leadership implies an obligation to subordinates then obligations should be spelled

out. The subordinates should also be given the opportunity to evaluate superiors on how well "the downward obligations of leadership" are carried out.

The evaluation system should identify those leadership characteristics which the Army seeks to instill and perpetuate. Those led should be given an opportunity to evaluate leader on these characteristics. This will add a new dimension to efficiency evaluations. It will also provide routine feedback on the effectiveness of Army leadership as perceived at the grassroot level. Leaders would tend to be more considerate of subordinates and subordinates would be provided a means for "letting off steam". Otherwise, all the lip service will continue with emphasis on pleasing their rating officers with minimal considerations for subordinates, because it will be profitable for them to do so. If this is unacceptable, other methods of feedback can be introduced as discussed below.

MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES

The Service Corps has introduced the Management by Objectives (MBO) concept of administration for all its Transport Companies. Objectives are set for all aspects of administration, Technical and Material Management. Units collect data and analyse on it monthly against set objectives which are submitted to MINDEF. This is one area which can be extended to all units of the Army without much trouble to ensure a common and latest method of administration for the Army as a whole. This would also enhance productivity. The data collected can also be fed into the computerization programmes for better analysis and decision-making.

MANAGEMENT AUDIT

Another feedback concept that can be

introduced is in the form of independent Mobile Evaluation Teams from MINDEF to visit and conduct "Management Audit" on all Army units and headquarters to assess the command and staff performances, capabilities and problems. This can go hand-in-hand with the MBO concept of management discussed above.

CONFERENCES, SEMINARS AND CONVENTIONS

Junior officer's conferences, SNCO's Seminar, CO/OCs Conventions should also be conducted periodically to review the duties and responsibilities of the various ranks and appointments. These meetings should be conducted by Commanders themselves on an informal basis. Groups should not be too large. "Preaching" should be avoided. Open and frank discussions should be encouraged instead and aimed at improving unit performance and productivity. Brainstorming sessions and Quality Control Circles (QCC) are recommended.

ANONYMOUS SURVEYS

Anonymous surveys on current problems can also be conducted. Questionnaires can be targetted separately for senior officers, junior officers, SNCOs and soldiers. This can be undertaken by the Mobile Evaluation Teams or even conducted through normal administrative channels as and when required.

CONCLUSION

The Army is the product of leadership of its officers corps. A unit is the reflection of its the reflection of its commander's personality. A good commander is dedicated, whose full-time preoccupation is in solving unit problems be it Man, Material, Method or Money. He works tirelessly to

accomplish his mission with the given resources.

A good military leader capitalizes on his strong points and moulds his subordinates into a combat effective unit. He is expected to set a good example to his men and his behaviour must be unquestionable. He also has a follower's role but with moral courage to speak his mind. Leaders are not born but made by proper training and experience.

NCOs must be given responsibility to act independently in the battle field. Their prestige must be recognized by all as Leaders' Trainers and Supervisors.

Soldier expectations must be met by all commanders by sound administration leading to the creation of superior units by proper analysis, application of basic principles and motivation. Our system of honours and awards must go beyond individuals. The effects must be felt by all men in the unit.

Human behavioural and environmental factors and influences must be noted and the soldiers' sacrifices respected. Civilians should be made to attend short military training programmes to appreciate the soldiers' profession.

Superior-subordinate relationship studies should be undertaken by MINDEF or by institutions of higher learning. The subordinates should also be given the opportunity to evaluate their superiors based on Army Policy.

Management by objectives concept of administration should be introduced for all Army units. Management audit should also be conducted by Evaluation Teams from MINDEF to check the performance of both command and staff functions. Seminars, conferences or conventions for open and

frank discussions should be encouraged for continuous feedback, review and development of Army policies. Brainstorming, QCC and confidential surveys should be conducted frequently.

THE TWENTY QUESTIONS

1. Is the officer seeking command duty willing to devote all hours of the day and night, seven days a week, to his command?
2. Is his wife willing to take an active role in helping to make a happy "Army Community" in their unit area?
3. Is his family willing to be secondary, if necessary, to the company, battalion, regiment, brigade, or division?
4. Is he willing to learn, teach, stress, and live with the "fundamentals" necessary to make his unit good and still believe his great talents for "bigger things" are not being wasted?
5. Does he like to be with young people? Can he live with their energy, points of view, and the problems they create?
6. Is he willing to take the hard knocks that come from carrying the responsibilities for the failures of his subordinates?
7. Can he juggle at the same time all the balls of training, maintenance, tests, administration, property, communications, messes, supply, athletic, marksmanship, discipline, and public relations without dropping any of them?
8. Is he able to do many things concurrently, rather than being a "consecutive" doer? Can he manage a complex job?
9. Can he receive and carry out orders? Can he follow orders as well as give them?

10. Can he stand tough competition from like units and still retain a spirit of co-operation and teamwork with them?

11. Is he physically and emotionally fit to carry the load?

12. Does he have the courage to make and stand by tough decisions?

13. Are he and his family willing to "live in a goldfish bowl" where their actions are closely observed by both subordinate and superior?

14. Is he still enthusiastic and cheerful when confronted with seemingly impossible tasks to perform with inadequate means?

15. Is he willing to leave a warm office to check and supervise training, maintenance, and many other activities of his unit?

16. Is he willing to take responsibility himself and correct the situation rather than blame it on the staff of a higher headquarters or on a subordinate when things go wrong in his unit?

17. Is he willing to do his best with what he has" even though what he has seems inadequate?

18. Is he confident he can produce a superior unit with the usual run of manpower? Can he inspire personnel to produce outstanding accomplishments?

19. Is he willing to take a chance on being relieved for attaining only mediocre results?

20. Does he really want command rather than just "to get command on his record"?

FOOTNOTES:

1. PAT's (then PTD) Opening Address at his first Commanders' Annual Conference in MINDEF on 24 February 1984.
2. Philippine Army News, November 1974.
3. Guidelines for the Leader and the Commander by Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, USA.
4. Training For Leadership by John Adair, Gower Books and PTD's Lecture in "Leadership in Higher Command" to the Malaysian Staff College students on 13 October 1982.
5. A Working Paper presented by En. Mohd Zaini Mohd Talha, Director of MAMPU, at the Symposium on Leadership By Example at UKM, Bangi on 29 January 1984.
6. As per 3 above.
7. Military Leadership Manual, Department of Army (USA), November 1965.



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CIGARETTE SMOKING AMONG SOLDIERS IN AN ARMY UNIT



Lt Kol (Dr) V Supramaniam

METHOD AND MATERIALS

INTRODUCTION

Cigarette smoking is the fastest growing habit among people in developing countries — rising by 2.1% a year while it is falling by 1.1% in industrialised countries. Malaysia is no exception and our soldiers are involved in this smoking epidemic in their hundreds. This article describes a survey of smoking prevalence among soldiers in an army unit and recommends measures to control the “epidemic”.

A pre-tested short questionnaire in Bahasa Malaysia was distributed to soldiers of a multi-racial army unit for self-completion. A total of 252 soldiers (all males), the entire unit personnel present in base during the survey period from 22 July 85 to 25 July 85, returned the completed questionnaire. This was a 100% response rate. The strength of the unit was, however, much larger with the remainder on operational duties, courses or on leave. The questionnaire was analysed manually and the results are presented below.

RESULTS

Of the 252 soldiers, 75.8% are current smokers (defined as those who smoke one or more cigarettes daily), 20.2% non-smokers (defined as those who have never smoked) and four per cent ex-smokers (smoked at least one cigarette a day for as long as six months but does not smoke now). The age distribution of smokers, ex-smokers and non-smokers and the number of cigarettes they smoked are shown in Tables 1 and 2.

Of the 199 soldiers below 30 years of age, 79% are smokers while of the 53 soldiers 30 years of age and older 64% are

smokers. Of the smokers, 82.2% are below 30 years of age. Smokers of one to 12 cigarettes are defined as "light" 13 to 22 as "medium", 23 to 32 "heavy" and 33 and above as "very heavy" smokers. In this survey population, 26.2% are light smokers, 65.5% are medium smokers, 1% heavy and 7.2% are very heavy smokers.

The age smokers started their smoking are given in Figure 1. The earliest age is eight and the oldest is 41. The majority, 22.2% initiated smoking at 18 years of age and the next highest group, 13.8% at 19 years of age. Three did not answer the question.

AGE GROUP	SMOKING STATUS	SMOKERS	EX-SMOKERS	NON-SMOKERS	TOTAL (%)
20-24		104	2	22	128(50.8)
25-29		53	1	17	71(28.2)
30-34		22	4	7	33(13.1)
35-39		8	1	4	13(5.1)
40-44		4	1	1	6(2.4)
45-49		0	1	0	1(0.4)
TOTAL		191	19	51	252(100)

TABLE 1. AGE DISTRIBUTION OF SOLDIERS BY SMOKING STATUS

AGE GROUP	NO OF CIGARETTES SMOKED PER DAY				TOTAL (%)
	1 - 12	13 - 22	23 - 32	≥ 33	
20-24	34	61	0	9	104(54.5)
25-29	6	43	0	4	53(27.7)
30-34	6	14	1	1	22(11.5)
35-39	2	5	1	0	8(4.2)
40-44	2	2	0	0	4(2.1)
TOTAL	50	125	2	14	191(100)

TABLE 2. AGE DISTRIBUTION OF SMOKERS BY NUMBER OF CIGARETTES SMOKED PER DAY




Fig. 1: Distribution of Age of Soldiers First Started Smoking

DISCUSSION

Smoking Prevalence and Smoking-related Ill-Health

The 76% prevalence of smoking in this unit is very high when compared to other military group smoking. A 1974 study of smoking in a Malaysian infantry battalion found 50% prevalence.² The same rate was found in 1977 in a study of Malaysian army doctors.³ A more recent study of a Malay infantry battalion carried out in December 1982 showed 60% prevalence.⁴ Though these are not comparable studies, they indicate a rising trend in our Army. In this study, though the majority are light and medium smokers their risk to several diseases, which increases proportionately to the number of cigarettes smoked are much greater than non-smokers. The risk to smokers for cancer of the lung, vocal cords, mouth, oesophagus, bladder, pancreas and kidney, chronic bronchitis and emphysema is 2 to 18 times greater than non-smokers. It is estimated that 85% of all lung cancers are due to cigarette smoking.⁵ Smokers have a 70% greater heart disease rate than non-smokers.⁶ In a British study of 164 soldiers with coronary heart disease, heavy cigarette smoking for 92% of them was a major factor for their heart attacks.⁷ The

same is true of Malaysian coronary heart disease.

Smoking also contributes to cerebrovascular and peripheral vascular disease.⁸ It is responsible for abortions, stillbirth, low birth weight and premature babies.^{8,9} Smoking has recently been shown to cause impotence which can damage sex life.¹⁰ Non-smokers are also subjected to the passive smoke of cigarette smokers and this increases their risk of lung cancer and other smoking-related diseases.¹¹ They should therefore be provided with a smoke-free environment to protect their health, a legitimate right of all non-smokers.

Army and Smoking

The largest percentage of smokers (36.1%) initiated their smoking habit at ages 18 and 19, the age most join as recruits. This time of initiation could be due to peer pressure and or availability of spare cash. Army life appears to contribute to widespread and heavy smoking. In fact the Army indirectly contributed to smoking with free issues of cigarettes (or equivalent tobacco in lieu) at the rate of 50 per week per serviceman till September 1958, when it was changed to 50 per fortnight.¹² From January 1960, this free issue was only for

soldiers actually engaged in jungle operations for any part of the day.

...ed the cigarettes of the ...
...ing from smoking-related ...
... claim compensation, suing ...
... sue tobacco companies as is ...
... the United States and Bri-

Economics of Smoking

The economic cost to the country is a staggering three million ringgit per day.¹⁶ To a soldier who smokes 20 cigarettes per day, a vast number in this category, it costs on average \$2.00 per day. This amounts to \$720 a year, a tidy sum which could have been better utilised. Besides the financial cost, he lays the foundation for his children to take up the habit as it has been shown that children of smokers are more likely to smoke than children of non-smokers¹⁷ and also suffer more ill-health than children of non-smokers.

Cabinet Circular on Anti-Smoking Measures

A "No Smoking" directive (Cabinet Circular) was issued to all government departments including the Ministry of Defence by the Chief Secretary to the Government in August 1982.¹⁸ "No Smoking" signs may have gone up but the puffing still goes on regardless of the sign.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Armed Forces to adopt non-smoking as the normal social behaviour among all ranks and promote the development of this attitude.

ircular of 1982 which includes...

... and ...
... smoking control programme ...
... directed at recruits and officer cadets.
... Individual counseling by medical officers to all servicemen who smoke should be encouraged to become a routine matter.

4. Carry out a random survey of a larger representative sample of all groups from all three services to determine prevalence. This can serve as baseline data for further research and evaluation.

5. Stop distributing cigarettes with Hari Raya food packets.

6. Military shops to cease sale of cigarette and cigarette lighters. This may be bad for business but morally sound not to peddle wares of ill-health. It must be noted that the only safe cigarette is an unsmoked one.

7. Change smoking-related traditions such as cigarette or cigar serving during mess night.

8. Smoking in other ranks clubs and messes be limited to "smokers' corners".

CONCLUSION

The rising trend in smoking prevalence is cause for concern and efforts should be made to reverse the trend with active anti-smoking measures, some of which are mentioned under recommendations. Our task is to provide health education on the hazards of smoking, but the final responsibility for smoking or health rests on the individual as "You are the owners and the ..."

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20. The author extends his appreciation to Master Senthilvasan for printing the original script through computer for submission to the Editor.



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