




SOROTAN DARAT

JURNAL TENTERA DARAT MALAYSIA

THE HOUSE JOURNAL OF THE MALAYSIAN ARMY



KANDUNGAN



2 Dari Meja Editor


ARTIKEL

3 Projek Tentera Masuk Desa
Long Kevok



12 The Linkage Between the Trainer,
the Organisation and Change

15 Field Artillery Survivability



20 Pembangunan Keupayaan Angkatan Pertahanan

27 Motivation in the Malaysian Armed Forces



34 PLPTD - Satu Pengalaman

41 Regional and
World Orders



Front cover: Projek Tentera Masuk Desa
Long Kevok

PROJEK TENTERA MASUK DESA LONG KEVOK



PERMULAAN

Konsep Tentera Masuk Desa (TMD) telah diilhamkan oleh bekas Panglima Angkatan Tentera Jen Tan Sri Hashim bin Mohd Ali dan penglibatan pihak tentera dalam projek TMD telah bermula dengan pengistiharan yang telah dibuat oleh beliau dalam ucapannya sempena menyambut hari ulangtauhun ATM yang ke 57 pada 16 Sep 1990. Rancangan TMD ini dilancarkan bertujuan:

- Membantu kerajaan dalam kerja-kerja pembangunan negara dengan mempergunakan kepakaran dan kemudahan tentera agar dapat memanfaatkan rakyat disegenap lapisan.
- Mempereratkan hubungan baik diantara tentera dan rakyat dengan hasrat untuk memupuk ketahanan nasional bagi memenuhi keperluan pertahanan menyeluruh yang digariskan dalam dasar pertahanan negara.

Perlaksanaan projek TMD sebenarnya bukanlah perkara baru kepada ATM malah ianya merupakan kesinambungan terhadap konsep 'Jiwa Murni' yang telah di implementasikan beberapa tahun yang lalu. Penekanan utama yang diberikan didalam rancangan TMD ini ialah melaksanakan kerja-kerja pembangunan dikawasan-kawasan pendalaman yang mana kemudahan dan pembangunan untuk dilaksanakan oleh agensi

agenzi awam kerajaan menerusi cara-cara konvensional sangat rumit. Kesukaran-kesukaran tersebut timbul disebabkan oleh dua faktor utama iaitu sistem perhubungan yang tidak baik dan juga perbelanjaan yang terlalu tinggi. Kemudahan serta kepakaran yang sedia wujud di dalam ATM membolehkan kerja-kerja pembangunan dilaksanakan dengan lebih teratur dan menjimatkan.

Panglima Wilayah II merupakan penggerak utama dalam memenuhi kehendak dan falsafah TMD di Sabah dan Sarawak. Pihak kerajaan negeri telah memberi sambutan yang menggalakkan di atas beberapa projek-projek pembangunan khususnya di kawasan pendalaman.

Projek-projek besar yang telah dilaksanakan dan di dalam peringkat perancangan adalah seperti

Bil	Jenis Projek	Anggaran Perbelanjaan
(a)	(b)	(c)
1.	Pusat Perkhidmatan Long Kevok	\$ 500,000.00
2.	Pusat Perkhidmatan Mulu	\$ 1,200,000.00
3.	Pusat Perkhidmatan Long Jegitan	\$ 500,000.00
4.	SRK Ba Kalalan	\$ 150,000.00
5.	Jambatan Gantung Tuaran	\$ 40,000.00
6.	Jambatan Gantung Bario	\$ 150,000.00

Setakat ini projek pembinaan Pusat Perkhidmatan Kaum Penan Long Kevok di Bahagian Miri merupakan projek terbesar pernah dilaksanakan melalui rancangan TMD. Ini berdasarkan kepada jumlah bangunan yang dibina, keperluan perbelanjaan dan jumlah anggota terlibat dalam menjayakan projek tersebut.

TUJUAN

Tujuan rencana ini ialah untuk memberi gambaran menyeluruh mengenai penglibatan pasukan Jurutera serta lain-lain kor dalam perlaksanaan projek TMD Long Kevok.

LATARBELAKANG PROJEK

Long Kevok merupakan sebuah perkampungan masyarakat Penan yang terletak di Ulu Tutoh, Baram di Bahagian Miri. Perkampungan yang terletak jauh dipendalamannya ini bergantung kepada dua jenis sistem perhubungan utama iaitu menggunakan pesawat udara dan juga bot serta kenderaan pembalakan. Penerbangan menggunakan helikopter ke kawasan ini daripada bandar Miri mengambil masa selama 40 minit sementara perjalanan menggunakan bot Ekspres/kenderaan pembalakan akan mengambil masa lebih kurang 2 hari.

Penduduk kampung Long Kevok terdiri daripada suku kaum Penan yang hidup secara separuh tetap (semi settled). Jumlah penduduk disini dianggarkan seramai 150 orang sementara jumlah penduduk Penan di perkampungan persekitaran dianggarkan berjumlah diantara 600 - 700 orang. Aktiviti kehidupan mereka tertumpu kepada kegiatan harian mereka iaitu memburu binatang, mengamalkan pertanian pindah serta mencari hasil hutan-hutan sebagai sumber pendapatan. Dengan mengamalkan cara hidup yang sedemikian, taraf hidup masyarakat Penan disini adalah dibawah paras kemiskinan negara. Pendapatan mereka melalui hasil-hasil hutan dan juga buruan telah terjejas dengan kehadiran kegiatan pembalakan di persekitaran perkampungan mereka.

Menyedari hakikat ini, maka pihak kerajaan Negeri Sarawak telah merancangkan agar satu Pusat Perkhidmatan di bina di Long Kevok bertujuan mendidik serta membimbing masyarakat Penan agar mengubah cara hidup mereka seterusnya memperbaiki taraf kehidupan mereka ke satu tahap yang lebih membanggakan. Sejajar dengan pelancaran TMD, pihak kerajaan negeri telah meminta jasabait pihak tentera di Wilayah II untuk memenuhi cara-cara ini dengan membina sebuah Pusat Perkhidmatan yang lengkap dengan kemudahan-kemudahan asas di Long Kevok.

PERLAKSANAAN

Tinjauan. Penglibatan pihak tentera secara fizikal dalam projek pembinaan Pusat Perkhidmatan Kaum Penan Long Kevok bermula satu tinjauan bersama bagi mengenalpasti kesesuaian tapak dan lain-lain keperluan dilakukan pada 2 Mei 91. Laporan tinjauan lengkap telah dihasilkan merangkumi perkara-perkara berikut:

- Keperluan bangunan dan kemudahan.
- Keadaan dan kawasan tapak projek.
- Keperluan sistem bekalan air dan elektrik.
- Rekabentuk dan pelan bangunan.
- Skop kerja.
- Sistem pembekalan bahan binaan.
- Sistem ulangbekal catuan, PMP dan gas.
- Peralatan-peralatan khas.
- Keperluan tenaga kerja.
- Jangkamasa pembinaan.
- Hal-hal pentadbiran.

Keperluan Bangunan dan Kemudahan. Keperluan pembinaan di Pusat Perkhidmatan ini merangkumi struktur-struktur berikut:

- 1 x bangunan sekolah berukuran 20' x 90' yang mengandungi 2 x bilik darjah, 1 x bilik sumber, 1 x pejabat dan 1 x stor.
- 1 x bangunan asrama berukuran 23' x 70' yang mengandungi 2 x bilik asrama (lelaki dan perempuan), 1 x pejabat dan 1 x bilik penginapan penjaga asrama. Bangunan ini juga perlu dilengkapkan dengan 'sleeping platform' dan almari pakaian.
- 1 x dewan makan berukuran 23' x 30' dilengkapkan dengan bangku dan meja makan.
- 1 x rumah masak berukuran 18' x 38' mengandungi kemudahan memasak yang lengkap serta 2 x stor.
- 1 x bangunan dua tingkat berukuran 35' x 120' yang mana bahagian atasnya mengandungi 4 x berek kediaman yang mempunyai 2 x bilik tidur, 1 x ruang tamu, 1 x dapur dan 1 x bilik mandi/tandas. Tingkat bawah bangunan akan digunakan sebagai 1 x pejabat perubatan serta klinik dan 1 x pejabat pertanian.
- 2 x bangunan tandas berukuran 14' x 5' yang mana tiap-tiap satu mengandungi 4 unit tandas curah.

- 1 x bangunan bilik mandi berukuran 30' x 8'.
- 1 x rumah penjanakuasa berukuran 12' x 12'.

Struktur-struktur lain yang juga perlu dibina merangkumi:

- Laluan pejalan kaki kayu belian.
- Laluan pejalan kaki konkrit.
- Tangki najis.
- Menara air.
- Ampaihan kain.
- Papan tanda.
- Tiang bendera.


Kawasan dan Keadaan Tapak Projek. Kawasan projek terletak di Long Kevok iaitu sebuah perkampungan Penan di kawasan pendalamana daerah Baram. Perhubungan utama ke kawasan ini dari Jeti terdekat di Tembalak adalah dengan menggunakan kenderaan pacuan empat roda melalui jalan-jalan pembalakan. Masa perjalanan di jeti tersebut adalah lebih kurang 2 jam merangkumi jarak kira-kira 80 km. Kawasan disekeliling kawasan pembinaan diliputi

hutan-hutan tebal yang merupakan kawasan pembalakan.


Kawasan tapak projek sebenar merupakan satu kawasan bukit yang telah dipotong dan sebahagian besar daripada kawasan ini dikelilingi oleh Sungai Layun dan Sungai Kevok. Keluasan keseluruhan kawasan pembinaan ialah lebih kurang 2.5 hektar.

Sistem Bekalan Air dan Lektrik. Oleh kerana terdapat kemudahan asas seperti bekalan air dan juga tenaga elektrik maka satu sistem pembekalan keperluan tersebut telah diwujudkan sendiri oleh pihak tentera. Sungai Kevok yang jauhnya kira-kira 100 kaki dari kawasan pembinaan telah dijadikan punca air bagi kegunaan harian anggota dan juga untuk digunakan dalam kerja-kerja pembinaan. Disebabkan tebing yang agak tinggi, 32 buah alcon pump telah digunakan serentak bagi tujuan tersebut. Untuk membekalkan tenaga elektrik, satu penjanakuasa elektirk 2.5 KVA telah digunakan. Ianya mampu membekalkan tenaga bagi menggunakan peralatan letrik semasa kerja-kerja pembinaan dan juga bekalan tenaga untuk kemudahan anggota pada waktu malam.

PETA KAWASAN PROJEK



SUSUNATUR KEDUDUKAN BANGUNAN



Rekabentuk dan Pelan Bangunan. Rekabentuk yang digunakan didalam projek ini adalah berdasarkan kepada rekabentuk yang telah dihasilkan oleh Jabatan Kerja Raya Negeri Sarawak (JKR). Walau bagaimanapun beberapa ubahsuai telah dibuat dimana difikirkan sesuai untuk memudahkan pembinaan serta untuk disesuaikan dengan bahan binaan yang dibekalkan.

Sebahagian besar daripada bangunan-bangunan telah dibina menggunakan kayu-kayu kecuali bahagian lantai dewan makan, lantai dan dinding rumah masak, lantai bilik mandi dan lantai serta dinding dapur berek kediaman di perbuat daripada menggunakan konkrit. Bumbung bagi kesemua bangunan diperbuat menggunakan 'spandek' dan asbestos.

Skop kerja. Bagi memastikan kelancaran perjalanan projek serta memenuhi kehendak untuk menyiapkan dalam jangkamasa yang ditetapkan, kerja-kerja telah dijalankan mengikut keutamaan. Skop kerja menurut keutamaan adalah seperti berikut:

- **Penyediaan Tapak (Keutamaan 1).** Memandangkan keadaan tanah di kawasan tapak

projek agak rata, maka kerja-kerja tanah yang kecil sahaja terpaksa dilakukan. Selain daripada kerja-kerja merata tapak, pembersihan kawasan daripada semak samun juga telah dibuat.

• **Setting Out (Keutamaan 2).** Kerja-kerja ini telah dilakukan bagi memastikan kedudukan dan bentuk asas bangunan mengenalpasti dengan lukisan kedudukan bangunan yang telah dihasilkan.

• **Pembinaan 4 Buah Bangunan Utama (Keutamaan 3).** Kerja-kerja pembinaan bangunan-bangunan utama telah dirancangkan untuk dilaksanakan pada peringkat awal meliputi bangunan-bangunan berikut:

- Bangunan bilik darjah.
- Bangunan Asrama.
- Bangunan rumah masak.
- Bangunan dewan makan.
- Bangunan berek kediaman/pejabat pertanian/klinik.

• **Pendawaian Lektrik (Keutamaan 4).** Tugas penugasan pendawaian elektrik perlu dilaksanakan

sebaik sahaja sebahagian daripada 4 buah bangunan utama dapat disiapkan. Ini perlu bagi memastikan kerja-kerja pendawaian dapat berjalan serentak dengan kerja-kerja pembinaan bagi menjimatkan masa kerja.

- **Pembinaan Bilik Mandi (Keutamaan 5).** Pembinaan bilik mandi dijalankan oleh kumpulan yang bertanggungjawab membina bilik darjah sebaik sahaja bangunan tersebut dapat disiapkan.
- **Pembinaan Rumah Penjanakuasa (Keutamaan 6).** Oleh kerana pembinaan bilik mandi tidak memerlukan satu jangkamasa yang lama, maka anggota yang telah selesaikan membinanya akan meneruskan kerja-kerja mereka untuk membina rumah penjanakuasa.
- **Pembinaan Tandas dan Kemudahan Infrastruktur (Keutamaan 7).** Ini meliputi kerja-kerja pembinaan 2 buah bangunan tandas dan juga lain-lain kemudahan yang perlu diadakan di pusat perkhidmatan ini. Ianya merupakan kerja-kerja pembinaan yang terakhir.
- **Pembersihan Akhir (Keutamaan 8).** Ianya merangkumi tugas-tugas pembersihan terakhir kawasan pembinaan dan juga persiapan keanggotaan dan peralatan sebelum pergerakan keluar anggota dari kawasan projek setelah semua kerja-kerja selesai dilaksanakan.

Sistem Pembekalan Bahan Binaan. Urusan mendapat serta menghantar bahan binaan ke tapak projek telah dipertanggungjawabkan kepada pihak Residen Miri. Barang-barang 'hardware' telah dibawa ke kawasan projek dari Miri ke Jeti Tamalak menggunakan bot sementara dari Jeti ke Long Kevok menggunakan trak pembalakan.

Kayu-kayan pula diperolehi daripada kem pembalakan berdekatan. Kayu-kayan ini telah dibelah di kawasan tersebut menggunakan gergaji rantai (chainsaw). Oleh kerana kayu-kayan yang dibekalkan bermutu rendah dan tidak menepati saiz yang diperlukan, maka anggota-anggota tentera telah sekali lagi terpaksa membelah dan mengetam semula sebaik sahaja kayu-kayan tersebut diterima di kawasan projek.

Semua senarai keperluan bahan binaan telah dihasilkan berdasarkan kepada lukisan rekabentuk yang dikeluarkan oleh pasukan jurutera. Ditapak projek segala penerimaan dan pengeluaran bahan binaan dikendalikan oleh seorang PTT Kanan yang berkelulusan KMSK.

Sistem Ulangbekal Catuan, PMP dan gas. Sepanjang penglibatan didalam projek TMD Long Kevok, segala urusan ulangbekal telah dibuat melalui 10 RAMD yang berpengkalan di Miri. Ulangbekal dibuat pada setiap 14 hari menggunakan pesawat TUDM-NURI dan melalui penguguran udara menggunakan pesawat TUDM-Carribou. Di dalam setiap ulangbekal catuan tempur untuk kegunaan 12 hari serta catuan basah dan kering untuk kegunaan 2 hari di hantar ke kawasan penempatan. Sekurang-kurangnya 2 sortie penerbangan NURI diperlukan untuk setiap ulangbekal. Ulangbekal PMP dan gas dibuat sekali dalam masa satu bulan menggunakan tongkang dan juga trak-trak pembalakan.

Keperluan Peralatan Khas. Beberapa peralatan khas telah dikemukakan untuk dibekalkan oleh pihak kerajaan negeri sebelum projek dimulakan. Ini bertujuan melicinkan perlaksanaan projek serta menepati jangkamasa perlaksanaan yang telah ditetapkan.

Tenaga Kerja. Jumlah keseluruhan tenaga kerja yang terlibat dalam perlaksanaan projek ini ialah 3 x pegawai dan 100 x LLP. Daripada jumlah tersebut 2 x pegawai dan 60 LLP adalah dari 10 Skn Jutra, 1 x pegawai dan 20 x LLP dari 10 RAMD dan 20 x LLP dari 2 Renjer DiRaja. Selain daripada anggota-anggota tersebut, pegawai dan anggota dari Kor Kesihatan dan Kor Agama Angkatan Tentera telah dimasukan ke kawasan projek dari masa ke semasa untuk memberi perkhidmatan kepada anggota-anggota tentera dan juga masyarakat Penan di Long Kevok serta perkampungan dipersekitarannya.

Jangkamasa Projek. Di dalam perancangan, projek ini dijangka akan dapat disiapkan dalam tempoh 90 hari kerja. Berdasarkan kepada tempoh tersebut, projek yang telah dimulakan pada 1 Jun 91 dijangkakan akan dapat disiapkan pada 31 Ogos 91. Walaubagaimanapun diatas sebab-sebab tertentu seperti kelewatan penerimaan bahan binaan, projek ini hanya dapat disiapkan sepenuhnya pada 4 Dis 91.

Serah Menyerah. Projek ini telahpun disiapkan pada 4 Dis 91 dan upacara perasmian dan serah menyerah projek telah dibuat pada 20 Jan 92. Untuk menyerahkan perasmian Pusat Perkhidmatan ini YB Dato' Seri Haji Najib bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak iaitu Menteri Pertahanan telah melapangkan masa untuk menyerahkan projek ini kepada YB Datuk Abang Abdul Rahman Zohari bin Datuk Haji Openg iaitu Menteri Pembangunan Perindustrian Sarawak merangkap Pengurus Jawatankuasa Kabinet Sarawak mengenai Kaum Penan. Turut hadir ialah Panglima Angkatan

Tentera Jen Tan Sri Hashim bin Mohd Ali, Panglima Wilayah II Mej Jen Dato' Abdul Manap bin Ibrahim dan Dif-dif Kenamaan.

PELAJARAN YANG DIPEROLEHI

Pada amnya, berbagai-bagai jenis masalah telah timbul dari beberapa aspek seperti bahan binaan, perhubungan dan masalah-masalah pentadbiran. Walaubagaimanapun, dengan kegigihan dan ketabahan anggota-anggota tentera dalam projek ini telah dapat melaksanakan dengan jayanya. Beberapa pelajaran yang didapati hasil dari perlaksanaan projek ini ialah:

- **Perhubungan.** Di dalam perlaksanaan sesuatu projek yang agak besar dan melibatkan keanggotaan yang ramai satu sistem komunikasi yang baik mestilah diwujudkan. Penglibatan didalam projek TMD yang pada kebiasaannya terletak di kawasan terpencil sepatutnya mempunyai sistem perhubungan seperti berikut:

- .. Sistem telefon mudah alih sebagai tambahan kepada sistem perhubungan biasa menggunakan komunikasi radio. Ini akan dapat menwujudkan perhubungan terus diantara pegawai tapak dan agensi-agensi awam.

- .. Sekurang-kurangnya sebuah kenderaan yang bersesuaian ditempatkan di kawasan projek bagi memudahkan perhubungan di dalam mengendalikan masalah pentadbiran dan kes-kes kecemasan.

- **Bahan-binaan.** Pihak yang menguruskan pembekalan bahan binaan seharusnya mengambil langkah-langkah tertentu bagi memastikan perkara-perkara berikut:

- .. Bahan binaan yang di hantar oleh pembekal mestilah mengikut spesifikasi yang terdapat didalam dokumen tender/sebutharga. Kegagalan berbuat demikian akan menyebabkan perlaksanaan kerja menjadi lambat.

- .. Penghantaran bahan binaan mestilah dibuat oleh pihak pembekal mengikut jadual penghantaran yang dikeluarkan. Anggota tentera hanya masukkan ke kawasan projek setelah kesemua bahan binaan sampai di tapak projek.

Pentadbiran

- .. **Catuan.** Pihak-pihak berkenaan mestilah menentukan agar makanan anggota-anggota projek bersesuaian dengan tugas berat yang dilaksanakan. Penggunaan catuan tempur untuk tempoh melebihi 4 bulan dianggap tidak bersesuaian dan memberi kesan negatif terhadap kesihatan dan moral anggota.

- .. **Hiburan.** Perkara-perkara riadah mestilah diberi perhatian wajar sebagai kebajikan anggota bagi menjaga moral dan juga mengelakkan daripada timbulnya masalah sosial.

- .. **Waran/Sijil Ketiadaan.** Perkara ini seharusnya diperuntukan kepada anggota projek yang terpaksa keluar dari kawasan projek untuk urusan mendapatkan bahan binaan dan sebagainya. Ini perlu bagi anggota-anggota daripada terpaksa menggunakan wang persendirian semasa menjalankan tugas tersebut. Perkara ini juga perlu dalam pengendalian kes-kes kecemasan.

PENUTUP

Secara keseluruhan projek TMD Long Kevok telah dapat dilaksanakan dengan memuaskan. Dengan terbinanya Pusat Perkhidmatan ini masayarakat Penan yang kebanyakannya buta huruf pada hari ini, telah mula menghantar anak-anak mereka ke sekolah yang didirikan untuk menimba ilmu pengetahuan. Keadaan kesihatan mereka juga menjadi lebih baik dengan adanya Klinik Desa untuk memenuhi keperluan mereka. Disamping itu juga, dengan adanya pejabat pertanian di Pusat Perkhidmatan ini, kaum Penan akan dibimbing kerja-kerja yang boleh mendapatkan pendapatan yang lebih baik.

Bagi ATM pula, projek TMD Long Kevok telah membuktikan keupayaannya untuk berganding bahu dengan agensi-agensi kerajaan yang lain dalam membangunkan negara. Ianya juga telah berjaya merapatkan hubungan diantara tentera dan rakyat untuk memupuk ketahanan nasional bagi mencapai keperluan pertahanan menyeluruh dalam dasar pertahanan negara.

**"TENTERA DAN RAKYAT BERSAMA
MEMBANGUNKAN NEGARA"**

*Sumbangan:
Jabatanarah Jurutera*

The Linkages Between the Trainer, the Organisation and Change

"Progress is impossible without change; and those who cannot change their minds cannot change anything"

- George Bernard Shaw -

INTRODUCTION

The Training and Development Department (or sometimes called the "trainer") is a familiar sub-group in most organisations. Why? Because the people of any organisation are like water put into the coffee machine: for their output to be acceptable, they must change from what they were when they reported for work, using the materials in an approved fashion and allowing the organisation to reach its desired output. Though primarily concerned with people, the trainer is also concerned with technology, materials and time, and other aspects and the final outcome is that the organisation requires work to be done in order to produce this output. Since organisations can rarely secure people who are, at time of employment total experts of their unique requirements, organisations need a subsystem called training to help them in the mastery of their tasks. That raises the question, "What about people who have been doing their present jobs properly - but no longer does so?" It is certainly true that these people are not meeting the established standards of performance but will training do them any good? Not really. Their non performance could be due to lots of varied reasons thus, it is amongst others, one of the responsibilities of the trainer to identify, evaluate and analyse and bring about a desired effect which we term as "change" employing learning experiences (knowledge, skills and attitudes) so as to attain the organisational goals and objectives accordingly.

AIM

The aim of this paper is to examine the linkages between the trainer, the organisation and change.

SCOPE

The scope of the paper will cover the following:

- What are Organisations?
- Change - What is it?, Who and Why organisations want it?

- The Trainer as the Change Agent in Organisations.
- Conclusion.

WHAT ARE ORGANISATIONS?

Organisations can be viewed as a system with units and components that are interrelated and interdependent forming an entity to achieve common goals and objectives. They need inputs such as resources for example raw materials, money, machines, methods and manpower for their existence and they also have to take into consideration constraints under which they function. The inputs are then "processed", that is functions in accomplishing the work, in order to obtain an output. These functions include planning, organising, communicating, interacting and working. The output will be the resultant goods or services that will meet the objectives of the organisation and impacts of these outputs in fulfilling the goals of the organisation are its outcome. To determine to what extent organisational objectives have faired so that remedial or corrective actions can be taken, feedbacks need to be obtained by whatever available means. Boundaries within which organisations operate will differentiate themselves from others and anything outside these boundaries that will influence the organisations directly or otherwise is the environment and these include amongst others; technological changes, political, social, demographic or economic situations.

Effective organisations are ones that are able to cope with and survive in ever changing surroundings and environments and are able to achieve its goals come what may. These organisations are also capable of maintaining itself internally in-house and are able to resolve its conflicts as and when they occur so as to maintain internal cohesion all the time.

CHANGE

The problems and challenges of change may be many. But so are the benefits. At the recent First Annual

Management Awards for Outstanding Companies in the fields of Marketing, Information Technology, People Development, Financial and Operations Management organised by the Asian Institute of Management and the sponsorship of Acer Incorporated, the winners for all their achievements, by most indications, have their best years still ahead of them. If they are equal to the challenges that lie before them, they will develop new strengths, new capabilities and in a very real sense, rich in potential, secure in their identities, confident of the future and poised on the brink of destiny. And one of the most important traits of all these outstanding Companies is their ability to adapt quickly to a sudden change in the environment without losing its composure or its identity.

Bank Niaga of Indonesia in the category of General Management displayed quick adaptations to changing banking environment brought about by deregulations and with a well balanced approach of innovation and conservatism, the company was transformed into an information-based, constantly gathering, updating and analyzing customer information to form the basis for further innovation and service. Edaran Otomobil Nasional Berhad (EON), the producer and marketer of the National car, the Proton Saga, was virtually against all odds in its nurturing stage but which has now proven its value in more competitive environments is another fine example of the effect of change in the local vehicle industry.

The goal for Syarikat Telekom Malaysia Berhad (STM), has been "For every problem, a technological cure and for every opportunity, a technological response." Although investments were heavy initially, STM has never looked back. Customer Automated Service Systems (CASS), videotext, packet switching, TEGAS (a human resource management system), SISWANG (an accounting management system), ACES (an architectural CAD system), SIKIS (a materials forecasting system), FLEET (a vehicle fleet management system) and so on is on their inventory. What next - only time will tell.

Quoted are only a few examples of organisations where change has brought about resultant effects to the environment under which they operate. Profitability, customer satisfaction, corporate leadership, planning and control, community relations, sales volumes, market leadership, marketing innovation, information technology (IT) enhancing efficiency, productivity, synergy and competitiveness, pervasiveness of IT use, type of technology used, excellence in the management and development of people in the organisation, gearing towards productivity, professional and tech-

nological development are just some indicators of these successes as a result of change or wanting change for the betterment and enhancement of the quality of life.

"All great changes are irksome to the human mind, especially those which are attended with great dangers of uncertain effects" John Adams

THE TRAINER - THE CHANGE AGENT IN ORGANISATIONS

The Trainer as The Facilitator of Learning. A professional that he is, facing the challenging task of training and the role that he plays, the trainer will definitely and surely make an effective and positive contribution to the organization he comes from. As a facilitator, he utilises all abilities and available resources in order to provide the best access to the knowledge and skills that the training is designed to impart with a view of achieving corporate goals and aspirations. As a designer of training programmes, this change agent with, will be responsible to identify organisational problems to meet its needs. His knowledge of learning theories will enable him to select methods and media to form the training programme so as to achieve organisational objectives. As a developer of instructional strategies, much can be impacted by his using different strategies in terms of methods, materials, techniques and devices, each with varying impact so as achieve maximum results from the adult learning processes. An instructor and a counsellor for which he is sometimes referred as, he himself will also be involved in analysing and responding to the learners needs and helping them to adapt accordingly to the strengths and weaknesses of the training design.

The Trainer as a Manager of Training Programs. As a developer of personnel (HR Policy), the trainer must determine the kinds of training programs that should be provided so as to increase the effectiveness of the learning programs to achieve training objectives. As a supervisor of on-going programs, he also has the task of ensuring its successful implementation and evaluation thereafter, so as to make amends as and whenever necessary. Adequate training support, facilities amenities and finance which contributes to the success of the running of training programs are equally the trainer's responsibilities. In the nutshell, he being the manager, will have to ensure through the various processes of management, the well being of the trainees so as to achieve a conductive environment to facilitate the adult learner to change and learn along its way.

The Trainer as a Consultant. Being the expert as he is, the trainer must be able to suggest options to the

management of organisations to deal with problems as and when necessary. As a change agent, he identifies the need for methodology to bring about change, especially through Human Resources Development (HRD). Performance problems are to be critically analysed and solutions recommended accordingly.

The Trainer as a Researcher. Determining training needs and evaluating its impact that is essential to the growth of the organisation is surely one of the critical roles of the trainer. As a researcher, studying and evaluating the impact of training on job performance within the organization, fulfilment of course objectives, participant expectations and the cost and benefit of the learning programs with a view of resultant positive change in work performance in relation to organisational objectives is achieved.

CONCLUSION

Training must result in positive change in the work performance of the trainees and it must fulfill the cognitive (knowledge), psychomotor (skills), and affective (attitudinal) needs of the trainees in relation to the organisational needs. The effective trainer is one who is able to ensure that the training efforts of the organisation has its pay-offs. The roles he plays, as elaborated above, will only label him the agent of change in all aspects. He must be able to bring about this change in the trainee so as to ultimately work towards achieving organisational goals and objectives.

"Changing a culture is not a matter of teaching people a bunch of new techniques, or replacing their behavior patterns with new ones. It is a matter of exchanging values and providing the models. This is done by changing attitudes."

-Philip B. Crosby-



BIODATA - MAJ HAJI MUHAMMAD BIN ABDULLAH

Maj Haji Muhammad bin Abdullah was commissioned into the Royal Regiment of Engineers from the Royal Military College on 25 Feb 68. Throughout his military career, he has held various command and staff appointments. He attended the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College, Haigate in 1989. Presently, he is the SO 2 Trg (Analysis and Evaluation) in the Training Branch, Department of Army and also Chief Editor of the Sorotan Darat.

"Mistakes"

The greatest mistake you can make in life is to be continually fearing you will make one.

- Elbert Hubbard


Knowledge rests not upon truth alone, but on error also.

- Carl Gustav Jung

We make progress if, and only if, we are prepared to learn from our mistakes.

- Karl R Ropper

FIELD ARTILLERY SURVIVABILITY



BY
MEJ HEERA SINGH

INTRODUCTION

The recent Gulf War has served to reemphasise and reiterate the fact that Field Artillery plays and will continue to play a major role in any future conventional conflict. Field Artillery with its massive fire power, will be able to enhance ground forces operations by neutralizing enemy targets prior to any manoeuvre. This is done through the interdiction and counter battery fire process. Once the operation gets underway, close fire support will be an integral part of the missions provided to the ground forces. Time and time again this simple formula has been proven successful in battle.

This ability of the Artillery to tilt the outcome of a battle has however, not gone unnoticed. Field Artillery is currently high on the priority list of targets of all field commanders. The neutralization of the opposing artillery will provide any commander with a decisive edge in any conflict. This is especially so when artillery is a scarce resource on the modern battle field.

It is for these reasons that in the past decade, Field Artillery survivability has become a topic of vital

concern to armies in general and the artillery in particular. Staying alive and providing vital fire support is now an integral part of Field Artillery tactics.

It would be pertinent at this point to define what we mean by "survivability". Survivability in the artillery context means the ability to sustain and maintain a percentage of the field artillery force that will be able to provide the minimum fire support to the supported force. This means that in any conflict there would be the expected artillery losses. The aim would however be to minimise these losses so that the supported force will be able to receive the minimum if not more fire support at all times.

THE THREATS

In a conventional scenario, other than the nuclear threat, the main threats to artillery will come from the following:

- a. Air threat.
- b. Artillery threat.
- c. Ground forces threat.
- d. Electronic threat

Air Threat. The Gulf War proved that artillery is highly vulnerable to the air threat. The Americans exploited their air supremacy to the maximum and used all major aerial platforms to destroy Iraqi artillery. The USAF-A10 combat aircraft and attack helicopters were used extensively to destroy Iraqi gun positions. At the same time, remotely piloted aircraft and the OH-58D scout helicopter were used to complement mortar/gun locating radars in pin pointing gun positions, to within minimum margins of error. This enabled the follow up fixed wing or rotary aircrafts to strike within seconds of the indirect fire positions being located. The results were devastating. As quoted from an article in the International Defence Review, "Most Iraqi artillery commanders therefore had only two choices, stand in place and be destroyed or abandon the guns and survive".

Artillery Threat. The artillery against artillery duel is always a crucial part of any conventional operation. In fact the Russians see the enemy's artillery as the greatest threat to their own artillery on the modern battle field. It can be safely said that the main enemy and threat of the artillery is the opposing artillery.

This is especially so with the new high tech ammunition that the Americans used in the Gulf War like the copper head and other laser guided projectiles. These ammunition proved to be very accurate and very effective. As long as the target acquisition devices were able to give accurate target locations, these projectiles had the ability to strike and hit the targets most of the time.

Ground Forces Threat. On the modern battlefield it can be expected that artillery units may come under ground attack occasionally. This may be in the form of attacks by swift moving infantry supported by tanks or raids conducted by special forces. It is for these reasons that all artillery units have a local defence plan when deployed and do also have static tank firing positions. The ground threat, although not as serious as the air and artillery threat, still merits serious concern.

The Electronic Threat. Radio electronic combat support is an essential element of enemy intelligence and embraces all electronic warfare resources. Agencies will be directed to intercept and jam artillery communications. They will also be used to neutralise target acquisition devices and surveillance systems. The end effect is twofold. Firstly they will be able to pin point our locations and secondly, they will be in a position to disrupt our communications during crucial

stages of a battle. Both these actions will serve to disrupt the fire support process and will therefore influence the immediate battle.

SURVIVABILITY TACTICS

To counter and overcome these threats, the artillery employs certain tactics. These tactics are employed to suit the tactical situation and are sometimes employed in combination. The tactics used are the following:

- a. Movement.
- b. Dispersion
- c. Hardening/Camouflage.
- d. Deception

Movement. The first rule of survival is to avoid detection, and the best method is to move as many times as possible from gun position to gun position. There are two types of movement done by the artillery. The first type is movement in response to tactical requirements and the second type of movement is movement done strictly to avoid detection and thus counter battery fire. These movements and deployments must be kept to the minimum during the day. A battery may be allocated an area of about 2-3 kilometers square and all movement will be confined to within the area allocated.

Movement does however have its disadvantages. The more a fire unit moves, the less it will be able to provide fire support which is its primary task. In addition to this, movement will also affect logistic support, security, communications and firing accuracy. The problem of fatigue will also come about, as gun crews will be hard pressed to conduct moves every four to five hours. This is especially so with towed guns or howitzers. The use of self propelled guns will offer great advantages here. This is because a battery of 155mm self propelled guns requires five times less time than a similar towed battery for movement from a primary position to a temporary one and subsequent readiness to fire.

Dispersion. By dispersion is meant the spreading out of the fire unit over an area as wide as possible but still capable of carrying out its tasks of providing fire support as a combat entity. Dispersion can be done in two ways. Firstly, it is done by spreading the individual guns and secondly, it is done by spreading the troops in a battery. The over-riding concern must always be that, although dispersed, they must be able to carry out their tasks as a fire unit. It has been proven that separate troop positions reduce the danger of


counter battery fire by as much as six to one. Enemy target acquisition devices may be deceived and ammunition expenditure will increase with enemy guns having to engage two targets rather than one.

Dispersion however has its setbacks, notably in local defence and command and control. A larger battery area will obviously be more difficult to defend. A large spread of guns may also create technical problems in terms of survey and accuracy of firing.

Hardening/Camouflage. Hardening here includes digging in, the building of parapets, the occupation of built-up areas and the use of camouflage and concealment.

Hardening takes up a lot of time as proven in a recent British exercise. It took a British battery 24 hours working full time to dig in and build six Abbots and two command posts respectively. This was in spite of assistance from two engineer wheeled tractors. This example clearly exemplifies the difficulty of hardening for the artillery. This is however the preferred method for survivability in countries like Pakistan, Netherlands and Denmark. The concept of hardening is based on the fact that the enemy may have detected the battery position but is not able to completely neutralize the position due to the fact that the battery is being dug in. The graph illustrates the reasoning behind this concept. Tests have shown that the first two minutes of fire is most effective and this effectiveness declines with time.

Graph 1. The effect of artillery fire in relation to time.



Note:

- 50 is an arbitrary figure on the effect scale to illustrate initial effectiveness of fire.
- 7 is an arbitrary figure on the time scale and it serves to illustrate that effectiveness of artillery fire declines with time.

The disadvantages of hardening is that it is easy to detect the gun position since movement is kept to a minimum. It is also difficult to practise hardening in a fluid situation where there is a necessity for the artillery to move often. Hardening also requires a large amount of defence stores which may strain the artillery logistics chain. Camouflage makes it more difficult to detect but it increases the time required to move. Digging reduces the effects of enemy artillery but the required engineer assets will be hard to obtain during any conflict.

Deception. Deception is the use of measures to deceive the enemy as to the actual locations of gun positions. These measures have been used with varying degrees of success for years. During the Falklands War for example, the Argentinians employed dummy howitzers to great effect.

Deception is usually planned and carried out at higher formation level. This is due to the fact that the deception plan must conform to the overall tactical plan to make it more believable. It must also not jeopardise the tactical plan. Secondly, due to the resources available, higher formations can embark on a deception plan more effectively.

This however, does not mean that at lower levels it should be neglected. For example, dummy howitzers are not a necessity. Camouflage nets set up in a typical battery formation can present a strong indication that an artillery unit is present. A little innovation on the part of commanders by scattering ammunition boxes and having vehicles drive through the area to leave tyre tracks will make the position a more believable dummy position. Radio transmissions will then add to the deception.

There are however limitations to the use of deception. It is difficult to be undertaken in an impromptu manner. Detailed planning is essential and resources must be available. Another criticism of deception is that it takes too much time to implement.

THE FUTURE

It is clear that Field Artillery will play a bigger role in the future battle field. The development of weapon systems has made the artillery the "arm of decision" by giving them that decisive edge or advantage in any future battle. Artillery will be in a position to alter the ground rules and dictate the terms of battle in future conflicts.

Survivability will however play a paramount role in the design of future artillery delivery means and

ammunition. Surviability is vital as future battles will:

- a: Extend over large areas and this will place increased demands on the artillery's mobility and range.
- b. Due to the increased mobility of combat units, artillery units themselves will have to have greater mobility, greater speed and shorter reaction time.
- c. Due to the new high tech ammunition, the Artillery will play a very important anti-armour role in the future.
- d. The threats to artillery survivability will demand that future artillery be designed having greater mobility and accuracy.

The MLRS (multi-launcher rocket system) is presently showing the way to the problem of survivability for the Artillery in the future. The design of this weapon system is such that it does not remain static. It establishes what are called roving positions from which it is able to release its rockets in minimum time and then proceed to the next roving position or move to a prepared logistics area to be refitted with new rockets. It comes as no surprise therefore that during the recent Gulf War, no MLRS was declared inoperable through any form of enemy action.

It is most likely that future delivery systems will be designed to incorporate the features of the MLRS. This does not however mean that the threat to artillery will completely be overcome. It means however that a higher percentage of artillery will survive and therefore be in a position to provide vital fire support to the ground forces.

CONCLUSION

The past ten years has witnessed great debate in the military in regards to artillery survivability. Having identified the threats as coming from the air, enemy artillery, ground forces and electronic measure, the artillery community is under-taking a reappraisal of traditional practices in an effort to decrease artillery vulnerability on the the modern battlefield. These threats are real and have proven to be devastating as seen during the Gulf War.

There are however measures that can be undertaken to overcome some of these threats and these measure include movement, dispersion, hardening and deception. There is debate going on as to the best

method but it is overwhelmingly agreed that a combination of these measures would be most effective. All these measure are however not without costs, both in terms of financial implications and in terms of advantages and disadvantages.

Artillery commanders on the ground must use these measures innovatively such that they conform to the overall tactical situation and does not jeopardise the primary task of providing fire support. Commanders must also realise that these survivability tactics are vital in any conflict. The greater the artillery losses, the more the balance tilts in favour of the enemy.

One of the major factors that will influence the future design of artillery will be the survivability aspect. Delivery means i.e guns howitzers be designed to have greater mobility, accuracy and shorter reaction times.

The outcome of battles will be influenced to a great extent by the amount of artillery firepower that a commander has at his disposal. For the artillery to provide this vital firepower, it needs to survive. Survivability tactics will therefore greatly influence the deployment and employment of field artillery in battle both at present and in the future.

REFERENCES

1. Colonel B. Adair Robert, I think, therefore I survive, *Field Artillery Journal*, January-December 1985, p. 18.
2. Lt Col B. Adair Robert, Division Artillery survivability, *Field Artillery Journal* January-February 1981, p. 46.
3. Major Daytonm, Keith W, Field Artillery Survivability: The Soviet Perspective, *Field Artillery Journal*, September-October 1981, p. 30.
4. Lt Col Hudson MJH, Survive to Fight, *Field Artillery Journal* January-December 1981, p. 30.
5. Colonel Mc Veigh Andrew J., Your Right to Survive, *Field Artillery Journal* May-June 1983, p.8.
6. Sergeant First Class Sharp Charles C, Survivability for Sophomores, *Field Artillery Journal* January-February 1985, p. 40.
7. The Gulf War in Review, *International Defense Review*, Vol 24, May 1991.

**BIODATA - MEJ HEERA SINGH (370412)**

Mej Heera Singh was commissioned from the Indian Military Academy Dehradun, into the Royal Artillery Corps on 20 Dec 75. He has held various command and staff appointments at regimental and Ministry levels. He attended the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College, Haigate in 1990 and is at present holding the appointment of SO 2 Doctrine in the Artillery Directorate.

"Kebenaran"

*Jalan itu sangat banyak
Tetapi jalan kebenaran hanya satu
Dan yang pergi berangkat
Kejalan kebenaran itu satu-satu*

*Manusia itu lalai
Apa dimaksudkan dengan mereka
Sebahagian besar tidur terkulai,
Jalan kebenaran sampai terlupa*

"Tauladan"

*Janganlah engkau melarang suatu pekerti,
Sedang engkau sendiri melakukannya,
Malulah kepada diri sendiri,
Dilihat orang engkau sendiri melakukannya!*

"Niat"

*Orang yang memperolehi penyakit,
Rasa pahit pada mulutnya,
Maka akan rasa pahit,
Air pancuran yang lazat cita rasanya.*



PEMBANGUNAN KEUPAYAAN ANGKATAN PERTAHANAN

OLEH
LT KOL MOHD KAMAL OMAR

"...to be made primarily with regard to the international environment and covering such matters as the size and composition of the state's armed forces as well as their geographic deployment and actual use ... identified as those with predominantly domestic political content and include questions of the size and distribution of the defence budget, military personnel policies (pay, recruitment and retention), supply and the organizational format of the defence establishment."¹

Samuel P. Huntington

Terdapat ramai pemerhati-pemerhati berpendapat bahawa telah menjadi satu aliran dunia untuk mempertingkatkan pembangunan ketenteraan termasuk membekalkan kelengkapan-kelengkapan yang lebih merbahaya dan lebih sofistikated, dan kini seolah-olah membawa dunia ke arah "militaristic societies" yang boleh menimbulkan "inter-state rivalries."²

Kepada kebanyakan negara-negara, masalah ini tidak dapat dielakkan dengan adanya perrusuhan yang boleh mengancam (ancaman dari luar) keselamatan negara. Berasaskan pada kewujudan ancaman-ancaman ini, pembangunan kenteraan dipertingkatkan dari masa ke semasa, mengikut suasana keadaan, dan keadaan seumpama ini memudahkan lagi pihak pemerintah

(kerajaan) untuk mengemukakan alasan-alasan yang munasabah dan boleh diterima oleh rakyat, atas sebab-sebab sebenar alat-alat kelengkapan tersebut dibekalkan.

Ada juga di kalangan setengah-tengah pihak yang berpendapat bahawa:

*"National security is but as a term of rhetoric, a tool of propaganda employed by governments to camouflage oppressive policies and aggressive behaviour."*³

Pendapat ini tidak saya pertikaikan, walau bagaimanapun, ada negara-negara yang sengaja "exaggerate" keadaan ancaman yang sebenar, bertujuan untuk melindungi dari pengetahuan rakyat sesuatu sebab "domestic" yang mungkin penting dan bernilai. Namun demikian, langkah seperti ini, jarang berhasil dan lambat-laun akan diketahui juga oleh rakyat. Mengikut Matthews:

*"the search for security is not a false issue but involves a genuine effort to resolve an existing and persistent dilemma States are therefore compelled by the very circumstances in which they find themselves to show a concern for their security and are generally prepared to allocate scarce resources to obtain it."*⁴

Sebelum saya melanjutkan kertas ini, mungkin perlu difahami atas maksud sebenar pembangunan angkatan pertahanan. Pembangunan yang dimaksudkan ini, seperti mana yang diperbentangkan oleh Douglas J. Muray and Paul R. Viotti, meliputi peningkatan kecekapan ketenteraan dari aspek-aspek persenjataan, latihan (termasuk doktrin), strategi dan teknik, teknologi dan juga peningkatan perhubungan awam-tentera.⁵

Selanjutnya, perlu dilihat dari segi ancaman manakah yang perlu dipertingkatkan pembangunan angkatan pertahanan, khususnya Angkatan Tentera Malaysia (ATM).

Pembangunan angkatan pertahanan, khasnya di Asia-Pasifik, rantau yang dianggap masih mencari keamanan dan kestabilan, adalah salah satu rantau yang utama di dunia dilengkapi dengan persenjataan. Di Semenanjung Korea, sejumlah 1.5 juta anggota tentera berhadapan muka diantara satu sama lain sepanjang 155 batu bertempat di **"Demilitarized Zone"** yang telah mengasingkan semenanjung tersebut di antara pihak komunis di bahagian utara, dan pihak bukan komunis di bahagian selatan. Manakala di IndoCina pula, meliputi Vietnam, Kampuchea dan Laos,

berjumlah 1.3 juta anggota bersenjata dan tentera Vietnam berhadapan dengan tentera China di perbatasan. Sementara itu, 1/3 daripada 4 juta anggota tentera China pula bersemuka dengan 1/3 dari 52 divisyen tentera Soviet yang berpengkalan di Timur Jauh Soviet.⁶ Namun begitu, jika dibandingkan Timur Tengah dengan Latin Amerika, Asia-Pasifik setakat ini masih berkekurangan dari aspek tercetusnya perperangan.⁷ Akan tetapi dengan adanya perilihan minat tadi kuasa menumpu ke rantau ini, kemungkinan besar rantau Asia-Pasifik akan menjadi kawasan utama konflik pada masa-masa akan datang tidak boleh dinafikan.

Untuk mewajarkan keperluan pembangunan angkatan pertahanan (ATM), mungkin perlu dikemukakan beberapa soalan, seperti apakah faktor-faktor yang menyebabkan kemunculan kuasa-kuasa asing di Asia-Pasifik? Adakah disebabkan perlumbaan keseimbangan kuasa? Ataupun adakah disebabkan penarikan kepentingan perlumbaan ekonomi yang kini sedang meningkat dan menarik perhatian dunia ke rantau ini?

Tumpuan Soviet ke rantau Asia-Pasifik, megikut Mikhail Gorbachev di dalam ucapannya di Vladivostok pada Julai 1986, menyatakan bahawa selain dari bertujuan memperkuuhkan keamanan, keselamatan dan mengeratkan kerjasama, adalah menumpukan pada faktor jajahan Soviet yang terletak di benua Asia. Sejumlah 75 peratus dari jajahan Soviet, meliputi Siberia, Asia Tengah dan Soviet Timur Jauh, terletak di Benua Asia.⁸

Mengikut seorang ahli falsafah pula, tumpuan Soviet ke rantau Asia-Pasifik meliputi lima senario, seperti berikut:

*"instability in the region; further shifts in the military balance in Moscow's favour; the unraveling of U.S. relations with China, Japan, or ASEAN, a breakthrough with Japan, and a successful Soviet reconciliation with China."*⁹

Kewujudan angkatan pertahanan adalah penting di dalam masyarakat moden. Disenaraikan sebagai **"permanent state apparatus"**, kuasa angkatan pertahanan, mengikut Dan Smith, boleh memainkan empat peranan asas, yang meliputi:

- a. *It can be used within domestic society.*
- b. *It can be used in relation between states with different social systems.*
- c. *It can be used in relation between states with essentially the same social systems.*

- d. It can be used to subjugate and colonise states and nations and resist movements to throw off that subjugation.¹⁰

Tambah Smith lagi:

"it is the ability of a society to perpetuate its existence and sustain its values in the face of threats and challenges from internal or external sources."¹¹

Mengikut seorang penulis lagi, angkatan pertahanan boleh memainkan berbagai-bagai peranan selain dari peranan utamanya untuk menentukan keselamatan negara dari ancaman musuh yang datang dari luar. Peranan ini disenaraikan sebagai:

- a. *National unifier: using military institutions and policies as the source of national political cohesion by setting aside (not solving or accommodating) interests and goal conflicts.*
- b. *National accommodator: using them to achieve them more political cohesion by narrowing and eliminating political differences.*
- c. *External buffer and accommodator: using them to narrow and eliminate differences between internal or domestic interest and external or foreign interests.*
- d. *Military defender: meeting perceived foreign military threats.¹²*

Selain dari kewujudan ancaman kuasa-kuasa asing terhadap negara-negara Asia-Pasifik, terdapat beberapa faktor lain yang tidak ketinggalan memainkan peranan penting sebagai asas mempengaruhi pembangunan keupayaan sebuah angkatan pertahanan khususnya ATM. Faktor-faktor ini meliputi ancaman serantau, geostrategik, politik (serantau) dan sumber ekonomi.¹³

Rancangan untuk mempertingkatkan pembangunan keupayaan ATM secara pesat telah mula dirancangkan pada 1963 oleh Menteri Pertahanan Tun Abdul Razak.¹⁴ Langkah ini diambil melalui pengumuman oleh Allahyarham bahawa:

"as Indonesia's attitude constituted a threat to the security of the country, the Government had decided to take immediate steps to effect a substantial expansion of our Armed Forces for our national defence."¹⁵

Mengikut ucapan, Menteri Kewangan Tan Siew Sin, dalam ucapan belanjawan 1964:

"the largest increase has occurred in the es-

timates of the Ministry of Defence which have risen by 49 million or 31 per cent over the 1964 provision."¹⁶

Pembangunan angkatan pertahanan ATM terus dipertingkatkan pada 1968/69 disebabkan penarikan balik tentera British dari rantau ini, tuntutan semula Filipina ke atas Sabah, dan juga disebabkan meningkatnya masalah pengganas komunis di perbatasan Malaysia-Thailand. Berasaskan ancaman-ancaman ini, belanjawan pertahanan Malaysia untuk 1969 ditetapkan sejumlah \$257.5 juta, penambahan \$5.5 juta ataupun 2.2 peratus jika dibandingkan dengan peruntukan belanjawan pertahanan 1968.¹⁷

Mengikut Tan Siew Sin:

"it was realized that the British withdrawal and the trouble with the Philippines had changed the entire defence picture, so much so that more will have to be spent on defence and internal security on the coming years.... there was a keen awareness that without security there can be no development, either economic or social and that security is all important, but it costs money, in fact, a plenty of it."¹⁸

Kepentingan pembangunan pertahanan telah mendapat penekanan dari Allahyarham Tun Razak yang berpendapat bahawa ATM perlu terus dibangun untuk menentukan Malaysia mempunyai sebuah angkatan tentera yang **"highly mobile"**, berkesan dan mampu untuk menghadapi apa jua jenis pencerobohan (yang **"limited"**). Tambah Allahyarham:

"in the final analysis we must defend on our own resources and strength for the defence of our country therefore Malaysia had to be more self-reliant as a nation and this in fact, means that, on the one hand, we may have to step up our defence expenditure."¹⁹

Keadaan keselamatan di rantau Asia Tenggara terus terancam pada pertengahan 1970an atas kejatuhan Vietnam Selatan dan diikuti dengan pencerobohan Vietnam ke atas Kampuchea pada 1978, penempatan tentera Soviet di Cam Ranh Bay dan juga tindakan Vietnam menduduki Amboyna Cay yang dituntut oleh Malaysia. Atas tekanan ancaman-ancaman ini, Malaysia telah melaksanakan pembangunan pertahanan secara pesatnya pada lewat 1970an, dikenali sebagai Perkembangan Istimewa Angkatan Tentera (Perista), dan juga diikuti dengan langkah-langkah mempertingkatkan kerjasama keselamatan dua hala

dengan negara-negara Asean khasnya Thailand dan Indonesia.

Dari segi faktor geo-strategik, yang tidak kurang memainkan peranan di dalam mempengaruhi pembangunan keupayaan angkatan pertahanan, kepentingan geografi telah diketarakan oleh Clausewitz apabila mengiktiraf empat unsur strategi seperti berikut:

- a. *Psychological elements including moral.*
- b. *Military force including its size, composition and organization.*
- c. *Geometry of the situation including the relative positions and movements of forces and their geometric relationship to obstacles, channels, objectives etc.*
- d. *Terrain including mountains, rivers, woods and roads which might influence military activities. Supply including its means and sources.*²⁰

Sun Tzu dalam bukunya *The Art of War* juga berpendapat bahawa

"success depends on constant awareness of different requirements as effected by the particular country where operations are contemplated, geographical and climatic conditions"

Kepentingan geo-strategik dalam konteks kertas ini lebih menumpukan pada geografi meliputi aspek fizikal dan strategik. Kedua-dua aspek ini, saya berpendapat adalah "key variable" dan amat ketara dari segi mempengaruhi angkatan pertahanan meningkatkan keupayaan pembangunan pertahanan. Aspek fizikal merangkumi faktor-faktor seperti rupa bentuk tanah, saiz, lokasi dan cuaca.

Lokasi strategik, bentuk rupa muka bumi dan kekuatan (ataupun kelemahan) "national boundaries" akan mempengaruhi tanggapan "vulnerability" keselamatan nasional sesebuah negeri kepada ancaman samada dari dalam ataupun dari luar negeri. Dimensi geo-strategik walaupun dianggap "durable" dan kadangkala berkemungkinan berubah-ubah mengikut perkembangan masa dan teknologi, tidak semestinya dianggap akan berubah dengan sekilip mata sahaja ketika menghadapi sesuatu ancaman.²¹

Dalam perlumbaan keseimbangan kuasa oleh negara-negara berkuasa (superpowers), negara-negara China dan Jepun juga tidak ketinggalan menonjolkan minat ke arah Asia Tenggara. Penarikan minat negara-negara ini adalah semata-mata disebabkan soal geo-strategik. Kepada Russia, rantau ini, khasnya Laut

China Selatan dan Selat Melaka, memainkan peranan yang penting untuk menghubungi tentera laut mereka di antara Vladivostok, melalui Lautan Hindi, ke Odesa. Komunis China pula, yang kini masih ditarafkan mempunyai "Brown Water Navy" menganggap Semenanjung Malaysia (menerusi Thailand) sebagai tali perhubungan untuk mengeksplotasikan aktiviti revolusi komunis ke arah selatan (melalui jalan darat). Baru-baru ini, China telah juga membuka langkah dan berlagak mengganas, mengancam Vietnam supaya beredar dari Kepulauan Spratly.²²

Kepada Jepun, Selat Melaka memainkan peranan yang sangat penting bagi menentukan saluran kapal-kapal minyak dari benua Arab tidak terjejas atau terhalang oleh pihak yang tidak diingini. Bagi Amerika Syarikat, kawasan Asia Tenggara sentiasa memainkan peranan penting di segi keselamatan, khasnya selepas kehilangan tapak pengkalan di Danang dan di Cam Ranh Bay kepada pihak komunis.

Dari sudut Malaysia pula, rantau ini amatlah penting bukan sahaja dari segi sumber-sumber yang sedia ada, khasnya minyak dan juga perikanan di Laut China Selatan, yang kini menjadi satu pertikaian tuntutan bertindih.²³

Dari segi faktor politik, politik memainkan peranan yang tidak kurang pentingnya untuk menentukan pembangunan keupayaan sesebuah angkatan pertahanan. Sokongan penuh politik adalah kemestian untuk menjamin kestabilan pembangunan angkatan pertahanan. Ini dapat ditentukan dengan adanya kesedaran rakyat atas kewujudan ancaman keselamatan di rantau ini. Rakyat juga perlu menyedari bahawa dengan adanya angkatan pertahanan yang kukuh lagi moden, kestabilan politik akan juga terjamin dan disegani oleh negara-negara asing.

Di Malaysia khususnya, saya berpendapat bahawa masih terdapat segolongan rakyat yang "enggan" untuk menerima wujudnya ancaman keselamatan di rantau ini. Selagi rakyat tidak "insaf dan tidak mahu" menyedari ancaman yang berleluasa ini, dan tidak sehati untuk bangun bersama berjuang dan mempertahankan negara, maka masalah mempengaruhi pembangunan keupayaan sesebuah angkatan pertahanan akan menghadapi kebuntuan.

Salah satu faktor lagi yang turut memainkan peranan utama dalam tajuk kertas ini, ialah faktor sumber dan ekonomi. Faktor ini tidak kurang pentingnya dari faktor-faktor yang telah dibincangkan terlebih awal. Mengikut Robert Matthews dalam artikalnya "National Security: Propaganda or Legitimate Con-

cern?" menyebut bahawa:

"It may be generally agreed that a particular state is secure, that is, that it is able to defend its internal values against any conceivable external attack".²⁴

Untuk boleh mempertahankan "its internal values", sebuah angkatan pertahanan yang serba lengkap perlu diwujudkan. Untuk mewujudkan angkatan pertahanan yang sedemikian berkebolehan, negara perlu memperolehi kekayaan sumber dan ekonomi. Ini bererti bahawa kestabilan ekonomi yang kukuh adalah penting untuk menentukan peruntukan belanjawan pertahanan yang mencukupi disediakan dari masa ke semasa walaupun dalam keadaan aman, supaya latihan-latihan ketenteraan tertentu dapat dikendalikan untuk menghadapi sesuatu ataupun mana-mana ancaman. Sepertimana terdapat pandangan seorang penulis yang arif:

"The basic decisions about wars and how to fight them have to be decided in time of peace: when war comes, it is too late."²⁵

Sebagai penutup, saya berpendapat bahawa faktor-faktor yang telah dibentangkan di atas, meliputi aspek-aspek ancaman serantau, geo-strategik, pergolakan politik serantau, dan sumber dan ekonomi, adalah faktor-faktor utama yang boleh digunakan sebagai asas untuk mempengaruhi pembangunan keupayaan sebuah angkatan pertahanan, khususnya ATM.

Perlu ditingkatkan juga bahawa pembangunan sebuah negara, memerlukan keperluan sumber dan ekonomi yang kukuh. Sambil itu juga, untuk menjamin kestabilan pembangunan itu, angkatan pertahanan yang serba berkebolehan, lagi moden, juga perlu diwujudkan, sepertimana terdapat pandangan seorang penulis"

"Without adequate resources to ensure the security of the country, there could be no development and that the two issues, defence and development, were inter-related".²⁶

NOTA-NOTA

1. Huntington, Samuel P., "The Two Worlds of Military Policy", *Comparative Defence Policy*, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1974) hlm. 107.
2. Matthews, Robert D., "National Security: Propaganda or Legitimate Concern?", *Problems of Contemporary Militarism*, (Croom Helm Ltd, London, 1990),

jlm. 140.

3. *Ibid.*, hlm. 140-141.
4. *Ibid.*, hlm. 141-142.
5. Murray, Douglas J. dan Viotti, Paul R., "Defence Policy in Comparative Perspective: An Introduction", *The Defence Policies of Nations, A Comparative Study*, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1982), hlm. 3-5.
6. Kihl, Young Whan & Grinter, Lawrence E., "Asia-Pasifik Security", (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 1986) hlm. 2.
7. Soriano, Emanuel, "External Powers, Conflict Management Mechanisms and Foreign Military Presence", Seminar Southeast Asia and Pacific Asia Security in the Final Decade to the Twentieth Century, Kuala Lumpur, 24 Mac 1988.
8. Lihat Vladivostok Speech dan penyampaian Dr. V. Lukin, "A Soviet Perspective" dalam Seminar Southeast Asia and the Pacific Asia Security in the Final Decade of the Twentieth Century", Kuala Lumpur, 24 Mac 1988.
9. Ini adalah pendapat Donald S. Zagoria, "Soviet Policy in East Asia" ("New Haven University Press, 1982), hlm. 5. Lihat juga Kihl, *op. cit.* hlm 11.
10. Smith, Dan, "The Defence of the Realm in the 1980s, (biddles Ltd, Guilford and King' Lynn, London, 1981), hlm. 20.
11. *Ibid.*, hlm 25. Lihat juga Cooper, R. N. "National Rescources and National Security in the Middle East and the International System II: Security and the Energy Crisis, *Adelphi Papers 115*, (IISS, London, 1975).
12. Hammond, Paul Y., "The Cross-National Comparison of Force Postures", *Comparative Defence Policy*, (The Johns Hopkins UNiversity Press, Baltimore and London, 1974), hlm. 299. Lihat juga Huntington, Samuel P., "Introduction: National Security and Civil-Military Relations", *The Soldier and the State*, (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 1979), hlm. 1.
13. Alagapa, Muthiah, "The National Security of Developing States: A Conceptual Framework", *The National Security of Developing States*, (Auburn Horse Publishing Company, Dover, Massachusetts, 1987), hlm. 1- 28.

14. Joshurun, Chandran, "The Expansion of the Armed Forces", Malaysian Defence Policy, (Universiti Malaia, 1980), hlm. 1 -13.
15. *Ibid.*, hlm. 1 - 17 mengenai pembangunan ATM untuk menghadapi konfrantasi Malaysia-Indonesia. Langkah yang diambil ini amat pesat jika diperbandingkan dengan langkah pembangunan pertahanan untuk menghadapi ancaman darurat komunis 1948-1960.
16. *Ibid.*, hlm. 14.
17. *Ibid.*, hlm. 33.
18. *Ibid.*, hlm. 34.
19. *Ibid.*, hlm. 34.
20. Peltier, Louis C. dan Pearcy G. Etzel, " Military Strategy", *Military Geography* (D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. Princeton, New Jersey, 1966), hlm. 45-46. Lihat juga Griffith, Samuel B. "Terrain" dan "The Nine Varieties of Ground", *Sun Tzu The Art of War*, (Oxford University Press, London, Oxford, New York, 1971), hlm. 124-140 mengenai kepentingan tanah.
21. Plano, J.C. "THE International Relations Dictionary" (Clio Press: Oxford, 1969), hlm 87.
22. Bernama, "China claims sovereignty over island, The New Straits Times, Kuala Lumpur, 24 February 1988.
23. Kihl, *Op. Cit.*, hlm. 204.
24. Eide, Asbjorn and Thee, Marek, Problems of Contemporary Militarism, (Croom Helm, London. 1980) hlm. 142.
25. Brodie, Bernard, Strategy in the Missile AGE, Princeton, Universiry Press, New Jersey, 1971), hlm. 267.
26. *Op. Cit.*, hlm. 46-47.
2. Aron, Raymond
1966 - *Peace and War*, Weidenfeld And Nicolson, London.
3. Brodie, Bernard
1971 - *Strategy In The Missile Age*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
4. Eidi, Asbjorn
and Thee,
Marek
1980 - *Problems of Contempo-
rary Militarism*, Croom Helm, London.
5. Griffith, Samuel
B.
1973 - *Sun Tzu, The Art of War*
Oxford University Press,
London, Oxford, New
York.
6. Hawkins, David
1972 - *The Defence of Malaysia
and Singapore, From
AMDA to ANZUK Royal
United Services Institue
For Defence Studies*,
London.
7. Horton 111,
Frank B,
Rogerson,
Anthony C. &
Warner 111,
Edward L.
1974 - *Comparative Defense
Policy*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London.
8. Howard,
Michael
1970 - *Studies in War and
Peace*, Temple Smith,
London.
9. Hunrington,
Samuel P.
1979 - *The Soldier and the State*,
The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachu-
setts, London.
10. Janowitz, Morris
1977 - *Military Institutions and
Coercion in the Devel-
oping Nations*, The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press,
Chicago and London.
11. Joshurun,
Chandran
1980 - *Malaysian Defence
Policy*, Penerbit Univer-
sity Malaya, Kuala Lumpur.

BIBLIOGRAFI

1. Alagappa,
Mutiah
1987 - *The National Security of
Developing States*, Au-
burn House Publishing
Company Dover, Massa-
chusetts.

- 12. Kihl, Young Whan & Grinter, Lawrence E. 1986 - *Asian-Pacific Security*, Lynne Boulder, Colorado.
- 13. MacDonald, J. Ramsay 1972 - *National Defence, A Study in Militarism*, Garland Publishing Inc., New York & London.
- 14. Masahide Shibusawa 1984 - *Japan and the Asian Pacific Region, Profile of Change*, Croom Helm, London.
- 15. Murray, Douglas J. & Viotti, Paul R. 1982 - *The Defence Policies of Nations, A Comparative Study*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore And London.
- 16. O' Connor, Michael 1985 - *To Live In Peace*, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria.
- 17. Peltier, Louis C. & Pearcy, G. Etzel 1966 - *Military Geography*, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey.
- 18. Preston, Richard A. & Wise, Sydney F. 1978 - *Men In Arms*. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, United States of America.
- 19. Roberts, Adam 1976 - *Nations In Arms*, Chatto & Windus, London.
- 20. Smith, Dan 1980 - *The Defence of the Realm in the 1980s*, Groom Helm Ltd, London.
- 21. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959 - *Man, The State and War*, Columbia University Press, New York.
- 22. Wanandi, Jusuf 1979 - *Security Dimensions of The Asia-Pacific Region in the 1980s*, Yayasan Proklamasi, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.
- 23. Zurcher, Louis A. & 1978 - *Supplementary Military Forces Reserves, Militias, Auxiliaries*, Saga Publications, Beverly Hills, London.



BIOGRAFI RINGKAS LT KOL MOHD KAMAL OMAR

Lt Kol Mohd Kamal telah dinauliahkan pada 16 Feb 67 ke dalam Kor Armor DiRaja. Beliau pernah memegang beberapa jawatan penting diperingkat Rejimen dan Staf termasuk di Bahagian Staff Perisikan Pertahanan KEMENTERAH dan JKKN Perak. Beliau telah menghadiri Kursus Armoured Gunnery Instructor di UK dan Command And Staff College, Quetta, Pakistan. Beliau telah memperolehi Diploma Lanjutan Pengajian Strategi dan Keselamatan dari UKM pada tahun 1988. Kini beliau menjadi Pegawai Memerintah II Armor DiRaja.

Yang termulia dari kamu pada sisi Allah ialah yang kuat taqwanya.

-Surah Al Hujurat, Ayat 13



MOTIVATION IN THE MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES

BY
KDR ABD RASHID ISA

"I think I am doing all right, because the boss hasn't criticized me in two or three months".

A Factory Worker

INTRODUCTION

The Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) is an organization created for the specific purpose of defending the country against any form of internal or external threat. Thus, it attracts individuals who wish to become members of this organization so that they can satisfy their needs for money, exciting work, glamour and so forth. Ideally, the MAF should achieve its objective and the members should satisfy all of the needs that have drawn them to it. However, this ideal situation is rarely if ever attained. For this reason, motivation is very important to the success of the MAF and it is the

officer's task to direct the men so that they can satisfy their needs as much as possible while they strive to accomplish the objectives of the organization.

AIM

The aim of this paper is to determine:

- The extent to which motivation theory can assist the officers in understanding the behaviour of personnel the MAF.
- The steps to be taken to increase their level of motivation.

MOTIVATION THEORIES AND UNDERSTANDING HUMAN BEHAVIOUR

GENERAL

Motivation has been defined as the process of inducing people to act in a given way¹. From a manager's perspective, a person who is motivated can be described as a person who works hard and whose behaviour is self-directed towards the organizational goals. An unsatisfied need is the starting point in the process of motivation and this is the first link in the chain of events leading to behaviour. The unsatisfied need causes tension within the individual, leading the individual to engage in some kind of behaviour to satisfy the need and thereby reduce the tension². As shown in Figure 1, this activity is directed toward a goal and achieving the goal satisfies the need which make the process of motivation complete.




Figure 1. Motivation Process

There are many theories of motivation that officers can use to improve their understanding of why people behave as they do. For the purpose of this paper, however, only the most popular theories will be covered since the main aim is to determine the extent which these theories can assist in studying human behaviour in an organization. The two most discussed groups of motivation theories are content theories and process theories³. **Content theories** are concerned with identifying what it is within an individual or work environment that energizes and sustains behaviour. On the other hand, **process theories** try to explain and describe the process of how behaviour is energized, directed, sustained, and finally stopped.

In this paper, firstly, two content theories i.e. Maslow's need hierarchy and Herzberg's two-factor theory will be discussed. Secondly, two process theories i.e. expectancy and reinforcement theory will be introduced. The comments on each of these theories are to indicate the extent which they can assist military officers in the understanding of people's behaviour in his units. This will be followed by the final analysis on how the theories can be applied to increase motivation of the personnel in the MAF.

CONTENTS THEORIES OF MOTIVATION

Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory

Maslow's need hierarchy theory has enjoyed widespread acceptance since it was introduced around 1943⁴. His theory of motivation stresses two fundamental premises:

- a. Man is a wanting animal whose needs depend on what he already has. Only needs not yet satisfied can influence behaviour. In other words, a satisfied need is not a motivator.
- b. Man's need are arranged in a hierarchy of importance. Once one need is satisfied, another emerges and demand satisfaction.

Maslow hypothesized five levels of needs and they are (1) physiological, (2) safety (3) social (4) esteem and (5) self-actualization. These needs are placed in a framework referred to as the hierarchy of needs because of the different levels of importance. This framework is as shown in Annex A. Maslow states that if all of a person's needs are unsatisfied at a particular time, satisfaction of the more predominant needs will be more pressing than the others. Those that come first must be satisfied before a higher-level need comes into play.

Comments on Maslow's Theory. The need hierarchy theory is widely accepted and referred to by practicing managers. This can be attributed to the theory's intuitive logic and ease of understanding. Unfortunately, however, this theory does not provide a complete understanding of human motivation since several recent studies that sought to validate it found not much support⁵. Further evidence also disputes the hierarchy notions. Researchers for example have found that as managers advance in an organization their need for security decreases, with a corresponding increase in their need for social interaction, achievement and self-actualization.

Herzberg's Two-Factor Theory

Another content theory of motivation was advanced by Frederick Herzberg in 1959. He based his theory on a study of need satisfactions and on the reported motivational effect of these satisfactions on 200 engineers and accountants. The theory is referred to as the two-factor theory of motivation⁶. The two factors are called the dissatisfiers-satisfiers or the extrinsic-intrinsic fac-

tors. The original research which led to the theory gave rise to two specific conclusions. First, there is a set of "extrinsic" conditions which result in dissatisfaction among employees when the condition are not present. These conditions are the "dissatisfiers" or hygiene factors since they are needed to maintain at least a level of "no dissatisfaction". Second, a set of "intrinsic" conditions which build strong levels of motivation that can result in job satisfaction. The factors in this set are called the "satisfiers" or motivators. A list of both the dissatisfiers and satisfiers are in Annex B.

Comments on Herzberg's Theory. Few would argue that Herzberg's theory still contribute substantially to the thinking on motivation at work. He certainly has extended Maslow's idea and made them more applicable to the work situation. He has drawn attention to the critical importance of job-centered factors and this has resulted in much of the enthusiasm for job enrichment. Despite all that, Herzberg's work has been criticized for a number of reasons. For example, some critics believe that the two-factor theory is an oversimplification of the true relationship between motivation and dissatisfaction as well as between the sources of job satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Several studies have shown that one factor can cause job satisfaction for one person and job dissatisfaction for another⁷. Regardless of these criticisms, Herzberg's theory is still widely popular and few managers are unfamiliar with his recommendations.

PROCESS THEORIES OF MOTIVATION

Vroom's Expectancy Theory

The expectancy theory of motivation as initially presented in 1964 by psychologist Victor Vroom views motivation as a process governing choices⁸. The theory suggests that individuals are motivated at work to make choices among different behaviours, for example intensity of work effort. The logic of expectancy motivation is that individuals will exert work effort to achieve performance that will result in preferred rewards. A general explanation of the expectant theory is as shown by the model in Annex C. Motivation to work is expressed as follows:

$$M = E \times I \times P$$

that is, motivation to work (M) results from expectancy (E) times instrumentality (I) times preference (P).

Comments on Expectant Theory. Though it has its critics, most of the research evidence is supportive of

this theory. It looks pretty complex but it really is not that difficult to visualise. Whether one has the desire to produce at any given time depends on one's particular goals and one's perception of the relative worth of performance as a path to the attainment of these goals. The main problem with this theory is the difficulty in measuring and studying the main variables in the model. However, despite the lack of tested validity, the expectancy model still adds insight into the role that perception plays in choices, expectancy and preferences.

Reinforcement Theory

Reinforcement theory is another widely discussed process theory of motivation. This theory considers the use of positive or negative reinforcers to motivate or create an environment of motivation. Thus, it is not concerned with needs or why people make choices but instead it is concerned with the environment and its consequences for the person. It centres on Thorndike's "Law of effect"⁹ which states that behaviour that results in a pleasing outcome will likely to be repeated; behaviour that results in an unpleasant outcome is not likely to be repeated. A type of reinforcement to modify behaviour by its consequences is called **Operant Conditioning** which is developed by psychologist B.F. Skinner. **Behaviour Modification** is the contemporary term used to describe techniques for applying the principles of operant conditioning to the control of individual behaviour. Annex D contain some of the key terms used in Behaviour Modification.

Comments on Reinforcement Theory. Some critics state that the idea of rewarding or reinforcing performance is bribery and that it is used to manipulate to fit a manager's concept of the ideal employee. Others argue that motivating employees through behaviour modification relies solely on extrinsic reward such as pay. What about intrinsic rewards, such as feeling the challenge of doing a good job? These criticisms illustrate some of the problems associated with the reinforcement theory and like any of the other motivation theories, it is not a solution to every motivation problem.

STEPS TO INCREASE LEVEL OF MOTIVATION

In the first part of the paper several theories on motivation and the extent which they can assist an officer in understanding behaviour of personnel in his unit have been discussed. As a military officer concerned with motivating his men in the MAF, how would he apply these theories and what steps would he have to take to increase their level of motivation?

While there seems to be no simple, all encompassing set of guidelines, the following suggestions draw on the essence of what steps are needed for motivating employees in an organization.

Clarify The Task Role. This may sound elementary but officers often take it for granted that the men fully understand their job. He can easily test a soldier's understanding of his task by asking "What is expected of you in this job?" More often jobs are understood by the personnel in terms of duties and responsibilities. As an officer wishing to improve their motivation, he should emphasize more on the expected results of their jobs.

Figure Out What Outcomes Each Soldier Values. Next step is to determine what kinds of outcomes or rewards have valence for the soldier. For each man there is a need to determine "what turns him on" and there are various ways of finding this out, including (a) finding out the soldier's desires through some structured method of data collection such as questionnaire (b) by observing the soldier's reaction to different situations or rewards, or (c) the fairly simple act of asking them what kinds of reward they want, what kind of career goals they have or "what's in it for them". Since it is very difficult to change what people want, but fairly easy to find out what they want; therefore an officer needs to focus on diagnosis of needs and not changing the individuals themselves.

Determine What Kind of Behaviour Is Desired. Officers frequently talk about "good performance" without really defining what good performance is. An important step in motivating is for an officer to figure out himself what kind of performances are required and what are adequate measures or indicators of performance (quantity, quality etc). There is also a need to be able to define those performances in fairly specific terms so that observable and measurable behaviour can be defined and the soldiers can understand what is desired of them (e.g. run 100 metres in 30 secs in combat gear - rather than just run as fast as possible).

Make Sure Desired Levels of Performance Are Reachable. The model states that motivation is determined not only by the performance-to-outcome expectancy, but also by the effort-to-performance expectancy. The implication of this is that the levels of performance which are set as the points at which individual receive desired outcomes must be reachable or attainable by these individuals. If the soldier feel that the level of performance required in getting a reward is higher than they can reasonably achieve,

then their motivation to perform well will be relatively low.

Link Desired Outcomes to Desired Performances. The next step is to directly, clearly, and explicitly link those outcomes desired by the soldier to the specific performances desired by the officer. If the soldier values external rewards, the emphasis should be on the rewards systems concerned with promotion, pay and approval. On the other hand if they value internal rewards, then the officer shold concentrate on changing the nature of the soldier's job for he is likely to respond well to such things as increased autonomy, feedback and challenge.

Analyse The Total Situation For Conflicting Expectancies. Having set up positive expectancies for the soldiers, there is a need to look at the entire situation to see if other factors (e.g. informal work group, other officers, the MAF's reward system) have set up conflicting expectancies in the minds of the soldiers. Motivation will only be high when the men see a number of rewards associated with good performance and few negative outcomes. Again, the officers can often gather this kind of information by asking the soldiers themselves. If there are major conflicts, he needs to make adjustments, either in the existing performance and reward system or in the other sources of rewards or punishments in the environment.

Make Sure Changes in Outcomes are Large Enough. In examining the motivational system, it is important to make sure that changes in outcomes or rewards are large enough to motivate significant behaviour. Trivial rewards will result in trivial amount of effort and thus trivial improvements in performance. Rewards must be large enough to motivate the soldiers to put forth the effort required to bring about significant changes in performances.

Check the System For Its Equity. Last but least, a need to ensure that the motivational system used is a fair one - one that has equity (not equality). This is based on the idea that individuals are different and therefore different reward will be needed to motivate different individuals. Equity should not be confused with a system of equality where all are rewarded equally, with no regard to performances. A system of equality is sure to produce low motivation.

CONCLUSION


24. Each of the motivation theories discussed attempts to explain the behaviour of people from a slightly different perspective. None of the theories has been

accepted as the sole basis for explaining motivation nor have they provided a universally accepted explanation of human behaviour. However, each of the theories provides an officer with some understanding of personnel's behaviour in the MAF. Maslow's theory offers a need classification system and Herzberg discusses intrinsic/extrinsic job factors. On the other hand, the expectant theory suggest that motivation is dependent on 3 main variables whereas the reinforcement theory considers the use of positive or negative reinforcers.

Various steps that could be taken to improve motivation in the MAF include (a) clarifying the task role (b) determination of outcomes (c) determination of desirable behaviour (d) making sure performance standard are attainable (e) linking desired outcomes to desired performances (f) analysing the total situation (g) making sure of large changes in outcomes and finally (h) checking the system for equity.

ANNEX A

MASLOW'S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS




ANNEX B

HERZBERG'S TWO-FACTOR THEORY

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Maintenance Factors (Dissatisfiers) | j. Status. |
| a. Company policy and administration. | 2. Motivational Factors (Satisfiers) |
| b. Technical supervision | a. Achievement. |
| c. Interpersonal relations with supervisor. | b. Recognition. |
| d. Interpersonal relations with peers. | c. Advancement |
| e. Interpersonal relations with subordinates. | d. The work itself. |
| f. Salary. | e. The possibility of personal growth. |
| g. Job security. | f. Responsibility. |
| h. Personal file. | |
| i. Work conditions. | |

HOW THE EXPECTANT THEORY OF MOTIVATION WORKS



ANNEX D

KEY TERMS USED IN BEHAVIOUR MODIFICATION

- | | | |
|---------------------------|---|---|
| 1. Positive reinforcement | - | a favourable consequence that accompanies behaviour and encourages repetition of the behaviour. |
| 2. Negative reinforcement | - | Removal of an unfavourable consequence that accompanies behaviour. |
| 3. Shaping | - | Successive reinforcements as behaviour come closer to the desired behaviour. |
| 4. Punishment | - | an unfavourable consequence that accompanies behaviour and discourages repetition of the behaviour. |
| 5. Extinction | - | no significant consequence accompanying behaviour. |
| 6. Reinforcement Schedule | - | frequency with which reinforcement accompanies a desired behaviour. |

NOTES

Plano-Texas, 1987, p. 108.

1. Hodgetts, Richard M.; *Management - Theory, Process and Practices*; Fifth Edition, HBJ Publishers, Florida 1990, P. 461.
2. Ibid, p. 464.
3. Matteson and Ivancevich; *Organizational Behaviour and Management*; Business Publication Inc,
4. Donnelly, James H. and Gibson, James L.; *Fundamental of Management*, BPi IRWIN, Homewood - Illinois 1987, p. 295.
5. For example, "A Causal Correlation Test of the Need Hierarchy Concept" by Edward E. Lawler in 1972 and "An Examination of Maslow's Need Hierarchy in an Organizational Setting" by Douglas T. Hall

in 1968. Both studies are mentioned in Robbins, Stephen P.; *Management*. Second Edition, Prentice Hall, New Jersey 1988, p. 341.

6. Herzberg, Frederick; Mausner, B. and Snyderman, B.: *The Motivation to Work*. John Wiley and Sons; New York, 1959.

7. For example; R.J. House: "Herzberg's Dual-Fac-

tor Theory of Job Satisfaction and Motivation. A Review of the Evidence and a Critism". *Personnel Psychology*, Summer 71.

8. Ivancevich: *Fundamentals of Management*; p. 304.

9. Davis, Keith: *Human Behaviour at Work: Organizational Behaviour*; Sixth Edition, Mc Graw Hill Inc, 1972, p. 83.



Kdr Abd Rashid Isa was commissioned into the RMN on 1 May 71 after initial naval cadet training at BRNC, Dartmouth. He is specialised in Gunnery and has served various appointments including CO of Fast Attack Craft (missile) and Principal Warfare Officer of the Corvette. He graduated from MTAT in 1985 and the US War College in 1989. Currently he is serving as SO1 (Navy) Plan at the AFHQ.

"Progress"

The art of progress is to preserve order amid change and to preserve change amid order.

Panic of error is the death of progress.

- Alfred North Whitehead

The greater part of progress is the desire to progress.

- Seneca

"Quality"

Quality is never an accident. It is always the result of intelligent effort. There must be the will to produce a superior thing.

- John Ruskin

Trifles make perfection, and perfection is no trifle.

- Michelangelo

People forget how fast you did a job, but they remembered how well you did it.

- Howard W Newton



PLPTD - SATU PENGALAMAN

Oleh

Kol Mohd Aris bin Salim

SINOPSIS RENCANA

Program Latihan Penilaian Tentera Darat (PLPTD) adalah satu kaedah latihan yang telah mendapat perakuan oleh Tentera Darat pada tahun 1984 melalui Arahan Latihan Panglima Tentera Darat 1984. Dalam Arahan Latihan Panglima Tentera Darat 1992/1993, Panglima Tentera Darat sekali lagi menekankan perlunya untuk menggunakan PLPTD sebagai satu kaedah untuk menilai unit-unit. Rejimen Artilleri telah melaksanakan PLPTD sejak tahun 1984 dan rencana merakamkan sedikit sebanyak pengalaman dan pelaksanaan PLPTD dengan harapan bahawa

pengalaman ini akan membantu kor-kor lain di dalam pelaksanaan PLPTD.

PENDAHULUAN

Rejimen artilleri telah melaksanakan Program Latihan Penilaian Tentera Darat (PLPTD) sejak tahun 1984. Sejarah PLPTD di dalam Rejimen Artilleri bermula pada Disember 1982, apabila Pengarah Artilleri di dalam dasar latihannya bagi tahun 1983 telah mengeluarkan satu arahan untuk menguji kecekapan unit-unit artilleri.¹ Pada ketika itu ujian ini dinamakan latihan ujian

1. KP/TD/ARTI/0301 bertarikh 09 Dis 82.

rejimen. Oleh sebab Rejimen Artilleri pada ketika itu tidak mempunyai satu kaedah-kaedah yang menyeluruh untuk menguji rejimen-rejimen, maka Sekolah Artilleri telah diarahkan untuk merangka satu kaedah ujian berpandukan kepada "Army Training Evaluation Programme (ARTEP)" kepunyaan Tentera Australia. Sepanjang tahun 1983 Sekolah Artilleri dengan kerjasama unit-unit lain telah menumpukan usaha-usaha kepada penulisan panduan-panduan ujian dan pada Jan 84 satu risalah sementara telah dihasilkan untuk dijadikan buku panduan bagi menguji unit-unit artilleri bantuan rapat.

Untuk melaksanakan PLPTD ini, Jabatanarah Artilleri menghadapi beberapa masalah logistik seperti peluru dan minyak. Masalah-masalah ini telah dikemukakan kepada Jabatanarah Latih yang telah memberi jawapan yang sungguh membanggakan, iaitu menyokong konsep PLPTD dan seterusnya menasihatkan Jabatanarah Artilleri untuk membuat anggaran perbelanjaan PLPTD bagi tahun-tahun yang akan datang. Dalam suratnya kepada Jabatanarah Artilleri, Pengarah Latihan berpendapat bahawa, "Latihan-latihan rejimen yang berpandukan kepada konsep ARTEP adalah dialulukan. Sebenarnya Jabatanarah ini sedang di dalam proses menyatukan sistem evaluasi tersebut, khasnya untuk diimplementasikan oleh pasukan-pasukan tempur dan bantuan tempur"². Dengan sokongan daripada Jabatanrah Latih beberapa masalah besar dapat diatasi dan pada 18 sehingga 21 Okt 84 ujian PLPTD yang pertama dijalankan ke atas 3 Arti.

Perakuan resmi ke atas PLPTD oleh Tentera Darat (TD) ialah melalui Arahan Latihan Panglima Tentera Darat 1984. Di dalam Arahan itu Panglima Tentera Darat (PTD) menyatakan bahawa TD akan menggunakan pendekatan latihan secara sistem dan seterusnya meminta komander-komander menggunakan PLPTD sebagai satu kaedah permulaan untuk menilai kompeni-kompeni infantri³. Selepas perakuan pertama ini, PTD telah mengeluarkan arahan-arahan untuk PLPTD digunakan di dalam Arahan Latihan PTD bagi tahun 1985/1986, 1987/1988, 1988/1989 dan 1992/1993. Di dalam Arahan Latihan PTD 1992/1993, PTD mengarahkan, "untuk latihan kolektif Army Training Evaluation Programme (ARTEP) serta doktrin kor masing-masing perlu digunakan"⁴.

Sejak bulan Okt 84 sehingga bulan Dis 91, semua unit-unit artilleri medan yang bertaraf beroperasi telah diuji termasuk A Bti, 21 Artilleri dan 611 Bti Pengesan yang baru mendapat peralatan mereka dalam tahun 1990/1991.

TUJUAN

Tujuan rencana ini ialah untuk merakamkan satu pengalaman di dalam perancangan dan pelaksanaan PLPTD dan seterusnya untuk membentangkan cadangan-cadangan yang difikirkan relevan untuk memperbaiki lagi pelaksanaan ujian PLPTD di dalam Tentera Darat.

Perspektif rencana ini ialah dari kacamata seorang pegawai yang telah terlibat secara langsung selama dua tahun setengah di dalam latihan-latihan di peringkat briged dan batalion infantri dalam siri-siri Gonzales, Gonzales Lasak, Perkhemahan Perang dan Simulasi Perang dan seterusnya selama empat tahun di dalam ujian pelaksanaan PLPTD bagi unit-unit artilleri⁵. Pengalaman ini mungkin boleh dianggap singkat oleh satu-satu pihak. Jika ada yang berpendapat bahawa cadangan yang dikemukakan di dalam rencana ini tidak mempunyai asas yang kukuh, penulis sungguh berharap mereka dapat menyumbangkan pendapat mereka supaya kita bersama dapat memantapkan lagi PLPTD di dalam Tentera Darat.

PLPTD DALAM LATIHAN TD

Semasa merangka PLPTD ini pada tahun 1983 tujuan Pengarah Artilleri ialah "untuk mengetahui taraf kecekapan dan prestasi pasukan-pasukan artilleri dari segi teknikal dan kemampuan bertindak dalam gerakan"⁶. Perkataan "teknikal" ini tidak terhad kepada kebolehan anggota-anggota artilleri untuk mengendalikan peralatan-peralatan ataupun untuk membuat perkiraan-perkiraan data tembakan dengan betul, tetapi ia memberi makna yang lebih luas. "Teknikal" di sini merangkumi kecekapan satu-satu unit itu untuk melaksanakan peranan utamanya sebagai satu unit artilleri. Peranan artilleri ialah untuk mengwujudkan keagungan tembakan di medan pertempuran. Untuk menguji unit-unit samada mereka

2. KP/TD/LATIH B1/5214 Jil 4 bertarikh 19 Sep 83.
3. KP/TD/LATIH C1/5178/1 bertarikh 12 Dis 83.
4. KP/TD/LATIH C/578/1 bertarikh 23 Dis 91.
5. Penulis memegang jawatan KS 1 Bdg pada Jan 85 sehingga Mei 87. Komander Sekolah Artilleri pada Mei 87 sehingga Mac 90 dan Komander Divisyen Artilleri pada Apr 90 sehingga sekarang.
6. KP/TD/ARTI/G/0312 Jil 3 bertarikh 30 Ogos 83.

dapat memainkan peranannya di dalam satu-satu situasi, unit-unit diuji dalam beberapa perkara dari peringkat bateri sehingga ke peringkat rejimen. Buku panduan PLPTD ditulis merangkumi tidak kurang daripada 28 ujian untuk menilai prestasi-prestasi elemen-elemen penting di dalam organisasi rejimen itu.

Pada tahun 1990 satu kajian telah dibuat oleh Jabatanarah Artilleri dan hasil daripada kajian ini, Jabatanarah Artilleri berpendapat bahawa "sistem penilaian amat berkesan dan pegawai-pegawai memerintah telah menggunakan Buku Panduan PLPTD sebagai asas bagi mengukur dan meningkatkan taraf kecekapan dan kemahiran Rejimen"⁷. Sistem ini berkesan kerana ujian dibuat mengikut satu jadual yang teratur dan kaedah-kaedah yang tertentu. Dengan cara sedemikian punca kelemahan-kelemahan dapat dikenalpasti.

Rencana berpendapat bahawa PLPTD ini patut dijadikan satu ujian perdana bagi semua unit-unit Tentera Darat kerana ia menilai unit-unit di dalam peranan utamanya. Dalam ertikata profesionalisme PLPTD, akan menilai unit-unit di dalam kepakarannya, iaitu bagi unit infantri kepakarannya di dalam pertempuran rapat (close quarter battle), bagi armor di dalam pertempuran mobil dan bagi artileri kepakarannya di dalam mengwujudkan keagungan tembakan. PLPTD mestilah dijadikan kemuncak latihan satu-satu unit itu sebelum unit itu dibenarkan untuk mengikuti latihan-latihan kelompok di peringkat briged ataupun divisyen.

Sebagai satu ujian kepakaran ke atas unit itu, segala aspek penting berkaitan dengan kepakaran satu-satu unit mesti diuji. Penekanan ialah kepada perkara-perkara yang MESTI tahu. Masa dan pengadil-pengadil yang mencukupi mesti diperuntukan. Unit yang gagal untuk lulus di dalam ujian ini mesti diuji semula kerana tiada baiknya jika unit yang didapati lemah di dalam menjalankan peranan utamanya dibenarkan mengambil bahagian di dalam latihan kelompok di peringkat formasi. Jika PLPTD dijadikan ujian perdana kepakaran maka apakah kedudukan latihan-latihan yang lain seperti latihan Gonzales, Gonzales Lasak, Jalan Lasak dan Perkhemahan Perang?

11. Rencana berpendapat bahawa latihan peringkat batalion seperti yang dijalankan sekarang ini mempunyai skop yang besar dan seterusnya objektif-objektif yang banyak. Latihan itu digunakan untuk menguji kepakaran unit-unit yang mengambil bahagian, kerjasama antara semua perkhidmatan, sistem

komunikasi dan lojistik di dalam satu kumpulan tempur. Oleh sebab skop latihan adalah besar, dan masa ujian latihan dan bilangan pengadil-pengadil adalah sungguh terhad, maka penilaian yang menyeluruh tidak dapat dijalankan ke atas semua unit yang terlibat. Apa yang dikenalpasti ialah simpton-simpton kelemahan bukan punca kelemahan itu. Latihan Gonzales akan lebih bermakna jika ia dijadikan satu latihan untuk menguji perkara-perkara berkaitan dengan semua perkhidmatan sahaja dan skop latihan, corak latihan dan pengadilan ditumpukan kepada kerjasama semua perkhidmatan. Perkara-perkara berkaitan dengan kepakaran satu-satu unit itu tidak perlu diuji kerana ujian PLPTD telah menyelesaikan kehendak itu.

Bagi unit-unit infantri latihan seperti Gonzales Lasak, Jalan Lasak dan Perkhemahan Perang patut disatukan ke dalam PLPTD kerana perkara-perkara itu adalah elemen-elemen penting di dalam kepakaran batalion infantri. Skop ujian PLPTD bagi unit TD patut meliputi ujian-ujian kecergasan fizikal dan mental, pengetahuan taktikal dan teknikal dan kecekapan pemerintahan dan kawalan oleh pegawai-pegawai di dalam unit itu. Dalam masa latihan 12 bulan, putaran latihan unit adalah seperti berikut:

- a. **Bulan 1 Ke 5** - Latihan Unit.
- b. **Bulan 6** - Ujian PLPTD.
- c. **Bulan 6 Ke 8** - Latihan dengan unit tempur.
- d. **Bulan 9** - Latihan kelompok peringkat kumpulan batalion atau formasi.
- e. **Bulan 10 ke 12** - Lain-lain latihan.

Bolehkah ujian PLPTD digabungkan dengan latihan-latihan kelompok di peringkat formasi? Rejimen Artilleri telah mencuba menilai unit-unit menggunakan kaedah ujian PLPTD semasa bateri-bateri mengambil bahagian di dalam latihan-latihan kelompok. Oleh sebab skop dan objektif latihan kelompok dan ujian PLPTD berbeza, maka beberapa perkara teknikal yang khusus tidak dapat diuji. Sebagai contoh, banyak ujian-ujian di jalankan dengan menembak peluru hidup. Ini bermakna ujian hanya boleh dijalankan di Asahan kerana semua latihan kelompok di peringkat formasi dibuat kawasan-kawasan awam.

Daripada pengalaman Rejimen Artilleri, rencana berpendapat bahawa beberapa aspek am boleh dinilai semasa latihan kelompok di peringkat formasi. Perkara-perkara yang bercorak ujian khusus mesti dijalankan

7. KP/TD/ARTI/G/2070 Jil 2 bertarikh 21 Sep 90.

semasa ujian PLPTD di tempat-tempat yang sesuai seperti di lapangsasaran ataupun diwoksyop dan stor untuk unit-unit lojistik.

TANGGUNGJAWAB MENGENDALIKAN PLPTD

Ujian PLPTD ialah untuk menilai kecekapan satu-satu unit itu di dalam kepakarannya. Kepakaran ini adalah satu perkara yang khusus kepada satu-satu Kor itu dan boleh dianggap sebagai satu perkara teknikal. Oleh yang demikian di dalam kontek saluran pemerintahan, PLPTD adalah termasuk di dalam tajuk pemerintahan teknikal. Ini bermakna ujian PLPTD adalah tanggungjawab Pengarah-Pengarah Kor. Selepas satu-satu ujian PLPTD itu, Pengarah-Pengarah Kor sebagai seorang Pegawai Kepakaran Terkanan di dalam kornya akan melapor kepada PTD dan Panglima formasi menyatakan bahawa unitnya adalah cekap di dalam fungsi utamanya dan seterusnya adalah tanggungjawab Panglima-Panglima formasi utnuk meningkatkan latihan unit itu di dalam latihan kelompok yang melibatkan kerjasama dengan semua perkhidmatan. Cara ini juga memberi peluang kepada Pengarah-Pengarah Kor untuk melihat secara langsung kecekapan pegawai-pegawai yang ia tukarkan kepada unit, kebaikan peralatan-peralatan yang ia tajakan untuk unit-unit dan kebaikan doktrin-doktrin kornya yang ia taja ke Jawatankuasa Doktrin.

Markas-markas formasi ada juga tanggungjawab di dalam ujian PLPTD kerana unit-unit di letakkan di bawah pemerintahan formasi. Di dalam mengendalikan ujian PLPTD, organisasi pengendalian mestilah mengandungi pegawai-pegawai daripada markas formasi untuk memberi bekalan maklumat yang sesuai supaya unit dapat melaksanakan tugas utamanya.

Untuk menentukan yang penilaian ujian adalah seimbang bagi semua unit, maka tim penilaian ataupun pengadil mesti datangnya daripada satu organisasi yang tetap ataupun sekurang-kurang kawalan mutu mesti di ketuai oleh seorang pegawai dari satu organisasi yang tetap. Organisasi itu mestilah satu organisasi yang pakar di dalam peranan utama unit-unit yang hendak diuji itu. Organisasi yang sesuai untuk menjalankan tugas penilaian ini ialah pusat latihan bagi kor yang berkenaan. Pusat latihan ini perlu mengwujudkan satu tim yang mempunyai tugas semata-mata untuk menilai unit-unit semasa ujian PLPTD. Cara ini mempunyai satu kebaikan dimana, pusat latihan itu dapat secara langsung mengenal pasti punca kelemahan dan ini akan membolehkan pusat latihan ini mengubah kaedah latihannya untuk mengatasi kelemahan-kelemahan yang

telah dikenalpasti itu. Di dalam rejimen artileri, kawalan mutu semasa ujian PLPTD dijalankan oleh pegawai-pegawai dari Cawangan Ujian/Penyelidikan dan Pembangunan/Korikulum (UPPK) dari Sekolah Artileri.

Untuk mengendalikan ujian PLPTD ke atas unit-unit, rencana ini mengesyorkan satu organisasi pengendali seperti berikut:

- a. **Ketua Ujian PLPTD.** Pengarah Kor ataupun Pegawai terkanan yang dilantik oleh Pengarah Kor.
- b. **Ketua Pegawal Ujian.** Ketua Staf Briged ataupun PS 1 atau Pegawai Memerintah bagi unit-unit lojistik.
- c. **Kumpulan Pengawal.** Staf Jabatanarah dan briged.
- d. **Tim Penilai.** Pusat latihan.
- e. **Kumpulan Tadbir.** Staf briged.

JADUAL PLPTD

Salah satu masalah besar yang dihadapi oleh Jabatanarah Artileri untuk melaksanakan ujian PLPTD ialah untuk mencari masa yang sesuai disebabkan oleh unit-unit terlibat dengan latihan-latihan di peringkat Markas Kor, Divisyen dan Briged. Oleh sebab unit-unit adalah di bawah pemerintahan Markas Kor, maka latihan diperingkat Markas Kor diberi keutamaan. Dengan adanya hubungan yang erat antara Markas Kor diberi keutamaan. Dengan adanya hubungan yang erat antara Markas Kor dan Jabatanarah Artileri, beberapa masalah masa untuk ujian PLPTD dapat dirundingkan tanpa menjelaskan dengan serius kepentingan kedua-dua pihak. Jika ujian PLPTD dijadikan satu ujian perdana, apa yang perlu dibuat ialah waktu untuk menguji unit-unit itu dijadualkan di dalam satu program induk dan semua yang terlibat di dalam ujian itu seperti markas-markas briged dan pusat latihan menjadualkan aktiviti-aktiviti mereka mengikut program induk itu. Dengan cara ini, matlamat PLPTD dapat dicapai sepenuhnya.

Kekerapan ujian PLPTD ke atas satu-satu unit adalah tertakluk kepada setakat mana satu-satu unit itu dapat mengekalkan kecekapannya setelah keputusan satu-satu ujian itu. Rencana berpendapat bahawa faktor-faktor yang perlu diambil kira untuk menentukan kekerapan ujian ialah pernubukan pucuk pimpinan di dalam unit; pembekalan peralatan baru ataupun pindaan kepada organisasi unit yang mempunyai implikasi taktikal ke atas peranan unit; laporan pemeriksaan pakar dan pemeriksaan tadbir tahunan dan akhir sekali keputusan ujian PLPTD yang lepas. Mengambil kira faktor-faktor ini, rencana ini syorkan bahawa kekerapan

ujian PLPTD ke atas satu-satu unit itu adalah seperti berikut:

- a. Sekali dalam masa dua tahun jika unit tidak dibekalkan dengan peralatan baru ataupun tidak ada pindaan baru kepada organisasi.
- b. Jika unit dibekalkan dengan peralatan baru ataupun organisasi dipinda, maka ujian dijalankan setelah unit diberi masa yang mencukupi untuk memahirkan diri dengan peralatan ataupun organisasi itu. Ujian ini boleh dilakukan hanya kepada kumpulan-kumpulan tertentu sahaja dan tidak keseluruhannya unit.
- c. Jika keputusan ujian PLPTD yang lepas didapati tidak memuaskan, unit ataupun unit kecilnya diuji semula selepas empat bulan; iaitu jangkamasa yang mengcukupi untuk unit memperbaiki kelemahannya.

BUKU PANDUAN UNTUK UJIAN PLPTD

Jabatanarrah Artileri mengambil masa satu tahun untuk menyediakan buku panduan ujian. Buku ini mengandungi kaedah-kaedah untuk melaksanakan penilaian. Untuk menyediakan risalah ini, apa yang penting ialah untuk mendapat seorang "pengarang" yang faham ke atas konsep PLPTD, yakin bahawa PLPTD ini adalah satu kaedah yang baik, mempunyai pengetahuan teknikal dan taktikal berkaitan dengan unit-unit, mempunyai imaginasi dan akhir sekali berupaya untuk menulis dengan jelas, tepat dan pendek. Di dalam Rejimen Artileri, tugas menyediakan risalah PLPTD diberikan kepada Sekolah Artileri kerana unit ini mempunyai ramai pegawai-pegawai yang berpengalaman dan mempunyai pengetahuan teknikal. Untuk menentukan yang risalah itu kelak boleh dipraktikkan, Sekolah Artileri pula berhubung dengan unit-unit yang lain untuk mendapatkan buah fikiran pegawai-pegawai memerintah.

Rencana ini berpendapat bahawa melantik seorang ketua pengarang adalah satu cara yang baik untuk menulis buku-buku panduan. Oleh sebab penulisan memakan masa yang panjang, dan untuk menentukan yang ujian dapat dijalankan dengan cepat, rencana ini syorkan draf ujian PLPTD untuk peringkat kompeni disediakan dahulu dan jalankan ujian ke atas kompeni-kompeni dengan seberapa cepat yang boleh. Tidak perlu bagi pihak pengarang untuk menyediakan buku panduan untuk satu batalion ataupun rejimen kerana cara ini akan memakan masa dan boleh membawa kepada kekecewaan dan PLPTD akan menjadi satu "non-starter".

PELAKSANAAN UJIAN PLPTD

Pelaksanaan ujian PLPTD merangkumi banyak perkara-perkara dan adalah mustahil untuk membincangkan perkara-perkara ini di dalam rencana yang pendek ini. Apa yang dibincangkan adalah perkara-perkara yang difikirkan penting untuk diketahui oleh semua.

Di dalam Rejimen Artileri, unit-unit artileri di bawah pemerintahan Markas-markas 2, 3 dan 4 Divisyen, ujian PLPTD dikendalikan oleh Jabatanarrah Artileri dan bagi unit-unit Markas Divisyen Artileri, 11 Divisyen Strategik, pelaksanaan ujian ini didelegasikan oleh Jabatanarrah Artileri kepada Markas Divisyen Artileri. Pelaksanaan ujian PLPTD oleh Jabatanarrah Artileri adalah mengikut cara yang digunakan oleh Royal Australian Artillery, iaitu dengan menilai prestasi-prestasi unit di medan. Unit-unit diuji ke atas teknik dan taktik aturgerak mereka, kecekapan pengendalian pos-pos rintah, kecekapan melaksanakan tembakan dan rancangan tembakan. Peluru hidup digunakan untuk semua misi-misi tembakan.

Di Markas Divisyen Artileri, sebelum unit-unit diuji di medan, pegawai-pegawai dan PTT Kanan dikehendaki mengambil ujian bertulis secara objektif dan juga beberapa ujian-ujian praktikal berdasarkan kepada ujian-ujian tred. Soalan-soalan untuk ujian bertulis diambil daripada risalah doktrin semasa yang telah dimaklumkan kepada unit-unit. Pada amnya pegawai-pegawai dan PTT Kanan diuji ke atas disiplin tembakan, peranan dan organisasi unit-unit artileri, pengetahuan am berkaitan dengan artileri dan sifat-sifat peralatan penting yang terdapat di dalam satu-satu unit itu. Tujuan mengadakan ujian bertulis ini adalah untuk mempastikan bahawa pegawai-pegawai dan PTT Kanan mempunyai pengetahuan teori yang minima sebelum ujian praktik di medan dijalankan. Dengan cara sedemikian, jika satu-satu kelemahan didapati semasa ujian medan, kita dapat merumuskan samada kelemahan itu berpunca daripada kurang pengalaman ataupun kurang pengetahuan ataupun kedua-duanya. Ujian bertulis ini juga akan memaksa pegawai-pegawai dan PTT Kanan membuka dan membaca risalah-risalah doktrin yang ada. Sejak ujian bertulis ini dimulakan Markas Divisyen Artileri ada bukti jelas untuk menyatakan bahawa mereka yang lemah di dalam ujian bertulis ataupun ujian praktikal di unit akan menunjukkan kelemahan semasa ujian praktikal di medan.

Daripada pengalaman-pengalaman yang lepas rencana berpendapat bahawa ujian PLPTD boleh dijalankan mengikut peringkat-peringkat seperti berikut:

- a. Ujian bertulis dan ujian kemahiran di dalam

kem. Ini untuk mempastikan pengetahuan teori dikalangan anggota-anggota unit.

b. Ujian atas kecekapan unit untuk bersiap sedia untuk gerakan.

c. Ujian pergerakan secara taktikal ke kawasan gerakan.

d. Ujian-ujian khusus seperti pelaksanaan serang hendap, tembak motar, serangan platun dan kompeni. Ujian-ujian kecerdasan jasmani bercorak keperluan tempur patut diserapkan semasa pelaksanaan serangan. Ujian elok diakhiri dengan tembakan peluru hidup kerana kemahiran menembak adalah penting terutama dikalangan unit-unit tempur dan bantuan tempur. Bagi unit-unit bukan tempur, ujian terakhir mestilah satu aktiviti yang benar-benar menguji satu aspek kepakaran yang dianggap penting bagi unit itu.

Di dalam perang, tiada unit yang boleh bertempuran dengan jayanya tanpa bantuan unit-unit lain. Oleh yang demikian, di dalam ujian PLPTD bekalan maklumat semua perkhidmatan mesti diberi kepada unit oleh pengawal latihan mengikut keperluan keadaan. Di dalam penulisan kertas ujian PLPTD, beberapa syarat-syarat keadaan ditentukan. Syarat-syarat keadaan adalah penting untuk menentukan objektif ujian tercapai sepenuhnya. Beberapa contoh syarat-syarat keadaan adalah seperti berikut:

a. **Bagi menguji pemerhati seorang pegawai.**

- (1) Ancaman musuh adalah minima.
- (2) Platun infantri berada 200 meter di utara sasaran.

b. **Bagi menguji rancangan tembakan rejimen.**

- (1) Tiada ancaman serangan atau tembak balas bateri oleh musuh.
- (2) Komander infantri hendakkan semua sasaran dijamin.

Semasa ujian PLPTD satu unit Markas Divisyen Artilleri, satu kaedah yang digunakan ialah untuk

menempatkan seseorang pegawai infantri di Markas kawalan. Pegawai ini, seorang tenaga pengajar di Sekolah Artilleri, bertindak sebagai komander infantri untuk memberi bekalan matlamat infantri kepada pegawai memerintah unit yang diuji.

Rencana ini berpendapat bahawa cara pembekalan maklumat semua perkhidmatan melalui syarat-syarat bertulis dan dengan menggunakan seorang pegawai yang terlatih, adalah satu kaedah yang mencukupi bagi maksud ujian PLPTD. Apa yang penting ialah syarat-syarat keadaan mesti ditulis dengan jelas dan pegawai yang bertindak untuk membekalkan maklumat semua perkhidmatan itu mesti tahu dan faham ke atas peranan utama unit yang diuji itu dan juga tahu dan faham objektif ujian PLPTD. Jika syarat tidak jelas ataupun maklumat lisan yang diberi tidak selaras dengan objektif, tindakan unit akan terpesong ke hala yang lain.

PENUTUP

Pengalaman Rejimen Artilleri di dalam ujian PLPTD selama 7 tahun menyakinkan bahawa ujian kecekapan unit berasaskan kepada PLPTD adalah satu kaedah yang berkesan. Di dalam sistem latihan Tentera Darat, ujian PLPTD patut dijalankan ke atas semua unit sebelum mereka dibenarkan untuk menyertai latihan-latihan kelompok di peringkat briged ataupun Divisyen. Ujian PLPTD boleh dijadikan satu ujian perdana mengabungkan latihan-latihan seperti Perkhemahan Perang dan Jalan Lasak.

Dalam menyediakan rangka ujian PLPTD, Jabatanarah-Jabatanarah akan menghadapi pelbagai masalah seperti mendapatkan pengarang untuk menulis panduan ujian, peruntukan peluru dan kekurangan masa dan tenaga. Masalah seperti ini tidak susah diatasi jika pucuk pimpinan berkeyakinan bahawa ujian PLPTD adalah satu kaedah yang baik dan mereka mempunyai keazaman untuk melaksanakan sistem PLPTD. Arahan Panglima Tentera Darat berkaitan dengan PLPTD adalah jelas dan oleh yang demikian, segala usaha patut diberi untuk melaksanakan sistem PLPTD di dalam Tentera Darat.



Kol Mohd Aris bin Salim banyak menghasilkan tulisan untuk jurnal ini. Beliau kerap menulis mengenai pelbagai aspek dalam profesion artileri.

Beliau memang mempunyai pengalaman yang luas dalam bidang ini. Sebagai seorang pegawai kanan Artilleri, pendedahan yang diterimanya melalui jawatan-jawatan yang disandangnya atau kursus-kursus yang dihadirinya, menjadikan beliau amat teliti terhadap aspek-aspek yang perlu diketengahkan.

Kini beliau ialah Komander Division Artilleri.

"Life"

It is a funny thing about life: If you refuse to accept anything but the best, you very often get it.

- W. Somerset Maugham

Life is like a bank account. You only get back what you put in. Experience is the interest.


-Anon

Life is a one way street. No matter how many detours you take, none of them leads back. And once you know and accept that, life becomes much simpler. Because then, you know you must do the best you can with what you have and what you are and what you have become.

- Isabel Moore

What we are is God's gift to us. What we become is our gift to God.

- Louis Nizer



MASTER OF DEFENCE SERIES REGIONAL AND WORLD ORDERS

Oleh

Lt Kol Khalid Othman

REGIONAL AND WORLD ORDERS

Does the term "world order" have any meaning? How does one kind of order change into another? Is a new world order in the offing?

INTRODUCTION

Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, President Bush accused Iraq of violating the very essence of international order and civilized ideas.¹ By com-

mitting a ruthless assault on a small nation which had little means to defend itself, Iraq had shown little respect not only to its neighbours but also the international community as a whole. Subsequently, Bush felt that there was a need once again to restore a world order. So what is this "new world order" that Bush is referring to? Although there are many articles written on the subject, no one can say for sure what it means. H Ross Perot, an American billionaire businessman even offered to buy US\$4,100,000 worth of television time for anyone who could really explain what the term "New World Order" means.² Even Len Aukland,

1. Len Aukland, *New World What?*, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July 1991, p2

2. Willian L Chasc, "The New World Order and Scoundrels", Defence and Diplomacy, May/June 1991, p64

the former chief editor of *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientist*, made a mischievous remark when he ran an editorial entitled "New World What?" Following Bush's enunciation of the new world order, there is a sudden surge of interest on this particular subject. It is so popularly mentioned these days that any actions or incidents that have taken place in the last few months are linked to the new world order, rightly or wrongly.

In the light of the above, this paper attempts to examine the term "world order" and analyse how one kind of order changes into another. It will also examine whether a "New World Order" is in the offing.

The World Order

According to Hedley Bull, world order can be described as "those patterns or dispositions of human activity that sustain that elementary or primary goals of social life among mankind as a whole."³ It is a society of sovereign states as opposed to a universal empire or a cosmopolitan society in which mankind as a whole is now politically organised. Unlike 'international order', which is order among states but does not include those group of men that do not form states, world order stresses more the great society of all mankind. Also it is said that international order is only a mean of sustaining world order. In that regard, order among mankind as a whole is something wider than order among states.⁴

Sometimes, world order is taken as the totality of relationships among states, i.e the international political system as a whole. On that aspect, it can be argued that order in international politics should be subordinate to freedom or liberty-the coalition against Napoleon, for example, saw itself as fighting for the liberties of European nations against a system that provided order which extinguished these liberties; and during the Cold War it was often said that within the American and Soviet "spheres of influence" order was imposed at the expense of freedom or independence of small states.

Bull also raised an interesting discussion when he raised the question of superpower-preferred world order. There is an urge to equate world order with a patterning or structuring of international life towards the preferred goals of some particular powers, for

example, an American preferred world order. In the Western World today when terms such as 'order' or 'stability' are used, it is an ordering of international relationships that serves such American-preferred or Western-preferred goals that is often meant. What is meant here, by contrast, is a quality of order that may be abstracted from particular 'preferred' international orders, that comprises a structuring of international life in relation to fundamental objectives.⁵

World order as Bull described, implies norms or rules and treats them as having 'values'. And that order in world politics is only one of a number of contending values, that its claims have to be compared alongside those of change, justice and peace and that to show that some course of action is a requirement of world order is not to have established that it would be undertaken.⁶

How does one kind of order change into another?

According to some analysts, the change from one kind of order to another can be looked into in various forms. Bull for instance, argues that during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union had a tacit understanding by refraining from intervening unilaterally within one another's⁷ 'spheres of influence'. During that period, Eastern Europe was considered to be under the 'sphere of influence' of the Soviets while Western Europe and the Caribbean states were said to be under the 'sphere of influence' of the United States. Under this kind of order, they had also sought to restrain their respective allies in local or regional conflicts.

In cases where they had been allied or closely associated with opposite sides in regional dispute, they had sought to restrain their respective allies or associates. This had been the pattern of US and Soviet policy in the international scene. In the Middle East for example, since the 1967 War, while the United States had sought to restrain Israel, the Soviet were putting the same effect on the Arab states. Similar pattern has been demonstrated in the case of the India-Pakistan or the China-Taiwan dispute. There was a balancing of power in each case.

The same view is echoed by Paul Keal. Keal for instance, examines the notion of spheres of influence

3. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, Columbia University Press, 1977, p20.

4. Loc. cit.

5. Hedley Bull, 'World Order and the Superpowers', *Superpowers and World Order*, ANU, Canberra, 1971, p. 142

6. Loc. cit.

7. Hedley Bull, op. cit., p20

that were long in existence between the superpowers.⁸ He argues that not only was there a tacit understanding about them but this understanding expressed some of what might be called the 'rules of the game' in relations between the superpowers. Basically what is understood was the United States would ignore Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe and by the same token the Soviets would show the same respect to the United States. Evidence in this kind of understanding can be found in the examples of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. At the same time the Soviet Union would not intervene militarily in America's action as in the case of the Vietnam War or in the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965.⁹

Although neither the Russians nor the Americans officially admitted to have such 'spheres,' activities during the Cold War showed that efforts had been made by the both parties to consolidate and extend them.¹⁰ The denial by both the United States and the Soviet Union showed that neither of these two powers either publicly recognized the sphere of the other or used the term "sphere of influence" to describe its relationship with states which were considered by other powers to be under its influence. Nonetheless, spheres of influence were part of the reality of international politics and the Soviet Union together with the United States had both acted as though they did not recognize each other's sphere. It was primarily through such understanding that spheres of influence contribute to international order.¹¹

Another analogy on this changing of order was pointed out by Arthur Lee Burns as in the case of changing from balance of power to a balance of terror which may eliminate major war. For what it is worth, history confirms this part of the theory. It was said that Rome, once it had defeated the Carthaginians was able to conquer piecemeal the many smaller states of the Mediterranean system, overthrowing thereby several inter-connected balances of power.¹²

Condominium was also used by some of the Western writers to show that a high degree of co-operation between the superpowers might secure world order. There are also others who feared that too much collaboration between the dominant powers would

reduce the freedom of the other members of the states-system. Condominium belongs to the terminology of international law.¹³ In the 1960s the term 'concert' appeared frequently in the works of those Western writers who, in their speculations about the future order of international society, went beyond the idea of a condominium of two superpowers and envisioned a group of perhaps half a dozen of the great powers jointly managing international politics.¹⁴ But because a concert operates on the notion of all against one and relies on collective action to resist aggression, it falls into the collective security family.¹⁵

When the Gulf War broke out, the concept of 'rules of the game' or 'spheres of influence' took a back seat. The Soviets could no longer exercise their power to prevent the United States from interfering. Even the Soviet Peace Plan proposed by Gorbachev as a 'face saving' device for both the Soviet Union and Iraq was rejected outright by President Bush. There were several reasons as to, why the Soviet did not act aggressively against the United States intervention. Apart from overcoming its own domestic political problems, the Soviet Union was also plagued with serious economic turmoil. It was Gorbachev every intention to seek economic aid from the West and clearly, the Soviets knew they could no longer 'call the shots'. In fact it has been said the Soviet Union was no longer a superpower following the fall of the Berlin wall.

In the absence of the previous order (concept of 'spheres of influence') one can say that a 'concept of nations' or what Owen Harries terms as the Collective Security Model has come into force. The international community under the auspices of the United Nation organises itself to put things into order as was the case during the Gulf War.

Is a new world order in the offing?

On the question of whether a world order is in the offing, current journals and articles show that there isn't a consensus on this issue. While Bush seems quite clear about the emergence of a "new world order" following the end of the Gulf War, many writers reacted differently on this issue. K

8. Paul Keal, *Unspoken Rules And Superpower Dominance*, The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1983, pp1-3

9. Loc. cit

10. John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System', *International Security*, 10:4 Spring 1986, pp99-142

11. Paul Keal, op.cit., pp1-3

12. Arthur Lee Burns, "From Balance To Deterrence" *World Politics* Vol IX No. 4 July 1957., p504

13. Carsten Holbreadt, *Condominium and Concert, Superpower and World Order*, ANU Press 1971, p.1

14. Loc. cit

15. Charles A Kupchan, *Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe*, *International Security*, Vol 16. No 1 Summer 1991. p119

Subrahmanyam, Chairman of the UN Study Group on Nuclear Deterrence for instance, finds that it is ridiculous to talk of a new world order after a short war in which a large coalition, including the military forces of a number of major powers, defeated a mid-level developing nation with a paranoid dictator.¹⁶ He argues that the United States is not the power it was in 1945, when it led the victors of World War II in defining a new world order. A nation that appealed for donations from other nations to finance a war against a developing nation cannot expect to impose its own order on the globe. To that extent one could argue that the new order has to involve not only the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, but also Japan and Germany who are economically strong.¹⁷

Amidst all the interpretations, Professor Owen Harries argues that the new world order can be considered from several perspectives. First, there is what one may call as interdependence or Global village of the future. Harries describes this model as a replacement of the old zero-sum game of power politics which is rapidly giving way to a new order characterised by harmony and mutual dependence. The same view is shared by Dou Hui, a professor of Chinese external relations at Shanghai International Studies University, who argues that the new world order is a thorough denial of the old order that was characterised by power politics—that is, an almost superstitious belief in the value of force.¹⁸ He adds that the new order is not entirely new but was formulated in the idea of peaceful coexistence, which was affirmed as the guiding principle in bilateral documents.

Peaceful co-existence rejects the old political and economic relations established by colonialism and imperialism and outlines the fundamental principles to which the world community should adhere. All sovereign states are equal and are free from intervention. But the new world order has been defined by some countries as a community of "free nations". It appears that Bush is imposing their social ideology on others and regard themselves as leaders in the rapidly changing world. Even though they claimed to be guided by legal norms, they seek to impose their chosen order on the world, with economic and military strength as their backing force. According to Hui, this is by no means a new world order but a new imperialism as advocated by Edward Heath, former British Prime Minister.¹⁹

The second version of the new world order is the Pax Democratica Model. There is a general feeling that liberal democracy has come out well from the Cold War and it was anticipated to be the dominant political system for the future. It is also said that since democracies do not fight each other, world order can therefore be restored. Both the models interdependence and Pax Democratica assume the decline in efficacy of force, and that economic power is about to displace military power as the principal measure of things. However this assumption was short-lived with the outbreak of the Gulf War. As was seen, the economic powers—Japan and Germany—played a marginal role in that affair. Political and military power were the decisive factor. Partly because of this, two other versions of a new world order have gained preference.

What the world saw during the Gulf war can be described as the Collective Security Model, whereby the international community organises itself to intervene by collective action. This concept brings up the prominence of the United Nations in the Gulf War, and more specifically from the fact that the Security Council for once functioned according to the manual, with no vetos obstructing it. In fact, Bush associated himself with this view, saying: "So, the New World Orders, foresees a revitalised peace keeping function of the United Nations."²⁰

Another new world order model in relation to Gulf War is the manifestation of American supremacy a Pax Americana, in what is now a unipolar world. Throughout the crisis, it was the United States who actually laid down the rules and 'call the shots'. Although one can argue that it was a United Nations operation, one cannot deny the fact that without the United States's active participation, Kuwait would not have been liberated. Besides, through the ordeal, the world was looking up at what Bush's next move would be and paid very little attention to what the former Secretary-General Perez De Cuellar had to say. If this is the model that was being adhered to, then the new world order looks very much like the old world order, an international coalition largely defined by the United States and making use of the United Nations to approve US strategies.²¹

Thomas Risse-Kappen, a professor from Cornell University, finds that the order presented in the Middle

16. K. Subrahmanyam, Some Nations More Equal Than Others, *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, July 1991, p21

17. Loc. cit

18. Dou Hui, Order Through Peaceful Coexistence, *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, July 1991, p2419.

Loc. cit

20. Pam Solo, Talking Law, Waging War, *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, July 1991, pp25-26

21. Loc. cit

East has serious flaws. The first is that although new world order implies that the international community acts collectively, most countries allowed the United States to do the job. Those who now complain about a Pax Americana should ask themselves what they were prepared to do to enforce the international law.²²

It is interesting to note that having talked about principles, the new era of international law, and the role of the United Nations in a new world order, Bush has introduced expectations on which he may have to deliver. There is now a need to put forward different definitions of the new world order which among other things include; the issues of sovereignty and intervention, the role of the state-and the United Nations-in a world increasingly defined by national and ethnic identities and finally managing environmental threats and conflicts over resources which, although they threaten the globe, are solvable only at the local level, albeit with the support of the international institutions.²³

A new world order thus cannot be confined to preventing aggression but has to deal with the underlying causes of armed conflict: economic inequality and ideological, cultural ethnic rivalries as well as blatant human rights violations. In that sense, Kappen finds it strange that the nations that were capable of coordinating 2,000 sorties a day to bomb Iraq could not provide food and shelter for the fleeing Kurds in a timely fashion. This is the lesson the have-nots of the world will learn about the new order.²⁴

Conclusion

The collapse of Soviet power, the decline of effective US hegemony and the rise of new power centers such as Japan and Germany and potentially China and India, indicate a shift towards a multipolar world structure.²⁵ Many people have argued that such a multipolar world may present more instabilities than a bipolar world of superpower hegemony.²⁶ Relations between countries may be volatile and possibly

duplicious as nation-states will have fewer commonly perceived serious threats and also, their behaviour/actions are no longer so constrained by superpower hegemony.

It is always debatable whether the new security environment at the end of the Cold War is more unstable than that of the Cold War era. For instance, one could argue that the recent Gulf War could well have occurred during the Cold War era and would have been made more complex by the then intense superpower rivalry. Many existing instabilities/conflicts, whether products of the Cold War era or not (for instance, the Cambodian and the Palestinian issues), will continue into the new security environment. This renders President George Bush's new world order as "not very new, nor very orderly and not especially global."²⁷ The new security environment at the end of the Cold War can, at best, be described as one which is not more stable than the Cold War era. There is therefore a continued need for a peace guarantor as well as a conflict regulator.

One of the most significant changes in the structure of international politics over the past decade has been the changing currency of power-seeming shifts in the relevance and usefulness of different power resources with military power declining and economic as well as technological power increasing its importance. The international relations scene had seen key actors, the US, Japan, Germany, China (seeking financial assistance from the G7 consortium) engaging in the "money game" rather than the 'power game'²⁸. In place of classical military strength, economic statecraft is playing an increasing role in the new world order. That is, 'economic power' rather than military power, is likely to be more competent as a guarantor of peace and a regulator of conflicts.

However the Gulf War may point to the fact that military strength is still required to terminate a conflict especially when economic sanctions have not worked or could not be given time to work in specific

22. Thomas Risse-Kappen, From Europe, A Ray of Hope, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July 1991, pp26

23. Loc. cit

24. Loc. cit

25. Huntington however labels the emerging world structure as unimultipolar in the light of the US role in the Middle-East since Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, in Samuel Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests" (PYSurvival, IISS, Vol. 33 No. 1, Jan/Feb 1991). In any case, the multipolar world structure had already taken shape before the end of the Cold War.

26. Henry Kissinger, Bordering on a Paradox: What's to be Done When the Bear has no Bite? The Australian, 1 April 1991

27. Senator Gareth Evans, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, in a response to US President George Bush's use of the phrase "a new world order" to describe the kind of international environment emerging at the end of the Cold War. Senator Gareth Evans in his address "The New World Order and the United Nations's" to the United Nations Association of Australian Seminar, 13 May 1991.

28. This perspective is given in Peter Polomka, "Towards a Pacific House", Survival, Vol 33. No. 2. Mar/Apr 1991 and also echoed in Joseph S Nye Jr, "The Changing Nature of Power", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 105, Summer 1990. Similar view is echoed by Lee Kuan Yew when he acknowledged that economic power gives a country more influence and leverage than military power (Straits Time, 10 May 1991)

conflicts. Even if military strength is still necessary, the Gulf war may serve as a precedent for future conflicts, which engendered similar international concern, to be resolved multilaterally by classical diplomacy and negotiation (regional or international) and if this approach fails, by economic sanctions before resorting to the use of military force via the collective security model.

BIBILOGRAPHY

Charles A Kupchan, Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe, International Security, Vol 16.No.1 Summer 1991.

Len Aukland, New World What? The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July 1991.

William L Chase, "The New World Order and Scoundrels". Defence and Diplomacy, May/June 1991.

Richard A Falk, 'Toward a new world order', On the Creation of a Just World Order, The Free Press, New York, 1975.

Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, Columbia University Press, 1977.

Hedley Bull, 'World Order and the Superpowers', Superpowers and World Order, ANU, Canberra, 1971.

Paul Keal, Unspoken Rules And Superpowers Dominance, The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1983.

John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System', International Security, 10;4 Spring 1986.

Arthur Lee Burns, "From Balance To Deterrence" World Politics Vol. IX No. 4 July 1957.

Carsten Holbraad, Condominium and Concert, Superpower and World Order, ANU Press 1971.

K Subrahmanyam, Some Nations More Equal Than Others, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July 1991.

George Perkovinch, Put Nuclear Weapons On The Agenda, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July 1991.

Dou Hui, Order Through Peaceful Coexistence, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists July 1991.

Pam Solo, Talking Law, Waging War, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July 1991.

Thomas Risse-Kappen, From Europe, A Ray of Hope, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July 1991.

Henry Kissinger, Bordering on a Paradox: What's to be Done When the Bear has no Bite? The Australian, 1 April 1991.

Senator Gareth Evans, "The New World Order and the United Nations" to the United Nations Associations of Australian Seminar, 13 May 1991.

Peter Polomka, "Towards a Pacific House" Survival, Vol. 33. No. 2. Mar/Apr 1991.

Joseph S Nye Jr, "The Changing Nature of Power". Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 105, Summer 1990.

Lee Kuan Yew, Straits Time, 10 May 1991.



BIODATA

Lt Kol Abd Khalid Othman was commissioned into the EME Corps on the 10 Apr 70. He holds a Bachelor's degree in Electrical Engineering from Universiti Teknologi Malaysia and a Master of Defence Studies from the University of New South Wales. He has held various appointment notably as OC LAD T Bty LLAD, LAD 1 MSSR, SO2 Electronics, OC 10 Wksp and CO 71 Wksp Div. Presently he is serving as one of the staff officers at Defence Logistics Division.