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
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KANDUNGAN


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*Penguatkuasaan Undang-undang
Oleh Kor Polis Tentera—
Cabaran dan Penyelesaian*

PENGUATKUASAAN UNDANG-UNDANG

OLEH KOR POLIS TENTERA— CABARAN DAN PENYELESAIAN



"We cannot have strong army without a good Police Force within it"

Napolean Bonaparte (1769-1821)

PENGENALAN

Tanggungjawab menguatkuasakan undang-undang di dalam ATM adalah merupakan suatu tanggungjawab yang rumit dan penuh dengan cabaran. Tanggungjawab ini selalunya dilihat sebagai tanggungjawab KPT keseluruhannya. (Pandangan yang terhad seperti ini boleh menimbulkan berbagai-bagai persoalan yang menjadi cabaran kepada KPT dan perlu diselesaikan). Tanggungjawab yang rumit ini bukan sahaja memerlukan suatu tahap komitmen yang tinggi, tetapi juga ciri-ciri ketegasan, keberanian dan kewibawaan yang tidak boleh dipersoalkan.

Petikan dari artikel peperangan oleh Charles I seperti berikut jelas membawa maksudnya yang sedemikian:

"The Provost must have a horse allowed him, and some soldiers to attend him, and all the rest commanded to obey him, or else the service will suffer, for he is but one man and must correct many, and therefore he cannot be beloved. And he must be riding from one garrison to another to see that the soldiers do not outrage nor scathe about the country."

Petikan artikel peperangan ini juga bermaksud bahawa tanggungjawab menguatkuasakan undang-undang atau disiplin di dalam ATM adalah melibatkan fungsi pemerintahan. Oleh yang demikian, kerjasama serta komitmen dari pihak-pihak terlibat seperti Pegawai-pegawai Memerintah dan Pemerintah-Pemerintah adalah diperlukan.

TUJUAN

Tujuan rencana ini ialah untuk memberi gambaran kepada para pembaca mengenai penguatkuasaan undang-undang oleh KPT dengan menumpukan kepada aspek-aspek cabaran dan penyelesaiannya.

SKOP

Rencana ini akan menyentuh aspek-aspek seperti berikut:

- * Keberkesan tugas KPT.
- * Cabaran semasa.
- * Penyelesaiannya.
- * Rumusan.

KEBERKESANAN TUGAS KPT

Sehingga kesemasa ini belum terdapat sesuatu formula yang benar-benar tepat yang boleh digunakan untuk mengukur keberkesanannya tugas KPT. Statistik aduan mungkin boleh membantu memberi beberapa petanda tetapi ianya tidak menyeluruh oleh kerana umum mengetahui tanggungjawab mengekalkan disiplin adalah terletak di bahu Pemerintah di medan. Anggota KPT membantu melaksanakan tugas-tugas ini melalui tindakan penguatkuasaan. Aduan Polis Tentera yang banyak tidak semestinya mempamirkan mutu tatatertib yang rendah di kalangan tentera. Manakala kurangnya aduan tidak juga bermakna tahap disiplin sudah pun memuaskan.

Pengukur lain yang tidak juga jelas tetapi tersirat maksudnya ialah melalui maklumbalas sama ada dari tindakan, hukuman, perhatian yang serius yang diberikan dan berbagai-bagai lagi. Perbincangan bagi maksud rencana ini akan menitikberatkan cara kedua iaitu melalui maklumbalas sama ada di peringkat Markas ATM mahupun di medan.

Sehingga ke masa ini, di antara maklumbalas yang telah diperolehi berhubung dengan Aduan Polis Tentera ialah:

- * Setiap lapisan bermula dari peringkat tertinggi TD hingga ke pasukan telah memberikan perhatian yang serius terhadap Laporan/ Aduan Polis Tentera.
- * Panglima-Panglima telah menegaskan agar Pegawai Memerintah/Pemerintah sendiri mengambil tindakan menyiasat pertuduhan ekoran dari Aduan Polis Tentera.
- * Didapati hukuman yang dikenakan ke atas anggota yang diadu adalah berat (jika diukur dengan kes-kes yang lepas).
- * Pegawai-pegawai Memerintah/Pemerintah telah ditegur oleh pihak atasaran ekoran dari Aduan Polis Tentera terhadap anggota-anggota di bawah pemerintahan mereka yang melakukan kesalahan (seperti memandu kenderaan awam tanpa lesen, cukai jalan, insuran dan lain-lain) yang mana mereka boleh mengambil tindakan sendiri tetapi telah gagal melaksanakan sepenuhnya.
- * Bahang tindakan penguatkuasaan oleh Polis Tentera dirasai oleh Pegawai-pegawai Memerintah/Pemerintah dan sekaligus meminta anggota Polis Tentera terutamanya peringkat Pegawai Memerintah untuk lebih berinteraksi dengan rakan sejawat mereka di tempat masing-masing.

Walaupun keberkesanannya tugas KPT tidak dapat diukur secara peratusan, tetapi kesimpulannya ialah tindakan penguatkuasaan oleh anggota Polis Tentera telah dapat dirasai disegenap peringkat terutamanya di medan.

CABARAN SEMASA

Peningkatan tugas penguatkuasaan oleh Polis Tentera tanpa disedari boleh menimbulkan beberapa masalah. Ada di antara masalah ini berpunca dari keghairahan sikap yang kurang betul, tersalah anggap, tersalah tafsir dan lain-lain. Masalah-masalah ini boleh dicetuskan oleh anggota Polis Tentera sendiri dan juga pasukan. Di antaranya ialah:

* Masalah Yang Di Cetuskan Oleh Anggota KPT Sendiri

* Kurang Sensitif.

Keberkesanannya yang wujud dan dilihat sekarang serba sedikitnya telah mendorong anggota Polis Tentera yang masih muda dan kurang pengalaman bersikap kurang sensitif semasa menjalankan tugas. Akibat dari sikap ini, telah dikatakan "anggota Polis Tentera bersikap angkuh" yang sebaik-baiknya, anggota Polis Tentera hendaklah mempamerkan satu sikap yang menjamin keberkesanannya seperti yang diutarakan oleh Polis Tentera British.

"The effectiveness of the Royal Military Police as a police force depends, to a great extent in which it is held by servicemen, the trust and confidence imposed by them and in which all ranks of the Royal Military Police carry out their duties. Many of the duties of Military Policemen are carried out in view of the general public, therefore it is necessary to earn their respect and cooperation"

* Kurang Menggunakan Kuasa Yang Diberi Menurut Peruntukan Undang-Undang.

Anggota KPT yang masih muda dan kurang pengalaman, mudah terpengaruh dengan keadaan yang kritikal atau mencabar dan selalunya tidak dapat mengawal perasaan. Peruntukan undang-undang yang diberi dilupai dan tidak digunakan pada masa-masa yang seperlunya. Contohnya, anggota KPT terlibat di dalam pertengkaran dan tidak menggunakan kuasa untuk menangkap pesalah. Di dalam konteks ini, wajarlah kita

meninjau pendapat seorang penulis buku undang-undang di Britain iaitu Charles Reith yang mengatakan:

"In securing the observance of law or in maintaining order, the Police should use, methods of persuasions, advice and warning. Should these fail, and the applications of force becomes inevitable, only the absolute minimum required in the circumstances should be used."

*** Kurang Menggunakan Kuasa Pemerintahan Untuk Membantu Di Dalam Tugas Penguatkuasaan Disiplin.**

Tugas kepolisian di dalam tentera adalah jauh berlainan dari tugas kepolisian di dalam masyarakat awam. Di dalam tentera, tanggungjawab terhadap disiplin adalah berasaskan kepada organisasi dan saluran pemerintahan. KPT perlu dilihat sentiasa memberi perhatian terhadap pendekatan ini iaitu dengan menggunakan kuasa serta pengaruh Pemerintah-pemerintah pasukan untuk menguatkuasakan disiplin di pasukan masing-masing.

*** Tidak Merasakan Bahawa Tugas Penguatkuasaan Yang Terlalu Pesat Akan Menjadi Satu Tekanan.**

Petugas-petugas KPT seharusnya sentiasa ingat bahawa tindakan penguatkuasaan yang keterlaluan sudah pasti akan menjadi satu tekanan ke atas pasukan. Tekanan ini jika tidak diredukan akan menimbulkan satu tindakbalas yang merugikan KPT (counter-productive) terhadap segala usaha yang dilaksanakan. Sifat bertoleransi secara berpada-pada diamalkan disamping meneruskan tugas penguatkuasaan.

*** Kelemahan Di segi Salah Lapur Apabila Membuat Aduan.**

Dari pemerintahan tertinggi hingga ke peringkat rendah, Aduan Polis Tentera didapati telah diberi perhatian. Ini menandakan keberkesaan KPT serta pengiktirafan pasukan lain terhadap KPT. Di dalam keadaan yang demikian, dikalangan anggota KPT yang masih muda dan kurang berpengalaman, masih didapati berlakunya kesilapan salah lapur, kesilapan catatan dan sebagainya. Keadaan ini telah merangsang pasukan membuat pertanyaan, meminta penjelasan dan seterusnya mencabar KPT walaupun atas alasan-alasan yang kurang konkrit.

*** Terdapat Beberapa Petugas KPT Kurang Mahir Terhadap Menggunakan Tatacara Penguatkuasaan.**

Tugas penguatkuasaan oleh KPT adalah merupakan adunan daripada beberapa tindakan seperti: menangkap, mengesan, mencegah dan menyiasat. Selain dari itu, tindakan secara psikologi juga boleh menghasilkan keberkesanan. Petugas KPT tidak seharusnya melaksanakan tugas-tugas penguatkuasaan hanya secara tangkapan sahaja tanpa menggunakan tatacara lain yang mungkin akan menimbulkan hasil yang lebih berkesan.

*** Masalah Yang Dicetuskan Oleh Anggota Atau Pasukannya Yang Diadukan:**

* Mencari jalan untuk menimbulkan kompleks, keraguan terhadap Aduan Polis Tentera atas alasan yang kurang konkret.

* Menolak Aduan Polis Tentera yang kadangkala ny terdapat kesilapan (kecil/ atau pun teknikal) yang mana boleh dipastikan secara memanggil anggota KPT memberi keterangan lisan semasa perbicaraan.

* Mencabar kes-kes siasatan yang meragukan pada pandangan mereka, pada hal bukti yang diperlukan telah mencukupi bagi maksud pendakwaan.

* Menyeleweng disegi hukuman (tidak menjatuhkan hukuman yang setimpal dengan kesalahan).

PENYELESAIANNYA

Setelah mengambilkira akan pencapaian KPT di dalam tugas-tugas penguatkuasaan dan cabaran-cabaran yang dihadapi, langkah-langkah penyelesaian yang dikenalpasti ini adalah merupakan salah satu daripada beberapa pendekatan bagi memantapkan lagi tugas-tugas penguatkuasaan undang-undang oleh KPT. Ada diantara yang akan dinyatakan nanti telah pun dilaksanakan. Walau bagaimanapun, penyelesaian ini adalah untuk tujuan yang lebih menyeluruh.

*** Penggunaan Struktur Pemerintahan Untuk Membantu Tugas KPT.**

Sebagai contoh, pendekatan secara ini boleh dilaksanakan seperti berikut:

* Memberi taklimat mengenai tugas-tugas penguatkuasaan undang-undang kepada Panglima dari masa ke masa.

- * Markas ATM diminta menyelaraskan Arahan/Polisi penguatkuasaan.
- * Arahan Operasi KPT wajar dikeluarkan oleh Markas Formasi (Div atau Bgd) bagi melaksanakan operasi KPT di kawasan tanggungjawab masing-masing.
- * Memasukkan subjek penguatkuasaan undang-undang dan disiplin semasa hari Pengajian Pegawai di peringkat Markas Formasi di dalam pengurusan pentadbiran.
- * Syarahan khas oleh wakil KPT untuk Hari Pegawai Formasi dan Seminar SMR dan KSM Formasi yang diselaraskan oleh Markas Formasi.
- * Pengeluaran Buletin atau Laporan Tatatertib oleh Markas Formasi kepada semua unit di bawah kawasan tanggungjawab. Buletin ini lengkap dengan ulasan yang memberi nasihat kepada unit berkenaan yang sering mengulangi kesalahan.

*** Membantu Pasukan Mengatasi Masalah Kesalahan Kecil.**

Pendekatan ini akan memberi wajaran (weight-age) yang tinggi terhadap keupayaan pasukan mengatasi masalah kesalahan kecil. Anggota KPT hanya berperanan membantu pasukan. Pendekatan ini boleh dilaksanakan secara berikut:

- * KPT membantu untuk mempertingkatkan kemampuan dan prestasi Polis Rejimen (RP).
- * Perkhidmatan syarahan oleh KPT kepada pasukan tentang kesalahan kecil.
- * Membuat teguran ke atas anggota pasukan yang melakukan kesalahan kecil (trivial offences) dan melapor kepada Pemerintah pasukan sahaja secara bulanan untuk diberi perhatian.
- * Melatih Polis Rejimen (RP) dalam menguatkuasakan disiplin.

*** Mempertingkatkan interaksi Dengan Pemerintahan Di Medan.**

Pendekatan secara ini boleh dilaksanakan secara berikut:

- * Mengadakan perjumpaan dan perbincangan terbuka dengan Pemerintah Pasukan tentang masalah disiplin di pasukan.
- * Memaklumkan dengan segera kepada pemerintah mengenai kesalahan-kesalahan serius yang dilakukan oleh anggota-anggota pasukan.
- * Mengadakan aktiviti sosial di Wisma Perwira dan Bintara serta perlawanan sukan persahabatan.
- * Wakil KPT dijemput memberi taklimat atau

persembahan mengenai masalah tatatertib di Hari Pegawai dan Hari PTT kanan.

- * Pegawai KPT didedahkan kepada hal-hal Public Relation.

*** Tugas Kepolisan Yang Lebih Pro aktif (Probos dan CPK).**

Pendekatan secara ini boleh dilaksanakan seperti berikut:

- * Meningkatkan rondaan tatatertib dan mencegah jenayah di tempat-tempat yang terpilih (selective enforcement).
- * Melengkapkan KPT dengan peralatan termasuklah kenderaan ronda yang bersesuaian.
- * Mengadakan lawatan yang berupa membantu pentadbiran bersama-sama tim dari TAP, RISIK 5 dan Audit Dalam.
- * Mengadakan pemeriksaan di Balai-balai Pengawal bersama-sama Polis Rejimen (RP).

*** Manakala CPK pula akan menentukan:**

- * Penyelesaian perkara kecil secara terbaik ini amat perlu di dalam usaha-usaha kita menentukan keadilan. Selaras dengan itu, seorang penulis Barat yang terkenal iaitu Benedict Costa ada mengatakan:

"It thus becomes a pious duty of the Police to see that no man is prosecuted on baseless accusations. For, even the trial of a false case ends in acquittal, the object of the malicious accuser is greatly fulfilled in that the victim is often forced to undergo the agony of a long-drawn trial before he earns his acquittal."

- * Langkah-langkah pencegahan yang lebih sesuai dan praktikal.
- * Mewujudkan sel pengumpulan data-data mengenai kegiatan jenayah.
- * Mempertingkatkan kerjasama dengan RISIK 5, BPR dan lan-lain.

*** Khidmat Kepada Pasukan.**

Pendekatan secara ini boleh dilaksanakan seperti berikut:

- * Memberi nasihat kepada Pemerintah Pasukan dari masa ke semasa mengenai hal-hal tatatertib.
- * Membuat kajian ke atas pasukan yang mempunyai masalah tatatertib.

- * Mengadakan kursus jangka masa pendek bagi Polis Rejimen (RP).
- * Memberi khidmat kaunseling kepada mereka yang menjalani hukuman tahanan melebihi 28 hari.
- * Memberi syarahan kepada soldado muda- diatur bersama-sama pasukan.
- * Mengadakan rondaan bersama dengan anggota RP.

RUMUSAN

Tindakan untuk menentukan tahap disiplin yang tinggi di dalam ATM adalah tanggungjawab setiap peringkat pemerintahan. Anggota KPT berperanan untuk membantu menguatkuasakan undang-undang dan menentukan ianya sentiasa dipatuhi. Cara-cara yang baik akan sentiasa digunakan oleh KPT untuk

melaksanakan tugas-tugas ini.

Tugas kepolisan yang baik mencakupi berbagai-bagi aspek seperti mengesan, menyiasat segala rupa bentuk jenayah dan salahlaku yang menjelaskan keadaan baik serta disiplin tentera, mengambil tindakan yang setimpal secara memajukan aduan ke pihak atasan, mewujudkan 'deterrence' secara psikologi, program pro aktif, program pendidikan dan lain-lainnya yang difikirkan sesuai. Adalah penting setiap peringkat saluran pemerintahan menangani masalah disiplin dengan cara tegas dan saksama supaya disiplin setiap anggota tentera akan sentiasa kekal ditahap yang diidam-idamkan. Sesuai dengan keperluan ini, Sun Tzu seorang cendekiawan Cina ada mengatakan:

"To be sure of victory, the wise in warfare see to it that they first have a strong moral cause and that army is well disciplined".

PENGHARGAAN

Pengarang merakamkan setinggi-tinggi penghargaan kepada Kol Husainay Bin Hashim, Probos Marsyal Angkatan Tentera Malaysia yang telah memberi beberapa pandangan terhadap langkah-langkah penyelesaian di dalam menghadapi cabaran-cabaran semasa yang diutarakan di dalam rencana ini.

RUJUKAN:

1. Mandat Probos Marsyal semasa perbarisan hari Ulangtahun KPT yang ke - 39 pada 12 Nov 92 di Kem Genting Klang.
2. Provost Training (Part I- Peace and Part II - War), W.O. Code No: 13772.
3. Charles Reith, *Death in The Police Custody*, pp. 147, 149.
4. Benedict Costa, *Who Will Police The Police*; pp. 89-91.
5. Graham Brash (Pte) Ltd. Singapore, *Sun Tzu -The Art Of War*.



BUTIR-BUTIR PERIBADI PENGARANG

Mej Ibrahim Bin Hashim telah ditauliahkan ke dalam Kor Polis Tentera pada 14 Apr 72. Di antara jawatan-jawatan yang pernah disandang oleh beliau ialah Pegawai Penyiasat CPK, Ketua Kompeni KPT, Pegawai Staf Probos, Pegawai Staf Undang-Undang, Ketua Memperoses Kertas Siasatan CPK dan Pegawai Staf Tata tertib. Pernah menghadiri kursus Probos di Pakistan. Berkelulusan 'Diploma In Law' dari ITM.

The Legitimacy of Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence

By Lt Kol Abd Khalid Othman

Introduction

The advent of nuclear weapons has brought a new dimension to many of the moral theorists and international lawyers. While the legitimacy of conventional warfare is quite easily analysed from the moral and legal standpoint, the same cannot be said for nuclear warfare or even nuclear deterrence. In the past, the morality and legality of conventional weapons and warfare were seen and coded without anticipating the future capability. But after seeing the devastating effects of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, scholars are finding difficulties in applying the Just War Doctrine to Nuclear Warfare.¹

Over the years there has been a lot of arguments and views on the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. While some moral philosophers argue that the use and intent use of nuclear weapons are illegitimate, others are of the opinion that the use is wrong but the threat to use can be morally legitimate under certain conditions. There are also some who argue that the principle of Just War legitimise certain limited forms of nuclear war and likewise nuclear deterrence.² From these different views one can see the difficulties at arriving to a consensus.


From the legal standpoint, the situation is no different. Since nuclear bombs had not as yet been invented when most of the existing conventions regulating the methods of warfare were drawn up, no explicit conventional law presently exists regarding the legality of these weapons.³ Besides there is a general feeling of futility among international lawyers who

know that the decision to use or not to use nuclear weapons will be made on military or political grounds but not on legal grounds.⁴ Although a number of significant books have been written on the subject, Adam Roberts notes that very little reference is made to international law. This scant attention is also felt in the academic teaching of international relations in Britain and many other countries where nuclear weapons have very little emphasis as compared to, say, the law of the sea or the humanitarian laws of war.⁵

This essay attempts to look at the moral and legal legitimacy of nuclear weapons and deterrence based on the Just War theory and the international law or agreements with the view of analysing some of the view points.

A Just War Analysis

The Just War tradition, developed from St Augustine onward, has been the basis of Catholic thought concerning any resort to armed conflict or violence on behalf of political units. Over the years it has been developed and refined by others including Catholic theologians. That tradition constitutes a strong belief against violence, and establishes very strict constraints, both on the circumstances under which a resort to violence may be considered 'just' and on the actions that can be morally taken in the course of exercising that right.⁶ Many moral philosophers are of the view that the essence of Just War theory in relation to nuclear warfare is to be found in the principles of discrimination and proportionality.



The principle of discrimination as described by Russett observes the rule of non-combatant immunity. It means that one is justified in using force only against those who are engaging in or directly contributing to the attack upon oneself. That is to say, one must distinguish, within the enemy's population, between combatants and non-combatants and to preserve non-combatants from direct or intentional attack.⁷

Of all the Just War criteria, the principle of non-combatant immunity is most frequently represented in the international laws of war. Walzer observes:

The war convention rests first on a certain view of combatants, which stipulates their battlefield equality. But it rests more deeply on a certain view of non-combatants which holds that men and women with rights and they cannot be used for some military purpose, even if it is a legitimate purpose.⁸

The principle of proportionality evaluates the effects or ends of war. It addresses the extent of the evil caused by war, or a particular act of war, compared with the goal that can be expected to be gained from it. According to S. M. Okin, a war should not be waged, even in the defence of the innocent, if it is adjudged that fighting the war will do more harm than refraining. Similarly in the case of particular acts of fighting, the military advantage gained must be greater than the costs incurred.⁹

Just War theory applies a particular combination of these principles to the moral assessment of military actions which involves indirect or collateral damage to non-combatants. According to the doctrine of 'double effect' it is permissible to perform an action likely to result in non-combatant casualties provided that the action itself is a legitimate act of war. The direct or intentional effect of the act as Okin sees it, is morally acceptable provided that the undesired effect is not out of proportion. Only the acceptable effect is aimed at and there is no intention to cause the death of innocent people.¹⁰

In the recent Gulf War for example, although the United States forces were accused of striking at civilian targets during the air raids in Iraq, they were quick to deny such accusations. In their justifications, they have strong reasons to believe that those so-called civilian areas that were bombed were Iraqis military fortified areas.

Concept of Deterrence

Richard Wasserstrom describes deterrence as "the adoption and maintenance of a policy by which one country threatens to use nuclear weapons against another in order to discourage that country from doing certain things that it might otherwise do - especially, but not exclusively, using its nuclear weapons first to devastate the other.¹¹ He adds, without such policy the opposing force might well decide that it is in its interest to use its nuclear weapons. However, by convincing the opposing force that a nuclear attack on it is imminent, it is then able to reassure the opposing force to decide that it is not in its interest to act.¹²

J. O'Connell however describes nuclear deterrence as the awareness of their capacity to devastate and sensitive to the danger of being themselves destroyed in an exchange of nuclear arms. Therefore, nations possessing such weapons wish to induce opposing nuclear powers to refrain from using them or seeking political advantage that might result in their use.¹³ Basically nuclear power States wish to point out that they are against the use of such weapons and expect the same from others using against them. However for deterrence to take effect, one has to build up its nuclear capability to a threatening level as advocated by Steven Lee. He claims that nuclear deterrence is a policy of threat.¹⁴

The Validity of the Just War Theory in the Nuclear Age

The validity of the Just War tradition in the nuclear age has become a centre of controversy. Donald L. Davidson notes that in the summer of 1960, an editorial in *Worldview* claimed that nuclear weapons make the norms of Just War obsolete.¹⁵ The same views were shared by British and American Catholic scholars. Many of these scholars felt that with the advent of nuclear weapons, the Just War can no longer be applied.¹⁶

While many Catholic theologians condemn that the Just War theory has become out of date and meaningless in relation to nuclear weapons, P. Ramsey stands firm and does not describe to their claims. He says, "The Just War theory cannot be repealed, it can only be violated. It states the limits beyond which war

as such becomes in itself a wholly non-human and non-political activity and the point beyond which military force becomes senseless violence, and our weapons are no longer weapons of 'war'. This is not because war has an 'essence' or 'nature' but because man has; and because political society has a nature to which military means must be kept subordinate."¹⁷

According to Ramsey, the Just War principles constitute the most valid doctrine for judging the morality of war even in the nuclear age. He argues that the principles of Just War legitimise certain limited forms of nuclear war and likewise of nuclear deterrence.¹⁸ Although he does subscribe to a limited form of nuclear war, he is totally opposed to both counter-population use and 'assured destruction' deterrence as violative of the principle of discrimination. However, he argues that if these nuclear weapons are used in counterforce strategies only, and not aimed directly at civilians their use can be considered to fall within the standard of legitimacy. He further adds that if it is morally justifiable to use nuclear weapons in certain ways, it is morally justifiable to threaten to do so.¹⁹

From Ramsey's argument, one can see that he does take into account the principle of discrimination or immunity of non-combatant before arriving at the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. On the question of deterrence, although he agrees it is wrong to threaten what is wrong to do, he did affirm, however:

*...it is moral to mount a deterrent whose effects flow from shared fear of the 'collateral' (unintended civil) damage unavoidably connected with targeting modern weapons of war, especially nuclear weapons upon legitimate military objectives. If the latter defines justice in the actual conduct of war, the former is a just form of deterrence. The one is just war; the other is the just use of the non-use of weapons.*²⁰

Ramsey appears to suggest that nuclear weapons should be maintained primarily for the sake of deterrence and only used as a limited defensive response against enemy nuclear force and not used indiscriminately.

Thus, from the above views as advocated by Ramsey, it can be seen that an 'all-out' nuclear war, or counter-society war, violates the moral principles of discrimination and proportionality. Nuclear weapons may be used in defence against an invading force and within the constraints of discrimination and proportionality.

M. Walzer seems to agree with Ramsey in rejecting 'all-out' nuclear war with nuclear weapons. It is morally unthinkable to initiate a large-scale attack, or responding in kind. In his words:

*It is a feature of massive retaliation that while there is or may be some rational purpose in threatening it, there could be none in carrying it out. Were our 'bluff' even to be called and our population centers suddenly attacked, the resulting war could not be 'won'. We could only drag our enemies after us into the abyss. The use of our deterrent capacity would be an act of pure destructiveness. For this reason, massive retaliation, if not literally unthinkable has always seemed undo-able.*²¹

Okin seems to infer that Walzer treats deterrence as bad but necessary. In her study, she finds that Walzer's understanding of deterrence as the threat of assured destruction. It is also clear that from her study she finds that Walzer would not accept counterforce deterrence in any less qualified way than he accepts 'massive assured destruction'. This is because he is convinced that, if it failed, the collateral damage of counterforce war-fighting would violate the proportionality principle and the danger of escalation is unacceptable.²²

Contrary to Ramsey argument on the case for making Just War possible in the modern age, Walzer feels that 'if there is to be justified deterrent strategy, there must be a justified form of nuclear war.'²³ Since he does not believe that there is a morally justified form of nuclear war, he must deny that there is a morally justified deterrent strategy. However, while he denies the moral legitimacy of deterrence, he claims that it is, at least in present conditions, a necessary evil that is less bad than any other realistic alternative, and less bad, certainly, than the occurrence of the harm that it threatens only in order to prevent.²⁴

In Walzer's view, although it is wrong to use nuclear weapons, for the moment such possession is necessary. It is necessary to keep a 'balance of terror' until a better way can be found. The present possession of nuclear weapons, according to Walzer, is necessary to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. In his words, "The real ambiguity of nuclear deterrence lies in the fact that no-one, including ourselves, can be sure that we will ever carry out the threats we make".²⁵

From the view of Ramsey and Walzer, it can be seen that both moralists, believe that the Just War

doctrine provides at least a set of 'formal' criteria by which to judge the weapons and the strategies of nuclear warfare and deterrence. Both are also of the view that although deterrence is undesirable, but for the moment justified for preventing nuclear war. On the use of nuclear weapons, each rejects the 'all out' use of strategic weapons for any cause including response or retaliation.²⁶

With respect to Principles of Discrimination and Proportionality, the Catholic Bishops are strongly against the use of nuclear weapons. In its Pastoral Letter On War and Peace issued in May 1983, the theologians were said to dictate some fundamental challenges to contemporary American military police de-legitimising the use of nuclear weapons and, to a certain extent, some ways of deterrence.²⁷ The Bishops totally forbid direct attack on non-combatants. It is a basic principle of Christian ethics that one may not directly and intentionally kill innocent human beings. To that extent the Bishops condemn the bombing of Dresden, the fire bombing of Tokyo, and of course, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Although President Truman regarded the atomic bombs as a military weapon and never had any doubt in using it, the Church fully detest to such a notion.²⁸ According to the Christian theologians, no matter that the destruction of those cities may have helped shorten the war, and even reduced the total number of civilian casualties, the bombings were still morally unjustified.

By the Principle of Proportionality, the American Catholic Church recognises that in almost any war, civilians will unavoidably be killed if military targets are hit. This is clearly a case of 'double effect' and admits that some civilian deaths can be accepted as a by-product of striking a military target. The church is of the view that just because civilians are not killed intentionally, they cannot be killed without limit. Hence within the context of discrimination, the principle of proportionality, to merely limit a nuclear strike to counter-force targets, is not enough to make the policy 'morally acceptable'.²⁹

Although the Bishops are totally against the use of nuclear weapons, their moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence is very strictly conditional. Firstly, it is morally acceptable 'not as an end to itself, but as a step on the toward a progressive disarmament'. It is described by Okin "a transitional strategy, justifiable only in conjunction with resolute determination to pursue arms control and disarmament".³⁰ Secondly, the Bishops state that deterrence is morally justifiable only if and when the

threats made satisfy the criteria of discrimination and proportionality. In this context, the Bishops accept the current US deterrence policy which satisfies both the criteria.

Hence it can be said that the Bishops have declared a policy of deterrence 'morally acceptable' on condition that deterrence must be based on 'sufficient' rather than 'superior' nuclear forces. They also reject indiscriminate bombing and first use of weapons. To the extent it is said that not only do the Bishops observe the principle of discrimination and proportionality but also as a last resort.³¹

While discrimination of combatant and non-combatant could be easily distinguished in the traditional warfare of the 17th century the same cannot be said in the modern warfare of the 20th century. According to O'Brien, even with conventional weapons in the form of artillery pieces, aircraft and submarines, the effect is devastating, indiscriminate and also destroys large target areas. In this instant, it is difficult for these weapons to be relied upon to spare non-combatants or non-military targets.³²

As to the intentional killing of non-combatants, Richard Wasserstrom views it from two perspectives that he believes is morally permissible.³³ Firstly, he argues that based on the principle of self defence, it is morally acceptable to kill non-combatants whose activities make a causal contribution of the requisite sort to the more direct and deadly activities of the combatants, for example, workers in munition factories and the like. The second has to do with moral responsibility and culpability of the non-combatants whose beliefs and actions with respect to the initiation of the war make it appropriate to view them as either having themselves assumed the deadly risks of war or being culpable for the initiation or conduct of the war.³⁴

What Wasserstrom pointed out may be acceptable in his argument if and only if non-combatants that do not fall into the above category are discriminated from being killed. It is said that in the nuclear age, there are small 'tactical' nuclear weapons which could be used in some regions in such way as to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, military and non-military targets. However, given the characteristics of the large H-bombs, nuclear deterrence based on such weapons requires a willingness to ignore these distinctions. It is said such weapons are maintained for the purpose of not

being used, but still they are deployed for retaliation to aggression.

Legality of Nuclear Weapons

While much progress has been made on the morality of nuclear weapons and deterrence, the same cannot be said from the legality standpoint. Many writers are of the view that international lawyers seem to pay little interest on the subject mainly because they do not share the same view on the basic question of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons.

According to Malcolm N. Shaw, morality and politics are deeply involved in any analysis of nuclear weapons and any attempt to deal solely with the legal aspects is doomed to justifiable accusations of unbalanced consideration of the dilemma that is faced.³⁵

International law while not effective, is at least acknowledged as existing. States' behaviour is overtly founded upon international law which is not the case with morality or political consideration.³⁶

Although there are no specific references to nuclear weapons in any of the international agreements, it does not mean that the deployment and use of the weapons are unregulated, and consented by international law. The international law of war is primarily concerned with alleviating the human suffering caused by warfare and less with regulating the use of the weapons by name. This is recognised by the British Manual of Military Law which declares that, "in the absence of any rule of international law dealing expressly with it, the use which may be made of a particular weapon will be governed by the ordinary rules and the question of the legality of its use in any particular case will, therefore, involve merely the application of the recognised principles of international law".³⁷ This contrasts with the position adopted by the United States as pointed out by G. Lewy.³⁸

The American 'Law of Land Warfare' states that, "The use of explosive atomic weapons', whether by air, sea or land forces cannot as such be regarded as violative of international law in the absence of any customary rule of international law or international convention restricting their employment".³⁹ On this issue, it is the opinion of many international lawyers, that the use of nuclear weapons is already prohibited by certain rules of customary international law or conventional rules which apply to

such weapons by analogy or by implication.

However, no matter what some international lawyers may feel, there is no international treaty banning nuclear weapons as such. This being the case, the notion suggested by the British has to be taken into account, i.e., one must have recourse to the other methods of international law creation to discern whether and to what extent international legal principles regulate the area of nuclear armaments. The principles adopted from the British Law of War (1958) include the principle that the means employed in weakening the enemy's power of resistance are not limited and that they take into account the aspects of humanity, morality, civilization and chivalry.⁴⁰

According to G. Lewy, from the legality point of view there are three criteria that need to be looked into, namely, unnecessary suffering, discrimination against combatant and non-combatants and also principle of humanity.⁴¹

Unnecessary Sufferings

The notion of unnecessary suffering was well thought of since the St Petersburg Declaration of 1868. Generally it emphasised that the only legitimate object which the State should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy and not to cause unnecessary suffering. This idea was carried forward into the Hague Regulation of 1907, which sought to codify the law. Article 23 (e) forbids the employment of arms, projectiles or material which is calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.⁴²

On the question of unnecessary suffering, there seems to be a controversial issue. The criterion in the prohibition against unnecessary suffering has normally been whether a weapon inflicts suffering disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained by the weapon, not the degree of suffering itself.⁴³ Unnecessary sufferings that may be inflicted on humans which are illegal include the use of projectiles filled with glass or other materials inherently difficult to detect medically, irregular-shaped bullets which cause them to expand on contact and thus aggravate the wound they cause. According to M. N. Shaw, the provision on unnecessary suffering was further reaffirmed in Article 35 (2) of Protocol I, 1977, which declares that it is prohibited 'to employ weapons,

projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.⁴⁴ It can be seen that this formulation slightly extends Article 23 (e) since it refers to 'methods of warfare' also.

According to Lewy, some lawyers feel that suffering caused by weapons with sufficiently large destructive potentialities is not 'unnecessary' in the meaning of this rule. Since nuclear weapons are notoriously potent and destructive, their use would seem unaffected by the prohibition of 'unnecessary suffering'.⁴⁵ To a certain extent there is some truth in what has been said if one compares to the sufferings of slow death through projectiles filled with glass or irregular-shaped bullets. The suffering through nuclear weapons is said to be short. This being the case, then Article 23 (e) or even Article 35 (2) of Protocol I, 1977, are not easily justifiable.

If one considers nuclear weapons as weapons that emit high fission poisonous gases, then it is said that Article 23 (a) of the Hague Convention No. IV, which forbids the employment of poison or poisoned weapons is more applicable.⁴⁶ Poison, in contemporary usage, means any substance which "when introduced into, or absorbed by a living organism, destroys life". Since all nuclear devices result in some radioactive fall-out which when introduced into the human body, may be fatal. It can be concluded that the use of nuclear weapons are prohibited. If the long-range somatic and genetic effects which nuclear weapons produce in their victims are taken into account, then within the orbit of biological warfare, nuclear weapons are prohibited.

Protection of Non-Combatants

The International Conference of the Red Cross in 1965 proclaimed that a distinction had to be maintained at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population.⁴⁷ This basic rule was further enhanced through Article 48 of Protocol I, 1977, which stipulates that "in order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants..."⁴⁸

It cannot be denied that with the advent of aircraft

and aerial bombing, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is becoming more difficult. Until and unless weapons, particularly nuclear in nature, can be designed for accuracy and precision it is difficult to give immunity to the non-combatants.

Some writers argue that air attacks are legitimate only when directed at military objectives. While this may be true for conventional bombs, the same cannot be said of nuclear explosives. Nuclear munitions delivered from the air have a destructive action many thousands of times more powerful than the largest TNT bombs and are therefore difficult to limit the area of impact. It is said that such a bomb not only could not discriminate between combatants and non-combatants, but might spread radioactive effects over neutral countries. Under these circumstances, the use of nuclear weapons is a violation of international law.⁴⁹

There is also possibility that the use of nuclear weapons can be restricted in certain areas or targets such as naval ships or specified military targets. Such use from the point of view of the protection of the non-combatant, at least, would not be illegal.

The Principles of Humanity

Under the Article 6 (c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal and the corresponding clause in Control Council Law No. 10, crimes against humanity along with crimes against peace and war crimes are punishable acts within the jurisdiction of the military tribunals.⁵⁰ On this principle, G. Lewy tries to make a resemblance of the use of nuclear weapons to Hitler's doctrine of acts which violate some of the moral standards. However, it has been suggested that the case for the 'principles of humanity' today would be stronger if the United Nations after World War II had applied these standards not only to the crimes of the losing side but to the winners as well.⁵¹ Although it is said that international tribunals have been lop-sided in the past, the fact still remains that 'the principle of humanity' is being observed.

On this matter, it has been argued that nuclear weapons used against the civilian population for purposes of terrorisation would be a crime against humanity. Although the Americans were condemned for dropping the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima and rightly could be tried for crimes against humanity, they were quick to retaliate by saying that it was justified. In defending their

action, the Americans argue that nuclear weapons might be legal against "an aggressor intent upon dominating the world".⁵²

Conclusion

From the moral standpoint, although the use of nuclear weapons is seen to be illegitimate, many theologians and moralist philosophers do accept deterrence on certain conditions as legitimate. From the legal viewpoint,

although nothing much has been said about nuclear deterrence, the argument for the legality of the use of nuclear weapons is based on rules of international customary law which is based on the principles of discrimination, proportionality and also humanitarian grounds.

With further improvement on nuclear technology, the use of nuclear weapons may be able to fulfil the 'Just War' theory. Until then, both the legal and moral philosophers are not convinced on their legitimacy.

Endnotes

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- 2 R. Hardin (ed.), *Nuclear Deterrence: Ethics and Strategy*, p. 37.
- 3 G. Lewy, 'Superior Orders, Nuclear Warfare and the Dictates of Conscience', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 55, no. 1 (March 1961), p. 11.
- 4 *Loc. cit.*
- 5 A. Roberts, 'Laws, Lawyers and Nuclear Weapons', *Review of International Studies*, p. 75.
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- 7 *Loc. cit.*
- 8 M. Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, p. 137.
- 9 S. M. Okin, 'The Moral Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence', *Politics*, vol. 18, no. 2 (November 1987), p. 16.
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- 11 R. Hardin (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 25.
- 12 *Loc. cit.*
- 13 B. Newman (ed.), 'What is Deterrence', *Nuclear Deterrence*, p. 39.
- 14 R. Hardins (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 173.
- 15 D. L. Davidson, *Nuclear Weapons and the American Church*, p. 41.
- 16 *Loc. cit.*
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- 19 M. Ramsey, *op. cit.*, p. 154.
- 20 *Ibid.*, p. 315.
- 21 M. Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, pp. 274-75.
- 22 S. M. Okin, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
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- 27 B. M. Russett, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
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- 29 B. M. Russett, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
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- 33 R. Hardins (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 36.

- 34 *Loc. cit.*
- 35 I. Pogany (ed.), *Nuclear Weapons and International Law*, p. 1.
- 36 *Loc. cit.*
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- 38 G. Lewy, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
- 39 *Loc. cit.*
- 40 HMSO, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
- 41 G. Lewy, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
- 42 I. Pogany, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
- 43 *Loc. cit.*
- 44 I. Pogany, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
- 45 G. Lewy, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
- 46 *Loc. cit.*
- 47 I. Pogany (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 5.
- 48 *Loc. cit.*
- 49 *Loc. cit.*
- 50 G. Lewy, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
- 51 *Loc. cit.*
- 52 *Loc. cit.*

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BIODATA

Lt Kol Abd Khalid Othman was commissioned into the EME Corps on the 10 April 1970. He holds a Bachelor's degree in Electrical Engineering from Universiti Teknologi Malaysia and a Master of Defence Studies from the University of New South Wales. He has held various appointment notably as OC LAD T Bty LLAD, LAD 1 MSSR, SO2 Electronics, OC 10 Wksp and CO 71 Wksp Div. Presently he is serving as one of the staff officers at Defence Logistics Division.

MILITARY SPACE

by Mej Jen Nordin bin Yusof

There is no way back into the past; the choice is the universe or nothing

H. G. Wells

Concept of Military Space

Space has been used for military purposes for more than three decades.¹ The potential of using space for military purposes was realised when the former Soviet Union launched the world's first satellite in October 1957.² The United States launched its first successful reconnaissance satellite in 1960³ followed by the Russians in 1962.⁴ Since the decision to use space for military purposes was made over thirty years ago, space has now become highly crowded with satellites.⁵

In this regard, reconnaissance satellites become the first spacecraft to occupy space for the specific purpose of engaging in one of the oldest military profession -espionage. Now, space is crowded with a multitude of spacecraft launched by the two leading countries" United States and the former Soviet Union. The space duopoly of both countries⁶ has now been challenged by emerging spaces regimes like France, Great Britain, China, Japan, India and Israel.⁷ Space has also become the testing ground for the conduct of scientific experiments in the field of aeronautical and space technologies which has resulted in the creation of space pollution.

Definition of Military Space

In this context, military may be defined as space used for the exploration and deployment of military spacecraft and weapon systems for the purpose of defensive and offensive application. In terms of military value, space does not provide a natural cover because of it is "transparent". As such, concealment in transparent space mainly depend on distance, random manoeuvres,

shadowing, stealth technology, decoys and other deceptive measures.⁸

Because of its military value, space has been given many other labels. Space has been called as the "high frontier". This was brought about by research study conducted by an American team known as High Frontier Incorporated established in 1980s to look into the military application of space. This High Frontier study headed by Lieutenant General Daniel O'Graham subsequently resulted in the formulation of President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) in March 1983.⁹

For the war-mongers, space has been called the 'final frontier'¹⁰ and the 'final battlefield'¹¹ besides being known as the 'latest frontier'.¹² Following the Army jargon of taking the 'high ground,' space is sometimes referred to as the 'new high ground'¹³ for tactical and strategic considerations. Not to be outdone, the Russians regard space as a "geo-political high ground" for the application of national power to achieve maximum advantage.¹⁴

It is therefore not surprising that in the manual of the United States Air Forces (USAF), space has been called as the "ultimate high ground".¹⁵ This is due to the fact that conventional military aircraft has reached its flying ceiling within the rarefied atmosphere of the air space and to venture into 'ultimate high ground' will required a new generation of aircraft installed with specialised equipment. For example, at about 32 kilometers (20 miles) above the Earth, turbojets will cease to function and further up at 44.8 kilometers (28 miles), ramjets will also stop functioning.¹⁶ And to venture into the ultimate high ground, rockets will be required.¹⁷ This is graphically illustrated in Diagram 6.

Space has also been called a 'frontier of

opportunity',¹⁸ a frontier to develop new technologies and new products, to advance manufacturing techniques to create markets for services that did not exist before and to create new jobs.¹⁹ In 1985, a product made in space on board US space shuttle was marketed for the first time. This 'space product' is known as *monodisperse latexsphere* which is used for calibrating laboratory measuring equipment.²⁰

It is anticipated that in the future, high quality products manufactured in space will be made available in the world market. As such, space offers Man virtually limitless opportunities of growth for space industry and space technology. However, the quest to exploit space for commercial enterprises and other economic activities in the long run, may lead to space competition and perhaps, space war.

Understanding of Space

According to Encyclopedia Britannica, space is defined as all the reaches of the universe beyond the sensible atmosphere of the Earth.²¹ The term space ordinarily means the distances extending without limit in all directions; that which is thought of as a boundless continuous expanse extending in all directions or in three dimensions within which all materials thing are contained.²²

Another understanding of space is what constitutes as the entire universe beyond the atmospheric envelope of the Earth, the near vacuum which encompasses the solar system, stars, nebulae, galaxies and other celestial bodies. As such, space continues in all directions and has no known limits. In short, space lies beyond "the wild blue yonder."²³

Until 1964, all that scientist deduced about space had been made from observations through the distorting atmosphere of the Earth. But now, the sophisticated technology of the twentieth century has allowed Man to leave the planet Earth, to venture into space and make his observations from above.

Parameters of Space

Over the years, Man has developed his own understanding and perception on the conceptual

parameters of space. In this modern era, Man has now come up with three concepts on the parameters of space. For want of better terms, these concepts can be simply classified into three categories:

- six-layered concept of space
- four-layered concept of space, and
- three-layered concept of space.

These three concepts have come about as a result of the need to quantify the parameters of space in relations with legal aspects and other human considerations and requirements such as the future management of space traffic, environmental effects on the ozone layer and space pollution caused by space debris.²⁴ While the six-layered space parameter is owes its origin from astronomical necessity, the other two concepts are mainly military in nature. Thus, the triple and the quadro-layered space concepts can be considered under the jargon of military space, that is, space of military value for essentially military application to meet both defensive and offensive requirements.

Six-Layered Concept of Space

In search of some order, astronomers and space scientists have devised a method for the classification of space in a multi-layered cosmic structure emanating the Earth in all directions from ground level into the unfathomable depths of space. It is due to this infinite characteristic that astronomers sometimes refer to space as the "endless frontier".²⁵ As such scientists have organized the "endless frontier" of space into six levels or strata with distance and the forces of gravity as the medium of measurement. The conceptual parameters of space²⁶ can be categorized as follows:

- Air Space (Atmosphere).
- Cislunar Space.
- Translunar Space.
- Interplanetary Space (or Solar Space).
- Interstellar Space (or Galactic Space)
- Intergalactic Space

These are nomenclatures purely coined from the astronomical viewpoint. Let us now examine briefly the

profile of each of the six layers of space under this astronomical concept.

Air Space

The air space forms the first layer of the Earth's protective blanket for the survival of human beings. At the Earth's surface, air is denser but at higher altitude, the oxygen in the air becomes thinner. Gradually, the atmosphere fades to almost nothing and other space begins. The air space or atmosphere is generally accepted from sea level up to an altitude of 100 -110 kilometers (62-68 miles).²⁷ At this height, a satellite may continue circling the Earth for months although there is still enough air to slow down a satellite and finally cause it to fall back to Earth.²⁸

Cislunar Space

The second layer of space known as *cislunar space* begins where the atmosphere (air space) ends at about 160 kilometers (100 miles) above the Earth until it reaches the moon, a distance of about 384,000 kilometers (240,000 miles). As the moon is approached through *cislunar space*, the Earth's gravity becomes weaker and conversely the moon's gravity becomes stronger.²⁹ In the vacuum of *cislunar space*, there are widely scattered atoms and molecules of gas and electricity-charged particles. Scientists call this part of atmosphere that contains these electrically charged particles, *magnetosphere*.³⁰

Translunar Space

The *translunar space*, as the third layer, covers a relatively small space zone starting from the moon at a distance of 384,000 kilometers (240,000 miles) up to a distance of 1,600,000 kilometers (1,000,000 miles) above the Earth. Space scientists have designated this space zone as the *translunar space* because the combined gravities of the Earth and the moon are effective to about one million mile from Earth.³¹

Interplanetary Space

Interplanetary space, that is 'space between planets' which forms the fourth layer, is gauged as the distance from the 160,000,000-kilometer mark (one million miles) to under 160,000,000,000 kilometers (100,000,000,000 miles) above the Earth.³² This is where all the eight planets are located moving in independent orbits round the Sun. In the *interplanetary space*, the gravity of the Sun plays the most dominant role, although each of the eight planets has its own gravity. The *interplanetary space* ends where the gravity of the Sun is no longer effective, perhaps at miles 80 billion kilometers (50 billion miles) from the Earth.³³


Interstellar Space

The distance of *interstellar space* (space between the stars) the fifth layer, is even more staggering. It begins from about 160,000,000,000 kilometers (1000,000,000,000 miles) at the extreme limit of interplanetary space to a distance of up to 1,600,000,000,000,000,000 kilometers (1,000,000,000,000,000,000 miles). In the inter-stellar space, matter largely hydrogen is scattered at extremely low density of 10 particles per cubic centimeters. The nearest star, Proxima Centauri in the Southern Cross constellation is over 40 trillion kilometers (25 trillion miles) away and to cover such an immense distance Man would have to travel as fast as light.³⁵

Intergalactic Space

The *intergalactic space* (space between the galaxies) is the last layer of space which occupies the outermost layer of space from the Earth. The intergalactic space begins at a mind-boggling distance of approximately 1,600,000,000,000,000,000 kilometers (1,000,000,000,000,000,000 miles) from Earth and reaches into infinity.³⁶ There are countless other galaxies scattered throughout as far as Man can see with the largest telescope out of which our galaxy is one of them.

Such is the pecking order of space with its six-layered stratification that Man has been able to determine at this point of his existence on Earth. The conceptual parameters of space is shown in Diagram 1.

**Diagram 1 Conceptual Parameters of Space**

Source: The World Book Encyclopedia,
(London: World Book Inc, 1981), pp. 562-563.

Quadro-Layered Concept of Space

Another concept of space as visualized by John M. Collins, a senior specialist in national defense at the Library of Congress, Washington D.C., is in the form of military regions encompassing what is called the Earth-moon system. In June 1987, the United States Congress requested John M. Collins to conduct a study with view to prepare "a frame of reference that could help Congress evaluate the future as well as present military space policies, programs and budgets."³⁷ With this Congressional, John M. Collins presented his study in the form of book, "Military Space The Next 50 Years," in which he outlined four purposed as the guiding principles:

- To describe space as a distinctive military medium.
- To describe military space planning and programming with particular concern for problems and options.
- To compare present and projected US-Soviet military space postures.
- To indicate courses of action that might improve US military space posture at sensible costs.³⁸

In this concept of space, the Earth-moon system is divided into four military regions starting from Earth emanating in a spherical envelope up to an arbitrary distance of 768,000 kilometers (480,000 miles) in deep space which is twice the distance of the Earth to the moon. In his study, Collins circumscribes the Earth-moon system into four interlocking regions known as (1) Earth and atmosphere, (2) circumterrestrial space, (3) moon and environs, and (4) outer envelope.³⁹ Conceptually, the macro classification of space into four military is arranged in the following order:

Region 1	From Earth up to 96 km (60 miles).
Region II	From 96 km (60 miles) to 80,000 km (50,000 miles)
Region III	From 80,000 km (50,000 miles) to 576,000 km (360,000 miles)
Region IV	From 384,000 km (240,000 miles) to 768,000 km (480,000 miles) ⁴⁰

The four military regions of space is shown schematically in Diagram 2.




Diagram 2 Schematic Concept of Military Regions

The quadro-regionalisation of the Earth-moon system is schematically shown in Diagram 3.




Diagram 3 Parameters of the Quadro Military Regions

Regions 1. This military region starts from the surface of the Earth (where all the ground infrastructures for both terrestrial and extra-terrestrial operations are located) up to a distance of 96 kilometers (60 miles) in the ionosphere which coincides with the limit of the atmosphere or air space. The limit of Region 1 is fixed at this height because during re-entry, a spacecraft encounters very severe friction and resistance from the atmosphere.⁴¹

Region 11. This region is known as circumterrestrial space, a newly-coined military medium which envelopes the Earth from an altitude of 96 kilometers (60 miles) up to a spherical height of 80,000 kilometers (50,000 miles).⁴² In this region, the aerodynamic drag and frictional heat are not as intense as compared to Region 1. However, the force of gravity still exerts a considerable influence on the orbital lifespan of a spacecraft like satellite, for example.⁴³ The relationship of Region 1 and II is shown in Diagram 3.

and Diagram 7.

The upper reaches of Region II are populated by space objects known as asteroids and meteoroids. These space denizens of various weights, shapes and sizes travel at speed ranging from 48,000 to 256,000 kilometers (30,000 to 160,000 miles)⁴⁴ pose a serious hazard to the safety of spacecraft.

Region 111. This rather unique region as conceived by Collins is fixed on the continuous movement of the moon sweeping an arc of 120 degrees⁴⁵ and orbiting at an average distance of 1,768,000 kilometers (240,000 miles) above the Earth. At this distance, radio signals take 1.3 seconds to travel one way from the Earth to the moon and vice versa.⁴⁶ The Military Region 111 is further demarcated into five sub-regions in the following manner:

L 1 - A distance of 72,000 kilometers (45,000 miles) from the facing the Earth.

- L 2 - A distance of 67,200 kilometers (42,000 miles) from the moon facing the Sun.
- L 3 - The average distance of moon from Earth.
- L 4 - It covers an arc of 60 degrees ahead of the moon.
- L 5 - It covers an arc of 60 degrees behind the moon.⁴⁷

(Note: L denotes lunar liberation point)

The five lunar liberation points (L) are points at all, but they are conceived as three dimensional positions in space. According to mathematical and computer calculations, L1, L2 and L3 are considered unstable because objects at these three locations, are influenced by the Sun and other forces and they will gradually wander further away.⁴⁸ However, L4 and L5, located 60 degrees ahead and behind the moon are stable because the gravitational field of the Earth and the moon are balance.⁴⁹ Therefore, a spacecraft remain in space for longer period without expending much fuel. The five lunar liberation points are shown in Diagram 4.

Region IV. This region forms the outermost envelope of the Earth covering a maximum distance of 768,000 kilometers (480,000 miles) which is twice the distance of the Earth to the moon.⁵⁰ However, the outer limit of Region 111 is flexible and this could be extended, if necessary. For example, G. Harry Stine in his book, "Handbook for Space Colonists," extends the limit of this region to 1 million kilometers (625,000 miles) above the Earth.⁵¹ This Military Region IV forms the outermost shell of the four-layered concept of space the Earth-moon system as visualised by John M. Collins.

The basic premise of Collin's concept of military space is based on Halford J. MacKinder's Hartland theory as applied to space. The original MacKinder Earth-bound Hartland theory postulated that:

Who rules East Europe commands the Hartland.
Who rules the Hartland commands the World Island.
Who rules the World Island rules the World.⁵²

(Note: Hartland refers to East-Central Europe and Russia; the rest of Eurasia and Africa is the World Island).




Diagram 4 Lunar Liberation Points of Military Region III

Adapted from John M. Collins, "Military Space Forces The Next 50 Years", (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publisher, Inc, 1989), p. 20.

In his study, Collins modified MacKinder's theory with his own space-bound interpretation which is described in the following manner:

Who rules circumterrestrial commands Planet Earth,
Who rules the moon commands circumterrestrial space,
Who rules L4 and L5 commands the Earth-Moon system.⁵³

From the United States viewpoint, the four regions represent the strategic "key terrain" for the implementation of military plans and operations in space. In his study, Collins indicates that the key terrain within the Earth-moon system contains six features of strategic value:

- Critical space installations on Earth,
- Critical economic and military enterprises on the moon,
- Critical military bases and civilian colonies in orbit,
- Geostationary and other equatorial orbits,
- Polar Earth orbits, and
- Lunar liberation points.⁵⁴

While the first three strategic aspects are man-made, the remaining three are important due to military values of their strategic positions in space. In this regard, the United States is probably the only country to study space vis-a-vis the Earth-moon system from a quadro-dimensional perspective for purposes of military application. This study has a direct implication in the preparation and the future of space warfare.

Triple-Layered Concept of Space

In recent years, scientists have come up with a simplified view of space which is classified in three layers. Scientists and modern writers have often been using the terms: air space, outer space and deep space. Even the United Nations (UN) has also accepted this simplified parameters of space. In 1958, the UN General Assembly set up a Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) which is now composed of 53 states.⁵⁵ One of the objectives of COPUOS is to study the legal

aspects of activities in outer space which by implication recognizes the usage of outer space.

In the preamble of the first space treaty formulated by COPUOS known as the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, it states that:

"The exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples, irrespective of the degree of economic or scientific development".⁵⁶

In 1979, a special research carried out jointly by the UN Secretariat and the Committee of Space Research (COSPAR) on the delimitation of air space and outer space notes:

"for both circular and elliptic orbits, the drag rapidly increases as perigee height decreases. At perigee heights of 80-100 kilometers the satellite can no longer remain in orbit and begins its final plunge into the lower atmosphere".⁵⁷

This opinion has also been accepted in legal literature on the basis that the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 which recognises the lowest perigee of a satellite to be the dividing line between air space and outer space, since it regards objects put in orbit as being in outer space.⁵⁸

As a result, the 59th Conference of the International Law Association held in Belgrade made a resolution which *inter alia* states that:

"..... The space at and above the altitude of about 100 kilometers above sea level has been growingly acknowledged by states as well as by experts in the field of outer space as outer space".⁵⁹

Thus, it is generally recognised that space, for both military and civilian application, can be categorised into three layers, namely: air space, outer space and deep space. The first layer, air space which forms the Earth's atmosphere is between the sea level up to a height of 100 kilometers (62.14 miles), while the outer space as it is known today is taken to exist between 100 kilometers (62.14 miles) and 3,200 kilometers (1988 miles). The deep space forms the third layer from 3,200

kilometers (1988 miles) extending towards infinity.⁶⁰ The conceptual parameters of space is shown in Diagram 5.




Diagram 5 Triple-Layered Concept of Space

Air Space

The first layer of air space above the Earth is commonly known as the atmosphere. The air space (atmosphere) is sometimes referred to as 'near space'.⁶¹ The Earth's atmosphere consists of three main elements; nitrogen (78%), oxygen (21%) and argon (1%). There are also other admixture of carbon dioxide, water vapour and negligible quantities of neon, helium, krypton and hydrogen.

At sea level the atmospheric particle density is calculated at $10^{18}/18^2$ cm. The gravity at the Earth's surface is 9.8 meters per second and the velocity which objects can escape the Earth's gravity is at the speed of 11.2 kilometers per second.⁶² This speed known as the escaped velocity is independent of mass and is the same for any object whether it is an atom or a rocket.

A broad division of the air space which a spacecraft has to pass through is illustrated in Diagram 6.




Diagram 6 Layers of Air Space (Atmosphere) showing
Military Region I and Region II

Generally, the atmosphere (air space) can be divided into three layers. The first layer of the atmosphere extending up to a height of 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) above the Earth is called troposphere.⁶³ In this layer, the temperatures turns colder as the elevation increases. As 10 kilometers, for example, the temperature above the pole is - 55°C.

The second layer of the atmosphere where the temperature increases is called the stratosphere (about 12 to 55 kilometers). The minimum temperature between the troposphere and the stratosphere is called tropopause. The temperature rise in the stratosphere continues up to a height of approximately 55 kilometers (34 miles). At this height, the temperature reaches its maximum approaching 0°C is called stratopause.⁶⁴

The third layer of the atmosphere (air space) extending from a height of between 80 kilometers (50 miles) and 90 kilometers (56 miles) is known as the mesosphere.⁶⁵ Beyond the 100-kilometer benchmark of the atmosphere, the temperature rises in the thermosphere and exosphere of the outer space.

Above the mesosphere where outer space begins, the temperature reaches up to 1200°C at an altitude of 400 kilometers (250 miles). This fourth layer in the outer space is termed thermosphere. Further upwards, the fifth layer, in the external shell of the atmosphere called exosphere the mean kinetic energy of molecules remains constant.⁶⁶ The relationship of height (altitude) and temperature of the Earth's atmosphere, sometimes known as 'puff pastry'⁶⁷ in graphically shown at Diagram 7.

Outer Space

Outer space begins where the air space (atmosphere) ends at 100 kilometers (62.14 miles) and reaches to its limit at 3,200 kilometers (1988 miles). Outer space is sometimes simply called 'space', or 'cosmic space',⁶⁸ 'extra-atmospheric space'⁶⁹ and 'extra territorium space'.⁷⁰ The Russians sometimes refer to outer space as the 'sixth ocean'.⁷¹ Outer space is limitless, endless,




Diagram 7 Dependence of Temperature on the Altitude in the Earth's Atmosphere

Adapted from A. V. Byalko, "Our Planet The Earth", (Moscow: Mir Publisher, 1987), p. 187.

timeless, directionless everythingless and beyond exact earthly descriptions.⁷² In outer space, day and night cycle as experienced on Earth is non-existent and absolute silence prevails regardless of any man-made activities.

What are the conditions of the outer space like? James Michener in his book, "Space" described it as follows:

"We think of outer space as empty. No gravity. No atmosphere. But there is this solar wind.⁷³ Nor blowing the way earthly wind does. Just particles of energy flowing out of the sun, constantly. As long as the Sun lasts.In outer space there is no wind, no gravity, no disturbance of any kind."⁷⁴

Outer space is a hostile environment to Man and he can only live there if he takes with him a self-contained earthly environment in which to live.⁷⁵ As such, one of the major problems of a space traveler is the danger of exposure to solar radiation which can be fatal unless adequately protected. Space scientists have gathered valuable data on the effect of solar radiation to human beings. Solar radiation is measured in units of "Roentgen Equivalent in Man" or Rem, for short.⁷⁶ The present thinking of the world's experts is summarised in what is known as "The Rem Table" (Roentgen Equivalent in Man), the sample of which is shown below:

100-150 Rems	Vomiting, nausea but not serious disability.
240-420 Rems	All personal sick, 20% death within 2 weeks.
500-620 Rems	All personnel very sick, 50% death within 1 month. Survivors incapacity for about 6 months.
690-930 Rems	Immediate severe vomiting, nausea. Up to 100% fatalities.
6,200 Rems	Total incapacitation almost immediately. All personnel dead. ⁷⁷

Another major problem of space travel is the re-entry phase. This is one of the most critical moments for a space traveller, that is, the return journey from outer space back to the Earth. Space scientists have calculated the re-entry angle must not be steeper than 7.3 degrees or the spacecraft will burn up. It must not be shallower

than 5.5 degrees or the spacecraft will bounce off into space.⁷⁸ This means that the space vehicle must enter a corridor 43.2 kilometers (27 miles) wide in diameter at the end of 380,800 kilometers or 238,000 miles (distance of the moon from the Earth) at a speed better than 38,400 kilometers (24,000 mph) per hour.⁷⁹

During re-entry, the friction created by a space vehicle with the atmosphere will generate a tremendous amount of heat and the exterior temperature can reach from 2,000°C to 5,000°C.⁸⁰ But the beauty of it all, the astronaut can see the flaming inferno outside and yet the internal temperature will not rise even a degree. During re-entry, a spacecraft is surrounded by ionized gases and the heat is so intense that all communications is blacked out, a complete radio silence for about 10 minutes.⁸¹

To overcome the problem of over-heating during re-entry, space scientists have created a miracle material known as ablative compound which is used to provide a protective shield to a spacecraft.⁸² This was the ideal material to protect space vehicles from the extreme heat and radiation of the Sun.

These are some of the major problems faced by a space traveller.

Deep Space

Deep space forms the last layer in our conceptual understanding of the three-layered parameters of space. Deep space starts from a distance of 3,200 kilometers (1,988 miles) above the Earth stretching in all directions into the deep void of the universe. The deep space is populated by a host of cosmic denizens; the stars, planets, moons, asteroids and comets and the Sun. Additionally, scientists have discovered new cosmic phenomena such as quasars (in early 1960s),⁸³ pulsars (1989),⁸⁴ and even the invisible Black Holes (1969).⁸⁵

In the vast spaces between planets there are many objects known as asteroids - some rocky, some metallic and some composed of organic molecules of varying sizes. Today, scientists estimate that the millions of asteroids orbiting the Sun in the asteroid belt between Mars and Jupiter are more than 4.5 billion years.⁸⁶ These celestial objects are believed to be leftovers from the time of the creation of the solar system. The existence of asteroids was not known until the beginning of the last century. In 1801, Italian monk and astronomer,

Giuseppe Piazzi discovered Ceres, the largest asteroid with a diameter of 933 kilometers (640 miles).⁸⁷

Earth-Crossing Asteroids

In the past, the Earth has experienced quite a number of close calls or "whiz-bys" with Earth-crossing asteroids known as Apollo asteroids.⁸⁸ In 1937, an Apollo asteroid that astronomers called Hermes about one mile across passed within 320,000 kilometers (200,000 miles) of Earth.⁸⁹ On August 10, 1972, a small asteroid about forty feet across, passed the Earth at a distance of only thirty miles through the stratosphere over southern Montana.⁹⁰

The most recent encounter occurred on May 20, 1993 when a 6,000-ton asteroid about nine meters in diameter streaked across the sky at a height of 144,000 kilometers (90 miles) over the Arizona.⁹¹ This asteroid which the International Astronomy Union named "1993 KA 2" was travelling at a speed of 78,000 kilometers per hour on its way towards the Sun.⁹²

According to Dr Jim Scotti of the University of Arizona, the total number of Earth-approaching objects bigger than a kilometer is in the order of 2,000 or 3,000 asteroids out of which only 150 have been catalogued.⁹³ These cosmic boulders i kilometer across could blaze into the Earth's atmosphere with the intensity of a nuclear explosion.⁹⁴ The location of the asteroid belt is shown in Diagram 8.




Diagram 8 Orbit of Typical Earth-Approaching Asteroid

Comets

The only celestial bodies known to roam the icy edges of the solar system are the 100 billion odd comets.⁹⁵ A comet is made mostly of ice - water (H_2O) ice, with little methane (CH_4) ice and some ammonia (NH_3) ice.⁹⁶ Scientists believed that on June 30, 1980 a comet exploded about 10 kilometers above the Podkamennaya Tunguska River of Siberia in Russia.⁹⁷

This phenomenal airburst over Tunguska created an enormous explosion equivalent to 1,000 Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons, flattening some 2,000 square kilometers of forest, burned thousands of trees in a flash fire, killed herds of reindeer and other animals and generated a great shock wave.⁹⁸ For decades, experts have debated on the cause of the Tunguska phenomena. Many theories have been advanced to explain the cause of this mysterious explosion which *inter alia* include, a meteorite (1927), a comet (1930), a nuclear explosion (1961), anti-matter (1965), a tiny black hole, explosion of a nuclear spacecraft and a flying saucer.⁹⁹

However, it was not until January 1993 that a team of American scientists, Christopher F. Chyba, Paul J. Thomas and Kevin J. Zahnle, on the basis of their study concluded that the cause of the mysterious explosion was due to a 30-meter wide stony asteroid which exploded at a height of about 9 kilometers in a 'catastrophic fragmentation'.¹⁰⁰ According to Dr Henry J. Melosh of the Lunar and Planetary Laboratory of the University of Arizona, the research team had "wrapped up" the most believable explanation of the Tunguska explosion.¹⁰¹

A well-known comet of the deep space is the Halley's comet which makes an awe-inspiring sojourn to the Earth at 76-year cycle interval. In March 1986, the first close-up observations of the Halley's comet was made from a spacecraft. Interestingly, it was the Russians and the Japanese who took the initiative to undertake the close observation of this comet from the deep space.¹⁰²

On October 24, 1992 the International Astronomical Union (IAU), the world authority on astronomy, made a startling prediction by announcing that a huge comet known as Swift-Tuttle is on a collision course with Earth on August 14, 2116.¹⁰³ The 5-kilometer (3-mile) wide Swift-Tuttle comet travelling at 60 kilometers (37 miles) per second, was first discovered

in 1862 and resighted in September 1992.¹⁰⁴ According to astronomer Duncan Steel of the Anglo Australian Observatory, a collision with Swift-Tuttle comet "would create an impact force of 20 millions megaton, or about 1.6 million times the force of the bomb dropped in Hiroshima".¹⁰⁵

On August 11-13, 1993 the Earth was treated with a display of meteor showers or perseids (meteorized comet dust) in the evening sky. This celestial phenomena was caused by space debris left behind by Swift-Tuttle comet when it crosses the Earth's in December 1992.¹⁰⁶ In Malaysia, local astronomers and stargazers witnessed this rare cosmic phenomena at Janda Baik near Genting Highlands.¹⁰⁷

Apart from the presence of Earth-crossing asteroids and comets in space, Man has also created another form of his presence - debris from decayed satellites, space stations, spacecraft and fragmentary by-products of space experiments, a legacy of the Cold War era. Man has thus contributed his own hazard in the form of "space junks"¹⁰⁸ which will remain a permanent feature of military space.

Conclusion

Thus, it would appear apart from space junks, the 100 billion-odd comets and some 3,000 wayward asteroids will pose a serious threat to Earth as they are likely to intersect the Earth's orbit. To this effect, astronomers believe that the occurrence of Tunguska type collisions by Earth-crossing comets and asteroids occur every 300 years or so.¹⁰⁹ More frightening is the doomsday prospects of Swift-Tuttle comet making a collision course with Earth on August 14, 2116 as predicted by astronomers of the International Astronomical Union (IAU).¹¹⁰

In March 1992, American scientists have come up with a proposal to develop a Star Wars system with the view to destroy or deflect near-Earth asteroids out in space.¹¹¹ More recently, a report to the United States Congress on the threat from space posed by the Earth-approaching asteroids and comets convincingly argues that Mankind should sit up and pay serious attention to these hostile cosmic rocks. Consequently, the Ballistic Missile Defence Organization (BMDO) formerly known as Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) has diverted its

telescopes used to snoop on foreign satellites towards maintaining space surveillance on errant Earth-crossing asteroids and comets.¹¹²

In the near term, BMDO is also planning to launch a spacecraft called Clementine to study asteroid Geographos in March 1994. The primary mission of Clementine is to test its Star Wars technology such as advanced sensors, computer memories and processors, whether or not it is capable of recognising a target and takes a pot-shot at it with the view to destroy or deflect a hostile asteroid.¹¹³

To scientists, the Clementine mission will provide an excellent opportunity to get a close-up view of a Earth-crossing asteroid for the first time besides the exciting possibility of prospecting minerals from the cosmic rocks as an economic spin-off. In future, it is anticipated when Man go out to explore the solar system, asteroids will become an important source of minerals and raw minerals.¹¹⁴

In the context of space warfare, it can be seen

that all the three layers of space especially outer and deep space are being utilized by the leading space-regime countries; the United States and the former Soviet Union. Both these countries have developed their respective weapon systems of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and Anti-Missile System (ABM). It can be seen that in the space battlefield scenario, the military satellites are currently deployed at altitudes between 150 kilometers or 90 miles (lowest) and 177,000 kilometers or 106,200 miles (highest) above the Earth.¹¹⁵

Thus, military space is focused towards the outer space and deep space where the main bulk of military satellites are operationally deployed. These two space zones are also located within the four-layered military regions as envisaged by Collins. Therefore, it can be anticipated that in the outbreak of war in space, the "ultimate battleground" will be fought in outer space as well as deep space otherwise known as military space.

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110. *The NST*, n. 103.
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Maj Gen Nordin bin Yusof was commissioned in the Royal Malay Regiment on 9 Dec 61. He has held various command and staff appointments in infantry units, formations headquarters and the Ministry of Defence. He served as the Defence Adviser in Indonesia from 1983 to 1986. He commanded 7 Malaysian Infantry Brigade, Kluang from 1987 until 1989. He attended the National Defence College, India in 1990. In 1991 he became the commandant of Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College. In July 1992 he was appointed as the Assistant Chief of Army, Administration and later as Deputy Chief of Personnel. On promotion, Maj Gen Nordin was appointed as the Assistant Chief of Staff - Personnel in June 1993.

MILITARY DECEPTION



by Mej Ahmad Tahir bin Mohd Said

Every operational plan must include measures to deceive the enemy. All commanders must consider deception as part of his overall operational plan from the earliest stage of planning. The aim contained in the deception plan and the actions taken must appear entirely plausible to the enemy. The enemy must be given time to assimilate the false information, to make an appreciation based on it, and to act accordingly.

INTRODUCTION

Military deception is an aspect of strategy and tactics that is often used but seldom acknowledged even long after a conflict has ended. Deception is the deliberate misrepresentation of reality done to gain a competitive advantage. The success of a deception can be evaluated in a variety of ways, none of them precise. One can consider how well the deception was implemented; were the activities outlined in the scenario carried out according to plan? Even at this narrow level defining success must be relative, since one characteristic of the most effective deceptions is that they adapt to changing circumstances and thus depart from the original plan.

A higher level of evaluation asks one to consider what impact the target's adverse actions, prompted to some degree by deception, had on the outcome of the encounter itself. What military and political consequences flowed from it? Deception is a powerful tool and the advantage in any properly executed scheme invariably belongs to the deceiver.

NATURE OF DECEPTION

The figure below illustrates how the broad concept of deception encompasses several subsidiary ideas.



At the figure's core is cover, the military term for secret keeping and camouflage. Cover embodies deception's negative side, i.e. a keeping of secrets by negating access to or withholding information. Cover is at the center of deception because, no matter what his or other

goals, a deceiver wishes to protect the existence of existing reality (e.g. the capabilities of a weapon) or an intended reality (such as the scenario for the weapon's use).

The concept of lying encompasses that of cover. To lie is also to withhold information, but it is something more as well; a liar acts to draw his victim away from the truth, and thus lying highlights deception's positive side. Liars create and perpetrate facilities and seek to fasten a victim's attention to them. In the narrow sense, to lie simply means to make an untrue statement, but in a broader sense it can also involve manipulating the context surrounding the statement in order to enhance its veracity. This is what we mean by artifice, an important element of nearly all strategic deceptions.

Just as lying subsumes cover, so does deception subsume lying in both of its senses. Although the terms are often used interchangeably, deception and lying are not exact synonyms. Lying looks primarily to one side of interaction between liar and audience, it stresses the actions of the teller of falsehoods. Deception is a term of wider scope because it also stresses the reactions of the receiver of those falsehoods.

VARIANTS OF DECEPTION

There are two distinguish variants of deception that produce somewhat different effects and operate in different ways. The less elegant variety, termed "ambiguity-increasing" or "A-type" confuses a target so that the target is unsure as to what to believe. It seeks to compound the uncertainties confronting any state's attempt to determine its adversary's wartime intentions. Contradictory indicators, missing data, fast-moving events, time lag between data collection and analysis, chance - all inhibit accurate intelligence assessment. Intelligence analysis work on the assumption, however, that as an adversary moves toward his true operational goal, his preparations to do so well serve as tip-offs clarifying his intent. What A-type deception seeks to ensure is that the level of ambiguity always remains high enough to protect the secret of the actual operation.

In contrast to deception increasing ambiguity, there is a second more complicated category that we label the "misleading or M-type". They reduce ambiguity by building up the attractiveness of one wrong alternative. They cause a target to concentrate his operational resources on a single contingency. Thereby maximizing the deceiver's chances for prevailing in all others.

Although the two variants of deception, M-type and A-type, are conceptually distinct and can be initiated

with different intentions in the deceiver's mind, in practice their effects often co-exist or shade into one another as the deception evolves. In the latter case the direction of change generally appears to be from M-type to A-type. Deceptions planned to mislead a target into choosing one possibility may degenerate and instead increase ambiguity if the target resists or postpones making the choice the deceiver intends. How one categorizes a particular deception partly depends on the perspective one takes. The variants can differ whether viewed from the deceiver's intentions or from the effects they ultimately have on the target. Thus it may be most useful to consider the outcome of the two variants as continuum between convinced misdirection at the one pole and utter confusion, in which all looks equally likely, at the other end.

THE PROCESS OF DECEPTION

In order to understand the process of deception, it is necessary to differentiate the categories of actors typically found on both sides of the interaction. The figure below adapts the traditional system model to illustrate these categories and their relationship.

The deceiver's side consists of decision makers, planners and implementers. Regardless of who has the inspiration, a deception does not begin until a decision maker agrees to it. The planners develop a scenario based on the deception's concept and the implementers generate false radio traffic, set-up deceptive camouflage, simulate


large troop movements or encampments and the like.

Designated as "channels" in the above diagram, their variety is limited. A channel could be a foreign newspaper monitored by the target, his reconnaissance satellites, electronic intercept system, diplomats or spies. Through these channels the deceiver transmits signals, planted clues or pieces of evidence, which is hoped that target will shape into indicators of the deceiver's intent or capabilities.

The direction of signals in a deception is not necessarily always from deceiver to target. There may be return channels from the latter to the former. This is the feedback loop as shown in the diagram. The deceiver can thereby modulate his activities if time allows. In a successful deception, the target is not aware that his actions and statements constitute feedback for the deceiver. Should the target realise it, the stage is set for a further permutation in the deception process, entrapment of the deceiver by his victim. By using the feedback channels to send deceptive signals to his enemy, the target becomes the deceiver and the deception channels become feedback for this new layer of deception.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF DECEPTION

Two groups of factors influence the likelihood of military deception: those that characterize situations confronting an actor and those that actors bring to a situation



by virtue of previous conditioning or personal predilection. The factors may operate independently or in a combination with one another. It is difficult to establish a priority which group is more important but the second set probably has a greater impact. Of the first group, high-stakes situations can certainly influence willingness to deceive. When outcomes are critical, adversaries are encouraged to make use of every capability, every advantage, to ensure victory or stave off defeat. Resort to deception can be particularly compelling if decision makers are not fully confident of a situation's outcome because of their own military weakness. Desiring to compensate for them, they seek through some ruse to indulge an enemy to lower his guard, dilute his strengths or concentrate his forces on the wrong objective.

Of the second group, there is the issue of a person's own predilection to deception. It is clear that, even within the same cultural or organizational setting, individuals differ in this regard. Some leaders relish deception, others put up with it, still others resist it. Personal reactions to deception are at least self-consistent; that is a commander who has appreciated and relied on deception in the past is likely to do so again.

FACTORS CONDITIONING THE SUCCESS OF DECEPTION

The success of a deception can be evaluated in a variety of ways, none of them precise. One can consider how well the deception was implemented; were the activities outlined in the scenario carried out according to plan? Even at this narrow level defining success must be relative, since of characteristic of the most effective deceptions is that they adapt to changing circumstances and thus depart from the original plan. To evaluate the plan itself one must sort out the impact of deception activities on the target from the other influences affecting him. First, did he adopt the false understanding the deceiver intended? And second, did he act on the basis of the understanding in ways contrary to his true interest? Usually it is impossible to recover precisely the relative weight deception had in tipping the scales of a decision. Misleading deceptions that reinforce what a target believes and ambiguity - increasing deceptions that multiply the options a target must consider both build on what already exists. Would the target have continued undisturbed in his (false) expectations without the deceiver's reinforcement? Would his existing ambiguity have been enough to cause delay and confusion without the deceiver's adding more? One cannot know for sure.

CASE STUDY ON DECEPTION

Pulling A Stupid Cow (Chinese Civil War -1949).

This campaign illustrates a deception that was M-type in intent and in tactical effect, while helping to produce an A-type (ambiguity-increasing) deceptive effects. From its earliest days, the Chinese Red Army had frequently used the standard guerrilla tactic of attacking a small enemy garrison in order to ambush the relief force. As the Civil War progressed, PLA commanders adapted this tactic (called "pulling a stupid cow") on an ever-grander scale. Perhaps its most successful practitioner was Liu Po-Cheng, commander of the Central Field Army (redesignated the 2nd Field Army in 1949).

In November 1946, Liu's diversionary offensive against the southern Hopei cities of Shangkuan and Loanchen drew eight Nationalist divisions in pursuit. In ensuing ambush and encirclement operations, Liu's forces destroyed the equivalent of a full strength division, whose weapons further enhanced communist firepower. Another variation of "pulling the cow" occurred on July 14, 1947, when Liu surrounded three Nationalist divisions east of Kai feng. Leaving an opening for their escape, Liu used the stratagem of encircling three sides while ambushing the fourth. Taking the bait, these divisions tried to break out and ran into waiting ambush columns.

Electronic War (1967 Middle East War).

The technological revolution instituted in the early 1960s helped to make possible the military triumph of the Israeli in the Six Day War (1967). Before and after the war, IDF Signal Corps, because of their ability to crack the codes of the allied Arab armies and their possession of powerful radio equipment in Sinai, Israeli intelligence was able to create military confusion by intercepting messages and transmitting false ones. To egg on Jordan to enter the war, there were phoney signals about Egyptian successes in Sinai. Jordanian troops were asked to support an Egyptian counter attack. In another piece of intelligence signals deception, the Jordanian were told that Israeli jets, about to raid their airfields, were Egyptian aircrafts.

In one of the great coups of that conflict, the signals people managed to listen in to a radio conference between President Gamal Abdel Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan. It was in that conversation that the Egyptian president claimed that the United States and Britain had intervened on the battlefield to aid the Israelis. Despite the fact that the text of this conference was released as part of Israeli disinformation campaign, it was still generally

accepted in the Arab world that Western aircrafts had attacked their armies. The suggestion is that they lured Jordan into the fighting at an appropriate moment when Israel was winning the war, in order to give themselves the opportunity to liberate East Jerusalem which at interception of high-level planning talks between the two enemy leaders was made public proved that in fact Israeli military intelligence used electronic deception for their own purposes as well.

1973 Middle East War.

A number of Arab ploys were aimed at increasing the ambiguity of the situation by making a high level of treat and crisis appear to be the norm, another set of activities was designed to create plausible alternative explanations for the massing of troops. The overall theme of these actions was that the Egyptians, in particular, were unable to fight a war and that they prefer some sort of diplomatic solution. The Arab's deception ploy were aided by prevailing Western and Israeli images of Arabs essentially incompetent. Their notion held that Syrian and Egyptians forces would not be coordinated in any militarily meaningful way; that Arab inability to maintain secrecy would provide more than adequate warning and that in any event no Arab attack would be contemplated without sufficient air cover. In this regard, the Egyptians themselves did at least six studies of Israeli military doctrine and perceptions, and Egyptian deception, was tailored to mesh with these perceptions.

In late September, the influx of troops, armour and artillery began under the cover of the normal annual exercise. But even here, the Egyptians were careful to confuse the issue. Ammunition was not sent; ammunition trucks were conspicuously empty because necessary

munitions had already been moved up by rail at the time of the May mobilization. Troops were moved up during the day for exercises but only half the units returned at night. Special bridging equipment was moved in crates to hide its identity, following a lesson learned from the Israelis. Syrian units were moved to the Golan, but the armour was then dug in hull down, in initiation of Syrian deployment in 1967. Special units known as "lazy squads" were detailed to sit on the canal bank, fish, dangle their feet in the water and eat oranges, giving the impression of total unconcern (and also playing into Israeli imaginary concerning the ineptness of Egyptians troops). Elsewhere, soldiers were forbidden to put on their helmets, completing the picture of a military apparatus that was not about to attack.

CONCLUSION

Deception gives the initiator many advantages before and during any situation or conflict. Deceptive means when employed either by the state or the military or any other agencies gives them the advantages of controlling the situation, causing the opponents to be caught unprepared and also gaining time and effort to substitute for some aspects of national and military efforts which need consolidation.

Deception ploys and mans will be used by both belligerent states and the inputs and feedbacks received will be both productive and counter productive. A checking system and a controlling organisation made responsible will ensure that an initiator always stand at the better end and controls whatever outcome as a result of the deception themes. Whoever uses deception correctly, smartly and intelligently in any situation, crisis or conflicts will achieve many positive results and many gainful returns.

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Mej Ahmad Tahir bin Mohd Said telah ditauliahkan pada 6 Mac 83 setelah tamat menjalani latihan di RMA Sandhurst. Telah memulakan perkhidmatan di 4 Armor DiRaja dan telah menjawat pelbagai jawatan di peringkat Rejimen dan juga sebagai Jurulatih di Maktab Tentera DiRaja. Pada 1992, telah dipilih untuk menghadiri kursus Command and Staff College, Quetta, Pakistan. Kini menjawat jawatan PS 2 Penyelidikan di PULADA.

MANAGING STAGNATION IN THE ARMY - AN OVERVIEW

by Lt Kol Mohd Ariffin bin Che Mat Din

Stagnation is defined as a situation of being stagnant. In management terms situations like these are often called plateaus. A career plateau therefore can be said to be a point in a career where the likelihood of additional hierarchical promotion is very low. Career plateaus are a natural hierarchical consequence of the way organizations are shaped. Since there are fewer positions than aspirants at each higher rung on the ladder virtually all managers reach positions from which further upward mobility is unlikely.

Are there situations like this in the Army? The fact that a lot of discussions have been thrown on this, is only indicative that such situations do exist. Of course they do. All organization face situations like these because "there should only be one captain in each ship" and that not all can be at the helm all the time. This is a typical model of all organizations. Unfortunately the term career plateaus has a negative tone to us all, suggesting failure and defeat. Discussions have always centred largely on problem situations as fence sitters, dead enders, deadwood and so on. Actually there is nothing inherently negative about the notion of a career plateau. To say a person has plateaued tells us nothing of his performance on his job, morale, ambition or any personal behavioural characteristics. It simply describes the individual's current career status within a particular organization.

During the past few years the Army Admin has highlighted and discussed a great deal on how to overcome this phenomenon. Whatever the results the product is not wholly seen particularly by people on the ground. This is not to say that nothing is done at the higher level. This article merely presents some suggestions on how we could manage the phenomenon effectively. The suggestions given are based on exploratory discussions within the military, banking and the entertainment industries.

MODEL OF OFFICER CAREER

The first parameter in a model to classify officer career states is the likelihood for future promotion. Here lies the organization's estimate of the individual's chances for receiving a hierarchical promotion. The second characteristic is performance in the present position. This shows how well the individual is seen by the organization as doing his present job.

The tools for ascertaining these two parameters are present in the Army today. By classifying individuals as high or low on these two parameters we can produce a straight forward classification of the officer career states. See Fig. 1. Naturally a more detailed model would allow for finer gradations of each characteristics.

MODEL OF CAREER STATES

Current Performance		Likelihood For Promotions	
		Low	High
High	SOLID CITIZEN	STARS	
	DEADWOOD	COMERS	
Low			

Fig. 1

From the model above one could categorize the officers into the principle career states as follows:

a. Comers.

Commonly known as learners. They are officers with high potential of advancement but presently perform below standards. This may sound confusing but a great many example of these groups are those officers recently promoted (just joined the group of career states) but are still learning the new job and have not yet integrated into the organizational culture. Also included are those who have not mastered or learned their new job. This could be temporary and the length of transit in this category will be dependent on where he is and what he does.

b. Stars.

These officers presently do outstanding work and are viewed as having high potential for continued advancement. They are often on the high potential, fast track career paths. Normally they are a readily identifiable group in an organization, particularly in the Army. They probably receive most attention and discussion by the peers, superior and subordinates alike.

c. Solid Citizen.

Their performance is rated from satisfactory to outstanding but they possess little chance for future

advancement either because of the organization, the system or they themselves. In the Army, this is the largest group and they perform the bulk of the organizational work. Efforts are seldom focussed at them.

d. Deadwood.

They have little potential for advancement and their performance are normally below the satisfactory level. They are organizational problems whether for reasons of motivation, ability or personal difficulty.

Having classified that, the individual on the left hand side of the model, the solid citizen and the deadwood are considered plateaued officers. As you like, the common usage in a Army today, stagnated officers. The solid citizen category are effective stagnants, the deadwood ineffective. For most organization, ours inclusive, only the deadwood are seen as current problems.

Formulating and adopting this model suggests three major implications:

- An important challenge in any organization is to prevent the solid citizens from slipping into deadwoods.
- Different managerial approach is required for the effective management of individuals in each career state. The most sensitive and fragile approach is required for the solid citizens.

- c. Whilst considerable efforts is being put in dealing with officers in the three categories, few are available for dealing with the solid citizens who form the major portion of an organization. Ironically these group are often left to fend for themselves.

OF FAST LANES AND SLOW LANES

Is there career planning in the Army today? People seemed to jitter when questions like these are asked. Indeed I feel there is some kind of planning done somewhere (though I'm not sure where) but good career planning needs to be documented. Otherwise the paths gets intertwined in dividers of whims and fancy moods of managers. As a starter the fast lanes/ slow lanes concept could be a good beginning.

The concept merely superimposes (or is derived from) the career model stated. The stars (and comers) on the right can be categorized as the fast lanes whilst the left hand side, the solid citizen can be the slow lane. The deadwood on the other hand has no-lane. They merely exit. Of course, like the career model, we have abundant tools to appraise each lane. And there must be ample traffic regulations documented as monitors and guides in each lane. Some elaboration over this concept are:

- a. The comers (learners) are normally classified as fast lanes because:
 - (1) Though they are new to the career states, their style is such that they learn new jobs fast and achieve high performance quickly, thus they are only learners for a short while.
 - (2) Normally their culture is such that they learn the new job even before they are promoted into it. They have mastered the job before doing it.
 - (3) Expectations of potential often influence evaluation during the learning period. They are normally rated as "doing the job well for someone who is new".
- b. Comers (learners) may even skip the learner category, sometimes. There are also comers who eventually end up as solid citizens (or may be deadwood) as the saying goes, "a good captain but a stupid major" and this is common.
- c. The solid citizen whilst conveniently graded in the slowlanes need to be identified as to whether he is

organizationally stagnant or personally plateaued. Reasons for these are, among others:

- (1) Organizationally Plateaued Due To:
 - (a) Competition. For a given position an officer is seen less qualified than others.
 - (b) Age. Less desirable for the need to utilize the position young. Youth has its advantage in that longer use is available. An old CO just cannot compete with a younger one in Gonzales Lasak as an example.
 - (c) Organizational Needs. An officer is seen too valuable or indispensable in his present position to be spared for other, albeit higher level, work.
- (2) Personally Plateaued Due To.
 - (a) Lack of skills.
 - (b) Lack of desire and enthusiasm.
 - (c) As is where is basis.

- d. Whilst a clear demarcation of lane is spared for the fast lanes, the disadvantage (over the advantage of climbing up fast) is that he falls faster than the slow lane if a grave mistake is done. Higher falls hurt more unlike that of the slow lane who inch up bit by bit.

CAREERS OVER TIME

The model stated above classifies at a particular point of time. Repeated models, static in nature, is required to classify each career state over various points of time. But a number of static models combined together can describe how careers progress over time. The common view of career dynamics (a typical model) is the life cycle view of careers at Fig 2 below.

Officers enter an organization (or any rank structure) and embark upon their careers as learners. Learning and mastering his job brings him to the star category and a likely candidate for promotion. Promotion puts him back to the learning category (compared to the longer ones, he is far too inferior in rank, ability and performance). Subsequent mastery of the job at new level eventually puts one back into the star category. The process of moving into learner-star category is repeated until one reaches his peak. There is a limit to learning and mastery. Officers gradually or abruptly drop out of competition for the next promotion when his limit is up and he moves on to the inevitable career


LIFE CYCLE VIEW OF CAREER

Fig. 2

plateau and becomes solid citizens. He remains there as long as his performance holds up. As age, lack of challenge, demotivations or lack of attention begin to undermine performance he drifts into the deadwood category. This progression traces out a life cycle of growth-stability-decline which parallels description of other aspects of human development.

Then there is the other aspect of career dynamics

normally known as Peter Principle. This is a popular but pessimistic description of organizational life. This principle suggests that a typical career consists of a series of promotion based on effective performance in successively higher position, culminating to the limit or the ceiling where one can go highest. Instead of being plateaued into solid citizens, one would be terminally placed as deadwood and eventually exit. See Fig. 3.


THE PETER PRINCIPLE

Fig. 3

The other view of career dynamics is maintaining a successful plateau as Fig 4 below. Here the solid citizens are made to exit before they become deadwood. If performance is seen on the decline, remedy is made early. Painful decisions arising from dealing with deadwood can be avoided.

WHAT TO DO? TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS

Before trying to suggest answers it is possibly wise to understand certain key features as follows:

- The speed of a rising star needs to be properly controlled.
- Solid citizens though not productive must not be neglected. They are effective and is needed in any organization.
- Deadwood is bad. It should be eliminated early.

Having looked at the above premises, the only model well suited is the one shown in Fig 4 where we maintain solid citizen and prevent deadwood. This shows how a successful stagnation is managed. Whilst the Peter Principle is considered more productive in terms of tangible gains, it leaves very little room for healthy, constructive solutions. If everybody wants to be G Staff who would be available to be Camp Commandants? A more reasonable assumption is that whilst an officer can be made to remain stagnant, his performance cannot be compromised. If this situation is true then solid citizens are the main workhorses of an

organization and must stay for as long as their performance hold. Plateauing merely indicates arrival at a presumably permanent position in a hierarchy for personal and career remain available to be plateaued officer. Senior officers and superiors must assist solid citizens to adjust effectively in the hierarchy until they leave the organization at the same category not as deadwood.

Let us now see how we can operationalize the model or the career dynamics discuss above:

- Identifying the Fast Lanes and their Back Ups.

This is relatively easy and can be done by proper appraisal like the ones which we are all aware of. Maintain strict guidelines for them. Control their speed. We always fail here. Remember we should not have too much fast cars. On the racetrack only about 5% stay in front, the others are merely follow in the main group.

- Early Identification of Slowlanes and the Creation of Plateaus.

Constant scouting in this highly competitive organization (the enthusiasm of wanting to be the helmsman) will inadvertently reveal the ones being left out. This is an early sign of the creation of plateaus. Detailed performance appraisal and succession planning program would be early predictors and indicators. Remember, never neglect them because they are useful to the organization and they form the bulk of assets. Scrutinize their

MAINTAINING SUCCESSFUL PLATEAU




Fig. 4

promotability under the two parameters we initially discussed. Assess current performance to estimate the extent of potential for promotion, when he will be ready for promotion and help determine training and development needs and plans. Then make more explicit decisions about individual long range career possibilities with principle concerns over identifying specific job for specific candidates, determine when he will be ready, determine needs for additional skill and develop plans for filling that needs.

c. Integrate Career Management Procedure.

Performance appraisal and career planning program which make plateauing judgement explicit and self confirming are very seldom integrated and cross referenced within an organization. Try checking in Army Admin and Infantry Directorate (as for the infantry). Several personnel function, vis-a-vis careering, such as development, internal placement, courses and counseling are all rested in different compartments and are frequently done as if other activities don't exist. A typical example is at the Infantry Directorate which is organized in area of G, A and Q. The G handles training whilst, A handles placement and career prospects. All these are important tenets in the management of career. Poor coordination like this leads to confusion and late identification of problems areas. The systematic integration to career progress and easy organizational transfers. It would also highlight discrepancies in assessment of potentials on appraisal form and designation for promotion.

d. Managing the Solid Citizens.

There are no easy answers for these but these effort are aimed at preventing them becoming dead-

woods. Some useful tips at restoring performance:

- (1) Educational program to upgrade skills allowing individual to keep pace with the jobs and environment.
- (2) Job Rotation or Job Enrichment.
- (3) Development Programmes.
- (4) Counseling and proper career pep talks.
- (5) Monitor attitudes and aspirations.

e. Sort Out the Deadwood.

Radical steps must be taken without malice to eliminate the deadwood.

One reservation which I have had for sometime on how to avoid stagnation is something which may seem difficult but not impossible. It is the notion of having a smaller base at the pyramid with a highly big apex. As we have commonly heard and disputed this is by having a small army (small at the base) and a top heavy organization (broad at the top). Tactically this is a sound practice adopted by many nations.

As a conclusion, the article lays down suggestions on how to manage a stagnated plateau. Operationalizing it requires management ingenuity. The following questions, as food for thought, are left unanswered.

- a. To what degree is personal and organization stagnation the inevitable consequence of long tenure in a given position?
- b. Is it better to tell an officer that he has plateaued or allow him some hope for eventual promotion?
- c. Are plateaued officers more effective when they accept their situation realistically or when they continue to aspire?
- d. Which career management method is likely to continued satisfactory performance and to a healthy adjustment to ones career situation?



Lt Kol Mohd Ariffin bin Che Mat Din was commissioned in the Royal Malay Regt in 1974. He is today the Head of Senior Tactics Division in PULADA. Prior to this, he was The Commanding Officer of 2 RAMD and is popularly known as the GEMBALA HARIMAU MALAYA. Lt Kol Mohd Ariffin holds a Diploma in Business Administration from the Lancashire University, United Kingdom.



AN INTRODUCTION TO DIRECTIVE CONTROL

BY LT COL A. J. RALPH

Because no plan of operation can with any certainty look beyond the initial clash of major forces, once it has occurred, it is incumbent on subordinate commanders to act on their initiative, but in accordance with a common doctrine.'

Field Marshal, Count Helmuth Von Moltke, 1800-1891

Introduction

The opening quote is by one of better known practitioners of modern war. This is not by chance but because it was the German Army in World War II which first institutionalized directive control. As you can see through, the genesis was well founded in the German Army's history. Their large scale, armoured operations, particularly in Russia required a command and control system that was both supple and flexible, and that was inherently different from the system which had been practiced during the trench warfare that prevailed four years on the Western Front.

The origins of the command system known as directive control is a matter for some dispute. There appears to be three prevailing and co-inciding concepts. The first is an almost universal belief among both victor and vanquished that the horrors and stagnation of the Western Front should never be repeated. If war is inevitable, then its execution needed a more scientific basis. The second is the concept of mobility. The influence of the tank cannot be over estimated. The tank was not bound to the trenches. Its subsequent adaptation spawned the concept of mechanization, and air power, that could both complement and exploit the tanks uniqueness. The third factor is communications. It is the radio which allows commanders to command and co-ordinate dispersed battles they cannot see nor personally direct.

These factors weighed heavily on military leaders and thinkers in the inter-war period. Experimental units were evaluated in innovative exercises in England, France and Germany. It was the Germans however who were to institute directive control as the principal command concept. This is perhaps no accident as their understanding of the 'friction of war' was better developed than many others. The introductory quote by Von Moltke illustrates this. Thus was born the 'blitzkreig' and the initial successes in Russia.

But directive control is more than tanks and radios and armoured operations over vast areas. Directive control is a command and control philosophy which can be utilized by any army. To

define it is difficult as its principal component is a mental attitude rather than a physical appearance.

It embodies a unique quality of trust, sense of purpose, commonality of doctrine and a full expression of initiative. It is not loose control or free reign, rather the allocation of a task, the allotment of resources and the freedom to execute the task.

Aim

The aim of article is to introduce the command and control philosophy known as directive control.

The Concept

'I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign...but simply to lay down the work it is desireable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way'.

General Ulysses S. Grant

The concept of directive control was incorporated into Australian Army doctrine beginning in 1987. We have already seen that it had its origin in the German Army. The Israeli Army has adopted this while the Americans, in typical fashion, have not only adopted it but Americanized it to suit their purposes. It underpins much of the 'Air Land Battle' series of publications.

The reasons for its study and adoption are manifold but essentially come down to the systems inherent advantages. That it has not been more widely implemented is perhaps due to the innate conservatism of military institutions and a mistaken belief that directive control is best suited to large, armoured formations and battles.

'Despite the origins of the concept of directive control, the future employment of its characteristics may indeed prove to be the key to victory in future year'.

Directive control as a command and control philosophy is not dependant on any particular type of communications system. Rather it is a command and control system which uses existing communications and intelligence systems.

Equally, directive control is not limited to a particular type or level of conflict. Admittedly the Germans saw the utility of this system when

conducting large, mobile campaigns during World War II, however, one of the reasons the Australian Army adopted directive control was that... 'This applies equally to low level conflict given that contact with enemy forces will probably by the province of the junior commander'.

The critical factor in the concept of directive control is that a subordinate must understand his superior intent and if the situation changes, as frequently and usually occurs, the subordinate will act on his own initiative to achieve his superiors goal.

In other words, at each level of command, a subordinate commander is aware, and understand what is his superiors mission, not just his mission or his part in the battle or campaign. Therefore a subordinate mission is seen as a complimentary and essential part of the superior mission. It can, in a way be equated to the concept of synergistic effect, that is 'the whole is greater than the sum of the parts'. A subordinate commander accepts that his mission is part of an overall mission and that to achieve success his part is important but not to the extent that it detracts from the overall mission, rather compliments the mission.

There is another element to directive control which is critical and this is initiative. Initiative is a word often used in the military context but one, I suspect, not fully understood. With regard to directive control, the Australian Army states the following:.. the subordinate commander has the freedom to modify his plan and adopt new tasks without having to refer back to his commander... when the developing situation does not represent the best use fo his resources in achieving his superiors intent'.

It then amplifies and qualifies this statement by saying 'Provided the subordinate commanders actions are militarily sound and accord with the commanders overall intent they will be supported'.

Initiative is therefore essential but it must be seen and understood within the context of the superior commander's intent. Initiative must be 'militarily acceptable' and not simply 'free reign'. This presupposes that while initiative is expected, the components of initiaive must be identifiable, understood and implemented. The superior commander must be comfortable in the knowledge

that his subordinates will act in a way which is predictable in that the opportunity is grasped but not necessarily predictable in the manner. If the superior commander were present at that precise moment, he would probably do the same thing as his subordinate.

Further, the Australian Army States 'In changing tactical circumstances which clearly require independant decisions, inaction is unacceptable. It is far worse than judgemental error based on a sincere effort to act decisively.'

Thus, imperative to use initiative is clear. This can be expressed as using initiative (a personal quality) or seizing the initiative (a physical and mental condition). Regardless, initiative is a prerequisite for directive control.

Application to Tactics

'Where Australian tactics might be described as 'bump in the ground' tactics with its emphasis on defending or attacking bumps in the ground, German tactics could be described as 'time and space' tactics.

Essential to this is understanding the concept of movement. Movement is generally described in the classic sense as strategic or tactical. While this is true, to understand the full implications of movement in the context of directive control is to understand the concept of movement on the battlefield: speed, surprise, concentration, dispersal. As the Germans say, 'speed and maintaining the initiative is more important than detailed planning in many cases'.

Thus movement is qualified by a number of constantly changing factors including the commanders ability to comprehend the use of movement, his own forces means and capacity for movement and his opponent's capability. Thus, the location and intensity of combat is relative to previous engagements not to 'bumps in the ground' but in the ability to act or react. Decisive engagement of opposing forces is not shunned, rather an ability to understand why an enemy is acting the way he is, seeking his area of weakness and exploiting that weakness using 'time and space' becomes all important.

Tactics therefore becomes less constrained

by preconceived notions and maxims. As Patton said: 'A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week'.

Implications for Training

It is in the field of training that the concept of directive control makes its most significant impact. Anyone who has seen German Army doctrine and training publications will immediately note that they contain fewer words than their equivalent American or British publications. When translated to English, the language is clear, terse and concise.

The reason for this is that the German training system is thorough, rigorous, subjected to constant analysis and above all appropriate to the needs of the German Army. Doctrine, tactics and organisations are thoroughly thought and tested, hence there is no need for voluminous publications.

In 1985 the Inspector of the German Army in his lecture 'The Ethics and Mission of the Soldier' formulated three principles for training'.

- 'a. In training, nothing should be taught or learnt which is contradicted by war.'
- b. Military skills are to be practiced under realistic stress.
- c. Training must stimulate soldiers to exercise judgement and to act independently.'

The last sentence is the most instructive. It gives a clear insight into the philosophy of not only training but of war of the present day German Army. The study of current German Army training methods is not the province of this article. Suffice to say that the Germans appear to have institutionalized excellence and solved what appears to be the great conundrum of directive control, the relationship between initiative on the one hand and a thorough, complete yet almost simplistic training system on the other. In other words, they have managed to teach initiative in the confines of a formal military training system.

One of the reasons for this is that they have welded together tactics, training and doctrine into a powerful and pervasive force. When doctrine changes all corps, departments and sections are consulted and advised. There is then a 'ripple down' effect throughout the Army to tactics, training, equipment and organizations.

The question remains though; how is initiative taught? The question needs to be put in the broader context; how is directive control taught?

There are three essential elements of directive control: 'mutual understanding and trust between leaders, clear and precise tasking within constraints, and leadership based on character'. The first and last of these, based on human qualities and interactions, made a directive control: '*part of the seamless fabric in the German war fighting philosophy*'.

In order to create this philosophy, the following qualities were required:

- a. strict discipline based on understanding;
- b. quick and effective decision making;
- c. a willingness to assume responsibility;
- d. total professional competence, that is, excellence;
- e. the ability to supervise in a controlled and encouraging manner; and
- f. the ability to give and receive detailed, effective and, where necessary, harsh criticism.

The essence appears to be the apparent contradiction between 'strict discipline' and a 'willingness to assume responsibility'. This is based on Clausewitz's view that operations could not be planned in great detail beyond initial contact and every clash of wills was unique.

Therefore detailed planning and strict adherence to the plan are necessary in the early stages of any operation. Beyond that the commanders overall intention becomes paramount and as the 'friction of war' renders detailed planning difficult, subordinate commanders are required and expected to display initiative through 'quick' and effective decision making'. As previously stated, there comes a point in the battle where initiative is both expected and predictable. How it manifests itself is unpredictable except within the broad confines of the superior intent.

A training system which incorporates directive control could therefore be characterized follows:

- a. Doctrine assumes a high priority. Doctrine should be the basis for tactics, organizations, equipment and training. Doctrine must be endorsed at the highest levels,

regularly and vigourously tested and modified. More importantly, it must be simple, understood and accessible.

- b. Training, by implication, must reflect doctrine.
- c. Training must encompass the two properties of 'strict discipline' and a 'willingness to assume responsibility'. The training system must therefore be strict, thorough and assessible in teaching the fundamentals and equally demanding when seeking 'quick and effective decision making'.

It follows that training plays a significant role in any command and control system based on directive control.

An essential part of this training system is that officers, in particular, be taught how to think, not what to think. Thinking therefore becomes the means to a clear analysis of the situation and leads to intellectual honesty. This analytical and intellectual approach is clearly stated by General Storbeck:

'I expect three capabilities for tactical leadership:

- a. A clear thought process within the framework of an appreciation.
- b. A clear and precise giving of orders both verbally and written.
- c. Willingness to act and to take decisions after a detailed consideration of the facts, and also a preparedness to take risks, which is not the same thing as superficial daring which is to be avoided'.

Components of the System

The fundamental requirement of directive control is the mental attribute. This can be expressed as intellectual honesty, integrity and loyalty, obedience and a willingness to take risks.

Directive control as a term (not a concept) is relatively new. Previously the English phrase 'mission orientated tactics' was used as a better translation of the German term 'Auftragstaktik'. 'Mission orientated tactics' had as one of its preconditions the concept of mission analysis.

Mission analysis has been incorporated in Australian Army doctrine as follows:

'Mission analysis should set the task(s) assigned by the immediate superior commander in context by considering:

- a. 'the superior commander's concept;
- b. the essential tasks (specified and implied);
- c. the constraints limiting one's own actions; and
- d. whether the situation has changed fundamentally since the task was given and what conclusions may have to be drawn from such a change.'

The concept of mission analysis is based on the belief that war is becoming more complex, armies are becoming larger, the speed with which campaigns and battles are being fought is increasing and lastly the commander cannot be everywhere at once. The potential for 'fog of war' to pervade every action increases daily.

The other components of the philosophy are mutual trust and understanding, leadership based on character, clear tasking of subordinates and the appropriate allocation of resources to achieve the tasks.

Overriding all of this are two fundamental assumptions. The first of these is honesty: honesty between superior and subordinate, subordinate and superior, honesty in tasking and honesty in the allocation of resources. The second assumption is that when things go astray, as they surely will even with the most thorough appreciation and plan, subordinate commanders will act with initiative to achieve their superior mission.

Conclusions

Directive control as a command and control philosophy is not a new system. It has been practiced by the German Army in World War II is still a fundamental tenet of their philosophy. It has been incorporated into the command and control system of several armies.

As a philosophy it is not only suitable for large armoured or mechanized formations. The Australian experience in this regards should be noted. Similarly, the philosophy is not bound by technology nor the type or complexity of modern

command, control and intelligence systems. In fact the sheer complexity of modern systems, and warfare in general require a simple and flexible command and control philosophy.

The elements of directive control are:

- a. 'It places higher demands on the command giver and the command executor - it is not 'free rein for the forces'.
- b. It emphasises integrity and loyalty - trust from leader and loyalty from the led.
- c. Honesty is paramount - we must be honest with overselves and honest in our opinions and in our reporting.
- d. Obedience is essential - subordinates must be able to comprehend the key elements of a mission.
- e. Anyone who acts dishonestly, misuses the facts or simply presses himself and his opinion forward regardless if the need becomes unbelievable.
- f. A preparedness to take risks is not the same as superficial daring.
- g. Decisions are based on knowledge - answers to a commander's questions must be able to withstand critical examination and be founded on integrity, honesty and modesty.'

The critical factor in this system is that a subordinate must understand his commanders intent and act to carry out that intent when the situation demands action. Failure to act cannot be tolerated.

Perhaps, though, the key component of directive control is the intellectual elements. Thorough, rigorous training, respect and obedience are essential. Without this directive control will not function.

Summary

The aim of this article is to introduce the concept of directive control. The subject is for more

comprehensive than the superfield reading of this article.

Many reading this could quite properly argue that the concept of directive control is not new and in fact is incorporated into current Malaysian doctrine. I disagree. Elements of the concept are practiced by most armies. What the Germans have achieved and the Australians are attempting is to bring all of the parts together into a single coherent philosophy.

The reference to the introduction of directive control into the Australian Army is deliberate. This is not for reasons of comparative judgement about the relative values of each Army but rather to show that the system is suitable for a relatively small army which may be engaged in low level conflict as well as large European armies from where it originated.

Whether the philosophy of command and control known as directive control is suitable or appropriate for the Malaysian Army is not perogative to decide. Obviously I believe the system is suitable but should be studied in more detail than this article allows.

To adopt the system simply because it appears to work for other Armies would be wrong. As Martin van Creveld has said:

.....it is simply not true that learning from ... military history consists, or should consist, solely of imitating the best features found in another army... the real aim...is... to understand the causes of things'.

Any study into the system of directive control must contend with two key elements.

The first is the training requirements of the system and the second is the unique intellectual requirements of directive control. The systems will not be understood nor implemented by merely issuing a policy directive. It is, however worthy of detailed consideration and study.


Notes

1. There is no clear definition of directive control that I have found. This tends to re-inforce the notion that it is philosophical and conceptual in nature rather than bound by empirical definitiveness. Perhaps, in

- lieu of anything more precise, directive control could be described as a decentralized command and control system in which a commander is given a task and the resources to achieve it.
2. Clausewitz coined the term 'the friction of war'. He stated that 'Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war'. Friction results from the cumulative effects of stress, fear, conflicting information, danger, exhaustion, uncertainty, chance, accident and other imponderables inseparable from conflict, which render the execution of a plan less perfect than the concept.
 3. Major Jamie Cullens. 'The Realm of Uncertainty' Directive Control and the Modern Battlefield'. *Australian Defence Force Journal*, No 90, Sept/Oct 91.
 4. *Australian Army Training Information Letter 1/88*, 'Directive Control'.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid.
 7. Ibid.
 8. Report of visit to Study German Tactics Instruction by Col G. Hellyer - Australian DA to FRG dated 28 Feb 85 - paragraph 8. (An unclassified report submitted to the CGS).
 9. Ibid.
 10. General George S. Patton. 'War as I knew it,' 1947.
 11. Extract from the English version of a speech to German Officers by Major General Siegfried Storbeek. Date unknown.
 12. Nelson John T., 'Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle' *Parameters*, September, 1987, p. 23.
 13. Ibid, p. 24, described as 'proper leader character, sound methodology for issuing and carrying out orders and enlightened senior-subordinate relations'.
 14. Van Creveld Martin, *Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945*, (Arms and Armor Press, London, 1983), p. 128.
 15. Authors emphasis.
 16. General Storbeek, Op Cit.
 17. Simplin Richard, *Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty First Century Warfare*.
 18. *Australian Army Training Information Letter 1/88* 'Directive Control.'
 19. Col. J.R. James, 'Directive Control - Command' dated 5 Sep 89. This was a covering letter on the subject of Directive Control written when the author was Chief of Staff of 2 Div.
 20. Van Creveld Martin, 'On Learning from the Wehrmacht and Other Things', *Military Review*, 1988.



Lt. Col A.J. (Tony) Ralph is currently posted as the Malaysia Australia Joint Defence Programme (MAJDP) Project Coordinator with Operations and Training Branch, Headquarters Malaysian Armed Forces. He is an Infantry Officer who graduated from the Officer Cadet School, Portsea in June 1969. He has a strong interests in training having served at the Land Warfare Centre, Canungra and twice at the Infantry Centre, Singleton, the last occasion as the Commanding Officer and Chief Instructor.



The Relationship Between the Revolutionary War- fare; Guerrilla Warfare and Terrorism

BY

LT KOL RAMLI
HJ NIK



INTRODUCTION

Since the eighteenth century, revolutionary warfare, guerrilla warfare and terrorism have become a major phenomena in most parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America. These forms of warfare can be categorised as "unconventional warfare" or as "internal war". This essay attempts to discuss the relationship between revolutionary warfare, guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Initially the essay will focus on the general concept and objectives of unconventional warfare. Then it will consider to what extent the relationship exists in terms of their source of power, the roles of the population, the use of strategy and tactics. It is also essential to consider the interaction between revolutionary warfare, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism, forming a single entity of unconventional warfare pursuing the desired objectives.

THE CONCEPTS AND OBJECTIVES

Revolutionary warfare is defined by Baylis as: "... a form of revolutionary activity which involves protracted struggle in which irregular military tactics are psychological and political operations to produce a new ideological system or political structure" (1975, 134). In this case, we can deduce that it is a revolutionary movement to mobilise the population to seize state power because of unfavorable political and economic conditions. Within these constraints revolutionary warfare can take the form of urban guerrilla war or rural guerrilla war. For example the Revolutionary War in Algeria, was clearly an urban guerrilla warfare, because the native population was deprived of their right for land by the colonialist French. It was fought on the same basis by General Giap in the war of liberation for the North Vietnamese in 1954 (O'Nell, 1969). It further emphasised that revolutionary warfare is the final phase of armed struggle with the objective of establishing new political power. In addition, other pertinent factors such as popular support, nationalism, terrain and selected military tactics, are essential for victory. At the same time the duration of war can be protracted, but the outcome must be decisive.

Guerrilla warfare is a form of armed struggle by the people whereby the guerrillas intermingle with the

masses or population. Arguably this form of warfare plays a dominant role during the early phase of revolutionary warfare, by establishing a suitable nucleus of a people's army in the rural zones. Indeed it is prudent to stress that guerrilla warfare can have three possible objectives; the first is, to take over political power when the anti-guerrilla forces are incapable of defeating the guerrilla movement, as illustrated by Lawrence's guerrilla war against the Turks in Arabia in the First World War. The second objective is to eliminate the occupying powers by disrupting and destroying their armed forces from the rear. For example, the Indochina War in 1946 was a classic case where the French provided the military aid for native guerrillas to fight against Japanese invaders during the Second World War. A similar objective was pursued by the British in supporting the guerrilla wars in Malaya and Burma against the Japanese (Elliot, 1967). In this respect the objective is to paralyse the government machinery as part of the overall revolutionary movement, (Debray, 1967). In essence, revolutionary warfare and guerrilla warfare converge to achieve a single objective, namely the attainment of political power, but, because of popular support, the means of attaining it varies.

Terrorism in the context of revolutionary warfare, is an act of violence by freedom fighters, bandits or peasants who are part of the guerrilla movement, to carry out assassination or sabotage, and the destruction of specific targets. However, based on Plano's definition: "in guerrilla warfare, terrorism is one of the techniques used to create fear or intimidate the government machinery" (1989, 211). Thus terrorism plays a subordinate role in guerrilla warfare with the principal objectives of creating fear amongst the masses with the psychological effect of drawing popular support from them. For example, the assassination of Sir Henry Gurney, the British Governor-General in Malaya by the terrorist in the mid 1950s, was a terrorist act of the guerrilla war. Therefore, based on the concept and the objective it can be denoted that terrorism supplements the activities in the revolutionary warfare and guerrilla warfare. It is also the case that the application of terrorism in unconventional warfare is interrelated.

Modern terrorism is designed to inflict injury or destruction in order to publicize a cause for the international community's attention. One can also argue that the political objective it is seeking in the long term


is one in which the act of terror can be classified as an initial stage of a long struggle in the revolutionary war. As a case in point, acts of terrorism in the form killing and bombing, as adopted the Irish Republican Army (IRA) are regarded as activities of guerrilla warfare.

POWER AND POPULATION

In order for unconventional warfare to attain its objective the support of the population is essential. In guerrilla warfare, the initial stage of the armed struggle is to win the masses support which is the primary condition for success. In other words, a base has to be established

from where the guerrilla movements operate. This was well recognised by Mao during the early stage of the Revolutionary War in China; "It is impossible to sustain guerrilla war in the enemy's rear without a base" (1935, 95). Basically one can assert that guerrilla war establishes its footing as a result of the success of those guerrilla activities which further consolidate the popular support. A secure base provides the nerve-centre to coordinate all major terrorist and guerrilla activities with maximum secrecy.

Revolutionary warfare needs to win over the majority of the population morally and physically, to help the people's army seize political authority. In this



"It is impossible to sustain guerilla war in the enemy's rear without a base."

"The civilian population, especially in rural areas constitute the main target of influence."

respect, guerrilla war gives the impetus to mobilise the population. The other element which is closely associated with political power is nationalism. This forms the basis of the people's determination to struggle against foreign occupation. By and large nationalism becomes the motive force to mobilise the population against the colonial power. One can take into consideration grievances such as appalling economic and social conditions as suffered by poor peasants, in North Vietnam in 1945, that gave the impetus for their support of guerrilla and revolutionary forces.

The civilian population, especially in rural areas constitute the main target of influence. Here, terrorism contributes significantly toward obtaining their support. Psychologically the guerrillas use terror to intimidate certain groups of people such as village notables or local officials. Furthermore, terror is employed to encourage a group of people to maintain their support, failing which they would face the consequences. The use of terror by the guerrillas in the earlier stages to eliminate the enemies of the people, namely the landlords (in the case of Vietnam), and informers and village headmen (in the case of Algeria), indirectly break the linkages between the government and the people. By this selective technique, popular support continues to increase and this enhances power.

The population not only provides the source of power but also assists the guerrillas, terrorists, and revolutionaries in other major ways: intelligence, and supplies. Intelligence is crucial in fighting a war of attrition in order to inflict maximum destruction on the enemy with minimum loss. This requires a systematic network of intelligence gathering by utilising the peasants, informers and special agents. In this form of protracted war there is no "front" as compared with the conventional scenario thereby enabling the informers to be strategically located. In addition, out of sympathy toward the revolutionaries's cause the peasants continue to cooperate. For instance the intelligence concerning Sir Henry Gurney's destination which led to his assassination was provided by his cook. The ability of terrorists to act quickly on receiving intelligence is essential to winning the war.

'Nevertheless, there is a distinct line to be drawn in the use of terror. Indiscriminate terrorism by guerrilla war can create hatred among the masses. For example, it led to the collapse of the Greek guerrillas

in 1946. In this situation the wide spread use of terror alienated half a million Greek supporters and contributed towards their ultimate defeat (Campbell, 1967). Consequently it indicated that the collaboration of terrorism with guerrilla movements to the extreme certainly can reduce popular support which constitute loss of power. The conquest of the population or masses is vitally important as the source of power that is indispensable to victory. In short, the relationship between revolutionary warfare, guerrilla warfare and terrorism is focused on political power, nationalism and the population which is the source of intelligence, sympathy and supplies.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS

With successful terrorist, and guerrilla activities which compel the government forces to withdraw from certain areas, the guerrillas will create liberated zones. In these, the legal authority would have been completely eliminated and the revolutionaries begin to install their own political system. This is indeed comparable to the result as achieved by Guevara that: "it raised the confidence of the masses and people in their own strength stirred their combative spirit" (1961, 193). Arguably, the most important strategy in this phase is the consolidation of the political and military leadership into a powerful driving force to wage the war. The political arm intensifies its ideological offensives and the military arm transform its guerrilla bands into a well organised liberation army. In this phase, the revolutionaries have two immediate objectives: the destruction of government forces and the adoption of political ideology as defined by Political Party to liberate the nation as was done in South Vietnam in 1965 by People's Revolutionary Party as part of National Liberation Front. The achievement of this objective is well argued by Debray; the party determines the political contents and the goal to be pursued, and the people's army is merely an instrument of implementation." (1977, 96). A case in point, the Algerian Revolution was aimed to expel the French colonialist to achieve independence, and to introduce a new revolutionary regime.

Another aspect is the dual leadership which exists in revolutionary warfare and guerrilla warfare. For example, Mao and Chu Teh in the Chinese Revolution, Ho Chi Minh and Giap in the Vietnamese

Revolutionary war, and Che Guevara and Fidel Castro in Cuba played a dual role. Therefore it further indicates the cohesiveness and unity between the political and the military objectives.

Another crucial factor in revolutionary warfare, guerrilla warfare and terrorism is the use of terrain; this includes the use of ground, climate and vegetation, to the maximum advantage. By establishing bases in the interior or rural areas, the local guerrillas have the advantage of the terrain which is vitally important in the conduct of their operations. Another strategy adopted in this type of unconventional warfare is the use of underground networks in order to infiltrate into government organisations such as economic and social agencies to intimidate the members. It can be argued that the underground movements weaken the morale of the regime in power.

Conversely, the conduct of operations in guerrilla warfare and revolutionary warfare have to be carefully planned and skillfully executed in order to avoid negative effects. The civilian support can neither be obtain at gunpoint nor by excessive use of terrorism. A case in point, is the guerrilla war in Malaya from 1948 to 1956 which collapsed totally because of poor support from population and the extreme use of terrorism by the insurgents (Elliot Bateman, 1967). From another perspective guerrilla warfare failed to transform into successful revolutionary warfare, owing to the fact that the political objective pursued was not acceptable to the ethnic group of the population. In essence these failures were due to the incompetent political leadership which adopted a strategy that was not suitable and viable for the indigenous people. The guerrilla leaders failed to adhere to the principles of guerrilla warfare as advocated by Clausewitz that: "the national character must support the war" (1968, 136).

INTERACTION OF THE STRUGGLE

Revolutionary warfare is the final phase of a people's war which requires strength and concentration of effort in the psychological, political, and military offensive against the government machinery, especially its regular army. The open fighting engaged by revolutionaries, terrorism and sabotage by the guerrillas and the continuing provision of supplies and intelligence, by the masses lead to the collapse of the ruling regime. In this

final phase, terrorism supplements revolutionary activities in the form of destruction of industries, killing and kidnapping of the government officials in the urban areas thereby assisting the liberation army toward a quick victory. For example, in June 1962, in South Vietnam, the Vietcong kidnapped more than 1,200 teachers and killed 22 government health officials. In this respect, terrorism has been used hand in glove with revolutionary warfare. This is well demonstrated by Lacquer's in the Cuban Revolutionary War that: "Cuban terrorism was regarded at best as supplementary form of warfare" (1977,19).

Moreover, the hardship suffered by the terrorists, guerrilla bands, and the revolutionaries compel them to become freedom fighters with strong will power and determination. In this light the success at Dien Bien Phu in 1945 by the Vietnamese Revolutionary Army against the French Army and despite their suffering heavy casualties, indicated their strong determination and moral courage to attain victory, which they had demonstrated throughout the guerrilla movements since 1946.

The success of this major offensive won them international support for their cause and further influenced the public opinion in the enemy's country. The impact of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu was devastating on the French public in general and on the French Army in particular. On this basis, we can deduce that the final outcome of revolutionary warfare, guerrilla warfare and terrorism turned out to be very costly and damaged the prestige of the imperial power. As a result one can assert that the sum total of terrorism, guerrilla activities and the revolutionary movements contributes toward the attainment of political objectives. Hence, it conformed with Clausewitz's dictum that;" war is never an isolated act" (1968, 106).

CONCLUSION

As far as revolutionary warfare and guerrilla warfare are concerned, the principal objectives sought is political power, coupled with a viable strategy to attain it. Terrorism has short and long term objectives. It is accepted as major activity conducted in revolutionary warfare. Ultimately, terrorism has overall political objectives as well to achieve. Nevertheless, it mostly

occurs during the early phase of a guerrilla war and contributes significantly toward establishing and protecting bases in the rural areas. Unwise or indiscriminate use of terrorism produces a negative effect which can lead to failure; in most cases guerrilla warfare is not the decisive phase, because it has to be transformed into revolutionary war to mobilise the population. Therefore, it is apparent that political power authority is the ultimate goal pursued.

Terrorism and the concerted activities of guerrillas strengthen and enhance the credibility of mobilising the majority of the population. In revolutionary war the conquest of the population to form a cohesive force is of paramount importance and this factor constitutes a source of power. Indirectly, there

is a constant increase in the size of manpower, morally and physically to sustain the struggle. The political and military integrate to form a liberation front supported by the liberation army or people's army. On this basis, a strong linkage between revolutionary war and guerrilla war based on the political ideology the military strategy.

In the final phase, close interaction between the different activities of the armed struggle bring about the collapse of ruling regime. The moral courage of the guerrillas and their determination to fight for a just cause, give the mental power to overcome the odds to attain victory. It is significant to note that the relationship between revolutionary warfare, guerrilla warfare and terrorism collectively contribute towards achieving the pursued goal.

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Lt Kol Ramli Hj Nik graduated from the RMA Sandhurst, UK and commissioned into Royal Signal in Dec 1970. He has held various command and Staff appointment including instructor RMC and PULADA. In Oct 1992 he obtained his master degree in Defence Security Analysis from Lancaster University and currently serves as Directing Staff in MAFSC Haigate.



TEORI KEKOSONGAN KUASA DALAM KESELAMATAN ASIA PASIFIK DAN KEMUNCULAN KUASA-KUASA BESAR SERANTAU

oleh Lt Kol Nik Mohd Zaaba

Kejatuhan adi kuasa Uni Soviet dan pengunduran kuasa ketenteraan Amerika Syarikat dari Asia Pasifik mungkin akan berlaku kekosongan kuasa keselamatan yang selama ini menjamin keselamatan serantau. Adakah dengan kemunculan kuasa-kuasa besar seperti China, Jepun dan India boleh menggugat keselamatan serantau? Dengan keadaan yang tidak menentu, masa sahaja akan mencorakkan perkiraan selanjutnya sama ada ke arah perdamaian yang diidamkan atau berkonflik yang membimbangkan.



PENDAHULUAN

Perubahan keadaan strategi di Asia Pasifik dalam jangkamasa yang pendek kebelakangan ini boleh menimbulkan pelbagai masalah keselamatan yang tidak menentu dan membimbangkan negara-negara serantau. Perubahan mendadak ini adalah berpuncu dari beberapa perubahan strategi di peringkat antarabangsa berikutan tercapainya persefahaman (detente) di antara Amerika Syarikat dan bekas Uni Soviet, berakhirnya perang dingin (cold war), kejatuhan negara-negara blok komunis di Eropah Timur dan berlakunya perpecahan di Uni Soviet sendiri. Pergolakan politik, persengketaan ekonomi dan berkonflik diibaratkan seperti 'roda' dengan keadaan yang tidak menentu boleh mengancam keselamatan dunia di mana-mana sahaja dalam masa yang singkat. Krisis dan Perang Teluk baru-baru ini merupakan bukti nyata. Pada hakikatnya, dalam hubungan antarabangsa, sahabat dan musuh tidak kekal, boleh bertukar ganti, yang kekal hanyalah kepentingan keselamatan nasional dan survivalnya sahaja walaupun aliran politik, fahaman dan dasar boleh berubah mengikut keadaan.

Pengurangan penglibatan adi kuasa (superpowers) di Asia Pasifik, sudah tentu akan mengendurkan ketegangan tetapi sebalik dari itu, ia juga boleh menimbulkan keimbangan di kalangan negara-negara di rantau ini dalam keadaan keselamatan yang tidak menentu. Kehadiran Amerika Syarikat dan Uni Soviet selama ini dikatakan telah dapat mengimbangkan kedudukan strategi dan kuasa ketenteraan sesuai dengan peranan adi kuasa bagi menjamin kestabilan serantau. Mengikut setengah pendapat, kalau sekiranya kedua-dua kuasa gergasi tersebut berundur dari Asia Pasifik, sudah pasti akan mengwujudkan kekosongan kuasa yang mungkin akan diisi oleh kuasa-kuasa besar (major powers) yang lain di rantau ini. Kedudukan sedemikian yang diibaratkan '*permainan catur*' boleh menggugat keselamatan serantau dan juga dunia. Lantaran itu juga akan menimbulkan keimbangan negara-negara kecil yang lain jika berlaku pergeseran politik dan perlumba persenjataan yang boleh mencetus persengketaan dan konflik di antara mereka yang akhirnya terheret ke dalam kancang perperangan. Bab kata pepatah Melayu, '*gajah sama gajah berjuang, pelanduk mati di tengah-tengah*'

TEORI KEKOSONGAN KUASA

Sebelum membuat kajian lanjut, amat perlu diberi pengertian berkenaan dengan teori kekosongan kuasa dalam keselamatan berdasarkan kepada perbincangan secara am. Teori kekosongan kuasa ada kaitannya dengan imbangkuasa (balance of power) dalam hubungan antarabangsa politik dan keselamatan yang menjadi rebutan kuasa-kuasa besar untuk mendapat pengaruh di segenap pelusuk dunia, khususnya melibatkan adi kuasa Amerika Syarikat dan Uni Soviet dan juga lain-lain kuasa besar serantau (regional powers). Mengikut pakar teoris dalam hubungan antarabangsa, Hans Morgenthau, '*... politik antarabangsa juga adalah politik untuk perjuangan mendapatkan kuasa... kemunculan imbangkuasa ialah untuk mencorakkan beberapa buah negara yang dibahagikan mengikut pengaruh dan kekuatan masing-masing bagi mengimbangkan kuasa di antara mereka.*'¹ Yang membimbangkan, persengketaan politik boleh mencetuskan konflik dan peperangan. Ungkapan Clausewitz amat tepat, '*... Peperangan adalah kesinambungan politik melalui cara lain... politik diibaratkan kandungan peranakan yang boleh melahirkan peperangan... oleh itu ia menjadi satu fenomena semulajadi dalam politik antarabangsa.*'²

Dengan itu jelas bahawa imbangkuasa merupakan satu sistem antarabangsa bertujuan untuk mengelakkan dari penguasaan dunia oleh kuasa-kuasa tertentu sahaja, iaini bagi melindungi negara-negara lain dari ditakluki oleh sesebuah negara berkuasa besar bagi kepentingannya. Ini juga merupakan satu institusi orde antarabangsa yang bergantung kepada diplomasi, peperangan, undang-undang antarabangsa dan pengurusan kuasa-kuasa besar itu sendiri dalam menyelesaikan pertikaian dan konflik antarabangsa.

Dalam peperangan imbangkuasa tersebut, jelas menunjukkan pertaliannya dengan teori kekosongan kuasa yang akan timbul jika terdapat kuasa-kuasa yang sudah lama bertapak tidak lagi dapat memainkan peranannya dengan berkesan atau mereka berundur terus. Ini dengan sendirinya akan memberi peluang kepada kuasa-kuasa besar yang lain terutama di rantau yang sama untuk berlumba-lumba mengisikan kekosongan tersebut bagi mengimbangkan pengaruh mereka pula sesuai dengan strategi untuk kepentingan masing-masing.

Untuk menjadi adi kuasa dunia, melibatkan banyak kriteria. Yang terpenting sekali ialah

kemampuan kekuatan kuasa ketenteraan, berkuasa nuklear, keteguhan struktur ekonomi, kedudukan geopolitik dan inspirasinya sendiri. Kekuatan kuasa ketenteraan adalah berasaskan kepada kemampuan maritimnya yang dapat menjelajah jauh keluar dari kawasannya. Mengikut Teori Kuasa Laut Mahan, '*... negara yang mengawal lautan, laluan laut utama, selat dan pangkalan akan mendapat menguasai ekonomi mana-mana kuasa darat... berkemampuan mengawal laut dan menghindar musuh dari menggunakan akan berkuasa... kuasa laut amat penting ... dahulu, sekarang dan akan berterusan pada masa-masa hadapan.*'³

Dengan itu jelas bahawa teori kekosongan ada hubungkaitnya denganimbangan kuasa yang diamalkan oleh adi kuasa dan kuasa-kuasa besar yang lain bagi menjaga pengaruh dan kepentingan mereka di peringkat antarabangsa atau di kawasan serantau. Adi kuasa akan tetap memain peranan tersebut jika terdapat cabaran dari kuasa lain selagi ia masih mampu untuk terus menapak di kawasan-kawasan yang ada kepentingannya. Sekiranya adi kuasa itu lemah dan tidak lagi mampu untuk memain peranannya, mungkin akan muncul pula kuasa-kuasa baru yang lain terutama dari rantau yang sama ingin mengambil peluang bagi mengisi tempat kekosongan kuasa yang wujud itu dan menyaingi di antara satu sama lain bagi mendapat pengaruh untuk kepentingan mereka pula.

PERKEMBANGAN KEDUDUKAN ADI KUASA DI ASIA PASIFIK

AMERIKA SYARIKAT

Perbincangan utama dalam tajuk ini adalah berkisar di atas peranan Amerika Syarikat dalam penguasaan pengaruh politik dan tenteranya di Asia Pasifik. Amerika Syarikat mula mengkaji balik kedudukan strategi dan penglibatan peranannya di Asia Pasifik sejak awal tahun 1969 sesuai dengan '*Doktrin Nixon*' atau juga dikenali dengan '*Doktrin Guam*'. Dalam doktrin ini menggariskan strategi Amerika Syarikat dengan mengamalkan konsep aturgerak dari pangkalan-pangkalan hadapan (forward base deployment) di gugusan kepulauan Asia setelah mengundur bala tenteranya dari kontinen Asia. Kemudian diikuti pula dengan pembaharuan persahabatan Amerika-China pada tahun 1973 yang mengubah corakimbangan kuasa yang baru iaitu daripada '*bipolar*' yang berasaskan kepada konflik Timur-Barat ke '*multipolar*' yang

menglibatkan peralihan kuasa politik dan ekonomi yang berpusat kepada empat kuasa besar iaitu Amerika Syarikat, Uni Soviet, China dan Jepun.⁴ Ini telah diakui sendiri oleh bekas Perdana Menteri Jepun, Kaifu Toshiki, '*... pakatan bipolar sudah loput, dan mengambil tempatnya ialah multipolar yang berasaskan kepada struktur perdagangan.*'⁵ Begitu juga dengan pendapat Henry A. Kissinger, '*... zaman adi kuasa sudah berlalu yang sekarang sudah berakhir. Bipolar militer bukan sahaja gagal untuk menghindarnya, malah menggalakkan kemunculan multipolar politik.*'⁶

Perlu diberi perhatian bahawa '*multipolar*' itu hanya tertumpu di bidang politik dan ekonomi sahaja, tetapi sebaliknya jika berlandaskan kepada kemampuan adi kuasa ianya masih lagi bipolar yang dikuasai sepenuhnya oleh Amerika Syarikat dan Uni Soviet (sebelum kejatuhannya). Setelah adi kuasa Uni Soviet berkubur, ternyata Amerika Syarikat tetap kekal sebagai adi kuasa tunggal dunia. Dengan angkuhnya pernah Presiden Bush berkata bahawa Amerika Syarikat bersedia menjadi '*polis dunia*' dalam melaksanakan impian '*Orde Baru Antarabangsa*' yang diasasnya. Kenyataan tersebut masih menjadi tandatanya dengan dasarnya yang tidak menentu dan kurang jelas yang berunsurkan kepada kepentingan sendiri.

Penguasaan Amerika Syarikat di Asia Pasifik sejak beberapa lama sebagai '*payung keselamatan*' dan benteng kepada perkembangan pengaruh komunis, mulai menurun pada awal tahun 1970an akibat dari perubahanimbangan kuasa ekonomi di antara Amerika Syarikat dengan Jepun serta negara-negara sekutunya yang lain. Sehubungan dengan perubahan itu, mengikut setengah pendapat penganalisis, mungkin akan menimbulkan keimbangan kerana ia boleh mengakibatkan adanya kekosongan kuasa yang kemudiannya akan menjadi rebutan di antara kuasa-kuasa besar serantau yang mempunyai minat dan berkepentingan.

Mengikut Paul Kennedy dalam bukunya, '*The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*'⁷ telah membangkitkan persoalan kemampuan Amerika Syarikat yang mengalami masalah ekonomi jika dibandingkan dengan ekonomi Jepun (dan Jerman Barat) untuk menampung bebanan pertahanannya bagi menjaga keselamatan negara-negara bebas dan kepentingannya di dunia khususnya di rantau Asia Pasifik. Ia juga meramalkan kedudukan pengaruh Amerika Syarikat di masa hadapan akan banyak bergantung kepada tindak-tanduk pucuk

pimpinan dan pendapat umum serta kesungguhannya untuk memperbaiki penguasaan ekonominya. Oleh itu ia mencadangkan supaya Amerika Syarikat sama-sama memikul bebanan pertahanan dengan sekutunya di samping memperbaiki struktur ekonomi untuk mengekalkan penguasaan pengaruhnya di dunia.

Buat masa sekarang, dasar Amerika Syarikat dan kemampuannya di Asia Pasifik adalah dianggap mencukupi bagi menjaga kepentingannya di rantau ini. Tetapi yang menjadi pokok persoalan, dapatkah ia mengekalkan keupayaannya sebagai adi kuasa dengan keadaan ekonomi yang tergugat dialaminya sekarang pada masa-masa hadapan? Namun begitu, Amerika Syarikat sudahpun merangka strateginya untuk memastikan imbalan kuasa adalah memihak kepadanya walaupun ia terpaksa mengurangkan komitmen pertahanannya di rantau ini.⁸ Amerika Syarikat telah mengadakan skim pertahanan yang berkehendakkan Jepun sama-sama memikul bebanannya yang selama ini dianggap sebagai '*penumpang percuma*'. Walaupun, Jepun dianggap sebagai sekutu pertahanannya yang utama tetapi ia juga merupakan saingan ekonominya yang ketat. Di samping itu, ia juga menggalakkan negara-negara Asia yang lain supaya bersedia dengan pertahanan mereka sendiri dan mengadakan pakatan secara '*multilateral* atau *bilateral*' dalam merangka strategi pertahanan masing-masing.

Pada tahun 1989, menandakan permulaan rancangan pengunduran Amerika Syarikat dari rantau Asia Pasifik. Ini melibatkan pengunduran sepenuhnya tentera udara dari 'Clark Air Base' dan armada dari pangkalan lautnya yang terbesar di Asia Pasifik di 'Subic Naval Base', Filipina pada akhir tahun 1992. Selanjutnya, ia juga akan mengurangkan tenteranya di pangkalan-pangkalan di Jepun dan Korea Selatan secara peringkat-peringkat. Sehubungan itu, Singapura telah membenarkan pangkalan-pangkalan tenteranya digunakan oleh tentera udara dan laut Amerika Syarikat sebagai pangkalan singgahan untuk senggaraan dan bagi keperluan logistik.

Presiden Bush telah menegaskan bahawa Amerika Syarikat akan tetap kekal di Asia Pasifik dan terus memain peranannya untuk menjaga kestabilan di rantau tersebut.⁹ Pentadbiran baru Presiden Clinton dikatakan tidak banyak berubah dalam peranan Amerika Syarikat di Asia Pasifik selagi ia masih mempunyai tanggungjawab dalam pakatan pertahanannya di Asia Timur. Semasa melawat Korea Selatan pada Julai 1993, Presiden

Clinton menegaskan bahawa Amerika Syarikat masih ada komitmen di Asia selagi ada ancaman dari Korea Utara. Beliau juga memberi amaran kepada Korea Utara akan mengambil tindakan kekerasan selagi ia tidak membenarkan loji nuklearnya diperiksa oleh pihak berkuasa antarabangsa. Di samping itu, Amerika Syarikat juga mempunyai kepentingan ekonomi dan perdagangan di rantau itu dan laluan laut di Asia Pasifik dianggap penting dan mempunyai strategi keselamatan kepadanya.

Di bidang ketenteraan, Pemerintahan Pasifik Amerika Syarikat (US Pacific Command) yang berpangkalan di Hawaii adalah bertanggungjawab dalam skim pertahanan di Asia Pasifik.¹⁰ Selain dari itu, ia juga mempunyai beberapa pangkalan strategik di Guam (kepulauan di Pasifik), Diego Garcia (kepulauan di Lautan Hindi), Jepun, Korea Selatan dan juga kemudahan pangkalan di Singapura. Kekuatan dan kemampuan armada tentera laut dan pesawat perangnya dengan persenjataan yang canggih terbukti sebegini padu dan berkesan dalam Peperangan Teluk baru-baru ini. Satuan tugas kapal-kapal perang pengangkut pesawat (aircraft carrier task force) merupakan kekuatan asas kemampuan ketenteraan Amerika Syarikat dapat bertindak jauh dari pangkalan asalnya yang tiada tandingan dari mana-mana kuasa buat masa sekarang dan berkemungkinan juga pada masa-masa hadapan selagi ia berkemampuan.

UNI SOVIET/RUSSIA

Adi kuasa Uni Soviet merupakan pencabar utama kepada Amerika Syarikat bukan sahaja di Eropah malah juga di Asia Pasifik sehingga pada akhir tahun 1980an. Selain dari itu, China juga menjadi seteru ketatnya walaupun kedua-duanya merupakan gergasi komunis. Kemampuan ketenteraannya di rantau ini sejak 15 tahun yang lepas secara langsung menjadi ancaman keselamatan kepada Jepun dan Korea Selatan sebagai sekutu Amerika Syarikat. Uni Soviet yang menjadi sekutu rapat kepada Vietnam yang dianggap sebagai '*proksinya*' menggunakan kemudahan pangkalan-pangkalan di Danang dan Cam Ranh Bay. Ini merupakan ancaman kepada Amerika Syarikat dan negara-negara lain khususnya di Asia Tenggara dan juga China yang menjadi musuh ketat Uni Soviet pada ketika itu. Pangkalan-pangkalan tersebut dikatakan masih kekal dengan kekuatan tentera Russia sehingga sekarang walaupun ia berkurangan dan beransur berundur.

Berikutnya kejatuhan negara-negara blok komunis di Eropah Timur dan masalah ekonomi pergolakan politik di Uni Soviet sendiri menyebabkan kedudukannya tergugat dan terpaksa menukar strategi keselamatannya dengan mengadakan pembaharuan persahabatan dan persefahaman (detente) dengan Amerika Syarikat serta mengamalkan sikap berbaik-baik dengan China dan Jepun. Ini tidak lama kerana Uni Soviet sendiri turut tumbang akibat dari perpecahan persekutuannya setelah berkuasa selama 74 tahun. Oleh itu dengan sendirinya bipolar kuasa ketenteraan dunia yang wujud selama ini juga turut luput dan kini dikuasai sepenuhnya oleh Amerika Syarikat selaku adi kuasa tunggal dunia. Walaupun Russia menubuhkan Persatuan Komanwel Merdeka yang dianggotai oleh kebanyakan negara-negara bekas Uni Soviet dahulu tetapi ia tidak berkesan memandangkan terdapatnya beberapa masalah dan tiada persefahaman antara mereka.

Namun begitu, kemunculan Russia yang mewarisi kebanyakan kuasa ketenteraan dan kelengkappannya termasuk senjata nuklear perlu diberi perhatian walaupun ia tidak lagi mampu menjadi adi kuasa. Kalau dilihat dari kedudukan Russia sebahagian besar dari kawasannya terletak di Pasifik Timur dan Asia Tengah yang masih mempunyai beberapa pangkalan strategik di Vladivostok, di kepulauan Kurile di Timur Pasifik dan beberapa lagi pangkalan tentera di Asia Tengah termasuk penempatan peluru berpandu balistik (ICBM) di sempadan dengan China. Pangkalan-pangkalan Danang dan Cam Ranh Bay di Vietnam masih digunakan oleh tentera Russia walaupun tidak aktif lagi. Tentera Russia mampu bergiat semula jika ia mahu berbuat demikian untuk memperoleh kekuatannya di Asia Pasifik pada suatu masa yang sesuai nanti. Tetapi buat pada masa sekarang ia tidak berkemungkinan berbuat sedemikian kerana ia masih lagi menumpu perhatian dalam reformasi ekonomi yang akan mengambil masa yang panjang dan mengharapkan bantuan dan belas ikhsan dari luar.

Walaupun terdapat dasar pembaharuan liberal, tetapi Moscow terus tergugat dengan keadaan ekonomi yang kucar-kacir. Fahaman konservatif yang bermiripkan kepada komunis masih kuat dan mampu bergiat aktif semula jika dasar perubahan Russia sekarang tidak berhasil. Kini Russia menjalin hubungan baik dengan Amerika Syarikat dan saling berhubung di atas isu-isu dunia dan serantau. Mereka juga mencapai beberapa persetujuan untuk mengurang dan menghadkan senjata nuklear

strategik masing-masing walaupun ancamannya tetap masih ada.

ULASAN

Hasil dari perbincangan di atas, jelas menunjukkan bahawa Amerika Syarikat akan tetap kekal untuk memain peranannya sebagai kuasa utama di Asia Pasifik kerana ia masih ada kepentingan dan tanggungjawabnya. Walaupun ia terpaksa mengurangkan bebanan pertahanannya tetapi ini tidak menimbulkan masalah kerana tiada lagi ancaman lama dari Uni Soviet. Strategi pertahanannya tetap kekal dengan kehadirannya di barisan hadapan (forward deployment presence) dan berkongsi bebanan pertahanan dengan sekutunya. Kemampuan Pemerintahan Pasifik Amerika Syarikat dalam skim pertahanan di Asia Pasifik tidak boleh dipertikaikan di atas keberkesanannya dan keunggulannya yang nyata terbukti dalam Peperangan Teluk.

Amerika Syarikat yang mengalami kemerosotan ekonomi sejak kebelakangan ini akan sedikit sebanyak menjelaskan prestasinya di Asia Pasifik terutama dengan pengurangan belanjawan pertahanan serta mengurangkan kekuatan tenteranya. Keadaan ini akan bertambah buruk jika ekonominya tidak stabil dan masih menurun. Ini akan membimbangkan kebanyakan negara-negara di rantau tersebut. Malah kebanyakan negara di Asia Pasifik setuju secara langsung atau tidak langsung di atas kehadiran ketenteraan Amerika Syarikat sebagai pengimbangan kuasa bagi terus menjamin kestabilan keselamatan serantau. Begitu juga dengan pendapat negara-negara ASEAN walaupun ia menjadi pengasas kepada deklarasi Zon Aman, Bebas dan Berkecuali (ZOPFAN) di Asia Tenggara. Namun demikian campurtangan Amerika Syarikat yang menggelar dirinya sebagai jaguh hak asasi manusia dalam satu-satu krisis antarabangsa boleh dipersoalkan. Ini berasaskan kepada tindakannya berbeza dan memilih bulu yang banyak bergantung kepada kepentingannya sendiri sahaja yang jelas terbukti dalam Peperangan Teluk dengan Iraq, penaklukan Soviet di Afghanistan, campurtangan ketenteraan Amerika Syarikat di Panama, perang saudara di Somalia, penindasan rakyat Palestin oleh Israel dan kekejaman kaum Serb di Bosnia.

Kuasa Russia yang berakar umbi dari Uni Soviet dahulu tidak boleh diketepikan begitu sahaja, lebih-lebih lagi sebahagian besar kawasannya

terletak di rantau yang sama dan sekaligus ia tetap ada kepentingannya. Sebaliknya, Russia tidak lagi terikat di Eropah Timur yang tiada berkepentingan lagi. Oleh itu, ia akan memberi lebih tumpuan kepada Asia Pasifik dan terus dengan kemunculannya sebagai kuasa serantau dan kemampuan kuasa tentera yang masih kuat tidak boleh dinafikan. Kedudukan dan kuasanya akan bertambah kuat sekiranya dasar pembaharuan reformasi dan ekonominya berjaya kelak. Ini mempastikan Russia akan terus memain peranannya yang penting untuk ketabilan dan keselamatan serantau di Asia Pasifik.

KEMUNCULAN KUASA-KUASA BARU SERANTAU DAN IMPLIKASINYA

AM

Adalah menjadi kenyataan bahawa Amerika Syarikat masih tetap dengan pendiriannya untuk meneruskan penglibatannya di Asia Pasifik walaupun tiada lagi cabaran dari Uni Soviet yang sudahpun berkubur sejak akhir tahun 1991. Amerika Syarikat hanya ingin mengurangkan kekuatan tenteranya sahaja di rantau ini dengan memberi penekanan kepada aturgerak ketenterannya melalui pangkalan hadapan. Selanjutnya perlu diberi perhatian kepada kemunculan kuasa-kuasa lain di rantau Asia Pasifik untuk dibuat penilaian sama ada mereka dapat menyaingi kekuatan Amerika Syarikat, sesuai dengan teori untuk mengisi kekosongan kuasa dalam keselamatan yang menjadi tajuk perbincangan dalam penulisan ini. Yang menjadi persoalan, adakah kuasa-kuasa serantau yang baru muncul itu mampu memainkan peranannya bagiimbangan kuasa mereka serta menyaingi adi kuasa tunggal Amerika Syarikat? Jika sedemikian apakah implikasi keselamatan di rantau tersebut?

Jika diberi segala kemungkinan dan masih boleh diperbahaskan akan kemunculan kuasa-kuasa serantau di Asia Pasifik seperti Jepun, China dan India (3 gergasi Asia) yang dijangka dapat memain peranan masing-masing dalam hal-ehwal keselamatan serantau. Ini berasaskan kepada potensi kemampuan mereka di bidang ekonomi, politik dan juga di bidang ketenteraan. Mengikut pendapat seorang penganalisis politik dalam perkembangan tersebut, "... walaupun Moscow dan Washington berundur, Beijing, Tokyo dan boleh jadi juga New Delhi memerhati dengan penuh minat".¹¹ Seorang lagi pemerhati pula mengutarakan

kebimbangannya, "... kuasa-kuasa serantau yang lain seperti Jepun, China dan India akan memain peranan dengan lebih giat... berpotensi mencetus konflik serantau di luar pengawasan adi kuasa akan lebih menyerlah".¹² Walaupun 3 kuasa besar serantau yang menyerlah sahaja dibincangkan dalam penulisan ini, tetapi tidak dinafikan akan potensi kemunculan kuasa-kuasa lain dalam jangkamasa panjang seperti Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Australia dan lain-lain lagi.

JEPUN

Jepun adalah gergasi dalam penguasaan ekonomi dunia yang menjadi sekutu rapat Amerika Syarikat dalam pertahanannya menghadapi ancaman Uni Soviet. Walaupun begitu, hubungan dua-hala mereka tegang sejak akhir-akhir ini kerana masalah imbangan dagangan ekonomi yang lebih menyebelahi kepada Jepun. Kebelakangan ini, Jepun telah mengambil tindakan yang lebih positif dalam pertahanannya sesuai dengan kemahuan Amerika Syarikat sendiri untuk sama-sama memkul bebanan pertahanannya yang selama ini ia kurang mengambil perhatian dan penglibatan dalam pertahanannya sendiri.

Berikut dari itu, Jepun telah menambahkan belanjawan pertahanannya melebihi 1% dari paras GNP (US \$28 bilion) pada setiap tahun sejak tahun 1987 yang dianggap ketiga terbanyak (selepas Amerika Syarikat dan Uni Soviet).¹³ Strategi pertahanan Jepun telah bertukar dari pertahanan daratnya kepada melindungi laluan laut sejauh 1,000 batu nautikal dari persisiran pantainya. Perkembangan ini telah menimbulkan kebimbangan terutama di kalangan negara-negara di Asia Tenggara yang masih menghantui semasa penaklukan Jepun dalam Peperangan Dunia II. Walaupun Jepun sebagai kuasa gergasi ekonomi dunia tetapi kekuatan tenteranya adalah terhad, hanya untuk pertahanan dirinya sahaja. Mengikut ulasan penganalisis, "... ini tidak bermakna penguasaan tenteranya dapat mempengaruhi keselamatan serantau, tetapi yang pasti ia tidak melebihi dari itu kerana ciri-ciri kebudayaan dalam dan kepercayaan bahawa peperangan bukan untuk tujuan politik sudah tentu akan menghindar penglibatan tentera Jepun".¹⁴

Kini Jepun sudahpun melibatkan tenteranya sebagai pasukan keamanan antarabangsa yang dianggap telah memecah tradisinya yang selama ini tidak lagi mahu terlibat dalam kegiatan ketenteraan

di luar negaranya selepas kalah dalam Perang Dunia Kedua. Mengikut seorang pengulas lagi, ‘... cabaran yang paling genting kepada Jepun ialah untuk membentuk peranan mengimbangkan kuasa yang wujud di Asia Pasifik... tetapi pada masa yang sama tidak akan muncul sebagai kuasa tentera yang terkuat.’¹⁵

Kalau dinilai dari sudut yang lain pula, Jepun berkemampuan untuk menjadi kuasa besar ketenteraan selari dengan penguasaan ekonominya. Jika diambil kira beberapa faktor, misalannya ia masih menganggap Russia menjadi ancaman selagi isu 4 kepulauannya belum selesai, pertelingkahan ekonomi dengan Amerika Syarikat masih memuncak dan Amerika Syarikat tidak lagi mampu untuk memain peranannya di Asia Pasifik akan memberi ruang dan dorongan kepada Jepun untuk bertindak lebih bebas dalam politik antarabangsa dan keselamatannya dengan kemunculannya sebagai sebuah negara berkuasa besar.

Jepun tetap menganggap kekuatan tenteranya amat perlu untuk melindungi ekonomi dan perdagangannya di rantau ini. Jika diambil kira di atas kemampuan ekonomi dan berteknologi tinggi, ia mampu menjadi kuasa tentera yang mencabar, malah ia boleh menjadi kuasa nuklear. Dengan adanya ancaman nuklear dari Korea Utara, berkemungkinan Jepun mencari sebab untuk mengeluarkan senjata nuklearnya sendiri untuk pertahanannya. Walaupun tentera lautnya tidak mempunyai bilangan kapal perang yang banyak tetapi ia mempunyai armada yang paling moden dan berkesan di rantau ini.

Faktor permodenan dan pembesaran tentera China membuat Jepun lebih berhati-hati dalam strategi menjaga keselamatannya walaupun ia mempunyai kepentingan dalam hubungan ekonomi dan perdagangan dengan China. Sebalik dari itu juga, China dikatakan bimbang dengan rancangan pembesaran tentera Jepun yang mempunyai kesan sejarah peperangan di antara kedua-dua buah negara tersebut. Amerika Syarikat setakat ini tetap dengan pendiriannya tidak akan memberarkan Jepun mengatasi kuasa tenteranya kerana takut ‘pisang berbuah dua kali’. Mengikut ulasan ahli diplomat Jepun, ‘...yang membimbangkan pada satu hari kelak Jepun terpaksa membuat pilihan... di antara Washington atau Beijing. ... Ini merupakan senario mimpi yang menakutkan... tetapi Tokyo lebih cenderung untuk menjadi orang tengah di antara kedua belah pihak.’¹⁶ Pucuk pimpinan Jepun

sentiasa memberi jaminan bahawa kekuatan tenteranya tidak sekali-kali akan mengancam keselamatan negara lain.

Pembesaran tentera Jepun boleh memberi pandangan positif dan negatif kepada negara-negara lain. Positif kerana ia mampu mengambil alih kuasa dari Amerika Syarikat untuk mengimbangkan kuasa bagi kestabilan serantau dan negatif kerana takut sejarah peperangan dengan Jepun berulang lagi. Peringatan dari Lee Kuan Yew boleh membimbangkan, ‘... berkemungkinan Jepun menjadi kuasa yang bebas selepas ke abad 20 ini boleh menggerunkan... kemungkinan ini boleh menjadi kenyataan jika diambil kira apa sahaja yang diceburinya pasti berjaya dengan mendapat nombor satu.’¹⁷ Negara-negara Asia Tenggara lebih senang dengan peranan politik Jepun yang lebih besar di rantau ini daripada bertambah operasi ketenteraannya.¹⁸

CHINA

Setelah tumbang Uni Soviet, China merupakan kuasa utama komunis di dunia yang masih setia mengamalkan fahaman Marx-Leninis yang menjadi kiblat kepada komunisme. China pernah menyokong dan memberi bantuan kepada pergerakan komunis di beberapa buah negara lain di Asia untuk mengembangkan pengaruhnya. Dahulunya pernah China menganggap Amerika Syarikat sebagai imperialis di Asia tetapi mengubah pendiriannya setelah Amerika Syarikat mengadakan hubungan persahabatan dan persefahaman dengannya pada awal tahun 1970an. Dalam hubungan China dengan Uni Soviet adalah lebih ketara dengan sikap pemuuhannya sejak tahun 1960an lagi. China menganggap Uni Soviet menggunakan Vietnam untuk mengelilingi dan mengancam keselamatannya berikutan penaklukan Kampuchea oleh Vietnam pada akhir tahun 1978. Ini menyebabkan ia bertindakbalas dengan menyerang sempadan Vietnam sebagai memberi ‘pengajaran dan amaran’.

Mengikut pemerhati, walaupun sikap bermusuhan tersebut telah reda berikutan pembaharuan persahabatan di antara mereka yang dibuat pada Mei 1989, dan kemudian dengan kejatuhan Uni Soviet itu sendiri, tetapi Russia masih wujud yang dianggap boleh menjadi ancaman kepadanya. Ini berasaskan kepada masalah di sempadan mereka yang masih belum selesai dan pengunduran tentera

masing-masing tidak dibuat sepenuhnya. Dengan perkembangan politik tersebut jelas menunjukkan China merupakan satu kuasa politik yang boleh memainkan peranan penting bagi kestabilan di rantau Asia Pasifik. Lee Kuan Yu pernah melahirkan kebimbangannya terhadap China yang memerlukan struktur keselamatan khusus bagi mengimbangi kekuatan tenteranya. Ini berdasarkan kuasa tentera China yang akan berkembang mengikut pertumbuhan ekonominya dalam tempoh 30 hingga 40 tahun yang akan datang. '*...Mustahil untuk kita berpura-pura bahawa China cuma sebuah negara. China adalah kuasa penting dalam sejarah.*'¹⁹

Tentera China merupakan salah satu angkatan tentera yang terbesar di dunia khususnya di rantau Asia dan mempunyai senjata nuklear sejak tahun 1964. Pemimpin-pemimpin China ingin menggunakan kekuatan tenteranya untuk pertahanan diri dan mengimbangkan kekuatannya dengan kuasa-kuasa besar yang lain di rantau tersebut. Kemampuan pengeluaran senjatanya bukan sahaja untuk kegunaan sendiri, malah untuk pasaran luar juga. Dalam rancangan permodenannya, jelas ia ingin menguatkan lagi ketenteraan dengan mempertingkatkan 'arsenal' persenjataan terutama bagi tentera lautnya dengan menggunakan teknologi yang diperolehi dari barat dan Amerika Syarikat sejak ia mengamalkan 'polisi pintu terbuka'. Tetapi bantuan dari Amerika terjejas berikutan dari peristiwa Tianenmen pada Jun 1989 yang dianggap tidak mengamalkan hak asasi manusia.

Sejak China mendapat persenjataan moden dari Russia dan juga lain-lain negara bekas wilayah Uni Soviet, ia dengan sendirinya dapat mempelajari dan memperolehi teknologi tinggi ketenteraan yang selama ini menjadi idamannya. Mengikut ulasan dari penerbit Jane's Defence Weekly percaya bahawa China mempunyai senjata untuk memperluaskan kuasa dan pengaruhnya, '*...lihat apa yang China beli, selain dari pesawat perang, mereka bermimat pada kelengkapan elektronik seperti radar dan sistem berpandu misil jarak jauh dan berusaha untuk memperolehi kapal pengangkut pesawat. ...Ini menunjukkan China bukan sahaja untuk menjaga keselamatan sempadan dan wilayahnya tetapi untuk memperluaskan pengaruhnya di Asia dan mungkin lebih jauh lagi dari itu. ... Walaupun setengah pemerhati menganggapnya sebagai tindakan biasa dalam memperbesarkan ketenteraannya.*'²⁰ Yang jelas terbukti, China memberi perhatian khusus dalam usaha mempertingkatkan kemampuan kuasa

tenteranya dalam 'Program 4 Permodenan China'. Yang menjadi tandatanya sekarang adakah ia ingin menjadi pengganti adi kuasa Uni Soviet bagi menyaingi Amerika Syarikat atau sekadar menjadi kuasa besar serantau sahaja yang sekarang ini sudahpun ternyata. Jaminan pemimpin-pemimpin China bahawa pembesaran tenteranya bukan ancaman harus berhati-hati kerana hasratnya untuk menjadi kuasa besar dari segi ketenteraan, ekonomi dan politik di rantau ini adalah jelas. '*If China memperkuatkan ketenteraannya sehingga menjadi kuasa terbesar di rantau ini terpaksa ada kuasa lain yang dapat mengimbangnya, kemungkinan besar ia boleh menggugat keamanan di rantau ini.*'²¹

Kekuatan Tentera Laut China sangat menyerlah yang merupakan salah satu yang terkuat di rantau ini dengan mempunyai banyak kapal perang dan kapal selam walaupun jenis lama tetapi setengah daripada kapal selamnya adalah bertenaga nuklear dan mampu melancar peluru berpandu balistik (SLBM). Ia juga dikatakan sedang berusaha untuk memperolehi kapal pengangkut pesawat (aircraft carrier). China juga mampu melancar serangan amfibi melalui pantai dengan kekuatan 30,000 tentera yang lengkap dengan persenjataan.²² Kemampuan tersebut mempunyai implikasi strategi keselamatan kepada negara-negara di Asia Tenggara yang masih menganggap China sebagai ancaman dalam jangka masa panjang. Kemampuan Tentera Laut China boleh memberi ancaman kepada negara-negara di kawasan Laut China Selatan yang dianggap di bawah penguasaannya. Perdana Menteri Malaysia, Dato' Sri Dr. Mahathir pernah melahir rasa kebimbangannya, '*... permodenan tentera China amat membimbangkan Malaysia jika dikaitkan dengan sejarah dan pengalaman lamanya.*'²³ China sendiri mengakui bahawa Asia Tenggara adalah 'kawasan belakangnya' (backyard) yang berhasrat untuk menguasainya. Ini terbukti dengan kenyataan Mao Zedong pada tahun 1965. '*Kita bersedia untuk memperolehi kembali Asia Tenggara kerana ia kaya dengan hasil galiannya ... bagi mendapatnya kembali tidak sia-sia usaha kita. Rantau ini boleh menguntungkan China dalam pembangunan industrinya di masa hadapan.*'²⁴

Konflik dan persengketaan dengan China boleh dikaitkan dengan tuntutan bertindih kepulauan Spratly dan Paracel yang menjadi rebutan beberapa buah negara serantau yang mana ia pernah bertempur dengan Vietnam. Walaupun China mengulangi untuk penyelesaian secara damai, tetapi

ia terus memperkuatkan kedudukan tentera dan meningkatkan rondaan lautnya serta membina lapangan terbang di kepulauan Spratly. Juga menjadi ancaman ialah sokongannya kepada pergerakan komunis bawah tanah yang menentang kerajaan yang sah untuk mengambil alih kuasa di negara-negara lain terutama di Asia. Begitu juga dengan isu-isu penyelesaian politik di Kampuchea serta dalam pertelingkahan di Semenanjung Korea kerana China dikatakan mempunyai pengaruh dan ada kepentingan sendiri.

Walaupun China dikatakan sebagai sebuah kuasa besar serantau, tetapi kemampuannya tidak dapat menandingi kekuatan Amerika Syarikat dan teknologi kelengkapan perangnya jauh ketinggalan kalau dibandingkan dengan negara-negara barat yang lebih maju. Namun begitu, senjata nuklearnya sudah cukup untuk menjadi ugutan atau cegah-lintang (deterrence) kepada kuasa-kuasa lain dalam sebarang konflik dengannya. Tentera Laut China hanya mampu beroperasi di sekitar kawasan serantau sahaja dan tidak mempunyai pangkalan luar dari China. Pangkalan strategik di bahagian Timur ialah Pulau Hainan yang mampu mengawal operasi di Laut China Selatan sahaja. Tetapi baru-baru ini China dikatakan membantu Burma membangun pangkalan tentera laut dan penempatan radar di kepulauan Haingyi dan Great Coco berhampiran dengan pangkalan strategik India di Pulau Andaman. Sekiranya China dapat menggunakan kemudahan di kepulauan tersebut tentu akan membimbangkan India kerana ia menjadi laluan dari Timur ke Lautan Hindi.²⁵

Sebelum itu China pernah menunjukkan kemampuan pelayaran armadanya di Lautan Hindi. China tetap memberi keutamaan untuk meningkatkan kemampuan kuasa tenteranya dalam rancangan permodenan China. Walaupun kekuatannya tidak dapat menandingi Amerika Syarikat dalam se abad dua ini, tetapi jika rancangan permodenan tenteranya berjaya, ia tetap akan memberi cabaran kepada kuasa-kuasa besar serantau yang lain dengan peningkatan kemampuannya. Oleh itu, China tetap dianggap sebagai kuasa terpenting untuk menentukan kestabilan dan keselamatan serantau.

INDIA

India dianggap sebagai kuasa serantau di Lautan Hindi yang terletak di bawah pengaruhnya. Ini sesuai dengan kepentingan strateginya yang banyak

bergantung kepada lautan tersebut dari pertalian ekonomi dan keselamatannya. India bimbang dengan penglibatan Tentera Laut Amerika Syarikat di Lautan Hindi yang mempunyai hubungan rapat dengan Pakistan. Ini terbukti dengan kejadian penempatan kapal induk pengangkut pesawat 'Enterprise' di teluk Bengal semasa perangsaan India-Pakistan dalam tahun 1971.²⁶ Amerika Syarikat juga mempunyai pangkalan strategik di Pulau Diego Garcia yang menyaingi kehadian Tentera Laut Uni Soviet pada ketika itu. India lebih condong kepada Uni Soviet dalam imbalan kuasanya. Kejatuhan Uni Soviet menyebabkan India bimbang kerana ia banyak bergantung kepada bekalan persenjataan dan sokongan moral dari Uni Soviet dalam krisisnya dengan negara lain. Ini menyebabkan India mengubah corak strateginya untuk berbaik-baik dengan Amerika Syarikat dan mengubah haluan ke barat.

Jika dibuat kajian di atas sebab-sebab pembesaran angkatan tentera India didapati ada kaitan dengan ancaman musuh tradisi ketatnya iaitu Pakistan dan China yang pernah berperang beberapa kali dengannya. Mengikut pemerhati, '...kebimbangan di atas peningkatan aktiviti Tentera Laut China di Lautan Hindi dan pembekalan senjata oleh Amerika Syarikat kepada Pakistan menjadi motivasi utama kepada pembesaran pesat Tentera Laut India'.²⁷ Bekas Perdana Menteri India, Indra Ghandi pernah berkata, 'Kita tahu di mana ancaman-ancaman itu datang pada masa yang lepas, oleh itu kita mesti bersedia untuk menghadapi sebarang kemungkinan'.²⁸ Oleh itu tidak mustahil bagi India memperbesar dan memodenkan angkatan bersenjatanya, khusus tentera laut dan udaranya. Di samping itu, ia juga mampu mengeluarkan persenjataannya sendiri dan berjaya menguji pelancaran peluru berpandu 'Agni' pada tahun 1989 yang merupakan era kemajuan pesat dalam teknologi nuklear India.²⁹ Ini semata-mata untuk menandingi China dan Pakistan.

Tentera Laut India mempunyai kekuatan yang boleh disegani termasuk 2 kapal pengangkut pesawat, 20 buah kapal selam yang mana pada satu ketika dahulu pernah memiliki dua buah kapal selam bertenaga nuklear yang dipinjam dari Uni Soviet dan kini sedang berusaha untuk membinanya sendiri. Dengan perlindungan udara yang cukup India dianggap mampu mengharungi lautan biru. Selain daripada mengawasi Lautan Hindi, India dikatakan berkemampuan untuk beroperasi di sebahagian kawasan Laut China Selatan dan Lautan

Pasifik Selatan dengan membangunkan kepulauan Nicobar dan Andaman sebagai pangkalan strateginya di sebelah timur. India berkemampuan mengawal Selat Melaka yang menjadi laluan penting dari Lautan Hindi ke Lautan China Selatan yang juga merupakan laluan utama timur-barat.

Boleh dikatakan, India kurang mempunyai kepentingan di Asia Pasifik, lagipun kedudukannya adalah di bahagian selatan kontinen Asia. India hanya sekadar ingin memperoleh kekuatannya di sebahagian Asia Pasifik kerana untuk menandingi kemampuan China yang pernah menunjukkan kekuatan 'flotilanya' di Lautan Hindi pada tahun 1987 yang dianggap sebagai ancaman serius kepada keselamatannya.³⁰ Sebarang konflik di antara India dan China, sudah pasti akan menjelaskan kawasan-kawasan operasi mereka termasuk Lautan Hindi, Laut China Selatan dan sebahagian dari Lautan Pasifik.

Dari segi strategi keselamatannya, India lebih berminat untuk menguasai Lautan Hindi yang terletak di bawah pengaruhnya yang jelas terbukti semasa penglibatan India di Maldives dan Sri Lanka. Sejak ada pertalian sejarah lagi terutama di Asia Tenggara dan sehingga sekarang, India masih tetap mempunyai kepentingan dalam perdagangan dan ekonomi di rantau Asia Pasifik walaupun tidak banyak penglibatannya. India masih lagi di tahap ekonomi yang tidak kukuh untuk menjadi sebuah kuasa besar sepenuhnya.

ULASAN

Setelah dilihat dari sifat-sifat dan ciri-ciri kemampuan kuasa ketenteraan dari negara berkuasa besar serantau, jelas menunjukkan mereka tidak dapat sama sekali menandingi keunggulan kuasa ketenteraan Amerika Syarikat walaupun mereka berpotensi untuk membangun. Mereka tetap memberi cabaran dengan adanya perlumbaan persenjataan dan bergiat untuk memoden dan memperkuatkan angkatan tentera masing-masing. '... Negara-negara kecil mererhati dengan penuh berwaspada, sama ada China, India atau Jepun yang dapat memain peranan sebagai polis serantau'.³¹

Jepun tetap akan menjadi sekutu pertahan Amerika Syarikat di Asia Pasifik walaupun terdapat pertelingkahan ekonomi di antara mereka. Ini berasaskan kepada tradisi dan keengganannya Jepun untuk terlibat dalam peperangan sejak tamat Perang Dunia Kedua. Setakat ini strategi

pertahanan Jepun selain daripada mempertahankan diri adalah untuk mengawal laluan laut sejauh 1,000 batu nautikal dan sebagai pengimbang kuasa bagi kestabilan keselamatan serantau. Di samping itu juga, terdapat perubahan kontroversi yang membenarkan tenteranya berkhidmat dengan pasukan keamanan antarabangsa perlu diberi perhatian kerana selama ini ia hanya terkongkong di dalaman sahaja. Pembesaran tenteranya adalah di atas kemahuan Amerika Syarikat sendiri untuk sama-sama memikul bebanan pertahanan di Asia Pasifik dan dengan itu, sudah tentu ia akan diawasinya supaya tidak melebihi batas lebih-lebih lagi dengan ketidaaan ancaman nyata dari Russia. Walaupun Amerika Syarikat tidak membenarkan Jepun mengatasi kekuatan kuasa tenteranya tetapi ekonomi Jepun sudahpun mengatasinya dan terus maju. Oleh sebab peranan politik, ekonomi dan keselamatan berkaitan rapat telah memberi bayangan kepada Jepun untuk bersedia memperbesarkan kuasa tenteranya bagi melindungi kepentingannya, jika ia beranggapan Amerika Syarikat tidak lagi dapat memain peranan untuk melindunginya.

India didapati kurang berminat untuk menguasai kawasan Asia Pasifik kerana ia memberi keutamaan untuk menjaga India di Asia Pasifik hanya boleh dikaitkan dengan persengketaannya dengan China di samping kepentingan penglibatan ekonominya. Konflik di antara kedua-dua kuasa tersebut boleh menular ke Asia Tenggara dan Pasifik Selatan. India akan lebih berhati-hati dalam imbalan kuasa serantau sejak kejatuhan Uni Soviet terutama bagi menghadapi musuh tradisinya iaitu Pakistan dan China.

Yang menjadi faktor keimbangan utama ialah China yang dianggap oleh kebanyakan negara-negara di Asia Tenggara sebagai ancaman dalam jangkamasa panjang yang dikatakan berhasrat untuk menguasai Asia Tenggara dan Laut China Selatan serta menjadi kuasa dominan Asia. Ini juga ada kaitannya dengan masalah tuntutan bertindih ke atas kepulauan di Laut China Selatan dan pertelingkahan politik di Kampuchea dan Korea yang mana China masih mempunyai peranan dan pengaruh. Ideologi komunismenya boleh menjadi ancaman kalau dikaitkan dengan pengalaman yang lepas dan peranannya sebagai kuasa gergasi komunis dunia. Kemampuan China mengharungi lautan biru amat membimbangkan, khususnya kepada kuasa besar lain dan juga negara-negara

kecil serantau yang menganggap China berpotensi menjadi musuh mereka. Ini lebih membimbangkan lagi dengan kejayaan rancangan permodenannya di abad akan datang. China tetap dianggap sebagai kuasa penting di rantau ini dan peranannya untuk kestabilan dan keselamatan serantau tidak dinafikan. Walaupun China tidak berkemampuan untuk menandingi adi kuasa Amerika Syarikat di Asia Pasifik tetapi ia tetap boleh memberi cabaran hebat terutama dengan kemampuan senjata nuklearnya jika berlaku sebarang konflik dagangnya. Malah dengan pertumbuhan ekonomi China yang pesat dan perkembangan ketenteraannya di masa hadapan tetap akan memberi cabaran kepada kuasa-kuasa besar yang lain termasuk Amerika Syarikat sendiri.

PENUTUP

Dalam kajian ini jelas menunjukkan masih belum wujud teori kekosongan kuasa dalam keselamatan sepenuhnya di Asia Pasifik. Amerika Syarikat selaku adi kuasa tunggal dunia akan terus memain peranannya kerana ia masih ada kepentingan dan tanggungjawab dalam keselamatan di rantau ini, walaupun ia terpaksa mengurangkan kekuatan ketenteraannya. Dalam konteks ini juga, Russia tetap ada kepentingannya di Asia Pasifik dan masih berkemampuan di bidang ketenteraan yang boleh dianggap sebagai sebuah negara berkuasa besar. Hubungan dua-hala Amerika Syarikat-Russia adalah ke arah bekerjasama untuk kestabilan dunia dan serantau yang boleh mengurangkan ketegangan politik dan keselamatan di Asia Pasifik. Corak politik Russia selanjutnya masih belum mendapat kepastian yang banyak bergantung kepada perkembangan ekonomi dan keadaan politiknya.

Kemunculan 3 kuasa besar serantau iaitu China, Jepun dan India akan menjadi faktor kepada

imbangan kuasa di Asia Pasifik sesuai dengan kuasa 'multipolar' yang wujud di rantau tersebut. Perimbangan kuasa ini tetap menjadi persoalan sama ada boleh menstabil atau menjelaskan keselamatan serantau. Ini bergantung ke arah mana yang dituju yang sukar diramalkan kerana keadaan keselamatan di Asia Pasifik masih tergugat dan tidak menentu dengan pelbagai masalah serta tiada persefahaman di kalangan negara-negara di rantau tersebut. Apa yang pasti kesemua mereka sedang bergiat untuk mengukuhkan ekonomi di samping memperkuatkan ketenteraan masing-masing. Walaupun sekarang wujud kestabilan dan perdamaian tetapi ia juga merupakan masa untuk persiapan menghadapi sebarang kemungkinan yang sukar diramalkan dan apa-apa sahaja boleh berlaku dalam masa yang singkat sahaja. Ini berasaskan terdapatnya perlumbaan persenjataan terutama di kalangan negara-negara serantau sama ada negara berkuasa besar yang baru muncul atau negara kecil itu sendiri. Ini sekaligus menimbulkan kecurigaan di antara satu sama lain di samping mencari jalan ke arah perdamaian. Hanya negara kriminal sahaja yang akan menggunakan kekerasan dalam penyelesaian masalahnya. Keadaan ini tidak menentu, hanya masa sahaja yang akan mencorakkan keadaan selanjutnya. Tetapi apa yang jelas, kehadiran Amerika Syarikat di rantau ini akan lebih menjamin keselamatan serantau Asia Pasifik dari segi politik dan ketenteraannya untuk memain peranan sebagai pengimbang kuasa... dalam erti kata menghalang kuasa-kuasa besar lainnya daripada membawa pengaruh yang lebih besar atau memperbesarkan kekuatan tenteranya di rantau ini sehingga boleh melahirkan satu keadaan perlumbaan persenjataan, menimbulkan syak-wasangka dan yang lebih membimbangkan ialah apabila tercetusnya persengketaan dan konflik.

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Lt Kol Nik Mohd Zaaba telah dinauliahkan dalam Rejimen Askar Melayu DiRaja pada tahun 1969 dan memegang beberapa jawatan medan dan staf di peringkat batalion, formasi Briged/Divisyen dan Kementah. Selain daripada menjalani kursus-kursus kerjaya tempatan, beliau juga berpeluang berkursus di Fort Benning, Amerika Syarikat (1978) dan di Land Warfare School Cannungra, Australia (1987). Beliau yang berkelulusan MTAT dan MPAT, kini sedang mengikuti program Pengajian Sarjana (Strategi dan Keselamatan) di UKM.