


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JURNAL TENTERA DARAT MALAYSIA
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
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
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How To Promote Preventive Maintenance In The Malaysian Army

Lt Kol Safii bin Mohammad



INTRODUCTION

Maintenance plays a vital part in ensuring the Army equipment is serviceable and fit for operational use at all time. At present, individual units play a major role to achieve maximum operational availability through regular servicing, inspections and immediate first aid. Although this is more of servicing in nature, but in actual fact preventive maintenance is being practiced. Over the past years, EME is beset with numerous problems in carrying out its maintenance functions in view of financial constraints, setbacks in the provisioning system and bureaucratic procedures. As a result of this, our

maintenance system is more geared towards corrective maintenance. In view of these shortcomings, it is felt that EME maintenance system should be reviewed for the future.

AIM

This article is an appraisal of how to promote preventive maintenance in the Malaysian Army.

MAINTENANCE CONCEPT AND OBJECTIVE

Concept

There are a number of possible repair policies. A repair policy specifies the anticipated extent to which repair of an equipment item will be accomplished. One or more repair policies may be stated as part of the initial maintenance concept. Each policy is evaluated in terms of impact on equipment design and logistic support, criteria are established and equipment design progresses within the bounds of the repair policy selected.

The maintenance concept must be developed as time progresses. When developing the maintenance concept, one must analyse the equipment operational requirement and identify repair policies that will support the requirement. It is quite possible that there will be as many policy variations as one can imagine. The intent is to narrow the field down to one or two logical

approaches.

Development of the maintenance concept is one of the most important steps in the system life cycle. Concept development must be relatively complete to ensure that all significant alternative repair policies are adequately considered.

Maintenance concept serves the following purposes:

- * It provides a basis for detailing the maintenance plan and impact upon the supply concept, training concept, supplier/consumer service, interim contractor support, phased logistic support, transportation and handling criteria, production data needs.

Objective

The objectives of the maintenance concept are:

- * To optimise usage/operational availability.
- * Reduce life cycle cost/cost effectiveness.
- * Reliability and maintainability.
- * Minimise failure rate.
- * Maintain a specified range of equipment in fully operational condition.
- * Restore any failed equipment to an operational state as quickly as possible, thus minimising downtime.
- * Maximise the economic life of equipment within his charge.
- * Optimise maintenance effort and cost in achieving the above objective.

Types Of Maintenance

Maintenance include all actions for retaining a system or product or restoring it to, a serviceable condition. Maintenance may be categorised, corrective, preventive and conditioning maintenance:

Corrective Maintenance.

Includes all unscheduled maintenance as a result of system or equipment failure and to restore the system or equipment to a specified condition. The corrective maintenance cycle includes:

- failure identification.
- localization and isolation.
- disassembly.
- item removal and replacement or repair in place.
- reassembly.
- checkout and condition verification.

Preventive Maintenance.

Includes all schedule maintenance action, to retain a system or equipment in specified condition. This includes:

- periodic inspection.
- condition monitoring.
- critical item replacement.
- calibration.

Conditioning Maintenance.

Includes all predicted maintenance action based on the deteriorating performance over a sufficient period of time. The monitoring procedures include:

- vibration monitoring.
- wear debris monitoring.
- temperature measurement.
- pressure and flow rate test.

PRESENT MAINTENANCE SUPPORT SYSTEM

EME Support. The task of EME providing for the effective and efficient maintenance support of Army equipment is by no means an easy task. It must be able to prevent breakdown or if breakdown occurs, to service in the quickest and cheapest manner. EME Corps has to strike a happy balance and its present maintenance system based on line repair is felt to be a happy compromise. The system divides maintenance into different categories of first, second, third and fourth line starting from the very simple maintenance performed at the user level. As the complexity of the maintenance increases, the task will be allocated to a higher category. In this way the corps can exercise control over maintenance operations by designating certain jobs to be done at certain level, allocating the necessary parts, tools and skill required for the job. The lines of repair adopted by EME at present are:

* **First Line.** This is performed in the units owning the vehicle. The EME role is to carry out minor repairs by adjustments and replacement of minor components and sub-assemblies which are made available through the FAMTO stores. The maintenance operation carried out is limited to preventive maintenance, such as cleaning, lubricating, and routine technical inspections. Those job is performed by equipment operator and the attached EME tradesmen.

* **Second Line.** This is provided by the EME Brigade Workshops. The repair is restricted to the exchange of major assemblies and heavy ancillary work that is beyond the capabilities of the EME attached tradesmen and LADs. The emphasis on the

exchange of major assemblies is designed to reduce down time on a minimum. Vehicles can be returned to the user as quickly as possible while the major assemblies are backloaded for Divisional Workshop repair.

* **Third Line.** This covers the overhaul and rebuild of equipment and major component and assemblies. The repaired equipment or components are then returned to stock for subsequent issue to Workshop through Ordance channel.

* **Fourth Line/Base Maintenance.** This covers the strip and rebuild of equipment. It is carried out by the Central Workshop through programmed repair.

It is essential therefore that for the maintenance system to be effective, each line of repair must be operated as designed. A failure in any line will produce an overspill into the next higher category. This in turn will not be able to cope to supplement the lower category in provision of the required capital equipment, assemblies, and components.

THE IMPACT OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM

The impact of the present system cannot be measured directly because most of them are intangibles. The best way to appraise the impact of the present maintenance system is to appraise the serviceability state of the equipment and vehicles of the Army. A standard has been set by the Army that all equipment/vehicles should be 80% serviceable at all time. With the present maintenance system, most of the units achieved more than 80% serviceability. Others which fail are due to factors that are beyond their control.

Status Quo. The impact of the present maintenance system is positive due to the system being incorporated from the British which is easy to understand and execute. The system is smoothly implemented and improved by the EME Corps.

The other factors that may contribute to negative impact of the present maintenance system are non-availability of spares and ungenuine spares, lack of maintenance facilities, inexperienced technical personnel. These are organisational problems where it can be resolved on short term and long term basis.

REMEDIAL APPROACH

The remedial approach that is adopted must consider factors that encompasses the maintenance system which will dictate maintenance support level, repair policies and effective measures (maintenance time constraint) and this is a principal factor in determining logistic support requirements. Here we are considering the maintenance system that are being categorized as first, second, third and fourth line repairs. So the remedial approach should delineate with this line system.

Within the constraints of maintenance system there are a number of possible repair policies. A repair policy will specify the anticipated extent to which repair an equipment/vehicles will be accomplished. One of more policies may be stated as part of the initial maintenance system. Each policy is evaluated in terms of impact on equipment design and logistic support. The repair policy may dictate that an item should be non-repairable, partially repairable or fully repairable.

Another factor for remedial approach is maintenance by equipment types. The Army has categorized equipment into 4 main types, vehicles (A & B), weapon system, electronic equipment and

miscellaneous equipments (categories A & B). In this case maintenance concept and system are designed to suit this major categories. It is felt that this consideration is more appropriate because each category is being considered by its critical requirements.

Options. For remedial action, there are 3 options to be considered :

- * Continue with the present system (Corrective Maintenance).
- * Selective Preventive Maintenance - Critical Equipment.
- * Total Preventive Maintenance.

Continue The Present Maintenance System. As we have discussed earlier, the present Maintenance System is giving a positive impact, so it cannot be totally discarded. What we are doing now is corrective maintenance and a few functions of preventive maintenance. If this is to be continued, it should be improved by considering the factors that are being discussed earlier which include the following:

- * Maintenance system that dictates support level, repair policies and effective measures (maintenance time constraint).
- * Repair policies that dictate nonrepairable, partially repairable and fully repairable items.
- * Maintenance by equipment types.

Selective Preventive Maintenance. For this option preventive maintenance is imposed on certain critical equipment that is of tactical and

operational importance such as a A vehicle, weapon systems, operational B vehicles etc. These equipments are vital for the Army in carrying out their roles and functions and its serviceability should be high and this can be achieved by adopting preventive maintenance. Furthermore, in the average by adopting preventive maintenance. It should be tailored to fit the same functions of different items of equipment rather than applied in the samemanner to all equipment.

Total Preventive Maintenance. It will be costly to adopt this options on all Army equipment although it has been recognised that preventive maintenance helps in the reduction of maintenance costs and improvement of equipment reliability. In practice it takes many forms. Two major factors that should control the extent of preventive maintenance are firstly, the cost of the program compared with the carefully measured reduction in total maintenance costs and improved equipment performance and secondly the percent utilisation of the equipment maintained.

ANTICIPATED PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE

For EME, it is not an easy task to provide an effective and efficient maintenance support for the Army equipment. In carrying out her task, the EME has faced many problems which is within and beyond her control. The problems faced within her control may take a long time to be rectified and those beyond her control, the solution is never in sight. Some of the problems faced by the present maintenance system are being mentioned below.

- * Limited Financial Allocation.
- * Provisioning Problems - Spare.
- * Skill.

- * Facilities.
- * Repair Standard.
- * Army Vehicle Fleet.
- * Equipment Procurement Policy.

ANALYSIS

Currently the main bulk of the present system is corrective maintenance and most of the preventive maintenance done are servicing in nature. EME Corps also sometimes carry out the preventive maintenance but on opportunity basis whereby it is carried out when the equipments/ vehicles send to workshops for corrective maintenance. We have discussed earlier that in order to provide service for the Army we have 3 main options, ie corrective maintenance, selective preventive maintenance and total preventive maintenance on selective basis. Preventive maintenance will be appropriate only on operational vital equipment/vehicles. If need be it can be extended to critical components of high value on other common user equipment/vehicles.

HOW TO PROMOTE PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE

In order to promote preventive maintenance, it is essential that the following measures be taken:

- * Create Awareness.
- * Availability of Facilities.
- * Training.
- * Provision of Spares.

- * CIV Inspection.
- * Enough Equipment/Vehicle Pool.
- * Incentive.
- * Availability of Standard.
- * Attitude of Tradesman.
- * Commitment To Preventive Maintenance.
- * To Educate EME Personnel.
- * Operation Estimate Forecast.
- * Adequate Budget.
- * Repair Pool.
- * Enforcement of Policy.
- * CIV Report.
- * Equipment Maintenance Schedule.

HOW TO IMPLEMENT PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE

It is evident that to implement Preventive Maintenance is quite impossible because of the many constraints that is being discussed in the preceding discussions. Considering the present situation of the Army, the best option is to start the implementation of preventive maintenance based on equipment criteria that is of vital operational requirement. In other words, it is desirable to start now implementing selective preventive maintenance which is discussed below.

For the purpose of improvement of the present maintenance system, we have discussed the problem of present maintenance system and how to promote preventive maintenance in the Army. In order to implement the selective preventive maintenance system, the following factors must be considered:

- * Equipment Policy Statement.
- * Repair Policy.
- * Role of Formation Commanders, CO and OC Units.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE

The responsibility of preventive maintenance does not lie on the EME shoulder only. It is the responsibility of every body right from Chief of Army down to the users in the units. Everybody must play their part. Awareness and commitment from the top and strict enforcement from the middle management by ensuring total compliance of policies and instructions of preventive maintenance by the users and the repairer is essential. The responsibility of preventive maintenance lies on various levels of command below:

- * MINDEF & MPL TD Level.
- * Command / Formation Level.
- * Users.
- * The Repairer.

IMPLICATION

There are numerous implications if preventive maintenance is to be adopted. The implications involved are either short or long term

and some require time to be rectified. The major implications that may arise if we decide to adopt selective preventive maintenance are as follows:

* **Time Factor.** Preventive maintenance cannot be implemented right away. It takes time in order for the groundwork to be ready. Factors such as financial allocation, provisioning of spares, skill of tradesman, facilities available, repair standard, repair pool must be rectified and make available before preventive maintenance can be implemented.

* **Centralised Preventive Maintenance.** In order for the preventive maintenance to be effective, it must be centralised. The requirement is difficult to be met due to equipment/vehicles distribution on all over the country and there should be enough pool for units equipment/vehicles in order not to affect units operational activities.

* **Financial.** Initial adoption of preventive maintenance will incur a large sum of allocations. This allocation is needed to prepare for the requirement of preventive maintenance facilities and spares that is being discussed earlier. Without enough allocation we have to be happy with what we are doing now.

* **Difficult Justification.** Justification may be difficult if we want to adopt preventive maintenance. Firstly preventive maintenance requires large capital for its infrastructure and top management must be convinced of the positive contribution of preventive maintenance towards the serviceability of Army's equipment/vehicles. Secondly for those who are not exposed to preventive

maintenance may have the misconception that preventive maintenance is wasteful. This is especially so in view of parts being replaced before it fails based on time or running hours. These two factors are difficult to justify because of limited funds and scarce resources.

CONCLUSION

Although preventive maintenance is widely used especially in industries and critical services such as the Air Force and Navy whereby failure in the equipment/system could mean loss of life, assets or profitability. The Army on the other hand has to strike a balance between the operational requirement and the constraints of limited funds and scarce resources. The maintenance system must tailor to the Army Doctrine and Concept of Operations. It is felt that as a starting point selective preventive maintenance be adopted especially on operational vital equipments and components.

In promoting preventive maintenance, total commitment at all level of command and users are essential. Before preventive maintenance can be effectively implemented it is vital that the shortcomings in the present system be resolved and the necessary infrastructure be made available in order for the concept of preventive maintenance to be practical and effective in achieving its objectives.

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
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*Tactics are the servant of strategy;
the overall goal and guidelines are set by strategy.*

Edward de Bono (In his book 'Tactics')



MARKAS ARTILERI DIVISYEN APA DIA TU?

Oleh

Brig Jen Mohd Aris bin Salim

PENDAHULUAN

Markas Artileri Divisyen (Mk Arti Div), telah diwujudkan dengan rasminya pada 01 Dis 94. Sebelum ini Mk Arti Div berfungsi menggunakan satu perjawatan 'ad hoc' yang diluluskan oleh Departmen Tentera Darat sejak 01 Mac 90. Penubuhan Mk Arti Div bukan hanya mencatatkan satu sejarah di dalam Tentera Darat Malaysia (TDM) malah ia juga sehaluan ke arah mengimbangkan kekuatan tempur TDM menjelang tahun 2000. Sebagai satu organisasi baru, yang tidak pernah wujud di dalam TDM, doktrin semasa kita tidak banyak memperbincangkan perihai-perihai berkaitan dengan Mk Arti Div. Kekurangan maklumat ini menimbulkan banyak persoalan di kalangan wira-wira TDM ke atas peranan, tanggungjawab dan cara-cara Mk Arti Div berfungsi di medan pertempuran.

Di dalam rencana pendek ini penulis akan memberi sedikit gambaran berkaitan dengan fungsi, tanggungjawab, organisasi dan kaedah aturgerak Mk Arti Div dengan harapan bahawa rencana ini akan membawa kepada satu respon yang dinamik dan positif dari kalangan pembaca-pembaca yang boleh membawa kepada kemantapan doktrin TDM, khususnya doktrin artileri.

MENGAPA PERLU DIWUJUDKAN MK ARTI DIV?

Meriam, dan peralatan yang berkaitan dengan fungsinya, adalah satu kategori peralatan yang sungguh mahal. Dari segi sifat-sifat operasi pula, meriam adalah satu jenis peralatan yang berpengaruh kerana kemampuannya untuk menembak dengan

berkesan ke jarak yang jauh. Besar atau kecilnya kawasan pengaruh seseorang Panglima Divisyen itu bergantung kepada kemampuan tembakan meriam-meriam yang diletakan di bawah perintahnya. Meriam meriam, jika digunakan dengan cekap boleh menentukan kejayaan satu-satu operasi itu. Tembakan meriam tidak terhalang oleh cuaca ataupun kegelapan. Oleh sebab meriam-meriam adalah peralatan yang mahal maka bilangan unit-unit artileri adalah terhad. Oleh sebab kedua-dua faktor ini, iaitu kekurangan bilangan unit-unit artileri dan pengaruh artileri di medan pertempuran, maka doktrin kita telah menetapkan bahawa pemerintahan dan kawalan artileri mesti dipusatkan. Dengan cara ini sumber-sumber artileri dapat diperuntukkan dengan berkesan mengikut keutamaan keperluan.

Ilmu artileri adalah satu bidang ilmu yang khusus. Untuk artileri digunakan dengan berkesan, pemerintahan dan pengawalan artileri mestilah dikendalikan oleh mereka yang ahli di dalam ilmu artileri. Di sinilah di mana Mk Arti Div memainkan peranannya. Mk Arti Div adalah markas pemerintahan dan kawalan artileri yang mengandungi pegawai-pegawai dan lain lain pangkat yang pakar di dalam semua aspek artileri. Setelah menerima arahan gerakan daripada Panglima Divisyen, pegawai-pegawai di Mk Arti Div akan menterjemahkan kehendak Panglima Divisyen itu kepada satu perintah gerakan dan kawalan menggunakan bahasa dan prosidur artileri. Selepas perintah gerakan dan kawalan ini dikeluarkan, pegawai-pegawai ini pula akan mengatur rancangan untuk mengatasi masalah-masalah taktikal, teknikal dan lojistik khusus kepada unit-unit artileri, untuk menentukan unit-unit artileri di bawah perintah dapat

beroperasi dengan berkesan.

APA DIA ITU MARKAS ARTILERI BRIGED (MK ARTI BGD)?

Di dalam doktrin negara-negara asing kita akan terdapat organisasi artileri seperti Artileri Briged (Arti Bgd) dan juga Artileri Divisyen (Arti Div). Untuk menjauhi daripada kekeliruan, rencana ini akan menerangkan perbezaan di antara kedua-dua organisasi ini. Mengikut doktrin kita semua artileri yang organik kepada markas divisyen itu dikenali sebagai Arti Div dan artileri ini diletakkan di bawah pemerintahan Mk Arti Div. Pada kebiasaannya jenis dan bilangan unit artileri yang diletakkan di bawah Mk Arti Div adalah tetap. *Unit-unit artileri yang tidak organik kepada divisyen dikumpulkan ke dalam satu organisasi yang dikenali sebagai Arti Bgd. Unit-unit ini diletakkan di bawah pemerintah Mk Arti Bgd* dan jenis dan bilangan unitnya tidak ditetapkan. Ada juga negara yang menggunakan istilah Arti Bgd bagi kedua-dua organisasi dan pengenalan dibuat dengan menggunakan perkataan "Div" ataupun "Bebas" selepas perkataan Arti Bgd, seperti Mk Arti Bgd Div ataupun Mk Arti Bgd Bebas. Mk Arti Bgd biasanya diletakkan di bawah pemerintahan markas atasan, jika di Malaysia ini, di bawah pemerintahan Markas Pemerintahan Medan (MPM).

FUNGSI DAN TANGGUNGJAWAB

Peranan artileri pada amnya ialah untuk mewujudkan keagungan tembakan di medan pertempuran pada setiap masa. Di peringkat divisyen artileri adalah senjata bantuan induk yang ada di dalam pegangan Panglima Divisyen. Keagungan tembakan akan hanya tercapai apabila tembakan artileri dan senjata-senjata bantuan yang lain dapat dirancang dan dikoodinasikan untuk menghasilkan satu tembakan yang bersepadu, berkesan dan tepat pada masa dan sasaran. Doktrin semasa kita menyatakan bahawa perancangan tembakan dan koodinasi bantuan tembakan adalah fungsi utama bagi sebuah Mk Arti Div. Perancangan tembakan dan koodinasi bantuan tembakan ini meliputi perkara-

perkara seperti berikut:

- * Memperuntukkan persenjataan kepada sasaran.
- * Mengkoodinasikan tembakan dengan formasi-formasi jiran.
- * Menyediakan permohonan untuk bantuan serangan udara.
- * Menapis permohonan untuk bantuan serangan udara.
- * Memperuntukkan kawalan bantuan serangan udara rapat kepada Pengawal Udara Hadapan.
- * Mengeluarkan amaran kepada unit unit berkaitan dengan bantuan serangan udara rapat yang akan dilaksanakan di kawasan-kawasan unit sahabat.
- * Mengkoodinasikan tembakan artileri ke atas meriam-meriam pertahanan udara musuh.
- * Mengkoodinasikan tindakan kawalan keselamatan untuk mengelakan pesawat udara sahabat ditembak oleh unit-unit sendiri.

Di dalam keadaan pertempuran Mk Arti Div ini boleh juga di gunakan sebagai markas alternatif bagi markas artileri atasan ataupun Mk Div di mana Mk Arti Div itu diletakkan. Di Mk Arti Div inilah di mana Komander Artileri Divisyen (KAD) menjalankan tanggungjawabnya, dibantu oleh staf-staf yang terlatih di dalam gerakan, perisikan dan logistik artileri. Tugas KAD adalah seperti berikut:

- * Memberi nasihat kepada Panglima Divisyen ke atas semua perkara berkaitan dengan artileri medan, pengesanan dan pertahanan udara. Nasihat yang diberi oleh KAD ini meliputi perkara-perkara berkaitan dengan keselamatan tembakan, keberkesanan tembakan, aturgerak artileri, perisikan artileri, pentadbiran dan logistik artileri.

* Memerintah semua aset-aset artileri yang telah diperuntukkan kepadanya.

* Mengikut doktrin semasa, aset-aset artileri yang diperuntukkan kepada divisyen ialah 3 x rejimen bantuan rapat, 1 x rejimen bantuan am, 1 x bateri artileri pengesan dan rejimen artileri pertahanan udara. Di dalam pertempuran aset-aset ini boleh bertambah dua kali ganda untuk memenuhi kehendak gerakan divisyen.

* KAD mempunyai kuasa untuk mengaturgerakan sumber-sumber artileri yang diperuntukkan kepadanya. Kuasa memerintah ini juga meliputi tanggungjawab untuk mentadbir semua unit-unit artileri. Di dalam keadaan tertentu kuasa ini boleh diperturunkan kepada komander-komander lain bagi maksud memperlicinkankan gerakan dan pentadbiran unit-unit artileri.

* Termaktub di dalam fungsi pemerintahan ialah tanggungjawab untuk mengawal tembakan dan mengawas semua aktiviti-aktiviti yang dijalankan oleh unit-unit artileri.

* Mengetuai Pusat Koodinasi Bantuan Tembakan yang biasanya diwujudkan di Mk Div. KAD bertanggungjawab untuk mengkoodinasikan semua keperluan bantuan tembakan dari semua jenis senjata bantuan yang diperuntukkan kepada satu-satu Mk Div itu. Di dalam melaksanakan tanggungjawab ini, KAD dibantu oleh komander-komander unit bantuan tembakan seperti Pegawai Bantuan Udara dan Pegawai Perhubungan bantuan Tembakan Tentera Laut.

Daripada apa yang telah diperkatakan, kita boleh membuat rumusan bahawa Mk Arti Div, selain daripada melaksanakan fungsi utamanya sebagai markas pemerintahan, juga melaksanakan fungsi-fungsi pengurusan artileri seperti perancangan, penyusunan, pengawalan, penyatuan dan pengarah.

STAF-STAF MARKAS ARTI DIV

Staf-staf Mk Arti Div dibahagikan kepada tiga kumpulan, iaitu, staf gerakan, staf perisikan, dan staf pentadbiran dan lojistik. Pada amnya fungsi staf-staf ini adalah seperti berikut:

* Membantu KAD di dalam tugas pemerintahan dan pengawalan gerakan unit-unit Mk Arti Div.

* Membantu markas-markas artileri bawahan di dalam pelaksanaan gerakan mereka.

* Berkerjasama dengan staf-staf Mk Div untuk menentukan sumber-sumber artileri yang ada dapat digunakan dengan sebaiknya.

Staf gerakan bertanggungjawab ke atas perkara-perkara perancangan, pelaksanaan dan pengawalan gerakan, komunikasi dan latihan. Staf perisikan pula bertanggungjawab untuk memberi gambaran perisikan ke atas mortar dan meriam-meriam musuh yang mempunyai kesan kepada gambaran perisikan keseluruhan, mendapatkan kedudukan dan aktiviti-aktiviti senjata-senjata musuh dan merakamkan maklumat-maklumat ini dan akhir sekali melaksanakan tembakan ke atas meriam-meriam musuh sejajar dengan rancangan gerakan artileri. Staf pentadbiran dan lojistik menumpukan tugas mereka kepada perkara-perkara berkaitan dengan personil dan lojistik yang bersifat artileri seperti gantian anggota artileri, peluru meriam dan penyelenggaraan peralatan meriam dan peralatan yang khusus kepada unit-unit artileri.

ORGANISASI MK ARTI DIV

Organisasi Mk Arti Div pada keseluruhannya tidak banyak berbeza dari organisasi yang terdapat di tentera-tentera asing. Mk Arti Div disusun untuk membolehkannya melaksanakan semua fungsi-fungsi pemerintahan dan kawalan. Cawangan-cawangan Mk Arti Div boleh dipecahkan kepada kumpulan-kumpulan kecil untuk menjalankan tugas-tugas tertentu yang dikehendaki oleh satu-satu keadaan itu. Mk Arti Div tidak mempunyai elemen-elemen Kem seperti terdapat di Mk Bgd Inf. Apabila diaturgerak, Mk Arti Div akan dibantu oleh Kem Mk Div.

GERAKAN ARTILERI

Di dalam kawasan tanggungjawab, Mk Arti Div akan mengendalikan beberapa gerakan artileri untuk membantu gerakan Mk Div. Gerakan artileri di dalam kawasan Mk Arti Div boleh dibahagikan kepada gerakan seperti berikut:

* *Tinjauan dan Penempatan Aset-Aset Artileri.* Di dalam gerakan ini kumpulan-kumpulan tinjauan dan aset-aset artileri seperti meriam, pemerhati dan alat kesan bunyi akan di aturgerakkan ke tempat-tempat yang telah dirancang oleh komander-komander artileri yang berkenaan. Aturgerak ini perlu diselarasakan dengan pergerakan unit-unit yang lain supaya bantuan artileri dapat diberi pada setiap masa. Kawalan rapi mesti dijalankan oleh staf-staf gerakan di Mk Arti Div untuk menentukan bahawa masalah-masalah yang timbul dapat di atasi dengan segera. Di dalam pelaksanaan aturgerak aset-aset Mk Arti Div ini, staf-staf Mk Div dan Mk Arti Div mesti peka kepada perkara-perkara berikut:

* *Masa.* Meriam-meriam memerlukan masa untuk aturgerak. Oleh yang demikian, rancangan gerakan unit yang dibantu mesti mengambil kira masa yang diperlukan untuk aset-aset artileri memasuki tempat-tempat mereka, masa untuk mengintegrasikan peralatan dan juga masa untuk melaras

sasaran.

* *Perlindungan Keselamatan.* Semasa aturgerak, unit-unit artileri akan bergerak di dalam kumpulan-kumpulan kecil. Elemen-elemen dari bateri pengesan akan bergerak jauh di hadapan untuk menjalankan kerja-kerja ukur dan penempatan alat-alat pengesan bunyi. Kumpulan-kumpulan pemerhati akan mencari tempat-tempat yang sesuai di mana mereka dapat membina pos-pos pemerhati. Kumpulan-kumpulan ini memerlukan perlindungan keselamatan semasa mereka menjalankan tugas.

* *Keutamaan Laluan.* Di dalam gerakan mobil, meriam-meriam akan banyak kali bergerak untuk menentukan yang mereka sentiasa dapat memberi bantuan kepada unit-unit tempur yang bergerak di hadapan. Jalan-jalan yang sesak akan melambatkan aturgerak meriam-meriam dan keadaan ini boleh menjejaskan pelaksanaan gerakan unit-unit yang dibantu. Oleh yang demikian, meriam-meriam mesti diberi keutamaan laluan.

* *Peruntukan Tempat-Tempat Meriam.* Semasa gerakan dirancang, kawasan-kawasan di mana meriam-meriam dijangka akan diaturgerakkan mesti dikhaskan dan tidak diduduki oleh unit-unit lain. Tempat-tempat meriam biasanya adalah sasaran utama bagi serangan artileri ataupun udara musuh. Oleh yang demikian artileri memerlukan kawasan aturgerak yang luas supaya meriam-meriam dapat bergerak dengan bebas ke tempat-tempat alternatif jika mereka diserang. Di dalam keadaan-keadaan tertentu, meriam-meriam perlu diberi keutamaan tempat supaya mereka dapat memberi perlindungan yang dikehendaki oleh Panglima Divisyen.

*** Menyediakan Prasarana Bantuan Tembakan**

* Bantuan tembakan yang berkesan memerlukan persediaan prasarana-prasarana seperti data-data ukur dan kajicuaca.

Kerja-kerja menyediakan data-data ukur memakan masa yang panjang dan data-data ukur ini perlu diberi kepada bateri-bateri meriam sebelum ataupun ketika mereka memasuki satu-satu tempat meriam itu. Gerakan untuk menyediakan data-data ukur dan kajicuaca ini adalah satu-satu gerakan artileri yang perlu dimulakan terlebih awal. Biasanya gerakan ini dimulakan selepas sahaja perintah amaran diterima dari Mk Div.

* Dalam keadaan-keadaan tertentu, tapak-tapak dan kubu-kubu meriam, alat-alat komunikasi dan himpunan peluru perlu disediakan terlebih awal. Dalam melaksanakan gerakan ini staf-staf Mk Arti Div perlu berkerja rapat dengan staf-staf Mk Div untuk menentukan bahawa apa-apa pindaan kepada rancangan gerakan divisyen disampaikan dengan segera kepada unit-unit supaya rancangan kerja dapat dipinda sejajar dengan kehendak gerakan semasa.

* **Mencari dan Mengesan Musuh.** Gerakan mencari dan mengesan musuh dijalankan oleh pemerhati-pemerhati artileri, alat radar, alat pengesan bunyi dan pesawat kawalan jauh. Tindakan yang diambil ke atas satu-satu kedudukan musuh itu tertakluk kepada kepentingannya kepada satu-satu gerakan itu. Kedudukan musuh yang ditaksirkan boleh mengancam gerakan akan dimusnahkan dengan segera. Semua maklumat-maklumat musuh akan dikumpulkan dan dikaji oleh sel perisikan Mk

Arti Div untuk tindakan tertentu.

* **Menembak Sasaran.** Menembak sasaran adalah gerakan utama yang dijalankan oleh unit-unit artileri. Sasaran ditembak untuk mencapai tujuan ataupun mendapatkan maklumat-maklumat tertentu seperti berikut :

* Sebagai tanda rujukan ataupun panduan.

* Mendapatkan data-data ukur dan kajicuaca di dalam keadaan di mana bateri pengesan tidak dapat memberi maklumat.

* Melumpuh dan memusnahkan musuh samada di bumi ataupun di udara. Di dalam istilah artileri, pelumpuhan tercapai apabila musuh mengalami kecederaan sebanyak 10 sehingga 20 peratus dan pemusnahan apabila kecederaan melebihi 30 peratus. Tembakan ini termasuklah tembakan ke atas kedudukan meriam dan mortar musuh yang diaturgerak di dalam kawasan mereka.

* Memberi perlindungan kepada angkatan sahabat samada dengan tembakan asap ataupun letupan kuat.

* Menerangkan kawasan dengan tembakan peluru suaran.

* Menyebarkan propaganda. Peluru meriam boleh diubahsuai untuk diisi dengan surat-surat propaganda yang boleh digugurkan di atas kawasan sasaran.

* **Rondaan dan Pergerakan Lojistik.** Selain daripada aktiviti-aktiviti yang khusus kepada artileri, unit-unit Mk Arti Div juga menjalankan aktiviti-aktiviti semua perkhidmatan seperti rondaan keselamatan di kawasan-kawasan meriam, pergerakan

pentadbiran dan logistik. Semua pergerakan pentadbiran dan logistik akan dikoodinasikan dengan Mk Div supaya sumber-sumber pergerakan dan perlindungan keselamatan dapat diatur dengan baik.

Ada beberapa sifat gerakan artileri yang mesti difahami oleh staf-staf gerakan supaya bantuan gerakan seterusnya dapat dilaksanakan dengan baik. Elemen-elemen unit artileri seperti bateri, pemerhati, seksyen ukur dan sebagainya boleh berpindah ke beberapa kedudukan yang jauh dalam jangkamasa yang singkat. Malah mereka boleh di tugaskan dari satu kawasan brided ke satu kawasan brided yang lain dalam satu gerakan yang sama. Tembakan meriam pula melintasi bukan hanya kawasan brided tetapi juga kawasan divisyen yang lain. Sifat gerakan artileri ini memerlukan koodinasi dan pengawasan yang rapi oleh staf-staf gerakan di Mk Bgd, Mk Arti Div dan Mk Div untuk menentukan gerakan artileri itu mencapai objektif-objektifnya dan keselamatan angkatan sahabat tidak terjejas.

PEMERINTAHAN DAN KAWALAN GERAKAN ARTILERI

Pemerintahan ialah kuasa yang diberi kepada seseorang individu bagi mengarah, mengkoodinasikan dan mengawal satu-satu kumpulan angkatan tentera itu. Di dalam gerakan divisyen, Panglima Divisyen bertanggungjawab untuk membuat rancangan taktikal, termasuk rancangan bantuan tembakan. KAD akan menasihati Panglima Divisyen di dalam semua perkara yang ada implikasi kepada bantuan tembakan. Setelah rancangan taktikal dipersetujui oleh Panglima Divisyen, KAD seterusnya akan menterjemahkan keperluan bantuan tembakan Panglima Divisyen itu kepada prosidur dan bahasa artileri. Seterusnya KAD akan mengeluarkan perintah aturgerak sumber-sumber artileri dan pelaksanaan rancangan bantuan tembakan. Di peringkat unit semua perintah gerakan dan pelaksanaan rancangan bantuan tembakan dikeluarkan oleh Pegawai Memerintah. Markas Taktikal (Mk Tak) Mk Arti Div ataupun rejimen adalah organisasi dari mana semua perintah-perintah gerakan dikeluarkan.

Pengawasan meliputi semua aktiviti-aktiviti pengawasan dan pengesanan pelaksanaan rancangan gerakan untuk menentukan yang semua aktiviti-aktiviti gerakan yang telah dirancang berjalan dengan lancar ke arah misi gerakan. Termaktub di dalam pengawasan ialah pengambilan tindakan untuk membetulkan penyelewengan jika berlaku. Walaupun sebahagian besar fungsi pengawasan ini dilakukan oleh pegawai-pegawai staf gerakan dan logistik di pos-pos rintah Mk Arti Div dan rejimen, pegawai-pegawai artileri yang terlibat dengan satu-satu gerakan itu perlu juga melaksanakan fungsi pengawasan gerakan ini. Pegawai-pegawai staf yang menjalankan tugas-tugas pengawasan mempunyai kuasa untuk mengambil tindakan bagi membetulkan penyelewengan selagi tindakan itu tidak terkeluar daripada rancangan awal yang diperintahkan oleh KAD. Pengawasan yang berkesan memerlukan adanya perkara-perkara berikut:

* Satu perintah gerakan yang lengkap dan jelas membentangkan objektif-objektif yang perlu dicapai oleh semua unit-unit artileri. Perintah-perintah ini akan dijadikan piawaian bagi mengukur kemajuan dan kejayaan satu-satu gerakan itu. Perintah tembakan mestilah jelas memberi maklumat-maklumat berkaitan dengan sasaran yang hendak ditembak, bilangan peluru yang diperlukan, jangkamasa tembakan dan unit tembakan. Perintah-perintah gerakan dan tembakan yang tidak jelas boleh membahayakan angkatan sahabat.

* Kaedah yang cekap untuk mengukur pencapaian objektif gerakan. Sistem komunikasi dan cara laporan maklumat yang baik adalah amat penting bagi pegawai-pegawai staf yang mengetahui perjalanan satu-satu gerakan itu. Maklumat-maklumat yang lewat dan tidak mengandungi data-data terperinci akan menyukarkan kerja-kerja pegawai staf. Laporan-laporan dan penyataan-penyataan mesti dihantar oleh unit-unit mengikut bentuk dan masa yang telah ditetapkan di dalam prosidur tetap Mk Arti Div.

* **Markas-markas taktikal dan pos-pos rintih** mesti diatur supaya tindakan ataupun keputusan yang perlu dibuat untuk membetulkan satu-satu penyelewengan itu dapat diambil dengan segera. Pegawai-pegawai staf perlu tahu had-had tindakan ataupun keputusan yang boleh dibuat oleh mereka dan apakah perkara-perkara yang mesti dirujuk kepada KAD. Di dalam keadaan tertentu kuasa untuk membuat satu-satu keputusan boleh diperturunkan oleh KAD kepada pegawai-pegawai yang berpengalaman. Mereka yang dipertanggungjawabkan untuk membuat keputusan mesti sentiasa boleh dihubungi oleh pegawai-pegawai staf. Aset-aset penting untuk melaksanakan satu-satu tindakan itu perlu ada dan bersedia digerakan pada bila-bila masa.

Semasa melaksanakan tugas-tugas pengawalan, staf-staf di pos-pos rintih mesti peka kepada perkara-perkara berikut:

* **Masa Siap.** Pergerakan kumpulan-kumpulan meriam dan elemen-elemen artileri yang lain mesti diawasi untuk menentukan mereka tidak tergendala oleh apa-apa halangan yang boleh menyebabkan mereka tidak dapat bersiap-sedia untuk memberi bantuan pada masa yang telah ditetapkan di dalam perintah KAD.

* **Jadual Tembakan.** Apabila tembakan berjadual dijalankan, pegawai-pegawai pos rintih mesti faham dengan jelas kehendak jadual tembakan dan seterusnya mengikuti pelaksanaan jadual itu dengan teliti sehingga selesai.

* **Pergerakan Angkatan Sahabat.** Pergerakan angkatan sahabat, samada infantri ataupun pesawat udara, mesti sentiasa diketahui supaya tindakan yang selamat dapat diambil jika mereka termasuk ke dalam kawasan bahaya.

* **Stok Peluru.** Tanpa peluru yang mencukupi, meriam tidak berguna. Di dalam kesibukan menembak, stok-stok peluru di tempat-tempat meriam mesti sentiasa disemak dan tindakan ulang-bekal dimulakan apabila stok peluru jatuh di bawah jumlah yang diperintahkan.

* **Kecederaan Kepada Anggota Dan Peralatan Khas.** Anggota-anggota artileri mempunyai pengkhususan tertentu dan bilangan mereka di dalam sesebuah unit tidaklah ramai. Semua peralatan khas memerlukan rawatan yang tidak boleh diperolehi di woksyp medan. Oleh yang demikian penyata-penyata kecederaan mesti diteliti oleh pegawai-pegawai staf dan tentukan tindakan yang sewajarnya diambil ke atas kecederaan ini. Jika tidak, unit-unit akan kekurangan tenaga dan peralatan pada saat-saat yang genting.

SALURAN PEMERINTAHAN

Mk Arti Div diletakkan di bawah perintah Mk Div bagi aspek-aspek gerakan, disiplin dan pentadbiran tempatan. Bagi maksud kawalan teknikal, Mk Arti Div adalah di bawah Jabatananarah Artileri.

Bagi unit-unit Mk Arti Div, keadaan gerakan dan penempatan unit-unit akan menentukan beberapa aspek saluran pemerintahan. Di dalam keadaan aman seperti sekarang ini peraturan berikut boleh dipatuhi:

* **Gerakan dan Latihan.** Unit-unit diletakkan sepenuhnya di bawah perintah Mk Arti Div. Mk Arti Div mempunyai kepakaran dan staf untuk merancang dan seterusnya melaksanakan gerakan dan latihan ke atas unit-unitnya.

* **Perkara Personil.**

Mk Arti Div mempunyai staf yang mencukupi untuk mengendalikan banyak perkara personil. Walau bagaimanapun, oleh sebab ketiadaan beberapa staf-staf turus seperti pegawai-pegawai staf gaji, pelajaran, KAGAT dan perubatan, maka pegawai-pegawai staf berkenaan yang ada di Mk Bgd Inf di kawasan mana unit-unit artileri berada perlulah memberi nasihat dan teguran kepada unit-unit artileri itu. Dari segi saluran pemerintahan, unit-unit Mk Bgd Inf yang berdekatan bagi perkara-perkara personil berkaitan dengan pelajaran, agama, perubatan dan gaji.

* Bagi maksud disiplin, KAD ialah seorang berpangkat brigadier jeneral dan memerintah trup. Oleh yang demikian KAD boleh diberi kuasa Pihak Berkuasa Atasan seperti dibenarkan oleh AKTA Angkatan Tentera, Akta 101 dan 104. Dengan adanya kuasa ini unit-unit Mk Arti Div boleh diletakan di bawah pemerintahan disiplin Mk Arti Div. Peraturan ini adalah wajar kerana sebagai komander yang mempunyai kuasa untuk mengaturnegerikan unit KAD perlu mempunyai kuasa disiplin ke atas trup-trupnya.

* **Perkara Logistik.** Mk Arti Div tidak mempunyai unit-unit logistiknya sendiri. Bagi bekalan dan bantuan logistik, unit-unit Mk Arti Div perlu mendapat bantuan daripada unit-unit logistik yang berhampiran. Dari segi saluran pemerintahan unit-unit Mk Arti Div boleh diletakan di bawah pentadbiran tempatan bagi maksud bekalan dan nasihat logistik di bawah Mk Bgd Inf, ataupun mana-mana formasi yang

mempunyai unit-unit logistik, di mana unit-unit artileri itu ditempatkan. Biasanya peraturan ini adalah bagi bekalan dan peralatan gunasama. Bagi bekalan dan peralatan khusus, permohonan bantuan logistik perlulah disalurkan kepada Mk Arti Div untuk diproses seterusnya.

Di dalam keadaan berperang beberapa aspek saluran pemerintahannya perlu di pinda untuk memudahkan saluran gerakan dan pentadbiran.

* **Aturgerak Unit-Unit Artileri.** Setelah peruntukan artileri dipersetujui oleh Panglima Divisyen, kuasa memerintah untuk pergerakan meriam boleh diperturunkan daripada KAD kepada Panglima Bgd. Sebelum kuasa ini diperturunkan, KAD perlu menasihati Panglima Divisyen ke atas implikasi peraturan ini supaya Mk Bgd tidak dibebankan dengan tanggungjawab yang sukar untuk dilaksanakan. Di dalam fasa mara untuk bertempur, unit artileri yang diperuntukkan kepada Mk Bgd sebagai dalam bantuan langsung, biasanya diletakan di bawah perintah untuk bergerak bersama Mk Bgd tersebut. Dengan cara sedemikian, respon aturgerak artileri kepada keperluan briged akan lebih cepat dan berkesan.

* **Perkara Personil dan Logistik**

Semasa merancang saluran pemerintah unit-unit artileri, staf-staf gerakan mesti mengambil-kira sifat aturgerak unit-unit artileri. Di dalam medan perang, unit-unit artileri akan kerap kali bergerak melintasi sempadan-sempadan kawasan briged. Oleh sebab sedemikian, saluran pemerintahan bagi maksud pentadbiran dan logistik akan bertukar mengikut pergerakan unit-unit tersebut.

* Bagi perkara-perkara personil yang memerlukan tindakan segera seperti kecederaan dan kebumian, unit-unit perlu diletakkan dibawah pentadbiran tempatan Mk Bgd yang berhampiran. Ini untuk menentukan bahawa rawatan yang berkesan dapat diambil dan seterusnya dapat mengatasi masalah moral. Bagi perkara-perkara personil yang tidak memerlukan tindakan serta-merta, ia akan dikendalikan oleh staf-staf pentadbiran di MK Arti Div.

* Bagi perkara-perkara lojistik, unit-unit Mk Arti perlu bergantung kepada mana-mana unit lojistik yang berhampiran bagi keperluan peralatan dan bantuan alat gunasama seperti bekalan minyak, ransum, peluru senjata kecil dan pembaikan kepada kenderaan am. Bagi maksud bantuan lojistik ini, unit-unit Mk Arti Div perlu diletakkan di bawah pentadbiran lojistik tempatan markas formasi yang berhampiran. Bagi peralatan dan senggaraan kepada kenderaan penarik meriam, bekalan dan senggaraan kepada kenderaan penarik meriam, bekalan dan senggaraan perlu dikendalikan oleh unit-unit lojistik divisyen melalui staf-staf Mk Arti Div.

KAWASAN GERAKAN MK ARTI DIV

KAD Bertanggungjawab untuk mengkoodinasikan bantuan tembakan supaya tercapainya keagungan tembakan diseluruh kawasan Mk Div. Kawasan gerakan Mk Arti Div, bukan hanya meliputi keseluruhan kawasan tanggungjawab Mk Div, tetapi juga termasuk kawasan-kawasan di mana meriam-meriam musuh bertempat. Di dalam perancangan gerakan dan seterusnya peruntukan aset aset kepada

brigid-brigid, staf-staf gerakan mesti memberi pertimbangan yang sewajarnya kepada perkara-perkara berikut:

* **Komunikasi.** Mk Arti Div dan unit-unitnya mesti mempunyai kemudahan komunikasi jarak jauh yang cekap pada setiap masa. Stesen-stesen pemancar semula perlu diwujudkan bagi radio-radio VHF.

* **Pengangkutan.** Aturgerak cepat di dalam kawasan yang luas memerlukan sistem pengangkutan udara yang mencukupi. Pengangkutan udara diperlukan untuk pergerakan meriam-meriam, peluru-peluru, pemerhati-pemerhati udara dan tinjauan udara.

* **Kerjasama.** Unit-unit artileri boleh digerakan di dalam masa yang singkat daripada satu kawasan brigid ke satu yang lain. Di dalam keadaan terdesak, komander-komander unit yang diperintahkan untuk memberi bantuan tembakan mungkin tidak mempunyai masa yang cukup untuk tinjauan. Oleh yang demikian untuk mempercepatkan aturgerak meriam-meriam, brigid-brigid dan unit-unit mereka patut menolong unit-unit artileri dengan menyediakan maklumat-maklumat, dokumen-dokumen dan peralatan seperti berikut sebelum unit-unit itu tiba di kawasan brigid:

* Kawasan-kawasan yang sesuai untuk dijadikan tempat meriam dan pos pemerhati.

* Jalan-jalan yang selamat untuk pergerakan meriam.

* Peta-peta kawasan gerakan dan data-data ukur yang boleh didapati dari sumber-sumber tempatan.

* Jika meriam-meriam diaturgerakan dengan helikopter, sediakan kenderaan untuk menarik meriam dan membawa peluru-peluru dan peralatan tembakan.

* *Lojistik.* Kawasan gerakan yang luas memerlukan sistem bantuan lojistik yang cekap. Peluru artileri adalah satu komoditi yang sungguh berat dan susah untuk digerakan di dalam kawasan gerakan. Oleh yang demikian, staf-staf gerakan dan lojistik mesti mencari kaedah yang baik untuk membekalkan peluru-peluru kepada meriam-meriam tidak kira di mana mereka berada.

KONSEP BANTUAN ARTILERI

Konsep bantuan artileri termaktub di dalam konsep bantuan tembakan yang digubal oleh Mk Div. Pada keseluruhannya bantuan artileri dirancang berasaskan kepada keperluan-keperluan seperti berikut:

* Memberi perlindungan kepada angkatan sahabat dan melumpuh ataupun memusnahkan musuh-musuh dalam bertempur rapat.

* Melumpuh ataupun memusnahkan elemen-elemen bantuan musuh, samada bantuan kombatan ataupun lojistik supaya angkatan musuh di hadapan tidak mempunyai keupayaan untuk meneruskan gerakan.

Untuk memenuhi keperluan ini, bantuan artileri di dalam kawasan gerakan divisyen diatur seperti berikut:

* Briged-briged yang berhadapan dengan musuh di dalam pertempuran rapat akan diperuntukan unit-unit artileri untuk membolehkan panglima-panglima briged yang berkenaan mencapai objektif-objektif gerakan mereka. Perancangan dan

koodinasi bantuan artileri dilaksanakan oleh pegawai-pegawai memerintah unit artileri yang diperuntukan secara bantuan langsung kepada briged-briged itu. Beberapa aspek saluran pemerintahan berkaitan dengan unit-unit artileri akan diperturunkan kepada panglima-panglima briged untuk menentukan yang bantuan artileri sepanjang gerakan tidak terjejas.

* Di peringkat divisyen, Panglima Divisyen dan KAD akan mengatur satu rancangan bantuan tembakan untuk memusnahkan elemen-elemen bantuan musuh di luar kawasan briged-briged dan meliputi keseluruhan kawasan gerakan divisyen. Koodinasi gerakan artileri ini dilaksanakan oleh KAD. Jika ada gerakan-gerakan khas yang dilaksanakan oleh kumpulan tempur dari simpanan divisyen, keperluan bantuan artileri akan diatur oleh Mk Arti Div dengan menggunakan peruntukan artileri yang tersedia ada ataupun mendapatkan bantuan artileri dari markas atasan.

Di dalam merancang kegunaan artileri dan senjata-senjata bantuan yang lain, KAD mesti berusaha untuk meningkatkan pengaruh Panglima Divisyen di dalam kawasan gerakan itu. Pada setiap masa Panglima Divisyen mesti berkeupayaan untuk menetapkan rentak pertempuran ke atas musuh.

KOMUNIKASI MK ARTI DIV

Sistem komunikasi yang cekap dan selamat adalah penting bagi mencapai pemerintahan dan pengawalan yang cekap. Kemudahan-kemudahan komunikasi seperti stesen-stesen pemancar semula perlu didirikan untuk membolehkan pemerhati-pemerhati menghubungi meriam-meriam yang bertempat jauh di belakang. Perintah-perintah tembakan mesti boleh dihantar dan diterima dengan jelas pada setiap waktu. Sistem komunikasi di dalam Mk Arti Div bukan hanya

terhad kepada sistem radio, tetapi juga meliputi perhubungan dengan menggunakan talian, faksimili dan penghantar utusan secara bermotosikal.

Keperluan komunikasi Mk Arti Div diselenggarakan sepenuhnya oleh Skuaderan Semboyan Mk Arti Div. Skuaderan ini adalah satu organisasi Kor Semboyan dan diletakan di bawah pemerintahan Mk Arti Div. Kawalan teknikal ke atas skuadren ini dilaksanakan oleh Rejimen Semboyan Mk Div yang berkenaan.

PENTADBIRAN ARTILERI

Di dalam istilah Angkatan Tentera pentadbiran meliputi perkara-perkara personil dan lojistik. Saluran pemerintahan yang tersedia ada membenarkan pemerintahan pentadbiran unit-unit artileri diperturunkan kepada Mk Bgd dengan tujuan untuk mempercepatkan gerakan artileri. Walaubagaimanapun KAD akan tetap bertanggungjawab ke atas kecekapan gerakan dan pentadbiran unit-unit artileri yang telah diperuntukkan kepadanya.

Bilangan anggota dan peralatan di bawah pemerintahan Mk Arti Div adalah banyak dan canggih. Di dalam divisyen hampir separuh daripada

peralatan canggih dan berat adalah peralatan artileri dan salah satu masalah lojistik terbesar yang perlu diselesaikan oleh staf-staf lojistik ialah masalah pembekalan dan pergerakan peluru artileri. Sistem pentadbiran yang cekap adalah penting untuk membolehkan Mk Arti Div mengwujudkan keagungan tembakan di medan pertempuran.

PENUTUP

Mk Arti Div ialah satu formasi pemerintahan yang organik kepada sebuah Mk Div. Di Mk Arti Div adalah dimana KAD melaksanakan tanggungjawabnya memerintah dan mengawal semua gerakan-gerakan unit-unit artileri yang telah diletakkan di bawah pemerintahannya. Di dalam melaksanakan tanggungjawabnya itu, KAD dibantu oleh staf-staf artileri yang pakar di dalam bidang-bidang tugas gerakan artileri, perisikan artileri dan lojistik artileri. Keperluan-keperluan gerakan Panglima Divisyen akan diterjemahkan oleh staf-staf Mk Arti Div kepada satu perintah gerakan artileri menggunakan bahasa dan prosidur khusus kepada artileri. Kerjasama yang rapat dan erat di antara staf-staf Mk Div, Mk Bgd dan Mk Arti Div adalah penting untuk menentukan sumber-sumber artileri yang terhad itu dapat dipergunakan dengan berkesan.



Brig Jen Mohd Aris bin Salim dari Kor Artileri kini bertugas sebagai Komander Divisyen Artileri. Beliau telah banyak menghasilkan tulisan-tulisan yang telah diterbitkan di dalam jurnal ini. Artikel beliau didalam Edisi ke 19 dan 27 telah dipilih sebagai artikel terbaik. Brig Jen Mohd Aris juga telah berkhidmat dibawah PBB di misi United Nations Transitional Authority-Cambodia (UNTAC) pada tahun 1992.

MALAYSIA'S DEFENCE POLICY POSTURE : A SHIFT FROM INTERNAL TO EXTERNAL DEFENCE IN THE 1990s ?

(PART II)

Kol Mohd Kamal bin Omar

"The very aim of having a credible armed forces is not to go to war but rather to preserve peace.....a force that could be placed into combat readiness, one capable of meeting any eventuality come what may....."

Jen Tan Sri Borhan bin Haji Ahmad

In this edition of Sorotan Darat is part II of the original article written by Kol Mohd Kamal bin Omar. The final part of his article covers 'Shift in Defence Policy Posture' and his recommendations.

SHIFT IN DEFENCE POLICY POSTURE

After having gone through the previous chapters in part I, I could derive, yes, we indeed have gone through some form of shifts in our defence policy posture, that is from internal to external threat, but it is not necessarily to be in the 1990s. At the same time, I strongly feel that other endangering factors, such as crisis, have also bring aloft something to be reckon with.

Anyway, to backup my points, according to our Prime Minister in 1969:

"It was realised that the British withdrawal and the trouble with the Philippines had changed the entire defence picture, so much so that more will have to be spent on defence and internal security on the coming years...."³⁷

So, as mentioned, it is not correct for us to take it in total, that only in the 1990s, with the laying down of arms by the CPM that there is a shift in the Malaysia's Defence Policy posture from internal to external defence. Infact it goes

back to the 1960s as clearly stated by the Finance Minister much earlier in the chapters. Infact in comparision to the defence spending incurred during the 12 years of communist emergency 1948-1960, visibly there was a vast different.³⁸

In the 1970s, with the sudden exit of the Americans on the fall of **Vietnam** to the Communist, to be followed by the Vietnamese invasion of **Cambodia**, the security in the region is again threatened. To create more instability to the Southeast Asia region, the stationed of the **Soviet Fleet at Cam Ranh Bay** and the occupation of **Amboyna Cay** by the Vietnamese sort of sent warning messages to the Malaysians to activate and again to increase its defence through what is known as **Perkembangan Istimewa Angkatan Tentera (Perista)**.

So, we tend to agree that there is a shift. So, what? What do we tend to do about it? We, the military planners, specially but locally trained by **Maktab Pertahanan Angkatan Tentera (MPAT)**, may need to come to the rescue. But, on second thought, let us see what the others

have got to say on defence planning. As being stipulated by Maj Frank B. Horton III, in his book **Comparative Defence Policy**, the military is one of the most important actors in the defence policy process, and it is the primary instrument for execution of that process. Defence planning must be based on a **coherent national strategy**. It is also widely understood that such a national strategy cannot be defined in a political and economic vacuum. Strategy which cannot combine the wider objective reality with a high level of political perception is doomed to be shortlisted as a basis of defence planning. The task is not so much to convince political masters that require a national strategy.

The task is more to provide **advice** which clearly pose its strategic concepts in the political and economic milieu in which policy is developed.

Talking about **Total Defence** in particular, the public (Malaysians) failed to see its value, its importance or its urgency. The only body, I could visualise today in trying to project it or doing most of the talking on what ever worth there is on Total Defence, is no other than the **MAF** themselves. This I strongly feel is totally a wrong move all the way. Let us be realistic. Will the public with their mind already attracted to the attractive business world would ever think to put aside this lucrative opportunity just to listen to us in uniform trying to tell them that the nation is in danger to external threats? They will undoubtedly think we are nuts. Further more, they may even ask, Where is the danger? From where? What threat are we talking about? Even if we were to list them out and enlighten them on the existing threats, will they believe us? No, certainly not through us in uniform. It is the **government**, the people that run the nation, that were picked and voted for by the people. These are the people that will be able to make headway in making the public to listen and understand the need and the

important of Total Defence. Better still, how about the implementation of **national service** and making it mandatory? It will indirectly bring the public to be fully conscious on the necessity of Total Defence. But, on the other hand, according to **Maj Gen Mohamed Ali Haji Wayat**, even our **Prime Minister** of the opinion that "**we are not ready yet**" to rope-in the public for national service.³⁹

So, where do we go from here? We are left with not much of a choice, even though Total Defence in total is not entirely our responsibility. Maybe, what we need to do as been done by Singapore is to utilise through the Ministry of Information in informing the people the need of Total Defence and the part to be played both by the MAF and the public⁴⁰. One thing which is obvious, as to enable to convince the public, is to paint the entire security situation more clearly on the threats overshadowing the region.

Apart from the aspect of its primary role in defence and its capable in advising the political masters, according to another writer, the armed forces could also fulfill the following roles:

- * **National Unifiers:** using military institutions and policies as source of national political cohesion by setting aside interest and goal conflicts.
- * **National accommodator:** using them to achieve more political cohesion by narrowing and eliminating political differences.
- * **External buffer and accommodator:** using them to narrow and eliminate differences between internal or domestic interest and external or foreign interests.

* **Military defence** : meeting perceived foreign threats.⁴¹

Otherwise, as being stipulated by Dan Smith, the modern armed forces which is a permanent state apparatus could play the following roles:

- * It can be used within domestic society.
- * It can be used in relations between states with different social systems.
- * It can be used in relations between states with essentially the same social systems.
- * It can be used to subjugate and colonise states and nations and resist movements to throw off that subjugation.

One thing for sure, there is something not right here. In spite of all those professional roles that the MAF can render, there are lots of loopholes here and there that need to be looked into. Maybe, either they are not fully being given the privilege to prove themselves, or maybe, their hidden capability is still not been tested fully.

RECOMMENDATIONS

"Success depends on constant awareness of different requirements as affected by the particular country where operations are contemplated, geographical and climatic conditions."

Sun Tzu

What Sun Tzu described above is the awareness on the importance of geo-strategy of

which Clausewitz too had his understanding on the matter in the following terms, as follows:

- * **Psychological elements including moral.**
- * **Military force including its size, composition and organization.**
- * **Geometry of the situation including the relative positions and movements of forces and their geometric relationship to obstacles, channels, objectives, etc.**
- * **Terrain including mountains, rivers, woods and roads which might influence military activities. Supply including its means and sources.**

The importance of geo-strategy has even been identified more than two thousands years ago. It is not strange therefore looking at the interest thrown towards this region of strategic importance. Basing on this aspect, there is no doubt that Malaysia is facing a changing security environment. The traditional insurgency and external land-based threats have given way, in the last few years, to predominantly maritime-based threats to the country's security. This changed in the source of the dangers that the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) must confront clearly necessitates a change in strategy and also force structure if need be.⁴³

Malaysia like many other Third World countries, has faced both internal and a possible external threats. **Initially, it was primarily an internal threat coming from the CPM and the possible external threat coming from the Vietnamese expansionism.**

Throughout this period of tensions, Malaysia, however, was much more concerned towards its internal communist threat as compared to the external. **Its priority**

throughout was basically to improve its counter-insurgency measures, be it within the MAF, the police or other government related agencies.

However, with the surrendering of their armed struggle by the CPM, to be followed by other recent events in the region, which could effect the regional's security environment, Malaysia's posture of threat perspective suddenly could be seen as though shifting more towards external threat than the internal threat then ever before. This is in relation to the numerous existing maritime-based threats to the integrity of Malaysia.

Firstly, need to be observed is the shift of regional capabilities from the superpowers to the major powers. This is relating to the pullout of the US from the Philippines and the Russians from Cam Ranh Bay which more or less provides the opportunity for major powers within the region to surface and flex their muscles. This is referring to China (PRC), with their intensifying of their South Sea Fleet, creating grave concern among the ASEAN members which includes Malaysia. The other major power of concern, apart from India towering itself in the Indian Ocean which could endanger the entrance to the Straits of Malacca, is land of the rising sun, Japan.

Japan, with its self-imposed naval operating limits as to safe-guard its vital sea links through the South China Sea, too, has more or less boggled the mind of regional political leaders.

Secondly, as being mentioned earlier, with the December 2 1989 signing of agreements by the CPM to lay down their arm struggle, indicated the end of 41-year-old era of

counter-insurgency and also ending the ever priority given by Malaysian defence planners towards combating jungle warfare, which partly ends the main internal threat.⁴⁴

Thirdly, is the creation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), resulting in overlapping claims in the South China Sea, covering a wide scope of an area in particular the Spratly Islands groups.

The claimants involve are PRC, Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia. Malaysia's claims referred to islands and atolls south of the Spratlys, covering Terumbu Laksamana, Pulau Kecil Amboyna, Terumbu Montanani, Terumbu Layang-Layang, Terumbu Samarang Barat Kecil, Terumbu Samarang Barat Besar, Terumbu Ubi, Terumbu Layar and Terumbu Perahu.⁴⁵

For Malaysia, likewise the other claimants, surveillance patrols of the EEZ is of utmost important, referring to its richness in fisheries, oil and possible undersea deposits of hydrocarbons and phosphates. To ensure this and being a maritime nation with a 4,800 km of coastline, Malaysia needs to intensify its air capabilities and also much-much more on its naval capabilities. This is to ensure that round-the-clock surveillance of its maritime boundaries is carried out as to counter and safe-guard its offshore oil and gas fields, prevent and warding off the encroachment of foreign fishing vessels, and not forgetting piracy, smugglers and illegal immigrants.

Over and above this, our maritime responsibilities too need to ensure and maintain the security of the sea lanes of communication, be it between Peninsular Malaysia and Sabah and Sarawak or the sea lanes plying through the

Straits of Malacca. This include pollution control and the possible deposit of hydrocarbon and tin deposits within the straits.⁴⁶

*"It may be generally agreed that a particular state is secure, that is, that it is able to defend its internal values against any conceivable external attack."*⁴⁷

In ensuring our vast area of security, a National Defence strategy will obviously have considered the relative strengths and weakness of land, sea and air power before arriving at its final form. Almost certainly, that end result will be a comprehensive, joint strategy. It is essential to appreciate that joint warfare capabilities rest squarely on single service expertise. The army, navy and air force have few more important task than continually to review and redefine their fundamental beliefs.

Each of the services, time and again, and with the end of the Gulf War, claim their superiority above one another, in particular the air force. The air force more or less claimed the faith of the Gulf War lies under the fold of the air force. This may be of an important to us to relate to the defence of our wide air space.⁴⁸

Let us therefore examine the nature of air power and the understanding of air strategy and of its importance. Firstly, its definitions.

Air power, as defined by M.J. Armitage and R.A. Mason in his book, *Air Power in the Nuclear Age*, the ability to project military force by or from a platform in the third dimension above the surface of the earth. Another definition comes from General H.H. Arnold, of which he described as the capacity

to deliver cargo, people, destructive missiles and war making potential through the air to a desired destination to accomplish a desired purpose. In combination, the two definitions provide a good description of the special qualities of air power⁴⁹

Perhaps the most widely recognised strength and air power is flexibility. Air assets can quickly diverted from one task to another and from one target to another. Other advantages include versatility, swiftness of application, pervasiveness, reach, shock effect, the ability rapidly to concentrate force, and high relative military effect.⁵⁰

According to General Giulio Douhet in his book *The Command of the Air* (trans. D. Ferrari), Washington, Office of Air Force History, 1983:

"To conquer command of the air means victory; to be beaten in the air means defeat and acceptance of whatever terms the enemy may be pleased to impose."

Initiative is vital. The side which takes the offensive in the war in the air has a distinct advantage. If the opposing forces are fairly equal, the side that moves first will gain the tactical and operational initiative.⁵¹

Superiority over an enemy's force was likely to be a prerequisite for victory, and would be gained not by combat in the skies, but by destruction on the ground, that is by again employing the inherent and decisive offensive capabilities of air power.⁵² To come to think of it, is this not what our immediate neighbour, Singapore, is gearing up for?

Other examples of successful air power,

were also evident in the **Middle East** from the 1960s onwards. During the **Six-Day War of 1967**, the **Yom Kippur War of 1973** and the **air war in the Bek'a Valley in 1982**, the **Israeli Air Force** provided examples of air strategy. The key to the success was **good planning, high quality training and a technological edge. Gaining control of the air was always the first priority**, after which attack aircraft were used to devastating effect either on independent strike operations or in support of surface combat forces.⁵³

Those strengths inevitably come at a cost. The air weapon is very expensive to acquire and operate and requires high quality in all support functions. Needless to say, with the current budget constraint towards defence, the MAF seems to be on the receiving end through-out of which it should not be so in the first place. Even in his address, the Defence Chief Secretary, **Dato' Kamaruzzaman Shariff**, mentioned of his sympathy towards the MAF due to the financial constraint.⁵⁴ We appreciate his concern, but come to think of it, is this the right thing happening, only the armed forces have to be sympathetic with and to face the deficit? No, I do not think so. Any short comings, it is not the armed forces that will suffer in the final analysis, but the nation on the whole. We, the MAF, is only carrying-out our sincere and unprofitable role that we are abide to from the very first day we took our oath to defend the country, the manner we are train to do so - as a professional soldier. Yes, as a professional soldier, of which, sad to say, even some of us seems to have forgotten the rightful meaning of it. If only Sun Tzu is his book "The Art Of War" have find time to educate us more on the true sense of professionalism in the armed forces.

As for talking about money, the politicians are conscious that money spent on

defence are money which could not be spent on providing other, possibly more desirable services, for the community. At the back of their minds lurked the fear that their decisions might rebound to their disadvantage, either by causing divisions within their own party or by costing them votes at the next general election.⁵⁵ Are these the same fear being agitated in the mind of our politicians too? And at what cost? The MAF?

Anyway, on a more serious note, the Defence Policy specified certain key defence guide lines which have implications in the development of our military capability. It is threfore, strongly recommended that:

- * **Malaysia must be self reliant in defending the Core Area and Strategic Areas in the immediate vicinity.**

- * **Regional interest should be defended in conjunction with neighbouring coutries on a network of bilateral arrangements.**

- * **Against High Level external threat or conflict, external assistance is required. Form of assistance should include moral, political, and material support such as weapons, training, technology and equipment. The source of such support should include regional countries under the bilateral arrangements and other friendly countries through defence arrangements such as FPDA.**

- * **In the development of military capability, the level should be adequate and balanced as to create adeterrence effect. This capability should be demonstrated whenever the need arises, which should include:**

- * Developing a high state of operational readiness and skills in the use of modern and sophisticated weapons.
- * Providing a capable maritime force which must be able to operate in a two theatre operations.
- * Ability to project force beyond our immediate vicinity inline with the Forward Defence Concept.
- * The MAF should be able to carry out combined and joint operations with other friendly forces in enforcing regional security.
- * The force structure should consists of a mixed force comprising of a core force of regular and reserves(reservists and volunteers) to augment the core force on short notice.
- * In time of High Level Conflict, the full resources of the nation should be mobilized.
- * Defence industries should be developed to cater some level of self sufficiency in defence supplies and material needs.⁵⁶

CONCLUSIONS

" Be flexible according to the circumstances and modify the plans to your advantage....These military tactics leading to victory must not be dogmatic beforehand. The general who wins a battle calculates in his mind before the battle..... More planning leads more chances of victories while less planning, less chances of victory. "

Sun Tzu

Internationally, Malaysia is identified by its roles, activities, and positions as a **non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council**, a founder member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). In term of defence and security dimension, Malaysia is a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) which comprise Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore. Malaysia also has **bilateral border security agreements** with Indonesia and Thailand in suppressing communists insurgents and in conducting **socio-economic development programmes** along the common borders.⁵⁷

Relating to Malaysia's National Defence Policy, one has to take note of the **geo-strategic setting** bearing in mind that Malaysia apart from being a **maritime nation** with **long coastlines**, large expanse of **territorial waters and EEZ**, it is being seperated into two land masses by an **intervening stretch of water, the South China Sea**.

Due to this, Malaysia depends on sea-borne **transportation** for more than 90% of its trades and derives approximately 30% of its revenue from the nation's territorial waters and EEZ in the form of fishing and petroleum

resources.⁵⁸

From here one could derive the **strategic important** Malaysia's location including of its **rich economic resources** apparently bordering the rest of its ASEAN neighbours, thus arises the prolong **disputed claims**.

The **threat faced** by the country **determines and gives shapes to the policies and forces structure** whether to increase or decrease. This paradoxically present **less problem when the threat could be clearly identified**. The problem arises when the threat, be it its directions or sizes, is doubtful. This is basically the hiccup faced by our policy planners. This doubtfulness creates problem in determining on how much of the nations resources should could be diverted for defence and to what defence capability are we expected of. This aspects too will raise questions of whether the **economic factor** will determine options for the type and level of defence policy we "need", or is there any way basing on the **threat perspective**, the defence policy makers could get what they really need for the right choice of defence?

As it stands, basing on the government's decision and basically the public's (voter's) opinion, anything relating to money that will affect paying more by the tax payers, the nation's **social and economy development** will definitely remains the **top priority**. To confirm this:

"This country recognised the importance of defence and security in ensuring the development of the country... Malaysia being a developing country has not and will not place defence and security as the top most priority in our annual budget allocation. It will remain an important

*component next to economic and social development"*⁵⁹

A nation's priority task is to **safeguard and promote its national interests**. Thus nations join formal organizations or even informal arrangements, if it is considered to be in their national interests and aligned to their internal and external goals.

However promising a regional grouping may appear to be, **conflict of interests** among states is bound to occur. Conflicts over interests are invariably harmful to maintaining or strengthening effective regional cooperation. In an arena dominated by "**sovereigners**", convergence of national interests would dampen such intentions. One of the underlying characteristics of a successful regional institution is its ability to **promote cooperation** where there is a convergence of the member's national interests while concurrently allowing each nation to pursue those policies that are essential to its set of priorities, so long as these national policies do not undermine any collective policies that the grouping may have adopted in a particular policy area.

Now that all **men** have become **neighbours**, international life must cease to be dominated by the **fear, suspicion and rivalry** which induce nations to **arm and overarm**, posing a **permanent threat** to the whole of the human race. An end must also be put to a situation in which the world is poised between global peace, ostensibly maintained by the **balance of terror**, and a proliferation of **local conflicts** which flare up wherever dominant structures desire to maintain their place and wherever the **spheres of influence** of various powers meet, come into **conflict** and, in some instances, **overlap**.

No one doubts that **capabilities** are now more narrowly concentrated than ever before in modern history. Many may argue, however, that the concentration of capabilities does not generate effective power. **Military power no longer brings political power.** But on the other hand, for the sake of security and unsure of one another's intentions, **nations still turn to their armed forces and tend to arm themselves and these could lead to competition or unprecedented arms race within the region. Due to this, arming of forces cannot be eliminated, ever.**

Therefore, how do we ensure peace or is peace still possible in the generation to come? There is no other way than to continue the build-up (or maybe in today's context, we rather use the term **arm modernization** instead of an arm race) and make known to your interested targets (neighbours) of your latest capabilities, if possible, **in carrying-out second-strike, as a deterrent.**

The general public seems more likely than ever to interest itself in defence matters is an economic one. Today, military effective defence policies, as admittedly by most, are inordinately expensive.

The changes, undoubtedly are taking place affecting a shift in posture from **internal to external defence**, within our regional security environment. This call for Malaysia to put more emphasis on its capacity to survey and secure its maritime boundaries as to **defend itself against maritime-based threats to the integrity of its sovereignty.** To achieve this, Malaysia may need to have a **second look of its air and naval defence structures and capabilities focusing towards a maritime-oriented strategy.** In 1967, a Government backbencher then, **Dr Mahathir Mohammad**, had suggested that the Armed

Forces were:

"too heavily based on the infantry and less on other elements found in most modern armies."⁶¹

This thoughts was also acknowledged by the **Naval and Air Service Chiefs**, as the need to intensify our maritime capabilities, particularly relating to the Navy and the Air Force in pursuant with the safeguarding of our national interest and sovereignty.

All this while, throughout the entire **thirty years of Emergency**, Malaysia has been geared for **counter-insurgency campaign.** But with the recent shift relating to the **maritime-based threats, Malaysia's maritime capabilities** too may need to be looked into towards a credible **"blue water"** navy and air force basing on its vast **territorial waters** to be safe-guarded. At the same time, I strongly feel, that we do not need a large standing army. what we do need is a **credible navy and air force** that we can proudly project in ensuring security of our sovereignty and as a deterrence that is capable to carry out a second-strike. We need this maritime capabilities. If the need arises, we must be capable to carry out **pre-emptive strikes** or to meet and destroy the enemy **way-out from our shore.** Once, **the enemy landed**, be it on the Peninsula, or Sabah-Sarawak, it might then **be too late.** To rely next on the army, in this era? I do not think it will be a wise move. Remember the **Gulf War. Iraq never stood a chance.** Was it due to the allied land assault, or was it virtually due to the **allied air superiority?** The answer is obvious. The Iraqies capabilities were virtually up-rooted single-handed by the allied air force. **Yes, we need a capable air force. We need a capable navy. We are a maritime nation.** It is time we behave like one. We need to operate jointly, as a **joint-forces**, with the

maritime force at the helm.

Still, undoubtedly, the question of economic **affordability** will arise.⁶¹ As to offset one of the **greatest enemy of defence**, that is **money**, but , at the same time to enhance its **maritime security**, Malaysia may use to rely more on its **diplomatic approach** and form of **co-operative arrangement** with its **Southeast Asian neighbours**, not forgetting the **current defence arrangement** through **FPDA**. Malaysia's future stand on the **FPDA** is not expected to be far different from the past. **Self reliance** will be one of its primary defence policy and does not envisage the **FPDA** to be activated for most of the defence contingents throughout. For this reason, the impact on the **FPDA** for Malaysia will rest not on the defence mechanism but more towards the **training value** which the bilateral component has provided and hope to be continued.⁶²

To conclude, therefore, the question on the subject matter as to whether there is a shift in the Malaysia's Defence Policy posture from **internal to external defence**, I would strongly say yes and no. But on the other hand it would be unfair and unwise not to mention on threat in its own perspective. If we are talking on the military term of understanding of threat, yes, there is a shift of focus from internal to external threat. But to my mind, on the whole, it is not in any way affecting the Defence Policy other then the review of manpower limit which need to be looked into from time to time.



Kol Mohd Kamal Omar was commissioned into the Royal Armoured Corps in 1967. Attended Staff College in Quetta, Pakistan and the Armed Forces Defence College (MPAT). Other overseas stints include the Armoured Gunnery Instructor UK, the International Senior Officers and Amphibious Planning Course San Deigo, USA, attached to the Australian Armoured Centre, Puckapunyal and served as UN observer in Iraq and Mozambique. Earned his Advance Diploma in Strategic Studies from UKM. Currently he is the Director of the Armoured Corps.

"We believe in the notion of comprehensive security. Domestically, Malaysia must be comprehensively developed, in terms of its economy, politics, social cohesion and its military. Everything depends on striking the right balance"

Dato' Sri Mohd Najib bin Tun Abd Razak

Footnotes :

37. Joshurun, op cit. pg.34

38. ibid. pp.1-7.

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40. This was based on the presentation made by Mej Gen Mohamed Ali Wayat, **The process of Formulating Defence Strategies and Planing**, at MPAT, on August 18, 1994.

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42. Peltier, Louis C. and Pearsy G. Etzel, **Military Strategy, Military Geography**, D. Van Nostrand Company, inc. Princeton, New Jersey, 1966, pp 45-46. Also look at Griffith. Samuel B, **Terrain and The Nine Varieties Of Ground**, Sun Tzu, **The Art Of War**, Oxford University Press, 1971, pp 124-140 on the importance of ground.

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45. Lee Yong Leng, "The Malaysian-Philippine Maritime Dispute", **Contemporary Southeast Asia** 11, No. 1 June 1989, pp. 71-72.

46. Stubbs, *op cit.* pg 48.

47. Kihl, Young Whan 7 Grinter, Lawrence E, **Asia Pacific Security**, Lynne Rienner Publisher, In, Boulder, Colorador, 1986, pg 2.

48. Waters, *op cit.* pg 1.

49. *ibid.* pg 2.

50. *ibid.*

51. *ibid.* pg. 50

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53. Waters, *op cit.* pg.17. See Also Colonel B. K. Narayan an, **Lessons and Consequences of the October War**, Vikes, New Delhi., pp. 50-52. For a much more comprehensive reading up the Gulf War, please see a much **Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress**: And Wing Commander Gary Waters, **Gulf Lessons One**, Air Power Studies Centre, 1992.

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
It is therefore necessary for the editor to state that the opinions expressed in this journal are those of the individual writers alone, and do not in anyway represent the views of the Ministry of Defence or any related institutions.

" The science of war does not only consist of the knowledge of tactics, strategy and logistics, but also embraces political science, propoganda, economics and sociology...The leader in a war who restricts himself to military affair will be a failure because he will be powerless in the political, propoganda and economic wars which are the foundation for victory in a modern war"

Gen Abdul Haris Nasution (TNI)

(In his book *Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare*-May 1953)

TEETH ARM SUPPORT MALBAT II UNPROFOR BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA



On Cover duty at Pazarić Camp

SYNOPSIS

The MAF Dental Service had been actively involved in peacekeeping assignments since the days of UNTAG Namibia, 1989. However, nothing much is known of the field dental elements - its missions, concepts of deployment and employment and how it had contributed towards MALBAT operations. This paper gives an account of the various activities of Dental Element MALBAT II UNPROFOR during its tour of duty in Bosnia Herzegovina from September 1994 to mid March 1995, highlighting its roles and potentials in supporting the overall operation - maintenance of troop morale and well-being, winning the hearts and minds of the locals, promoting goodwill and friendship with other UN staff and enhancing national image.

INTRODUCTION

Duty fit soldiers are essential in any military operation. Non-battle dental casualties are certainly most unfortunate and constitute 'unnecessary' loss of manpower. However, attaining full dental fitness for mission-bound soldiers remained an elusive goal in view of tight training schedules and the tedious administrative and logistic preparations.

The Dental Team of MALBAT II comprised of an officer, a senior assistant, a hygienist and a technician. Its mission was to ensure duty-fit troops by preventing unnecessary incapacitation due to dental diseases and maxillofacial injuries. It also supported OP INSANIAH humanitarian and civic action projects. As such its concepts of operation were maximum coverage, treatment as far forward possible and patients without creed or colour.

DENTAL COVER

MALBAT

The Dental team was based in Konjic where it operated from a parked container, the clinomobil which was equipped to provide the efficiency and comfort of an urban surgery in adverse field conditions. However, MALBAT's troop disposition dictated that the Dental Team be highly mobile. Hence a portable field set complete with generator, compressor and an x-ray machine were added to its inventory. Movement was usually by a 3/4 ton Land Rover and a 4 tonner or an ATV Hagglund.

Apart from the usual duty hours work was also carried out at night, especially for those tedious and time consuming cases which required more detailed management for example, surgical extractions, bite registration and scaling. Operating at night was also undertaken if the day's attendance of civilian patients warranted such postponement

provided of course, the soldier's well-being was not compromised and more importantly, he had agreed to it. Such flexibility was exercised in view of the facts that most of the civilians had come from distant locations (patients who had come walking for nearly 6 hours were not uncommon) and that in most instances could not wait that long as many other chores awaited (peace was not as certain tomorrow). Furthermore they had to reach home before nightfall.

For units outside Konjic visits were programmed as such:

1. Jablanica and Pazaric - twice monthly
2. Split and Visoko - once monthly.

A total of 652 attendances were recorded for the period from September 1994 to February 1995. Main reasons for the sick reports were pain to cold temperatures (82), general dental pain (242), denture problems (67) and scaling (257). Two interesting cases needed special mention. One was a soldier who slipped off the ice-covered steps of the ablution container and broke his front teeth. The other was a senior rank who lost his dentures whilst swimming in the Adriatic Sea. Perhaps an Italian or may be a Croatian fish would now be looking pretty good !

MALBAT soldiers going on leave should always look smart with their healthy clean smiles. Towards this end a special programme was organised whereby the Dental assistant (Hygienist) did thorough scaling and prophylaxis to those would be holiday goers. Nevertheless only those that came early were served. The Hygienist himself had to be on leave!

Dental Hygienist at work in Jablanica



disease had already become full blown with loosening of teeth thus necessitating the need for full dentures. For those fortunate enough to have dentures these were however loose, time-worn and broken.

Local dental facilities included hospital dental departments, rural clinics and private practices. However, only the dental departments were active and functioning as part of "War Hospitals" had to be very selective in their acceptance of cases. Only battle-related injuries would be given priority. Acute shortages of drugs and materials had made routine fillings and denture works either unavailable or financially inaccessible to the masses. Who would spend DM 40 for a filling or DM 200 for a denture? Only extractions were free but even then, in most instances had to be done "raw". Local anaesthetics when available were well beyond expiry dates whilst sharp and fine injection needles were rare luxuries. Together with failing equipment working at well below 50% efficiency, the stage was thus set for the most unpleasant experience on the chair, even for the most simplest form of operation.

As part of its humanitarian programme MALBAT II also extended its dental services to the locals. Treatments were provided at Konjic and Pazaric. Responses had been overwhelming with attendances of up to 40 per day. However, due to time constraints only 25 were seen. The rest were given appointments and hence by the end of February, a waiting list of 2 months!!

In addition to these in-house services visits were also made to isolated villages and refugee centres but mainly on opportunity basis. Material support were given to the Dental Departments of Konjic, Jablanica and Suhodol Hospitals as well as some individual practitioners. Talks on toothbrushing techniques were also given to 10 - 15 years old of Konjic Catholic Church, Lisicici and Surau MALBAT. However, several other requests could not be met due to time and workload constraints and these included scheduled visits to the mental hospital at Pazaric, Health Centre Lisicici and number of rural health centres within the AOR of 2 Royal Armour in Jablanica.

OTHER UN

Apart from MALBAT other dental facilities were also available at Divulje Barracks in Split, CANBAT in Visoko, BRITBAT in Sarajevo, FREBAT in Sarajevo and MASH in Zagreb. However, due to one reason or another MALBAT soldiers in Visoko and Split would rather wait for the monthly visits or made their own trips to Konjic. Some of the reasons cited were irreconcilable difference between treatment requested and treatment recommended, unfamiliar surrounding and frequent closures.

Eventhough its main concern was dental fitness of MALBAT troops, treatments were also extended to other UN peacekeepers, observers and staff. Amongst these were 49 PAKBAT soldiers, 4 SLOVENGBAT sappers, 6 military observers and 25 civilian staff.

LOCAL POPULATION

The dental state of health was very poor. Front teeth of 12 year olds were badly diseased whilst only stumps remained of their molar teeth. Teenagers at the age of 6 were already losing anterior teeth and in need of dentures to attain their social well-being. By mid thirties periodontal



With a little help from MALBAT



Looking good was indeed very important. Nearly 90% of daily attendances were for anterior fillings. It did not matter if there were septic teeth, so long as they were the back ones. Walking long distances for hours was no big hassle either. The front teeth must be done! Extraction was a big nay. It would be too painful to bear unless of course, it involved the anteriors and even then, only when there were promises of dentures. A number of payment offers had to be turned down.

For the period from September 1994 to February 1995, over 2100 cases had been seen with 650 fillings and dressings done. A total of 320 teeth were extracted whilst 58 pieces of dentures were issued and 12 repair jobs done. It would be interesting to note that even though the number of filling/dressings done was double the amount of extraction, this was not reflective of the

real situation. The fear for extraction and the desire to look nice had widened the gap between treatment demanded and treatment actually required. Indeed there were still a lot of work that needed to be done to realize a reasonable state of oral and dental health.



Hearts and Minds project at Lukomir

SUMMARY

Non-battle dental casualties are inevitable especially in a prolonged mission such as this. Eventhough alternative facilities may be available, these may not be as easily accessible, psychologically comfortable or acceptable.

War had made dentistry a most scarce and rare commodity. When available it is also unfortunately, most traumatic. Being able to provide some form of service, though on a small basis, had provided opportunities for the local population to regain its self-esteem and at the same time enjoy the pleasant benefits of modern dentistry.

CONCLUSION

Adequate field support is essential to ensure minimal incapacitation thus safeguarding morale and well-being. A good field dental support would also be a worthy asset towards winning the hearts and minds of the local population as well as enhancing the country's image amongst other force contributing nations.



Lt Kol (DR) Hussin graduated from the Univeristy of Queensland, Australia in 1979 and joined service in January 1980. He was dental officer for RASCOM and 2 BIM Ipoh before pursuing a postgraduate course at the University of Sydney in 1982. Upon his return he was the SO 2 Dental at Medical Directorate until 1987. An old boy of Malay College Kuala Kangsar, Lt Kol (Dr) Hussin is now at AFDC Mindef practicing orthodontics.

"Around this time, September last year, the people of Konjjic were dying. We were isolated and we were desperate. There was no fuel and there were no medicines. Old people who were chronically ill, we could not help them. We could not even help them to come to hospital. They had to walk or be carried. With the onset of winter just round the corner, we thought that we will not be able to make it. The UNHCR people came and in this very room we sat. We talked. They wrote down a lot of notes. They asked for a list of things that we needed and we gave them a list. Nothing happened after that. A lot of talking and a lot of writing but still nothing came. Then something good happened to us we heard that MALBAT was coming. When it came, things got better. We began to have fuel and we began to have some medicines. Suddenly we realised that somewhere out there we still have a friend".

Dr Sead Butesrovic, Director Konjjic Hospital, at presentation ceremony of medical equipment aid.

(Konjjic Hospital, 28 September 1994).

COMPARE AND CONTRAST THE STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES OF CLAUSEWITZ AND JOMINI

Oleh:

Lt Kol Sharuddin bin Hassim

INTRODUCTION

The **Enlightenment** of the 17th and 18th Century Europe produced an atmosphere in which scholars and writers sought to discover knowledge by the application of reason. In this environment a succession of military writers attempted to apply scientific principles to study the conduct of war. Eventually this movement was replaced by schools of thought which emphasised on the action and the importance of the individuals. Predominant among these groups were Roman Philosophers and German Idealists. Henceforth two schools of military thought emerged: a retrospective one, looking to the **Enlightenment**, which sought scientific exactitude and forward looking Romantic path which described war more in terms of uncertainty. Jomini and Clausewitz were to emerge as the principal advocates of these respective schools. However, whilst they are described as occupying the poles of strategic writing there are clear similarities in their approach to, and conclusions about war. **This essay will compare and contrast the strategic principles of Clausewitz and Jomini.**

BACKGROUND

Clausewitz's and Jomini's writings on military strategy were based on their analysis of the land campaigns occurring in 18th and 19th Century in Europe. These wars resulted from the frictions caused by several great military powers co-existing in a constricted area. Moreover, both men were admirers of Frederick the Great and had been caught up in the fury of Napoleonic Wars. Jomini, a Swiss bank clerk, studied the military profession by attaching himself to

Marshall Ney's, and later Napoleon's staffs. In 1838 he wrote **Precis de L'Art de la Guerre** in which he sought to reduce war to district principles. These principles were based on mathematical and geometric formula. Moreover, he argued that a commander, by choosing the correct lines of approach within a theatre, could prevent battle by forcing the enemy to leave. By contrasts the Prussian soldier Clausewitz approached war as a complex totality. Like Jomini he spent the majority of his military career as staff and had devoted his to writing on military strategy as it emerged from Napoleonic period. This study was published in his unrevised book, on war, after his death in 1831. Although he, like Jomini, sought to determine strategic principles he argued that his theory could, at best, illuminate the complexity of war. Moreover, war to Clausewitz involved great battles whose primary object was the destruction of the enemy forces. *Paret* believes the basic reason for their different perspective is due to their contrasting psychologies. He stated that "*Clausewitz approached war as a complex totality, seeing it in what may be called tragic terms, always threatening to escape human control, where as Jomini saw war largely in personal, heroic terms, controlled by the masterful commander.*" (*Paret*, 1986,158).

Another reason for Jomini and Clausewitz's different emphasis on certain issues lies in the purpose for which each based their work. Jomini drew his theories from the campaigns of Napoleon and Alexander. From these specific examples, he drew general hypothesis. The purpose of the resulting

principles was to provide "a compass for the commander-in-chief of the army to guide him in his task of directing operations in the midst of the noise and tumult of battle" (Brinton, 1971, 85) ultimately Jomini sought to erect a theoretical system of winning war. Clausewitz, by contrast argued from the general to the specific. In studying Napoleon's campaigns he attempted to understand war in absolute terms. Moreover, the resulting principles and theories were not aimed at providing a commander with a clear bearing but simply to guide him in his self education and in developing his judgement (Paret, 1965, 29). Therefore, whilst Jomini's principles were prescriptive and retrospective, in nature, Clausewitz developed themes which would aid the general understanding of war. As such Clausewitz initiated the non-prescriptive, non-judgemental study of war as a total phenomenon. However, whilst Jomini's approach to the analysis of war is considered as opposite to Clausewitz's, there are some clear parallels in the resulting strategic principles.

STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES

Similarities

Clausewitz's *On War* reinforced Jomini's emphasis on the massive and aggressive use of force. Both writers stressed the need to concentrate overwhelming force at the decisive point and both were intent on the destruction of enemy's main field army. To Jomini all strategic combinations were faulty if they did not conform to the basic principle of "operating with the greatest possible force in a combined effort against the decisive point" (Paret, 1986, 152w). Moreover, if initially unsuccessful a commander must persist and would eventually succeed by using sound principles based on attacking, massing and persisting. By comparison

Clausewitz stated that "there is no higher and simpler law of strategy than to concentrate force on the enemy's weak link, his strategic centre of gravity, the best strategy is always to be very strong: first, in general, and then at the decisive point" (Howard, 1976 204). Like Jomini, he also placed emphasis on the principles of surprise, offence, manoeuvre and mass. However, whilst there appears to be a general conformity within these principles there are major differences in the emphasis.

The Decisive Point

Although Jomini and Clausewitz agreed that the key to war was in striking at the decisive point, Jomini placed far more emphasis on this factor. Jomini, in searching for a clear and simple explanation for Napoleon's success based his work on the underlying premise... "that strategy is controlled by invariable scientific principles; and that these principles prescribe offensive action to mass force against weaker enemy forces at some decisive point if strategy is to lead to victory" (Paret, 1986, 146). Jomini's theory is on what constitutes a decisive point and the choice of interior lines of operations dominated his work. He stressed that the enemy's centre of gravity should only be attacked when his forces were overextended. To achieve this; the enemy's flanks, his nervous system, communications and rear area, were all valuable objectives. Ultimately by obtaining a strategic "interior position", one part of the enemy, then another could be defeated in turn, (Shy, 1986, 169). Moreover, his later writings indicated that territorial control was the true objective of an armed conflict. Whilst Clausewitz acknowledged the importance of determining the enemy's centre of gravity he dismissed Jomini's apparent preoccupation with this principle, arguing that in trying to reduce war to a single location at a specific time Jomini's

study was oversimplified and would not stand up to the reality of warfare. Therefore, whilst Clausewitz agreed that an army's prime task was to locate the adversary's centre of gravity, which might be his capital, his key ally or his armed forces, other factors must be considered in achieving victory.

Unquantifiable Forces

In determining Jomini's theoretical and reductionist approach Clausewitz emphasised that theory of war must address unquantifiable forces. In particular he stressed "...the intellectual and psychological strengths of the commander and his subordinates; the morale, spirit and permanent traits of society as reflected in its soldiers-enthusiasm for war, political loyalty, and energy" (Paret, 1986, 203). Whilst Jomini acknowledged that battles often escaped scientific control and that such factors as moral inspirations sometimes played an important and major role. He emphasised that a sound grasp of principles 'would always provide a guide through the confusion' (Howard, 1965 17). Jomini's insistence on the primacy of principles is consistent with his prescriptive approach. By contrast Clausewitz saw such confusion as 'opportunities to be grasped' (Howard, 1983, 14). Furthermore, war contains the interaction of moral forces such as 'will'. Ultimately, he believes that the destruction of the enemy's will is the primary target of any conflict. 'Battle is the bloodiest of solutions,' observes Clausewitz, but it should be considered an act aimed at "killing in the enemy's spirit rather than in his men." (Howard, 1983, 259). Despite Jomini's prescription to throw the army across the communications of the enemy, there is no evidence that he recognised it in terms of the moral object.

Jomini's commitment to reductionism and prescription led him to reduce, or completely ignore, relevant factors in his analysis. He can be accused of disregarding historical examples which contradicted his theories and criticised for his inadequate analysis of *People's Wars*. However, his assumption that armed forces of equal size were equally well trained, motivated and armed has been identified as one of the weaknesses in his work. Clausewitz, consistent with his approach to war as a complex totality, saw them as variables worthy of consideration. To Clausewitz, war involved "uncertainties, errors, accidents, technical difficulties, the unforeseen, and their effects on decisions morale and actions." "To Clausewitz, this was the "friction" of war and he described it as the "only concept which more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper." (Howard, 1976, 169). There are three main elements to Clausewitz's friction of war: the danger of war, war's demanding physical efforts and the fog of war. "Friction as we choose to call it is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult" (Paret, 1986, 293). Ultimately Jomini's desire for scientific exactitude caused him to enter the field of abstract reasoning. The resulting prescriptive principles have tended to cloud a basically commonsense approach, which in turn have detracted from their long-term relevance.

Jomini was a practical and true land soldier who recognised the importance of ground, the functions of logistics and the requirements of effective communications in battle. He also provided some attention to naval warfare which later became Mahan's writing on maritime strategy. The above elements have significant values in mobile warfare where combined arms cooperation plays valuable roles in World Wars I and II. Jomini emphasised on the use of

terrain irregularities to protect armies from artillery. He identified the *vital zone* behind the fighting front and *communication centres*. His classical theory is still applicable and some are taken into the current guiding principles of war.

Clausewitz was considered more as a philosopher. His statement about *war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means* is an example of his theory (Paret, 1986, 200). *On War*, he advocates that once it is decided upon, a commander should be allowed to act freely according to scientific principles. Political interference is unnecessary in a war ruled by invariable and enduring principles. Clausewitz argues that not only *do policy makers shape military strategy but political leaders are paramount because policy is guiding intelligence and war is only the instrument for no other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political*. (Howard, 1976, 607). However, whilst the thrust *On War* is directed primarily at the primacy of policy, Clausewitz, nonetheless, contends that military leaders should not be subjected to the capriciousness of some government policies. Additionally he concludes that out the close interplay between politics and military affairs war is ultimately waged by a remarkable trinity of the government, armed forces and people. A theory that ignores any of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless, (Howard, 1976, 89). The government provides the purpose, the military the means and the people the will.

CONCLUSION

Clausewitz and Jomini's emphasis on massive and aggressive use of force at the critical point provides the basis for similar

strategic principles. However, Clausewitz's insistence on the complexity of war, its political nature and the use of theory as a means to clarify relationships contradict to Jomini's aim of erecting simple and prescriptive theories on military strategy. However, whilst Jomini's theories have become dated, if taken in the context of his aim, which was *to reduce the complexity of warfare to the smallest number of crucial factors and to describe those lines of action that make victory most likely* (Paret, 1986, 172), they are still worthy of study. Moreover his influence on the writings of later military strategists, in particular Alfred Mahan, bear testimony to this work's worth. However, it is Clausewitz's theories contained in *On War* which have passed the litmus test of time. His guidelines for an army which is versatile, efficient and effective, whilst not losing sight of the political purpose is a sound basis for current military strategies. Indeed he has led many military authorities, like the American strategist Benard Brodie, to believe that *On War "is not simply the greatest but the only truly great book on war"*. (Brodie, 1976, 53). Perhaps, Zvi Lanir sums up best when he states that *Clausewitz's major contribution to military thought lies not in the concepts he discovered but in the methodology of thinking that he demonstrated*. (Zvi Lanir, 1993, 10).

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" The Value of a soldier is only Known in War. Civilians don't appreciate us unless we were fighting"

*Major Lyangsong Tomsang
2nd Gurkha Rifles.*

STRUKTUR ORGANISASI PERTAHANAN DAN KEBERKESANANNYA

oleh Mej Naharuddin bin Shaari

PENGENALAN

Ada penulis-penulis memperkatakan bahawa kebanyakan masyarakat awam menganggap organisasi pertahanan yang sebilang besarnya dimonopoli oleh anggota tentera, sebagai satu ancaman kepada kerajaan yang memerintah.¹ Anggapan ini amat ketara berlaku dalam tahun 1950an dan 60an terutama di negara-negara yang baru merdeka. Namun demikian organisasi pertahanan tetap wujud hampir di semua negara. Anggapan sebegini diburuki lagi apabila terlalu banyak contoh bahawa institusi seperti ini telah mengambil alih kuasa negara atau sekurang-kurangnya mereka telah menguasai dan mempengaruhi pentadbiran kerajaan. Insiden-insiden sebegini kebanyakannya berlaku pada masa itu hampir seluruh negara-negara di Amerika Latin dan di Asia. Kepentingan kuasa lebih penting daripada objektif asal iaitu mempertahankan negara. Di dalam keserabutan kenegatifan ini, kebanyakan organisasi pertahanan di negara-negara barat masih kekal sebagai institusi yang di hormati dan berperanan penting di dalam pembangunan negara.

STRUKTUR ORGANISASI PERTAHANAN

Kewujudan Angkatan Tentera yang sah adalah sebagai elemen yang penting di dalam masyarakat yang dibentuk dan dilatih untuk mengendali 'keganasan' oleh kerajaan yang memerintah. Antara ahli politik (yang membuat keputusan menggunakan kegarasan dan anggota tentera yang menjalankan arahan tersebut), kewujudan sistem yang 'elaborate' yakni

sebahagian awam dan sebahagian besarnya tentera adalah ketara. Ini adalah untuk menentukan kesiapsiagaan semasa aman dengan merancang, mengarah, mengawal, kordinasi dan membekal keperluan semasa peperangan dan darurat.² Oleh itu atas dorongan hujah-hujah di atas maka adalah baik dibincangkan apakah itu struktur organisasi pertahanan? dan apakah keberkesanannya? Mengikut kamus Webster's 'structure' bermaksud 'something made up of interdependent parts in a definite pattern of organization'.³ Manakala kamus dewan bahasa dan pustaka pula struktur bermaksud kaedah bagaimana sesuatu disusun atau rangka.

Organisasi pertahanan adalah bersangkutan dengan keselamatan negara sama ada ancaman dari luar atau dari dalam. Namun dari perkataan 'pertahanan' dapatlah diringkaskan bahawa keutamaan diberi kepada ancaman dari luar. Boleh dikatakan semua negara di dunia ini mempunyai organisasi pertahanan mereka sendiri. Organisasi pertahanan merangkumi pengurusan sumber manusia, kelengkapan, persenjataan dan teknologi. Organisasi ini adalah sebahagian dari beberapa cabang institusi-institusi atau kementerian di dalam kerajaan sesebuah negara yang berdaulat. Oleh itu Organisasi pertahanan tidak boleh lari daripada dasar awam sesebuah negara iaitu berkaitan dengan kepentingan nasional, dasar dalam negeri dan luar negara. Setiap tindak tanduk dan keputusan yang dibuat perlu melalui proses birokrasi yang telah ditetapkan. Walaupun strukturnya dilengkapi oleh sebahagian besarnya anggota tentera, namun dari

segi pelaksanaan polisi pertahanan nasional terutama semasa aman dikuasai oleh pemimpin politik. Panglima-panglima tentera hanya perlu mentadbir dan melatih anggota-anggota mereka. Apabila terdusanya peperangan maka barulah peranan kuasa panglima tentera agak lebih ketara. Contoh yang relevan adalah semasa perang Korea, apabila Jeneral Mac Arthur telah diberi kuasa sepenuhnya untuk memimpin bala tentera memerangi pihak komunis Korea Utara.

Organisasi Pertahanan adalah 'purposive instrument'. Ianya bukan organisasi yang longgar dan ditubuhkan dengan beberapa matlamat tertentu. Antaranya ialah untuk membantu pihak berkuasa awam. Tetapi peranan utamanya masih kekal sebagai bertempur dan menang perang. Struktur organisasinya dibentuk atas keperluan peranan utamanya. Ianya dibentuk atas dasar pemerintahan pusat, 'hierachy', disiplin, komunikasi dan semangat kekitaan yang diperkukuhkan dengan 'self-sufficiency'.⁴


Kelazimannya organisasi pertahanan adalah satu cabang yang sehinggakan kebanyakan negara Angkatan Tenteranya diaktakan atau dikuatkuasakan di dalam undang-undang negara atau pun dimasukkan kedalam perlembagaan negara. Negara seperti United Kingdom polisi dan kuasa pertahanannya berlandaskan 'Ministry of Defence Act'. Manakala di Malaysia walaupun dasar pertahanannya dikuasai oleh pemimpin politik, tetapi ianya ada kaitan dengan perkara 41, 132, 137 dan 150 Perlembagaan Persekutuan.⁵

Untuk mendapat penjelasan yang lebih lanjut kajian struktur organisasi pertahanan ini perlu di buat dengan menonjolkan beberapa perbandingan negara yang maju dan negara ketiga.

REPUBLIK RAKYAT CHINA (RRC).

Struktur pertahanan RRC amat menarik kerana negara ini diperintah oleh komunis. Untuk mengetahui dengan lebih lanjut, tiga elemen penting perlu diberi perhatian. Pertama, Mao Zedong pernah berkata, 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun'. Revolusi dan penubuhan Parti Komunis China (PKC) adalah atas kejayaan People's Liberation Army (PLA). Oleh itu PKC memberi kesahihan terhadap peranan PLA untuk mengekalkan kuasa parti. Kedua, Mao berkata 'the party controls the gun', oleh itu senjata tidak akan dibenarkan menguasai parti. Atas dasar ini, walaupun akur terhadap kekuatan PLA, PKC sentiasa waspada dan mengawasi PLA. Ketiga, semasa awal pemerintahan komunis, negara tersebut adalah serba kekurangan dari segi kekuatan ekonomi dan teknologi. Ianya mengharapkan kuasa tentera infantri dan strategi 'peoples war'.

Ketiga-tiga elemen inilah dijadikan sebagai asas pembentukan struktur organisasi pertahanan RRC. Jika dilihat didalam Rajah 1 didapati bahawa kuasa pertahanan dikawal oleh PKC melalui politburo yang mempunyai jawatankuasa pusat yang mana melalui 'Central Military Commission' (CMC) semua dasar akan disalurkan kepada Kementerian Pertahanan Negara (MND). Namun demikian politburo tidak mempunyai kuasa mutlak terhadap penyaluran dasar-dasar. Ini kerana Jawatankuasa tetap melalui Kongres kebangsaan Rakyat (NPC) juga mempunyai kuasa yang sama untuk menyalurkan dasar-dasar pertahanan.⁶ Oleh itu dapatlah dirumuskan struktur organisasi pertahanan RRC adalah rumit. Antara sebabnya adalah untuk mengelakkan sesuatu bahagian mempunyai kuasa yang mutlak.

STRUKTUR ORGANISASI PERTAHANAN RRC

CMC = Central Military Committee
 GPD = General Political Dept
 GRSD = Gen Rear Svc Dept
 MD = Military District
 MR = Military Region
 STINDC = Science, Tech, and Industry Def Committee

RAJAH 1

UNITED KINGDOM (UK)

Organisasi pertahanan UK adalah salah satu organisasi yang tertua. Ia telah melalui berbagai sejarah kegemilangannya yang penuh cabaran dan kebanggaan. Banyak negara-negara lain terutamanya negara-negara commonwealth telah mencontohi struktur organisasi pertahanannya. Perubahan perlembagaan masyarakat Eropah banyak tertumpu dalam lingkungan antara 'Cromwell rebellion di England' 1642 dan revolusi Perancis 1789. Sebelum itu tentera tetap adalah sebagai alat kepada kuasa di Raja atau orang-orang bangsawan dan mereka memberi taat setia mereka kepada Raja yang memerintah. Tentera adalah sebagai alat kepada raja-raja yang memerintah dan peperangan adalah untuk kepentingan raja-raja dan bukan untuk negara.⁷


Antara perang Napoleonik 1792 dan 'Great War' 1914, baru terdapat peralihan berlaku di mana pemikir-pemikir tentera menganggap kekuatan nasionalis dan kepentingan negara diberi keutamaan. Lebih ketara lagi pada tahun perubahan ini berlaku pada tahun 1870 semasa peperangan Franco-Prussian. Pada tahun tersebut struktur organisasi pertahanan tertumpu kepada kerajaan negara dan keseluruhannya tentera dianggotai oleh rakyat sendiri dan tidak lagi dianggotai oleh tentera upahan berbagai bangsa. Struktur pertahanan disusun secara berpusat dan tidak lagi digunakan untuk kepentingan raja sebaliknya sebagai alat diplomasi dan pertahanan negara.

Sebagai contoh di Rajah 2 dapat dilihat bagaimana struktur organisasi pertahanan UK dibentuk dan disusun untuk kepentingan dan kedaulatan negara tersebut. Struktur ini dibentuk semasa kemuncak perang dingin dan

kemungkinan telah banyak berubah sejajar dengan perkembangan masa kini. Namun demikian dapatlah dijangka bahawa dasar pertahanan negara UK banyak bergantung kepada ancaman dari luar terutama dari blok timur. Dasarnya juga sejajar dengan kehendak dasar luar negaranya yang berpegang teguh dengan konsep NATO disamping sebagai anggota tetap majlis Keselamatan Pertubuhan Bangsa-bangsa Bersatu kononnya bertanggungjawab membantu Amerika Syarikat dan negara-negara lain (yang percaya kepada keamanan) terhadap keselamatan dunia.

ITALI

Sejarah ketenteraan Itali sama seperti UK telah melalui kegemilangannya tersendiri. Empayar Roman adalah satu-satu detik sejarah yang penting dan telah dikatakan politik demokrasi moden dunia bermula di Rom. Namun demikian pada masa kini, struktur organisasi pertahanannya telah melalui pembaharuan sejajar dengan dasar pertahanan dan luarnya. Seperti negara UK, Itali juga sebuah negara demokrasi dan dasar pertahanannya semasa perang dingin adalah untuk pertahanan Eropah Barat dari serangan Blok Timur terutama dari Uni-Soviet. Tidak diketahui apakah perubahan yang telah berlaku terhadap struktur organisasi pertahanannya pada masa kini, namun dijangka tidak banyak perbezaannya. Jika dilihat di Rajah 3, kita dapati struktur organisasi pertahanannya agak lebih kurang sama dengan UK. Tetapi sejarah politik Itali yang terlalu tidak menentu dan 'volatile' membuatkan kuasa meneraju kementerian pertahanan agak kabur. Terutamanya kuasa parlimennya yang dianggotai oleh berbagai parti dan tidak ada parti majoriti. Oleh itu kuasa pertahanan telah diagihkan antara parti gabungan. Oleh itu sesuatu dasar pertahanan terpaksa melalui proses yang terlalu panjang.⁸

STRUKTUR ORGANISASI PERTAHANAN UK

(Source: based on the British and NATO structures.)

RAJAH 2

AMERIKA SYARIKAT

Jabatan pertahanan AS dapat dilihat kepentingannya terserlah apabila pembuat keputusan berkehendakkan perubahan semasa perang dunia kedua. Organisasi pertahanan pusat secara 'de facto' telah wujud pada tahun 1942 dan seterusnya diikuti pula penubuhan Ketua Turus Bersama (JCS). Akta Keselamatan Kebangsaan 1947 secara formalnya telah menubuh JCS sebagai penasihat tentera yang terpenting kepada Presiden, Majlis Keselamatan Negara, Setiausaha Pertahanan dan Kongress. Akta tersebut juga telah menubuhkan Departmen Tentera Udara yang digabungkan bersama Tentera Darat dan Laut yang telah ditubuhkan terlebih awal di bawah satu bumbung Departmen Pertahanan.⁹

Di Rajah 4 adalah struktur organisasi pertahanan AS yang asal. Namun, keperluan peningkatan dan keperluan masakini telah membuatkan perubahan terhadap fungsi khusus di dalam departmen Pertahanan. Perubahan ini diperlukan setelah kelemahan dan kesilapan telah dikenalpasti. Matlamat perubahan ini adalah untuk memudahkan keputusan pertahanan dilakukan. Walaupun perubahan struktur organisasi ini banyak tentangan dan tidak banyak masalah dapat diatasi, namun, yang ketara adalah disebabkan tradisi, sentimen dan berokratik, Rajah 5 dapat dilihat sebagai organisasi pertahanan yang diubah suai. Secara keseluruhan prosesnya telah dapat dilihat secara tidak langsung kuasa departmen tentera perlahan-lahan telah dipindah kepada Setiausaha Pertahanan dan JCS telah diberi pengawalan yang jelas terhadap kordinasi dan kawalan pusat.

Organisasi pertahanan AS telah menumpukan ancaman berperang menentang


China dan beberapa negara lain secara serentak. Dasar ini digubal pada 1950an dan awal 1960an. Ianya digelar 'two and a half wars'. Oleh itu dasar AS tertumpu melengkapkan Angkatan Tenteranya dengan perbelanjaan yang besar. Pada akhir 1960an pula sekali lagi perubahan telah berlaku pada dasar pertahanan AS yakni telah menumpukan pula kepada 'One and a half Wars'. AS menjangka gabungan Uni-Soviet dan China untuk menentangnya mungkin pupus.

JEPUN

Agensi Pertahanan Jepun, Kementerian Pertahanan Jepun dan 'Japanese Self-Defence Forces (JSDF)' secara rasminya telah ditubuhkan pada 1 Julai, 1954. Struktur organisasi ini telah dilahirkan dengan melalui pahit getir kesan perang dunia kedua. Sebelumnya Struktur pertahanan Jepun dipanggil tentera imperialis yang taat kepada Raja mereka. Setelah mereka dikalahkan oleh tentera bersekutu dan Amerika Syarikat mereka telah di'demili tarization' oleh Amerika Syarikat yang dasarnya tidak mahu melihat adanya kuasa tentera yang kuat di rantau Asia.


Namun, apabila berlakunya peperangan Korea, dasar Amerika Syarikat telah berubah dan mahukan Jepun di'rearm' kerana bala tentera Amerika Syarikat perlu digerakkan ke Semenanjung Korea. Pada Julai 1950 Mac Arthur telah mengarahkan kerajaan Perdana Menteri Shigeru Yoshida menubuhkan pasukan polis simpanan seramai 75,000 anggota. Setelah Jepun mendapat semula kedaulatannya pada 28 April, 1952, pasukan Polis Simpanan telah ditukar kepada Pasukan Keselamatan yang membayangkan peranannya sebagai Angkatan Tentera. Namun Artikel 9 kepada perlembagaan Jepun tidak membenarkan berperang dan menggunakan Angkatan Tentera untuk menyelesaikan masalah antarabangsa. Atas

STRUKTUR ORGANISASI PERTAHANAN ITALI




RAJAH 3

STRUKTUR ORGANISASI PERTAHANAN ASAL AMERIKA SYARIKAT




RAJAH 4

STRUKTUR ORGANISASI PERTAHANAN AMERIKA SYARIKAT



Source: U.S. Department of Defense.

RAJAH 5

STRUKTUR ORGANISASI PERTAHANAN JEPUN**RAJAH 6**

desakan kepentingan negara dan berpandukan Artikel 51 'charter' Pertubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu yang mengatakan bahawa negara yang berdaulat berhak untuk 'self-defence', maka Jepun terus meningkatkan pasukan keselamatannya ke tahap JSDF.

Struktur organisasi pertahanan Jepun mempunyai dwi-fungsi iaitu operasi dan pentadbiran. Struktur pemerintah operasi berfungsi sebagai:

- * Perdana Menteri mempunyai kuasa mutlak untuk menggerakkan anggota tentera (melalui SDF law, Art 8). Beliau memberi perintah kepada Ketua Pengarah Agensi Pertahanan dan seterusnya memberi arahan kepada Panglima-panglima Tentera ketiga-tiga perkhidmatan.

- * Jika keadaan membimbangkan Ketua Pengarah melalui persetujuan Perdana Menteri boleh mengarah bersiap sedia untuk menggerakkan anggota tentera.

- * Perdana Menteri untuk meluluskan arahan di atas perlu pula mendapat persetujuan 'diet' (parlimen). Beliau juga perlu mendapat persetujuan Majlis Pertahanan Negara (NDC) yang diletakkan di dalam Kabinet.

- * Untuk menentukan keberkesanan saluran pemerintah Pos Pemerintah Pusat telah ditubuhkan.

Fungsi struktur pertahanan kedua ialah pentadbiran yang mana JSDF telah ditadbirkan oleh awam yang dipanggil buro dalaman (naikyoku) dan Pejabat ketua Turus ketiga-tiga perkhidmatan. Ianya dibahagikan kepada beberapa buro yang dipaparkan di Rajah 6.¹⁰

MALAYSIA

Struktur organisasi pertahanan Malaysia adalah dikuasai secara jelas oleh ahli politik. Strukturnya banyak diambil daripada UK kerana sebelum negara merdeka struktur pertahanan negara telah ditadbir oleh tentera British. Perbezaannya pada masa dahulu walaupun kuasa pemerintah di pegang oleh Perdana Menteri UK melalui parlimennya namun pemerintah tentera di Malaya pada masa itu mempunyai kuasa yang agak keterlaluan dan membuat sesuatu tanpa melalui proses yang sebenar. Setelah merdeka Malaysia telah mengambil alih kementerian pertahanan dan seterusnya telah melalui proses pembangunan dan pemodenan yang pesat, terutama setelah perletakan senjata oleh Parti Komunis Malaya pada 2 Dis 1989.

Sebagai sebuah negara demokrasi Angkatan Tenteranya (yang memainkan peranan yang besar di dalam Struktur organisasi pertahanan negara) tidak pernah terlibat secara terus di dalam kancah politik negara. Angkatan Tenteranya sentiasa berada di luar politik dan taat kepada Raja dan negara. Sesuatu dasar yang penting yang memerlukan pergerakan Angkatan Tentera kuasa untuk menggerakkannya adalah daripada Menteri Pertahanan. Beliau pula perlu mendapat persetujuan Perdana Menteri yang telah mendapat 'consensus' daripada Kabinet. Persetujuan Kabinet adalah formaliti sahaja. Jika kita lihat di Rajah 7 dapatlah ditanggap bahawa ada proses dasar awam yang mana Pertahanan adalah sebahagian daripadanya, tidak perlu melalui proses yang sebenarnya.

Di dalam Rajah 8 dapat dilihat bahawa Yang DiPertuan Agong adalah sebagai 'Supreme Commander' kepada Angkatan Tentera Malaysia. Tetapi di dalam struktur Organisasi Pertahanan Malaysia peranan Agong hanyalah sebagai simbol di Raja dan sebagai mengekalkan

adat tradisi ketenteraan samalah seperti di UK.

KEBERKESANANNYA

Untuk mengubal sesuatu organisasi pertahanan sebagai organisasi yang berkesan ianya bukan sahaja tertumpu kepada perundangan, sistem pentadbiran, politik yang stabil dan struktur hirarki. Namun ianya juga ada kaitan dengan faktor-faktor kewangan, politik antarabangsa dan 'intangibles'.

Perbandingan di atas dapat dilihat bahawa Amerika Syarikat mempunyai struktur organisasi pertahanan yang lebih bersistematik. Ini sejajar dengan reputasinya sebagai kuasa unggul di dunia. Selain dari itu negara tersebut adalah sebuah negara yang terkaya dan mampu membiayai mengikut dasar yang telah digubal. Oleh itu keberkesanan organisasi pertahanannya itu dapatlah dilihat melalui kemampuan untuk memenuhi dan mempertahankan dasar-dasar yang telah digubal. Dari itu atas dasar kemampuannya AS sentiasa dapat memantapkan struktur organisasi pertahanannya sebagai instrumen yang berkesan sejajar dengan dasar dan kepentingan negara.

Berbanding dengan negara-negara lain yang mempunyai sistem politik yang lebih kurang sama, keberkesanan struktur organisasi pertahanan AS lebih menonjol kerana kemampuan kewangannya. Ini tidak bermakna negara-negara seperti UK, Itali dan Jepun tidak berkesan tetapi ianya ada kaitan sampingan. Sebagai contoh Jepun, dasar negara berpandukan kepada Artikel 9 kepada perlembagaannya. Struktur organisasi pertahanannya adalah berkesan tetapi tidaklah mencapai tahap keberkesanan ketaraf 'hegemon' walaupun dari segi kewangan ia mampu melakukannya. Manakala menurut James Fallows¹¹ pula peningkatan perbelanjaan tidak semestinya akan

meningkatkan kemampuan pertahanan. Sebagai contoh UK telah membelanjakan 60 juta pound sebelum perang dunia kedua sebagai persiapan pertahanan di Singapura. Namun sistem pertahanannya ini tidak dapat menahan kemaraan tentera Jepun yang bukannya datang dari arah laut tetapi melalui Semenanjung Tanah Melayu. Ini jelas membuktikan kegagalan organisasi pertahanan untuk menyesuaikan diri dengan keadaan yang berubah-ubah dan suasana politik antarabangsa yang tidak ketentuan.

Selain dari itu faktor 'intangibles' yang disarankan oleh Fallows juga boleh mempengaruhi keberkesanan sesuatu organisasi pertahanan. Katanya faktor moral, keberanian dan kecekapan adalah antara 'intangibles' yang boleh menyebabkan kesan negatif atau positif. Sebagai contoh struktur organisasi pertahanan Vietnam Utara semasa peperangan di Vietnam dahulu tidaklah secanggih AS. Namun, faktor 'intangibles' telah dapat mengatasi kekuatan AS.

Manakala RRC dan Malaysia struktur organisasi pertahanan tidak sejajar dengan kepentingan negara. Ini adalah disebabkan dengan kemampuan kewangan mereka yang terhad. Oleh itu negara-negara ini terpaksa mengikut teori 'incrementalism'¹² yakni melengkapkan sesuatu struktur organisasi dengan berperingkat-peringkat mengikut kemampuan kewangan negara. Kesukaran yang timbul ialah politik antarabangsa dan teknologi canggih sentiasa berubah dengan cepat. Maka itu, keberkesanan organisasi pertahanan seperti ini mungkin tercapai dari segi pengurusan sumber manusia sahaja dan tidak dari kelengkapan, persenjataan dan teknologi.

Kesemua struktur organisasi pertahanan di atas jika dipandang dari sudut seorang ahli politik maka ianya berkesan dari kawalan terhadap Angkatan Tentera yang pada

keseluruhannya berkuasa dengan senjata yang ada pada mereka. Ianya juga dilihat bahawa di era sekarang struktur pertahanan memang diadakan untuk kepentingan negara dan tidak lagi kuasa tentera diterajui oleh kerabat diRaja. Jika ada pun ianya hanya sebagai simbol tradisi yang diikuti berkurun-kurun lamanya dan kuasa pentadbiran dan pemerintahan dipegang oleh kerajaan yang memerintah sama ada secara demokrasi atau cara yang lain. Oleh itu apa yang didapati ialah ianya berkesan dari segi kawalan sahaja.

Selain dari segi kawalan oleh pihak kerajaan yang memerintah terdapat masalah sampingan. Antaranya proses pentadbiran dan dasar yang digubal terpaksa melalui peringkat yang terlalu rumit. Di sini dapatlah dijangka bahawa ada antara peringkat proses tersebut yang tidak setuju kepada sesuatu dasar yang disyorkan. Selain dari itu pihak pemerintah tentera akan berasa tidak puas hati sesuatu dasar atau pun pembelian senjata terpaksa akur kepada kehendak kuasa politik. Sebagai anggota tentera profesional sudah tentu keperluan senjata dan alat kelengkapan pihak tenteralah lebih memahaminya daripada orang politik. Perasaan syak wasangka dirasakan oleh semua negara yang mempunyai struktur organisasi pertahanan seperti di atas. Perkara ini tidak dapat dielakkan kerana penyelenggaraan sesebuah Angkatan Tentera memerlukan peruntukan yang tinggi dan melibatkan pendapatan negara secara keseluruhannya.¹³

Namun demikian jika negara yang mempunyai sistem politik satu parti seperti RRC maka proses sesuatu dasar itu kebanyakannya mementingkan hidup matinya negara tersebut. Oleh itu sudah tentu kepentingan Angkatan Tenteranya diberi keutamaan daripada lain pembangunan masyarakat. Di sini dapat dilihat bahawa ahli politik walaupun seorang awam

tetapi atas 'survival' politiknya terpaksa keutamaannya ditumpukan kepada kesejahteraan anggota tentera supaya mereka tidak berpaling tadah.

Terdapat juga sistem politik demokrasi yang terkawal seperti Malaysia yang mana ketidakpuasan itu ditinggal begitu sahaja. Selain daripada itu pada masa kemuncak ancaman komunis Panglima Angkatan Tentera atau pun Panglima Tentera Darat ada kaitan saudara dengan Ketua Kerajaan.¹⁴ Pada masa ini pula kemungkinan sistem yang ada seperti di Rajah 7 dan 8 telah memperlihatkan bahawa, walaupun proses sesuatu dasar itu agak panjang, namun atas kuasa yang ada kepada Menteri Pertahanan melalui Perdana Menteri telah membolehkan mereka membuat keputusan yang cepat dan di samping itu pandangan itu Panglima-panglima diberi perhatian yang serius maka ianya dapat mencairkan perasaan ketidakpuasan hati terhadap kerajaan yang memerintah.

PENUTUP

Struktur Organisasi pertahanan tidak dapat dipisahkan dengan kepentingan negara. Ianya harus mampu dan berkeupayaan melaksanakan peranan dengan berkesan kerana atas kepercayaan pemimpin politik yang menggubal sesuatu dasar dan telah memberi peruntukan kewangan yang begitu tinggi. Organisasi itu juga perlu saling mempercayai antara tentera dan kerajaan. Kerajaan tidak teragak-agak menggubal dasar dan memperuntukkan kewangan yang tinggi dan pihak tentera pula percaya keikhlasan kerajaan terhadap organisasi pertahanan yang bertanggungjawab terhadap pertahanan negara. Ini akan menjamin kesejahteraan sesuatu negara dari segi keselamatan dalaman dan luaran. Seterusnya akan mengekalkan kestabilan politik dan kepentingan rakyat dan negara.

Nota

1. Menurut S.E. Finer di dalam bukunya *The Man on the Horseback - The Role of Military in Politics*, Peregrine Book, Norwich, UK, 1975, ms.9, telah mengatakan 'The Military are not universally well regarded, in Egypt, during the same period...the profession of arms was despised: the Chinese soldiers were despised...'. Ianya juga telah dikukuhkan oleh Nordlinger, di dalam bukunya *Tentera dalam Politik*, terjemahan Ghazali Mahyuddin, DBP, KL., 1986, ms., 9. Perkara ini juga dibincangkan oleh Morris Jonowitz di dalam bukunya *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977 dan Viberto Selochan di dalam bukunya *The Military, the State and Development in Asia and the Pacific*, Westview Press Inc., Colorado, USA., 1991.
2. John Downey, *Management in the Armed Forces, - An Anatomy of the Military Profession*, McGraw-Hill Book Company (UK) Ltd., U.K., 1977, ms.19.
3. Time, *Webster's New Ideal Dictionary*, G & C., Merriam Co., USA., 1976.
4. S.E. Finer., ms. 6.
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6. Martin Edmonds, *Central Organization of Defence*, Westview/Printer, Colorado,US/London, U.K., 1985, ms.16-31.
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8. *Ibid.*, ms. 115.
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10. Martin Edmonds, ms. 138.
11. James Fallows, *National Defense*, Random House Inc., New York, 1981, ms. 12-13.
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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE CASE OF THE KURDS IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Oleh Mejar Azmi Rashid

INTRODUCTION

The new political environment of the post-Cold War era has brought the issues of sovereignty, human rights and humanitarian politics generally to international prominence. One incident which illustrates this phenomenon is the fight of the Kurds against the government of Iraq. The world-wide attention given by the media and political pressure by Turkey influenced western powers and later the United Nations to intervene to provide humanitarian relief. Other reasons for intervention were geo-strategic, namely to maintain regional stability and international peace and security.

This essay focuses on humanitarian intervention as an aspect of conflict of this nature. For this purpose, two models of humanitarian intervention by an external power in Iraq are highlighted. The first model represents the intervention by the western allied forces (the United States of America, Britain and France). The second model corresponds to the humanitarian assistance provided by the United Nations (UN). Although the humanitarian relief was meant for the whole of Iraq, which includes the Shia Muslims in the south, this essay will focus on the activities carried out by the external powers in northern Iraq from 1991 to 1993.

AIM

The aim is to determine in which situation was humanitarian intervention in Iraq justified.

Before going into the two models, it is pertinent to first examine the nature of humanitarian intervention and the problems associated with it. This will lay as the theoretical framework for the overall study.

DEFINING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

The term intervention has many meanings. It is associated with a form of military, economic or social behaviour which occurs in all areas of social activity. In terms of international relations, that behaviour may come from a state which interferes in the internal jurisdiction of another country with the intention to preserve or change the structure of the existing political authority of that country. The problem is that this phenomenon is often mixed up with other terms such as aggression, imperialism and colonialism. Hedley Bull defines intervention as:

*"dictatorial or coercive interference, by an outside party, in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state, or more broadly of an independent political community."*¹

Bull's definition suggest that intervention

may be forcible or nonforcible, direct or indirect, open or clandestine. The outside party that interferes may be a state, group of states or even an international organisation like the UN, the International Monetary Foundation (IMF) or big business corporations like IBM, AT&T and others. The interference can apply itself to a state's jurisdiction over its territory, its citizens, its right to determine its internal affair or to conduct its international relations. A broader definition is by John Vincent:

*"that activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state or an international organisation which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state. It is not necessarily lawful or unlawful, but it does break a conventional pattern of international relations"*²

From the two definitions above, the key factor is "coercive interference". In International Relations (IR), most interference that involves attempts or influence on the behaviour of states or relevant actors, is not included to mean intervention.³

TO INTERVENE OR NOT TO INTERVENE

The norm has always been non-intervention. Closely associated with this norm are questions of justice, rights, duties, and obligations which originate from international law from the European state system that emerged from the Peace of Westphalia (1618-48). The main principles of the system were reflected in *Kants Perpetual Peace*, in which the fifth articles says: "No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state."⁴ Kant acknowledged the existence of basic principles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states and respect for human

rights and fundamental freedom. He also expressed his moral concerns in international relations, where the basis of the settled norms of the modern system as found in the Charter of the United Nations. Kants basic conception of non-intervention also reflected his moral concerns for humanity, which forced him to admit that there exist situations where this principle can be disregarded. Although it does not provide the license to simply interfere, yet the normative grounds are there. Different people have different traditions, cultures, customs and therefore different moral values. However there are some common grounds that everyone can agree upon, such as the basic rights for security, shelter, food, water and freedom to live. The case for intervention if such basic rights are violated by the authorities therefore exists but the burden of proof is still required.

The notion that it is alright to intervene in certain circumstances can also be found in Jeremy Bentham *Principles of International Law* (1843). He shared the conviction that as citizens of the world our basic duty is to the welfare of mankind. Therefore states may intervene into each others affairs when they have entered a legal arrangement that legitimates such actions. For Michael Walzer intervention is justified *when the violation of human rights within a set of boundaries is so terrible like in cases of enslavement or massacre*.⁵ From this view it seems that the norms of non intervention can or should be breached when the purpose is for the good of mankind or when it is legally justified. There is no problem if such intervention is at the invitation of the target state, at least theoretically. But what about intervention to protect human rights, such as providing security and humanitarian aid to refugees who are running away for fear of been killed by their own government? Cosmopolitan thought rejects

the idea of a state's autonomy when this autonomy itself could violate international agreements or treaties. But the state has the absolute right to defend its sovereignty.

During the Cold War era, many military interventions termed as humanitarian were not within the context of the above definitions. For example, the treatment of the Armenians in 1922 in Turkey, the Egyptian intervention in Palestine and the deployment of troops by Belgium in 1960 in Congo in order to protect Belgium's interests and the lives of Belgians and other nationals, were all wrongly described as humanitarian intervention. It is generally agreed that humanitarian intervention is deemed legitimate when its purpose is to intervene by force against a state which practices genocide on a large scale or which would, for instance, starve its inhabitants. Such was the justification for the removal of Idi Amin from power by Tanzania's intervention in Uganda, and for the Indian intervention for the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. The problem with this argument is that in the real world things are more ambiguous. It is hard to know whether an intervention which starts as a humanitarian move does not later end up with other ulterior motives. Cambodia is an example of such a case, where Vietnam's occupation started as an attempt at removing Pol Pot but ended up with the imposition of Vietnamese rules.

The end of the Cold War has changed the attitude of the international community drastically and the moral case for non-intervention is no longer required⁶. The criteria for human intervention have become more powerful, when the state itself is incapable of protecting the rights of its citizens or is itself an active violator. This new thinking advocates a new humanitarian order in which governments are held by force, if necessary, to raise standard

of respect for human life. It is generally felt that the protection of ethnic, religious and other minorities endangered by conflict and alienated from a hostile government is now increasingly a recognised obligation of the international community.⁷ From this point of view, sovereignty is no longer an obstacle but a political constraint. It no longer resides with the state but the people within them; self-determination would no longer refer to peoples but to individuals. This new shift for normal concerns has raised some questions on the very nature of humanitarian intervention itself.

After taking consideration of all the pros and cons, we need to answer the question: Where to draw the line between the justification to intervene and not to intervene, disregarding the sovereignty of States. The fundamental principles which could be derived from the theories above suggest that some criteria for humanitarian intervention could be derived as follows:

- * The intervention must be for a humanitarian purpose such as to prevent massive deprivations of fundamental human rights.
- * The use of force, if necessary, must be proportionate after all peaceful means have exhausted.
- * The intervention should not last longer than necessary.
- * The object states authority structures should not be altered.
- * The intervention must be legally authorised and a general consensus approved by the international community.

- * The intervention must be carried out with the consent of the target state, by the UN, or by groups states or any specialised agencies under the auspices of the UN.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Who should decide when moral justice takes precedence over legal justice on the issue of human rights? A socialist would argue that capitalism violates the human rights of the poor for the profit of the owners of production. On the other hand, the capitalist would say that there is nothing worse than the intellectual deprivation of middle class elites.⁸ To add to the confusion, according to the 1948 UN Declaration on Human Right, totalitarian societies can be redeemed if they emphasise social and economic rights in their official ideology.⁹ Indeed justice is being served when the state keeps to the laws set out in its constitution. This is theoretically upheld by international law, but reality shows that there are many flaws within the system.

The traditional Western view advocated human rights as natural, inborn and inalienable. This is contrary to our beliefs that human rights know no boundary is not theoretically wrong but also harmful politically and practically. On December 9, 1981, the UN Resolution 36/103 adopted a resolution which states that, no state or group of State has the right to intervene or interfere in any form or for any reason what so ever in the internal and external affairs of other States. It further added, *"the duty of states is to refrain from the exploitation and the distortion of human rights issues as a means or interference in the internal affairs of States, and of exerting pressures on other States or creating distrust and disorder within and among States or group of State"*.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the

change in world politics have shifted this attitude, which makes humanitarian intervention possible in certain circumstances such as for the protection of human rights. John Vincent *"Human Rights and International Relations"*, says that certain developments in the United Nations challenged the freemasonry of sovereign states. He says that *"notions of human rights now infuse the international system and the individual states which compose it; and that there is an area of domestic conduct which is under the scrutiny of international law. But this does not issue the general license for intervention"*.¹¹

THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

When if at all, may the violation of human justify external intervention? Four articles of the UN Charter are significant to this inquiry. Article 2(4) and 51 represent two opposite opinions. The prohibition to use force is balanced by the permission to engage in individual or collective self-defence. Article 2 (4) says that a state can intervene in another state, by use of force. It could be misused to support the view that it is lawful to use force for the purpose of humanitarian intervention.

This argument was used in the past when states claimed their right to humanitarian intervention such as during the raid on Entebbe in 1976 or the United States attempt to rescue US hostages in Iran in 1980. In both occasions, the target states condemned the actions as violations of their sovereignty, but the interveners argued that it was purely humanitarian and did not constitute an assault on the territorial integrity or political independence of the affected state.¹² It was repeated in the General Assembly Declaration of October 24, 1970 on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and

co-operation among State. Therefore, there exists a case of discrepancy between the formal law of non-intervention in the affairs of another country and the moral law of human concern. On the other hand no country say that they are intervening in the affairs of another country; they would claim that they are providing assistance or restoring democracy or even preventing intervention by another power to that country. Some academicians argue that the UN Charter 51 should not be read as restricting any unilateral use of force to self-defensive purpose. This argument could be justified by the intervention of India in Bangladesh, of Tanzania in Uganda, Of Vietnam in Kampuchea, of the United States and members of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States in Grenada and of the United States in Panama.

Article 2 (4) can also be interpreted as authorizing humanitarian intervention even to the extent of the use of force. Here, the Security Council could declare that the violations of human rights in a particular country constitute a threat to peace in accordance with Article 39 and could take military or non-military action to remove that threat, while Article 51 could be interpreted as restricting any unilateral use of force to self-defensive purposes. In other words force can be used.

In Article 2 (7), the UN is unauthorized to intervene in domestic jurisdiction of state. However, it has undertaken many action which affect the domestic affairs of member countries. It is argued that such actions do not constitute intervention since peacekeeping operations are deployed to pacify a conflict. They have a limited purpose, limited duration of mission, limited use of coercive measures, and lack of recourse. Most importantly, they are launched when consented by the host country and would

be withdrawn if such consent is terminated.

THE CASE OF THE KURDS IN NORTHERN IRAQ


BACKGROUND

Although, at some 20 million strong, the Kurds represent the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East, they do not have a state of their own. Instead they are divided over several countries: Turkey (10 million), Iran (6 million), Iraq (3 million), and Syria (1 million). In all these countries, they are politically disadvantaged and have challenged central authority often at great cost to themselves.¹³

In Iraq, the Kurds form the majority in the northern governorate of Sulaymaniah, Arbil, Dahuk, and Kirkuk, Iraq richest oil-producing area. Since the creation of Iraq, it has been understood *"that they were to negotiate their future position, a right that the Kurds in other states did not have."*¹⁴ The Iraqi government has always feared the possibility of Kurdish separatism, because it would also set a precedent to the Shia Muslims in southern Iraq who represent some 55 percent of the whole population of Iraq. The Kurdish secession would also strike at the economic heart of the state. This situation has caused the historical struggle between the government of Iraq and its Kurdish minority.¹⁵

The Kurdish rights to some form of autonomy can be traced back to the Anglo-Iraqi Joint Declaration to the Council of the League of Nations which was recognised and guaranteed, at least in theory, in an Anglo-Iraqi Joint Declaration to the League of Nations.

The major geo-political reason favouring

"KURDISH POPULATED AREAS IN THE MIDDLE EAST "

the creation of a Kurdish state after the First World war was geo-strategic: to create a buffer state between Iraq, Turkey and Iran and the autonomous region of Azerbaijan in the Soviet Union or in other words, a buffer between the Turks and the Arabs; and to contain the spread of Muslim unity. Such perception led Britain to encourage Kurdish nationalism with Iraq.¹⁶ This tactic would at least intimidate Turkey and Iran to acquiesce to British policies toward the Arab countries.

After the coup of 1958, Kurds in Northern Iraq led by Mustafa Barzani first saw some positive gains. Nevertheless, they were heavily pounded, their villages destroyed and many were killed. Barzani demanded but was not granted full autonomy and fighting resumed. Eventually in 1970 a peace treaty was signed but it could not hold because neither side was prepared to concede on the principles of autonomy and profit from the oil produced in the Kurdish. In the following years the Iraq government continued with its effort to suppress the Kurdish language and culture.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE GULF WAR

Although the Kurdish rebellion resumed the control of their areas when Iraq was occupied with the Iran-Iraq War between 1980 to 1988, their role only achieved prominence after the Gulf War in 1991. Iraq's annexation of Kuwait culminated with massive devastation of Saddam Hussein's forces. The Kurds, believing that Iraqi armed forces were badly weakened, resumed their attack on government forces with the aim of re-establishing control over the northern territory. This attempt failed and by the end of 1991 the Iraqi army had pushed the Kurds to the 36th parallel: the line that the Allied

coalition had drawn in the mountains which was to be the "safe haven" for the Kurds. It was in fact, the creation of a de facto Kurdish mini state, where the Iraqi army and air forces were prevented from exercising their will.

The Anfal Operation. During the uprisings of March 1991, the UN reported that the government of Iraq had carried out genocide-type operations against the Kurds. The reported military actions used artillery, mortars, tanks and aircraft to demolish, raze, burn, destroy and wipe out 113 named villages in Kurdish settlements. Use of chemical weapons and other forms of atrocities included systematic destruction of civilian property, arbitrary arrest, detention, and forced relocation.

Serious restrictions of freedom of expression were exercised by strict control of almost all means of communication (newspaper, radio, television) which, along with the Iraqi News Agency, are state properties. In short, the Kurdish population was denied the free expression of its cultural, religious and political views and ideas both in public and within their private lives. While Iraq was facing economic sanctions imposed by the international community, Saddam Hussein imposed an economic embargo upon the northern region and pulled out their government administration. In such a desperate situation the Kurdish rebels warned that unless the Kurds receive immediate help from the United States, they may be forced into brokering a deal with Saddam Hussein that could ensure that he remained in power for years. He renewed the offer of a negotiated settlement based on an autonomy arrangement but never honoured. The Kurds indicated their willingness to negotiate for a settlement under the auspices of the UN.

THE FIRST MODEL: Role of the Western Allied Forces

By April 1991 it became apparent that the Kurdish rebellion had failed. Instead a massive refugee problem emerged; some 2 million refugees were reported to be starving and freezing in extreme terrain and weather conditions. Hundreds of thousands more spilled over into Turkey and Iran. The average deaths totaled as many as 1000 a day, comprising mainly of children and old people. The appalling conditions received extensive media coverage, when pictures of their sufferings and death were shown in newspapers and on television world-wide. The Turkish government reacted to get the Kurdish refugees removed from their territory but not into a separate Kurdish state. Everyone then knew that something must be done. The question was how to do it without creating an embryonic Kurdish state. The alternative was some form of guarantee of safety within Iraqi northern borders.

The first proposal was put forward by British Prime Minister John Major to the Luxembourg summit meeting of the European Union on 8 April 1991. Former US President George Bush, working closely with other European partners, implemented Operation Provide Comfort to create the safe havens concept. The western Allied Forces comprising 5000 American marines, 1000 French soldiers and 2000 British commandos, were deployed to operate in Iraq with permanent bases in southern Turkey. The plan called for six zone of protection each capable of handling 60,000 refugees.

President Saddam Hussein denounced the safe haven concept as a conspiracy and a continuation of the policy of intervention in Iraq's

internal affairs. President Bush, in response to international reaction, announced that his policy of setting up the safe havens was purely for humanitarian reasons. Eventually for security reasons western allied forces were needed to cover a substantial area. The whole area of Kurdistan were vitally occupied and protected by the western allied forces.

THE SECOND MODEL: Role of the United Nations

From the start it was presumed that the UN could take over the relief operations once the western allied forces had established the relief system. The Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar rejected the United States request to place western troops in Iraq under UN command without the additional approval of the Security Council; he observed that the deployment of foreign troops posed political problems, although from the moral and humanitarian point of view there was no difficulty.

The UN, had been organising the relief efforts along a separate path. In October 1992, after months of negotiations Iraq and the UN agreed on a 21-point memorandum of understanding on establishing humanitarian centres in Iraq to care for all refugees and displaced persons. Given the circumstances, Iraq had no other choice and was forced to co-operate. They however rejected plans involving military forces. The UN forces were to work at their own camps, not those of the western allied forces, and despite inadequate funds relief programmes were implemented.

To solve the security problem, both sides subsequently agreed to employ 500 UN police forces to replace the western allied forces which totaled 21,700 at the peak of deployment.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 688

The horror caused by the violation of humans rights by the Baghdad regime provided the justification to Turkey and other western countries to convene the 2982 and Security Council meeting which took place on 5 April 1991. The draft resolution later became Security Council Resolution 688.¹⁷ The important question was 'would Resolution 688 be dealing with a matter pertaining to Iraqs domestic jurisdiction, rather than a threat to internal peace and security? Iraq, Cuba, Yemen, Zimbabwe, China and India argued that the human rights and humanitarian concerns addressed by the draft resolution were beyond the purview of the Security Council and their very discussion was incompatible with UN Charter 2(7). Others, in favour of intervention, counterargued that the situation was indeed a threat to international peace and security. The violation of human rights by Iraq was described by France as a "crime against humanity". According to the United States the refugee problem and its effects had trans-boundary impact on Turkey and Iran. Some mentioned its "destablising effects" on the region.¹⁸

The problem began with the first paragraph, whereby the Council:

"condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security."

The paragraph reflected internal repression rather the external consequences; therefore an internal human rights problem, even though it had external consequences, was being considered a threat to international peace and

security; the precondition for action under Chapter VII of the Charter. But no where in the resolution is Chapter VII expressly invoked. The next point is paragraph 2. By it the Council:

*"Demands the Iraq, as a contribution to removing the threat to international peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression and expresses the hope in the same context than an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the human and political rights of all citizens are respected"*²⁰

The third paragraph then says that the Council.

*"insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organisation to all those in need of assistance and to make available all necessary facilities for their operations"*²¹

This language can be understood as requiring Iraq to surrender the normal right of a state to refuse access to the country to any foreign individual or organisation. On the other hand, it is nor the practice of most humanitarian organisations, be they governmental (e.g. UNHCR), or non-governmental (e.g. ICRC), to enter countries and embark on relief operations without agreement of the state in question.

However, this could also be seen as an "interpretation" problem, which is a usual thing when it comes to interpreting the law. The significant point was that the resolution was passed with ten votes in favour, three votes against (Cuba, Yemen, Zimbabwe) and two abstention (China and India). There was no question of the resolution requiring or authorising direct enforcement action since at the time it was adopted, all "coercive measures short of armed

force envisaged in the Charter were already deployed in pursuant to the war, with a view to securing full implementation of the cease-fire resolution".

CONCLUSION

As earlier discussed, it is generally accepted that intervention includes all forms of coercive interference by an external power in the internal affairs of another. In the case of humanitarian interventions to transcend national boundaries without infringement on the sovereignty of the target state. Such actions would have to meet those criteria mentioned aforesaid.

Against this background of growing global convergence, concern for human right has become a central issue in UN agenda. The notion that human rights should stop at national borders and only inter-state wars and natural, not man-made disasters should be of concern to the international community is no longer predominant. But it does not mean that the sovereignty of states is no longer important. It still is. The fact that it is sovereign therefore requires it to be responsible to exercise such rights to observe some common human rights concern and not becoming a major violator itself.

The aim of this essay was to determine in which situation was humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq justified. We shall now look into this inquiry in further detail.

What is the legal justification?

From the theoretical point of view the burden of proof for the intervention in Iraq is the responsibility of the western allied powers. This is because it tramples on the integrity of a

sovereign state with potential harmful consequences. If one accepts the principle sovereignty as the fundamental principle of international society the intervention defined as "*coercive interference*" by the western allied forces led by the United States is illegitimate. The UN Charter Article 2.7 excludes the possibility of UN intervention "*in matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any State*". The problem is that this article has been "modified" by Article 39 which empowers the Security Council to determine the existence of any threat to international peace and security and to take measures to maintain and restore it.

Article 2.4 of the UN Charter state the principle of non-intervention. The only recognise provision to this is in Article 51 which gives the inherent right of individual or collective self defence if armed attack occurs. In other words, Article 51 is meant to strengthen the principle of non-intervention and not to weaken it. The problem is, there is no mention in international law to intervene for humanitarian reasons, even to stop the gross violations of human rights. It is not peace enforcement under Chapter 7, nor is it a peacekeeping operation under the so-called Chapter six and a half. So it lies in between. Resolution 688 was on Frances initiative with Belgiums and Britains support. What this resolution said is; "*...consequences which threatens international peace and security*". It therefore under the shadow of Chapter 7 of UN Charter. This was the justification for the breach of sovereignty by the western allied forces.

What was the moral circumstances to intervene?

The sovereignty of Iraq was challenged but not altered. Iraq remain as a member State of the UN and its diplomatic missions around

the world still exists. But, why do we need to care about the Kurds in northern Iraq, while the other Kurds in Turkey are oppressed the same way by their own government. No one has said that Turkey has violated human rights. By intervening in northern Iraq i.e. helping to feed them, giving them food and medical supplies would only provide them with the moral and psychological courage to carry on fighting for their political ambition. Thus the conflict will not end. It could even escalate. Saddam Hussein denied them administrative rights because they themselves did not want them. They wanted the United States and the UN to strengthen their political struggle. So the case for of human rights is generally a moral obligation, but if it serves a political aim in the long run then such an obligation should be given a second thought. The important condition is that the harm likely to result from the conflict must be disproportionate to the likely good to be achieved, taking into account the probability of success.

Was the use of armed force justified?

The justification to use force has to be made clear even before the intervention takes place. It should be used in self defence. This means that its use is more appropriate to protect the UN personnel and properties involved in providing the humanitarian aid. The use of military power against Iraq during the Gulf War was a different perspective altogether. It was humanitarian intervention but peace enforcement under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, with a clear mandate to liberate Kuwait and served as a lesson for big state not to simply conquer the sovereignty of smaller countries.

The use of military force in humanitarian assistance as a last resort is sensible since its use

could bring lethal consequences. But the question of when and how much should be use in indeed a real problem. In fact, for humanitarian assistance, should it be used at all? Michael Walzer, in his just war theory, advocates that it was just to use force to liberate Kuwait but then the subsequent operation in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds was unjustified. This means that the use of armed force in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds was overacting. Surely, Saddam Hussein knew before hand that it would be suicidal to challenge the allied forces militarily. Given that situation, a demonstration of allied concentration in military bases in southern Turkey and the "no-fly zone" enforcement would have been more appropriate to deter Saddam Hussein from continuing his oppression of the Kurds. These steps coupled with the timely peaceful negotiations by the UN to get the consent of the government of Iraq would have projected a better image of humanitarian intentions. This was proven when the second intervention by UN was consented by the Iraqi government and authorised by the Security Council Resolution 688. The MOU between the UN and the government of Iraq substantiated the legal document. Unlike the earlier intervention, this was a clear case to provide humanitarian aid since it was done in collaboration with the government of Iraq. It is difficult to draw the line in which circumstances does the humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq was justified. The confused situation in northern Iraq actually reflected the confusion that reigned the UN in New York. There was a lack of co-ordination by the special representative department for humanitarian relief. Furthermore, the UN bodies such as UNDRO, INHCR and ICRC and other relevant agencies under the auspices of the UN were politicised and not given the neutrality they deserve.

The Kurdish issue was a special case, being the first time such a situation happened. Even then, having learnt from this experience the UN had shown dismal performance in the current Balkan conflict. In reality it was indeed a case of double standards. Are humanitarian politics about putting double standards right. Lessons learnt from this study reveal that humanitarian intervention is an ambiguous concept. Nevertheless, if it has a future, the procedures provided by the second model are recommended as a basis for action.

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MEMBINA TRADISI BERILMU DI DALAM ANGKATAN TENTERA

OLEH KAPT MOHD RADZI ABD HAMID

Fenomena keghairahan memperbaiki keruntuhan akhlak islamiah anggota, kemerosotan disiplin, kemodenan sistem pertahanan dan keselamatan, peningkatan taraf kehidupan anggota dan yang paling muktakhir ialah wawasan Tentera Darat Tahun 2000; merupakan simptom yang menandakan bahawa pembangunan menyeluruh berlaku terlalu cepat sehingga anggota tentera gagal membuat transformasi diri yang sesuai.

Kelemahan yang nyata ialah kebangkitan hal-hal di atas tidak disusuli dengan tradisi berilmu dan tradisi akhlah yang sepatut mendukungnya. Sekiranya masyarakat tentera mempraktikan tradisi berilmu di dalam diri masing-masing, nescaya mereka akan menjadi anggota tentera yang jauh bergerak ke hadapan.

MEMBACA! Mungkin dianggap satu persoalan yang tidak perlu diberi perhatian. Seandainya perkara ini diajukan kepada seorang anggota tentera, nescaya mereka akan menceritakan tentang masalah anak-anak mereka yang malas membaca. Tidak terlintas langsung

untuk memikirkan bahawa mereka sendiri malas membaca. Jika persoalan ini dipersoalkan kepada golongan intelektual, mereka akan mengatakan bahawa negara Malaysia menghadapi masalah kekurangan bahan-bahan bacaan yang bermutu. Tetapi jika kita persoalkan pula kepada golongan ibubapa di kampung, mereka akan mengatakan bahawa usia mereka sudah lanjut dan tidak guna lagi mereka membaca.

Kesimpulannya, jawapan yang sebegini rupa secara langsungnya melambangkan bahawa masyarakat kita belum menerima tradisi membaca dengan sepenuhnya atau pun malas membaca.

Menurut Vogel, membaca membawa maksud meneliti sesuatu dengan tujuan untuk mengetahui secara terhad sahaja.¹ Manakala tradisi berilmu pula ialah seseorang itu membaca kerana ia merasakan bahawa ia perlu membaca, bukan hanya untuk mengetahui sesuatu berita, bahkan golongan ini berpendapat membaca adalah merupakan satu aktiviti harian.² Suasana keilmuan yang amat dangkal di kalangan anggota tentera dan keluarga tentera adalah masalah yang perlu ditangani dengan bijaksana. Hakikatnya masalah tradisi berilmu ini bukan sahaja dihadapi oleh Angkatan Tentera bahkan semua lapisan rakyat Malaysia. Hal ini pernah didedahkan oleh bekas Menteri Pendidikan Malaysia iaitu Dato Sri Anwar Ibrahim ketika beliau mengistiharkan 'Tahun Membaca', pada tahun 1987 dan baru-baru ini Kabinet telah mengistiharkan bulan Ogos adalah bulan membaca negara.³

MENGAPA MEMBACA/TRADISI BERILMU PENTING PADA ANGKATAN TENTERA

Kempen membaca adalah satu usaha kesedaran untuk melahirkan masyarakat yang membaca dan mencintai buku dan ilmu. Tujuan utamanya ialah untuk mewujudkan perancangan yang

bersepadu bagi mendorong minat membaca di kalangan rakyat dan meletakkan tradisi berilmu di mercu yang tinggi dalam kehidupan manusia dan sebagai amalan kehidupan negara.

Menurut Menteri Pendidikan yang lalu Datuk Amar Dr Sulaiman Daud,

" the campaign, or activity, to be carried out every year was to inculcate a reading culture in the society, we want to make the reading culture a reality among Malaysians. Reading culture could help create a knowledgeable, responsible, productive society and a modern industrialised nation as what was aspired in the Vision 2020 "
(*The Star*, 8 Sep 1994).

Sebenarnya setakat ini tiada perbincangan yang serius diadakan mengenai masalah membaca ataupun mengamalkan tradisi berilmu di kalangan anggota tentera. Jikalau diteliti karya Allan Bloom yang bertajuk 'The Closing Of The American Mind', beliau cuma membicarakan secara ringkas sahaja masalah membaca di kalangan pasukan keselamatan Amerika.⁴ Di dalam kontek ini saya berpendapat bahawa Allan Bloom adalah merupakan orang yang pertama mengatakan masalah membaca di kalangan pasukan keselamatan berhubungkait dengan keselamatan sesebuah negara. Walau bagaimanapun di dalam buku beliau, Allan Bloom juga ada mengatakan bahawa pada zaman Hitler, pernah ada usaha-usaha kearah ini tetapi tidak terdapat bukti yang nyata.⁵

Beliau juga berpendapat bahawa pengetahuan seorang anggota tentera perlu dikemaskini. Antara 45% hingga 53% pasukan keselamatan di negara dunia mengalami masalah malas membaca, 9% membaca buku-buku yang tidak berfeadah dan sekurang-kurangnya 13.5%

mengalami masalah untuk mentafsirkan apa yang telah mereka baca dan selebihnya tidak menghadapi sebarang masalah.⁶ Implikasi daripada ini telah didapati anggota tentera tidak lagi kreatif kerana imaginasi mereka dipengaruhi oleh media elektronik.


Keadaan sedemikian sudah tentu amat mencemaskan, lebih-lebih lagi bagi Angkatan Tentera Malaysia yang tidak mempunyai tradisi intelektual yang kukuh. Padahal kita adalah generasi yang perlu memikul tanggungjawab dan tugas berat untuk membentuk satu angkatan yang bertradisi intelektual.

Kenyataan ini menjadi lebih tepat, apabila dilihat pada peratus sambutan angkatan tentera terhadap perpustakaan pasukan.

Jika dilihat pada Rajah I sambutan masyarakat tentera kepada perpustakaan amatlah menyedihkan kerana jumlah pinjaman tahunan berada diparas yang sungguh membimbangkan. Situasi ini lebih membimbangkan lagi kerana 63% dari jumlah pinjaman adalah dilakukan oleh orang yang sama. Purata pinjaman sebulan ialah 1300 buah buku bagi perpustakaan unit atau pasukan.


Orientasi latihan dan sistem pelaksanaan kursus sekarang yang masih menekankan kepada kelulusan di dalam setiap kursus dan pencapaian akademik tidak akan dapat membantu melahirkan generasi tentera yang intelektual dan cintakan ilmu demi kemodenan perkhidmatan. Keadaan yang sedemikian tentunya memakan masa untuk mengubah dan menukarkan persepsi kefahaman sosial, visi, kesedaran serta 'renaissance' daripada semua pemimpin tinggi tentera.

**JUMLAH PINJAMAN BUKU DI PERPUSTAKAAN KEMENTAH UNTUK TAHUN
1991, 1992 DAN 1993.**




Sumber : Perpustakaan Kementerian Pertahanan.

**JUMLAH PINJAMAN BUKU DI PERPUSTAKAAN BN 2 RAMD
UNTUK TAHUN 1989, 1990 DAN 1991**




Sumber : Perpustakaan Batalion Ke 2, RAMD

**JUMLAH PINJAMAN BUKU DI PERPUSTAKAAN SEKOLAH PERISIKAN
UNTUK TAHUN 1990 DAN 1991.**



Sumber : Perpustakaan Sekolah Perisikan



RAJAH 1

MENGAPA ANGGOTA TENTERA MALAS MEMBACA?

Daripada kajian yang telah dijalankan, 83% anggota tentera memberi jawapan kesuntukan masa atau sibuk. Jika dibuat pendekatan dengan teliti mengenai alasan tersebut, akan dapati bahawa anggota tentera dewasa ini menghadapi sindrom malas membaca.

Keadaan ini adalah hasil daripada pengamalan Sistem Pendidikan Umum Untuk Semua (SPUUS) selama sembilan tahun (universal education) sejak 1965. Pada dasarnya sistem ini didukung oleh langkah-langkah untuk membendung keciciran, ianya termasuk bantuan kepada keluarga miskin iaitu skim biasiswa, buku teks percuma, pakaian seragam percuma dan penyediaan kemudahan-kemudahan asas yang lain.⁷ Hakikatnya sistem ini telah gagal mencapai matlamatnya.

Paling menyedihkan di sini ialah di kalangan pemimpin sendiri pun masih tidak membaca. Bagaimanapun diharapkan anggota bawahan untuk membaca dan mendapat maklumat dengan sendirinya? Bagaimana rakyat boleh mengharapakan tentera untuk menjaga keselamatan mereka jika buku-buku yang berkaitan dengan tugas-tugas mereka tidak dibaca dan dihayati? Bagaimana mahu melihat lahirnya satu angkatan tentera yang serba moden atau pencetusan idea-idea baru di kalangan pemimpin jika tradisi berilmu tidak diamalkan. Akhirnya ke mana arah tentera atau bagaimana membentuk tamaddun tentera jika anggotanya beku, pasif dan tidak kreatif. Menyedari akan situasi ini: maka panglima Tentera Darat telah menobatkan budaya ilmu sebagai salah satu dari rancangan pelaksanaan beliau semasa menyampaikan Perintah Ulungnya pada 3 Februari 1995.

"Berusaha untuk memupuk minda yang berteraskan budaya ilmu dikalangan semua lapisan pemimpin. Lahirkan golongan yang berpengetahuan luas dan berfikiran bernas"

(Jen Dato' Che Md Noor bin Mat Arshad)

Dari kajian yang dijalankan terhadap beberapa peringkat anggota tentera yang terlibat secara langsung atau tidak langsung dengan dunia pembacaan, dapatlah disimpulkan beberapa sebab mengapa sindrom malas membaca ini membelengu anggota-anggota tentera.

Pertama. Ketidakwujudan Tradisi Membaca. Sindrom hantu buku belum lagi wujud di dalam angkatan tentera. Jadi sudah tentu amat sukar untuk kita membentuk tabiat ini apabila tidak ada contoh atau suasana tradisi berilmu di mana-mana di dalam masyarakat tentera yang oleh merangsang individu dalam sesebuah keluarga tentera.

Kedua. Persaingan Media Elektronik. Media elektronik mencabar pemusatan fikiran anggota untuk membaca. Media elektronik juga telah mengalihkan perhatian daripada membaca kepada menonton, ini tidaklah bermakna saya mengatakan media elektronik itu mendatangkan kesan yang terlalu buruk. Bagaimanapun haruslah diingatkan bahawa media elektronik tidak boleh menggantikan media cetak seluruhnya. Masih banyak aspek yang tidak boleh disampaikan oleh media elektronik seperti yang ada pada buku.

Ketiga. Sikap atau kesedaran terhadap membaca. Ramai yang mengetahui bahawa manfaat membaca itu adalah lebih baik daripada menonton, namun masih ramai yang mengambil mudah tentang hal ini. Tambahan pula

membaca memerlukan kesabaran dan penumpuan fikiran yang padu. Hanya dengan memperbetulkan sikap daripada terbawa-bawa oleh kesibukan dan alasan yang sengaja di cipta, yang akan memungkinkan tradisi membaca atau tradisi berilmu ini berjaya.

Keempat. Sistem Pendidikan. Sistem pendidikan telah diterima oleh anggota tentera semasa mereka di alam persekolahan terlalu dikongkong dan membaca hanyalah untuk lulus peperiksaan sahaja. Pada pendapat saya jiwa semasa mereka di alam persekolahan tidak begitu berkesan untuk memupuk tabiat membaca. Implikasi daripada itu apabila mereka menamatkan persekolahan dan menceburi bidang ketenteraan, maka lahirlah satu generasi tentera yang malas membaca hingga ke hari ini.

Kelima. Kekurangan Bahan Bacaan Yang Menarik Diperudahkan. Perpustakaan di pasukan-pasukan kekurangan buku-buku yang menarik dan kebanyakannya adalah buku-buku lama yang tidak menepati selera anggota. Sesetengah anggota menganggap rendah dan 'leceh' apabila membaca buku-buku yang bersifat tempatan. Berkemungkinan besar mereka akan mengatakan novel-novel tempatan tidak setaraf dengan novel-novel luar negeri ataupun buku-buku di perpustakaan pasukan amat kurang mutunya jika dibandingkan dengan perpustakaan awam. Masalah banding-membanding ini pernah dibincangkan oleh Prof Syed Hussein AlAttas dan beliau mengelar masalah ini sebagai 'The Capative Mind' (Mentaliti Perangkap).⁸

Keenam. Usaha Pembentukan Minat. Sebenarnya usaha pembentukan minat membaca dikalangan tentera amatlah kurang dan hampir tiada langsung. Walaupun kita menyediakan perpustakaan tetapi usaha lanjutan daripada itu tidak pernah wujud. Usaha itu adalah penting

kerana ianya adalah perkara yang utama yang mana pihak majikan perlu dahulu untuk melabur demi kepentingan di kemudian hari.

Ketujuh. Sejarah/Sistem Pemilihan Anggota. Sebenarnya sistem pemilihan tentera kita tidak seberapa tepat jika dibandingkan dengan pasukan awam lain. Kelulusan darjah enam dan Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia ini biasanya malas atau kurang membaca. Sepatutnya sistem pemilihan haruslah ditukar kepada kelulusan yang agak tinggi yang mana sedia mengamalkan sikap membaca secara kolektif dan atas konsen kesedaran.

Berlandaskan kajian yang telah dibuat mendapati 78% anggota tentera hanya membaca satu helai hingga ke dua muka surat setahun sedangkan kadar celik huruf sudah mencapai 99 peratus.⁹

Sebenarnya sebab-sebab diatas tidak kuat. Jika kita menoleh ke negara Jepun yang jauh lebih pesat perkembangan media elektroniknya dan sistem pendidikannya amat menekankan peperiksaan, minat membacanya cukup tinggi. Malah Alan Bloom mengatakan bahawa Tentera Jepun adalah merupakan pasukan keselamatan yang mempunyai minat membaca yang paling tinggi di dunia.¹⁰ Rakyat dan tenteranya sedar bahawa untuk maju perlu pelancaran pemikiran antara budaya di seluruh dunia. Budaya membaca sudah menjadi sebahagian dari kehidupan mereka. Bahkan pengarang yang terkenal kini iaitu Gore Vidal dalam bukunya 'Armageddon' mengatakan untuk menjadi satu bangsa yang matang, kreatif dan berfikiran luas, caranya ialah melalui pembacaan dan penghayatan alam yang luas.¹¹

Ezra Vogel juga berpendapat dalam buku beliau iaitu "Japan As No 1":

"kejayaan masyarakat Jepun adalah berasaskan kepada sikap rakyatnya yang suka membaca dan menguasai ilmu"

(Berita Harian, 29 Ogos 94)

BAGAIMANA MEMUPUK BUDAYA MEMBACA DI KALANGAN TENTERA

Anggota tentera kini berada dalam era yang berlainan sendi iaitu dalam pembentukan satu angkatan tentera yang berpendidikan tinggi. Lima tahun lagi kita akan memasuki abad ke 21. Abad mendatang adalah abad ledakan ilmu, begitu pesatnya ilmu berkembang sehingga sukar dikejar oleh manusia biasa dan ilmu ini akan tersebar dengan cepat sekali. Yang mampu mengejanya ialah ketinggalan. Mahu tidak mahu kita akan terseret dengan revolusi yang berlaku di tempat lain.

Perkembangan ilmu yang begitu cepat mengakibatkan kertas yang disebut Ijazah merosot nilai dan kegunaannya. Di Negara Jepun sekarang, seorang Jurutera yang berkelulusan boleh bekerja dengan yakin selama 3 tahun. Sesudah itu, jikalau dia tidak terus belajar memperkemaskinikan ilmunya, dia akan ketinggalan.¹² Implikasi dari itu akan wujudlah satu golongan yang digelar masyarakat 'life long self-education'

Kunci kepada 'life long self-education' ialah pengamalan tradisi berilmu melalui membaca. Membaca adalah 'survival kit' untuk masyarakat akan datang. Hari ini banyak siswazah sebaik sahaja meninggalkan kampus universiti tidak lagi membaca, melainkan membaca akhbar dan majalah ringan. Mereka yang telah memperolehi tabiat suka membaca sejak kecil akan terus mengekalkan budaya tersebut untuk menimba sebanyak ilmu.

Oleh itu, kita mestilah menyediakan anak-anak kita untuk menghadapi abad akan datang ini dengan menyemaikan tabiat suka membaca, gemarkan buku dan menghormati ilmu dan orang yang berilmu. Pembacaan bukan hanya terhad kepada buku teks, komik atau majalah filem sahaja, malah membaca buku-buku yang bernilai karya kesusasteraan dan ilmu pengetahuan.

Dengan mengamalkan tabiat suka membaca, adalah diharapkan peribadi mereka akan bertambah baik, tidak mudah terperangkap dengan dadah dan kejahatan lain. Menurut Bill Tammeus dalam rencana beliau yang bertajuk 'More Reading, Less Violence' beliau berpendapat bahawa dengan membaca, masyarakat akan dapat mengurangkan keganasan.¹³

MEMUPUK BUDAYA MEMBACA DI KALANGAN ANGGOTA TENTERA

Angkatan Tentera adalah tunjang kepada keamanan negara dan adalah perlu untuk memiliki satu angkatan yang berpengetahuan tinggi. Untuk memiliki satu angkatan yang mantap, maka usaha-usaha untuk memupuk budaya berilmu perlulah dilakukan dan diantaranya adalah seperti berikut:

Penglibatan Ibubapa. Semua pihak mesti dibawa sama terlibat dalam proses ini. Proses ini melibatkan anak-anak, ibubapa, pekerja awam, guru, sekolah, pemimpin rendah dan pemimpin atasan. Penumpuan hendaklah diberikan kepada dua golongan utama iaitu anak-anak dan institusi pengajian. Dengan membincangkan golongan tersebut secara tidak langsung akan melibatkan ibubapa.

Sasaran utama dalam kempen ini perlu diuruskan kepada kanak-kanak dan institusi pengajian kerana adalah sukar sekali untuk mengubah tabiat orang dewasa, 'alah bisa tegal biasa'. Jikalau mereka sudah menjadi penagih televisyen, wayang, kedai kopi, snoker dan video game, maka agak sukar untuk menarik mereka keluar daripada tabiat tersebut.

Dengan menumpukan sasaran kepada kanak-kanak dan institusi pengajian, tidak boleh tidak kita akan mengaitkan ibubapa iaitu anggota tentera. Hakikatnya, secara tidak langsung kita akan lebih melibatkan ibubapa dan guru, walaupun perhatian diberi kepada kanak-kanak dan institusi pengajian. Maka disini akan kelihatan satu belitan 'ajaib' iaitu untuk mendidik anak kita perlu mendidik ibubapa terlebih dahulu.

Anak-anak berada dalam jagaan guru paling lama tujuh jam sehari dan selebihnya dibawah kawalan ibubapa. Sekolah boleh mengajar membaca dan menyemai tabiat suka membaca tetapi terserah kepada ibubapa untuk memupuknya.

Mengenal Pasti Minat Anak-Anak. Kita boleh mulai apa yang mereka sendiri gemar. Semua kanak-kanak sukakan cerita, maka cerita adalah alat yang paling ampuh untuk menarik anak-anak untuk membaca. Anak-anak yang masih kecil, baik yang sudah boleh membaca sendiri atau pun belum, ibubapa boleh memulakannya dengan berpandukan buku cerita. Ambillah buku 'Sang Kancil Dengan Buaya' atau pun 'The Adventures of Huckleberry', bagi

yang sudah pandai membaca, sesudah bercerita, anak-anak bolehlah digalakkan membaca sendiri.

Bagi kanak-kanak yang belum pandai membaca, buku-buku yang bergambar terutama gambar yang berwarna-warni boleh merupakan tarikan minat mereka untuk sukakan buku. Bagi yang sudah tahu membaca, satu cara ialah dengan membaca sebahagian daripada cerita itu bersama-sama atau dengan menceritakan bahagian awal daripada cerita dan jikalau cerita itu menarik, anak-anak akan dirangsang untuk membaca seterusnya. Alat-alat pandang dengar seperti radio, pita rakaman, televisyen dan pelbagai permainan yang sesuai boleh juga membantu menyediakan kanak-kanak untuk membaca.

Penglibatan Secara Total. Satu cara lagi yang boleh melibatkan satu keluarga ialah dengan cara membaca bersama-sama dalam keluarga. Kita tahu zaman penglipurlara telah berlalu dan tidak ramai orang pandai membaca pada zaman penglipurlara. Sang pujangga akan membacakan cerita untuk didengar dan diminati secara bersama, menghayati secara bersama-sama dalam keluarga akan menggalakkan perbincangan dan perbincangan boleh mempertajam selera untuk membaca selanjutnya.

Bagaimanapun, kita harus berhati-hati supaya jangan melakukannya dengan lebih sehingga membosankan kanak-kanak itu akan membawa akibat yang buruk. Menurut ahli psikologi, dan kajian yang telah dijalankan oleh 'American Psychological Associations',

untuk membentuk tabiat membaca, lebih baik membaca 15 minit setiap hari daripada membaca satu jam seminggu sekali.¹⁴ Sekali-sekala baik juga ibubapa membaca satu atau dua buah buku anak-naknya. Ini bukan sahaja untuk mengetahui apa jenis buku yang mereka baca, bahkan untuk mengenal pasti minat membaca dan dengan itu membuka peluang untuk berbincang.

Menyediakan Kemudahan Sendiri. Bagi mereka yang mampu, baik sekali memulakan sebuah perpustakaan peribadi bagi anak-anak mereka. Ini membantu membentuk sifat sayangkan buku. Dalam hubungan ini cuba pastikan kanak-kanak itu mengeneipkan sebahagian daripada wang sakunya untuk membeli buku yang digemarinya, mereka lebih menghargai apa yang mereka beli dengan wang simpanan mereka sendiri.

Menyemai Sikap Menghormati Penulis. Minat terhadap buku mestilah disertai dengan rasa ingin tahu tentang penulisnya. Anak-anak mestilah diajar supaya meminati penulis dan seterusnya mengenali penulis supaya mereka lebih cenderung untuk membaca. Jika ada kemudahan, ibubapa boleh mengundang penulis sebagai tetamu untuk minum di rumah mereka atau berkelah dimana sahaja. Dengan begitu kanak-kanak berpeluang untuk bercakap-cakap dengan penulis buku yang diminatinya.

Mengadakan Lawatan. Selain daripada itu, membawa anak ke perpustakaan, pameran buku dan kedai buku boleh mendedahkan mereka kepada pelbagai jenis buku. Dengan

adanya peluang yang sebegini rupa, anak-anak boleh memilih jenis buku yang mereka gemar. Pembelian buku atas pilihan sendiri akan lebih mendorong pembacaan dan penjagaan.

Rangsangan Secara Berterusan.

Menurut ahli psikologi pendidikan, tahun-tahun keempat dan kelima sekolah rendah adalah tempoh yang paling kritis. Jika pada peringkat ini anak-anak masih tidak menunjukkan minat terhadap buku, keadaan akan bertambah sukar selepas itu.¹⁵ Maka perhatian mereka perlu diberikan kepada kanak-kanak dalam lingkungan umur tersebut.

Peranan Organisasi.

Peranan sesebuah pasukan atau organisasi untuk menggalakkan pembacaan di kalangan anggota-anggotanya tidak seharusnya terbatas kepada menyediakan buku-buku yang sesuai untuk perpustakaan sahaja. Malah mesti ada kegiatan untuk menggalak anggota meminjam dan membaca buku-buku tersebut.

Sistem Pinjaman.

Sesebuah pasukan boleh menjalankan sistem yang pernah dijalankan oleh Hitler ke atas tenteranya iaitu dipaksa membaca setiap hari. Disini konsep ini boleh diubahsuai iaitu setiap anggota diwajibkan meminjam buku sebanyak sebuah setiap bulan. Walaupun anggota tidak membaca buku yang dipinjamnya tetapi sekurang-kurangnya anggota tersebut telah berupaya ke perpustakaan, telah memilih buku, telah mengetahui tajuk buku dan pengarangnya, tetapi saya percaya 85% anggota-anggota kita akan membaca buku yang dipinjam dengan yang hanya

cuma akan menyimpan di dalam almari sahaja. Menurut Leo Tolstoy dalam bukunya 'War and Peace', cara begini pernah dipraktikkan oleh Hitler kepada kakitangannya dan telah berjaya menunjukkan hasil yang baik.¹⁶

Memperkenalkan Sistem 'Lure Into Reading Programmes'.

Selain daripada itu di Austria kini sedang berjalan satu sistem yang dipanggil 'Lure into Reading Programmes'. Dipercayai sistem ini sebenarnya diasaskan oleh Jepun dan telah ditiru oleh Austria kerana keberkesanannya begitu mengagumkan.¹⁷ 'Lure into Reading Programmes' ialah satu sistem dapat dipraktikkan di dalam mesyuarat, ceramah, kelas, perjumpaan dan lain-lain cara yang melibatkan orang ramai. Contohnya di dalam sesuatu mesyuarat, pengerusi akan memberhentikan seketika dan membaca buku yang menarik dengan kuat atau pun menyuruh salah seorang daripada ahli membaca cerita yang menarik dengan kuat sehingga sampai kepada puncaknya, atau bahagian yang paling menarik. Kemudian ahli-ahli diminta meneruskan membaca sendiri untuk mendapatkan klimaks cerita tersebut; percubaan yang sebegini dikatakan cukup berjaya di Austria.¹⁷

Mengadakan 'Reader License'.

Di samping itu satu kaedah baru iaitu lesen membaca boleh diperkenalkan, sistem ini merupakan kaedah dimana pasukan akan mengenalpasti anggota-anggota yang paling cepat membaca dari segi catatan kemajuan pembacaan dan kefahaman. Anggota-anggota ini akan diberi hadiah dan diumumkan atau pun

diberi keistimewaan lain daripada orang lain. Untuk mengenalpasti pemegang lesen pembaca ini, pasukan perlulah mengadakan satu pertandingan, di mana anggota-anggota yang dipilih dari Kompeni akan diberi sebuah buku untuk dibaca mengenai tajuk tertentu dalam tempoh yang ditetapkan. Setelah cukup masa yang ditetapkan anggota tersebut akan disoal atau pun diberi kertas soalan untuk menjawab tanpa melihat buku tersebut. Disini kita akan mengetahui kecepatan seseorang itu membaca, kefahaman dan daya ingatan. Dan sesiapa yang berjaya akan diberi lesen pembacaan, markah kemenangan akan diambil kira dalam markah program kompeni agong. Di samping itu juga pertandingan boleh dibuat dalam bentuk kumpulan. Oleh kerana budaya membaca mempunyai kesan yang langsung kepada penguasaan bahasa, pembentukan peribadi dan penambahan pengetahuan, usaha seperti ini boleh meninggikan lagi taraf anggota-anggota kita.

Mengadakan Hari Buku. Selain itu pasukan juga boleh mengadakan 'Hari Buku' atau pun pertunjukan buku sekali atau dua kali setahun di dalam kem. Perancangan tersebut hendaklah dibuat dengan teliti seperti masa pertunjukkan hendaklah sesuai dengan masa keadaan kewangan anggota atau pun sistem beli buku cara ansuran diadakan oleh syarikat. Di Jepun sekarang umpamanya sedang mengadakan 'Hari Kreativiti' sekali atau dua kali setahun. Pada hari itu pekerja-pekerja diberi cuti dan dibawa keluar dari kilang dan dibawa ke tempat-tempat tertentu. Di sana mereka boleh melaksanakan apa saja corak kreativiti

yang disukai seperti menulis, melukis, mengambil gambar, memahat, membuat model, drama dan lainnya.¹⁸ Kegiatan ini bukan sahaja menyuburkan bakat kreativiti malah lebih banyak membaca akan mempunyai lebih banyak gesaan untuk dilaksanakan secara kreatif.

Mengadakan Pertandingan Membaca/Bercerita. Untuk menggalakkan anggota-anggota membaca pasukan juga boleh membuat pertandingan bercerita atau drama berdasarkan sesebuah buku. Pertandingan bercerita ini hendaklah dilakukan dengan jayanya sekali dan boleh dilakukan secara perseorangan, kumpulan atau pertandingan antara keluarga. Implikasinya secara tidak langsung anggota akan membaca buku yang akan dilakonkannya.

Pembelian Buku Secara Pilihan. Adalah disarankan juga agar setiap pembelian buku-buku baru tidak dipilih oleh perpustakaan tetapi ianya diberi kemudahan kepada semua anggota-anggota untuk memberi tajuk-tajuk yang difikirkan menarik ataupun ia mempunyai keinginan untuk membaca buku tersebut tetapi tidak ada di dalam simpanan. Pihak perpustakaan cuma bertanggungjawab untuk memilih tajuk-tajuk cadangan tersebut supaya pembelian buku yang kurang mutunya tidak berlaku.

Penyediaan Masa Khusus. Berikutan dengan itu juga Pasukan atau kompeni perlu pengkhusus masa untuk ke perpustakaan pasukan di dalam waktu kerja sekiranya pasukan benar-benar ingin

menyemai tradisi membaca di kalangan anggota. Hal ini hendaklah dirancang dengan teliti.

PENUTUP

Sekiranya pasukan benar-benar ingin menyemai tradisi berilmu atau budaya membaca di kalangan anggota, maka pasukan haruslah meletakkanya di keutamaan yang pertama kerana setakat ini budaya membaca di kalangan anggota-anggota kita berada di tahap yang paling rendah. Pasukan haruslah sanggup berkorban. Sebagai seorang pemimpin atau orang yang telah disedarkan, kita seharusnya berasa sangat bimbang apabila melihat anggota-anggota kita tidak mengamalkan tradisi berilmu. Bagaimanakah kita yang tidak membaca, samada buku lama atau baru, boleh berasa tenang dan gembira, sedangkan orang lain yang jauh lebih maju daripada kita yang tidak ada masalah tradisi berilmu seperti Jepun, Austria, Perancis dan Jerman. Negara-negara maju kini mula mempersoalkan minat membaca kerana generasi warisan mereka telah didapati tidak mahu membaca buku-buku yang penting dan utama yang mengikat diri mereka dengan sejarah, dalam usaha untuk membebaskan diri daripada tekanan hidup.

" sesungguhnya, buku adalah wahana bagi membantu ke arah perluasan horizon pemikiran manusia. Negara maju di dunia seperti Jepun dan Amerika tidak mencipta keajaiban dalam sekelip mata melainkan mempunyai rakyat yang mencintai ilmu dan kemahiran yang perlu disumbangkan"

Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim, 29 Ogos 1994.

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
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Kapt Mohd Radzi bin Abd Hamid telah ditauliahkan dalam Kor Rejimen Askar Melayu DiRaja . Beliau merupakan lulusan Diploma Pengajian Strategik dan Keselamatan dari Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. Seorang pegawai yang aktif dalam penulisan dan sering menyumbang dalam Berita tentera Darat dan Sorotan Darat. Kini, sedang berkhidmat di Cawangan Perancangan dan Pembangunan, Markas Tentera Darat sebagai Pegawai Staf 3 Perjawatan 'A'.



FREQUENCY HOPPING

oleh :
Kapt Azizi bin A Hadi

INTRODUCTION

Electronic Warfare (EW) is becoming one of the most effective weapons in the armoury of any nation facing any threat of a sophisticated nature of contemplating any form of military action. Today, EW is no longer a simple matter of merely listening to enemy or potentially hostile communications. It is an all-embracing subject concerned with coverage of the entire electromagnetic spectrum in which radiations may be detected or disrupted. Thus it may be of a passive or active nature. Passive EW is divisible into two principal classifications. Under the general title of Sigint (signal intelligence), these are Elint (electronic intelligence) and Comint (communications intelligence). The latter is suggestive of its role, mainly that of listening to hostile signals with the intent of gaining knowledge of their verbal or textual content. Modern encryption methods largely defeat this object and emphasis grows on Elint operations which concentrate mainly on the location of transmitters and the analysis of their signals from an electronic view point.

In both Comint and Elint, the use of direction finding (DF) and signal analysis are becoming more widely used as primary intelligence sources for locating enemy communications centers, often located in close proximity to command posts and command and control nodes, and which make attractive targets for both physical and electronic attack. Knowledge of the transmissions used by an enemy and the interception of his signals in the interest of deriving communications intelligence from these, can provide important tactical clues of hostile intent.

If deciphering of enemy transmissions proves impossible and physical attack likewise, then electronic assault can be made on hostile communications themselves by the well known process of jamming which is part of electronic countermeasures (ECM). Jamming can be done

either on narrow or wide band approach by proper power management. In a dense EW environment however, it is possible to accurately detect the frequencies of a number of hostile transmitters, then selective frequency management techniques may be used to the advantage.

For these reasons, tactical radio equipments must have frequency hopping essence to counter enemy EW systems as well as to maintain communications for exercising command and control.

This paper is intended to briefly describe the frequency hopping system which is derived from spread spectrum systems, the hopping parameters and lastly the implications on frequency management.

SPREAD FREQUENCY SPECTRUM SYSTEMS

Generally, a spread frequency spectrum systems is a frequency domain representation of a signal with a bandwidth much higher than the message bandwidth. A voice signal, for example, can be sent, with amplitude modulation in a bandwidth only twice that of the information itself. Other forms of modulation, such as low deviation FM or Single Sideband AM, also permit informations to be transmitted in a bandwidth comparable to the bandwidth of the informations itself. A Spread Spectrum System, on the other hand, often takes a baseband signal (say a voice channel) with a bandwidth of only a few kilo Hertz, and distributes it over a band that may be many Mega Hertz wide. This is accomplished by modulating with the informations to be sent and the carrier with a wideband encoding signal.

Because a spread-spectrum system distributes the transmitted energy over a wide bandwidth, the signal-to-noise ratio at the receiver input is low. Nevertheless, the receiver is capable of operating successfully because the transmitted signal has distinct characteristics relative to noise. The spreading wave form is controlled by pseudo noise code, which is a binary sequence that is apparently random, but can be reproduced deterministically by the intended user.

Spread-spectrum systems are useful for military communications because they make it difficult to detect the transmitted waveform, extract the message, or jam the intended receiver. The most widely used spread-spectrum modulations are:

- * Modulation of a carrier by a digital code sequence whose bit rate is much higher than the information signal band width. Such systems are called "direct sequence" modulated systems.

- * Carrier frequency shifting in discrete increments in a pattern dictated by a code sequence. These are called "frequency hoppers". The transmitted frequency jumps within some predetermined jump set (hop set) and the order of frequency usage is determined by a code -sequence.

- * Pulsed FM or "Chirp" modulation in which a carrier is swept over a wide band during a given pulse interval.

FREQUENCY HOPPING

Frequency Hopping is the periodic changing of the frequency or frequency set associated with a transmission. Successive frequency sets are determined by a pseudonoise code. If the data modulation is multiple frequency-shift keying, two or more frequencies are in the set that changes at each hop.

FREQUENCY HOPPING SYSTEM PARAMETERS

HOP SPEED RATE

In all frequency hopping systems (HF, VHF or UHF transmission devices) the frequency synthesizer of the system is controlled by a digital pseudo random code whose generation/duplication is not possible unless otherwise the right key combination is made available or held. Ideally the transmitted waveform is of constant amplitude and divided into constant frequency 'chips' (shortest uninterrupted waveform in the system) of short duration. The number of 'chips' transmitted per second is called the 'chip' rate or hop rate. The frequency band necessary for the transmission of a 'chip' is called a channel and its width is approximately twice the 'chip' rate.

The hopping speed is considered as an important feature in all frequency hopping radio systems. The hop rates are termed as low, medium, medium-fast and fast (the speed of hopping varying from a few times per second to few hundreds or more per second). It must also be remembered that the chosen hop rate is not too low, allowing enemy follower jammers from following the frequency changes and jamming the transmission concerned. It was therefore considered that hopping as fast as possible was desirable. With a very fast hop there is a decrease in 'frame time' resulting in a decrease in 'dwell time', leaving inadequate time for the transmission of the intelligence concerned. However, in the past, technology constraints limited the design and the use of very fast hoppers whose synthesizers had to respond to such changes. With the advent of digital (fast switching) synthesizers the current trend is towards faster hopping speeds. Presently available equipment in the market fall into any one of the following categories:

- * Low Hop < 30 Hops/Sec.
- * Medium Hop > 30 Hops
but below 300 Hops
/Sec.
- * Fast Hop > 300 Hops/
Sec.

The selection and choice of the hopping rate usable in a typical system is determined by the following:

- * Type of information being sent and its rate.
- * The amount of redundancy used and its rate.
- * Distance to the nearest potential interference.

HOPPING BANDWIDTH

Military VHF manpack or vehicular transceivers normally have gazetted Band and with a selectable channel separation of 25 KHz, making available a total of 2320 channels. With frequency hopping systems the hopping bandwidth (the frequency range over which the hopping takes place) need to be as wide as possible to avoid detection and jamming etc. The equipment available today caters for Narrow Band Hopping (The 30 to 88 MHz band is subdivided into discrete bands — of say 9 bands of 6.4 MHz wide and having 256 channels) or Wide Band Hopping (the hopping takes place over the entire 30 to 88 MHz bandwidth and allowing usage of 2320 channels). Also to be noted is the fact that the equipment available today caters for bandwidth in the following manner:

- * Narrow Band Hopping. In which hopping takes place within a selected frequency band (available in hop sets of 4, 8, 16 or 256 discrete frequencies).

- * Wide Band Hopping. Falls into two categories as follows:-

- * The hopping takes place over the entire frequency range of the equipment but limited to a fixed number of frequencies (say 256 in some cases).

- * The hopping takes place over the entire frequency range of the equipment allowing the usage of all available channels (say 2320 in some cases).

The selection of a bandwidth is usually a compromise between the need to protect against enemy interference/jamming and the interference/jamming caused by the hopping system to one's

own communications systems. In providing for the selection of a bandwidth, facilities are available/provided to select the required frequencies (or band of frequencies) for operation and at the same time bar the frequencies (or band of frequencies) that are to be avoided.

HOP SEQUENCE

Hopping sequence or the order in which the hopping takes place is vital as this determines the ease with which an enemy could detect or intervene with the transmission taking place. A frequency hopping system, to withstand enemy attacks (jamming, detection etc.) must contain a method/procedure for the hopping pattern that is not reproducible by the enemy. In practice this is achieved through a pseudo random periodic code combination (sequence) with sufficiently long period, ensuring the unrepeatability of the code sequence. It must also be remembered that pseudo random is not random at all and is deterministic, periodic signal known both to the transmitter and receiver.

SYNCHRONIZATION

In order to ensure the in-step operability of the transmitter and receiver, so that their timing clocks are so arranged to cater for the propagation delay (the receiver clock lagging the transmitter clock by a predetermined delay) and function correctly enabling the transfer of information. There are numerous means of achieving synchronization (or sometimes referred to as handshake). Any chosen synchronization method/system must fulfill the following requirements to be suitable/effective:-

- * It must be automatic and fast responding.
- * It must be operable at low or marginal signal levels.

- * It must be resistant to atmospheric/man-made interference.
- * It must in no way affect the intelligence contained in the transmission.

IMPLICATIONS OF FREQUENCY HOPPING SYSTEM ON FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT

Satisfactory radio communications cannot be established without an ability to operate over the radio links using an appropriate frequency. The choice of the right frequency at the right time is fundamental to maintaining an acceptable communications performance. The process of selecting the frequency is known as frequency management.

Successful frequency management depends upon the ability to predict, measure and react to its characteristic parameter. The problem faced in the selection of the right frequency for better communications has always been with the users. Due to atmospheric noise, interference from adjacent radio networks and electronic counter measures, it has been necessary to change frequency from time to time. This is a very difficult process involving mechanical operations, accurate timing and detailed planning at all levels. Now by the use of modern techniques, it is possible for the complete net to change frequency automatically and simultaneously. This can be achieved by selecting a large number of frequencies possibly many hundreds which constitute what is known as a hop set.

Each radio in a net is then programmed to dwell for a very short time on these frequencies in a pseudo-random pattern with synchronization signal ensuring that all radios are in step with one another.

PROBLEM FACED IN FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT

The problems do not entirely depend on the systems implemented to the frequency hopping equipment but on the whole series of factors ranging from the characteristics of the existing equipment to the operating procedures and operating regulations. In order to understand frequency management problems, firstly is to consider the fixed frequency systems. Correct operations of a network at a fixed frequency requires that no other network using the same frequency. In practice the number of frequencies allocated are less than the number of networks required, so the same frequency must be allocated to several different networks spaced as widely as possible in geographical terms. In real life, the problem is more complex, since the geographical disposition of military unit changes during operations. Certain imperfections must also be taken into account in particular, intermodulation and adjacent channel interference, while enemy units which must share the same radio frequency spectrum as friendly forces, are hardly likely to have coordinated their frequency plan with the forces they are attacking.

The temptation for frequency-hop network designers to apply the same allocation concept as that used for fixed frequency is hard to resist. This type of

approach has resulted in orthogonalization method, the most simple being to make a frequency shift between network but this method requires accurate inter-network synchronization with all the attendant operational problem.

CONCLUSION

Electronic Warfare (EW) has now been practised for many years. The threat has two main aspects, Electronic Support Measures (ESM), and Electronic Counter Measures (ECM). ESM consists essentially of passive activities such as surveillance and direction finding while ECM involves active measures such as jamming and recording of messages which are subsequently retransmitted in order to confuse the enemy. Fixed frequency radios are vulnerable to all the above forms of attacks. Frequency hopping radio or "frequency hopper" can provide the solution of the EW threats by transmitting a group of frequencies in one second depending on the hop rate available.

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Kapt Azizi bin A. Hadi telah ditauliahkan pada tahun 1987 ke dalam Rejimen Semboyan Diraja setelah tamat pengajian di dalam bidang Kejuruteraan Elektrik di Wichita State University, USA. Beliau kini adalah Jurulatih Teknikal dan juga Pegawai Staf Latihan di Institut Komunikasi dan Elektronik TD.

DOKTRIN

SATU PANDUAN MASA HADAPAN

oleh Kapt Hamalik bin Adnan

PENDAHULUAN

Pada 10 Mei 1940 Tentera Darat Jerman telah menyerang dari arah barat keatas Low Country di utara Perancis. Pasukan Jerman telah melaksanakan serangan dengan mengekalkan inisiatif dan menentukan mobiliti disamping membahagikan pemerintahan dan kawalan yang berasingan. Matlamat Jerman adalah menakluk pihak lawan dengan memecah belahkan struktur pemerintahan musuh yang ada. Rancangan tersebut dilaksanakan bagi mengekalkan pihak musuh dapat melakukan pertahanan yang kukuh terhadap garisan 'Moginot' dan memecahkan dengan segera laluan musuh melalui kawasan belakang kedudukan pasukan bersekutu.

Doktrin Pasukan Tentera Perancis telah membuat fokus tersendiri terhadap penggunaan kuasa tembakan dan pengawalan struktur pemerintahan secara pusat. Mereka percaya bahawa kunci kejayaan medan tempur sangat perlu persiapan secara tersusun yang diselaraskan bagi semua kuasa tembakan yang ada secara berkesan. Koodinasi untuk melaksanakan rancangan ini hanya diberi kepada Markas Formasi yang tertinggi sahaja.

Jika dibuat perbandingan, Doktrin Tentera Perancis adalah kaku terutama semasa pertahanan. Pengalaman ini menunjukkan dalam pertempuran, doktrin telah memainkan peranan dalam medan tempur dan dapat memberi keputusan jelas dalam kejayaan peperangan.

Kita perlu mengelakkan agar tidak menyediakan atau jenis peperangan yang salah disamping kita mempunyai doktrin yang sesuai

dan jelas. Doktrin ini dibentuk bagi menentukan keupayaan pasukan agar lebih unggul pada pertempuran mendatang.

TUJUAN

Tujuan artikel ini adalah untuk memberi pandangan tentang peranan doktrin TD dan kepentingannya.

PERANAN UTAMA DOKTRIN


Garis Panduan

Doktrin adalah prinsip yang ditentukan untuk digunakan kepada Tentera Darat bagi panduan tindakan untuk mencapai objektif Negara. Ianya merupakan satu pegangan namun memerlukan pertimbangan dalam pelaksanaannya, doktrin juga memberi arah tujuan Tentera Darat dalam melaksanakan operasi-operasi yang diterima dalam misi tertentu. Ia memerlukan satu pemahaman yang luas dan penting dalam budaya profesyen yang merupakan 'Fabric' terhadap Tentera Darat. Rajah 1 adalah rangkaian hubungkait doktrin. Rajah ini adalah pembentukan kerangka asas bagi peringkat-peringkat pengembangan doktrin bermula dari polisi kerajaan dalam mewujudkan satu organisasi atau sistem bagi mewujudkan proses berterusan.

Misi Kepada Wawasan


Doktrin memainkan peranan utama dalam misi kita kepada wawasan untuk masa hadapan

PENGEMBANGAN DOKTRIN



Rajah 2

GABUNGAN DOKTRIN



Rajah 3

kerana doktrin merupakan kunci dalam mengekalkan peperangan bagi mengatasi pihak lawan. Pengekalan ini perlu bagi mengimbangi prinsip-prinsip peperangan yang ada. Bagi mendapatkannya ia juga merupakan keberkesanan kobinasi terhadap masyarakat tentera yang berkualiti, terlatih, dapat berkembang mengikut peredaran, pemimpin yang bernas, mempunyai struktur gabungan oleh kumpulan yang cekap dan dapat berkeupayaan melaksanakan tugas mengikut doktrin yang terkini. Bagi ketua-ketua pasukan di medan doktrin dapat dijadikan sebagai garis panduan bagi memulakan satu-satu operasi. Bagi menuju kearah ini doktrin tersebut boleh diubahsuai mengikut keadaan semasa.

Membentuk Arus Tentera Darat

Doktrin juga memainkan peranan dalam membentuk arus keadaan Tentera Darat dimasa hadapan. Doktrin sebagai panduan dalam memenuhi tuntutan bagi mengubal, melatih dan melengkapkan bagi pelaksanaan segera dan pengekalan operasi kombatan di daratan. Pelaksanaan ini termasuklah melaksanakan framework untuk semua Institusi TD dalam program latihan dan melengkapkan serta memajukan, seterusnya mendapatkan hasil terbaik. Bagi jangka pendek pula ia melaksanakan kajian dan pengembangan serta permasalahan semasa doktrin yang sedia ada.

Kepenggunaan Perintah Tetap Operasi (SOP) yang kemaskini disemua peringkat pasukan juga membantu pengekalan kepada doktrin disamping sebagai panduan asas. Rajah 2 adalah menunjukkan hubungkait doktrin TD. Pada asasnya Doktrin TD digariskan bagi menentukan pencapaian pemerintahan dapat dilakukan disamping mencapai matlamat di

medan tempur dan dapat melengkapkan organisasi dengan lebih sistematik.

Pembentukan Gabungan Bersama

Peranan utama doktrin boleh diibaratkan sebagai orkestra. Konsep bagi mengalunkan dan penyamaan semua elemen muzik di mana semua alat yang ada dapat disatukan yang hasilnya dari kordinasi tersebut sebagai sebuah bentuk gabungan yang menerbitkan lagu seiring. Doktrin juga memerlukan keadaan yang lebih 'flexible' bagi membolehkan semua komander menyesuaikan keadaan dalam situasi tertentu.

Hubungkaitan Doktrin

Doktrin juga mempunyai hubungkait dengan sokongan oleh masyarakat dalam negara. Gabungan dari pasukan keselamatan yang ada, awam dan pasukan simpanan yang akan mencerminkan nilai padu sesebuah negara tersebut. Bagi menangani masaalah ini perhubungan rapat antara awam dan pihak keselamatan juga perlu bagi membentuk pertalian kuat sentiasa wujud. Rajah 3 menunjukkan perlunya gabungan untuk mendapatkan kuasa tempur yang mantap. Kekuatan tempur diistilahkan sebagai keupayaan dan keberkesanan bertempur. Konsep diwujudkan melalui prinsip peperangan yang sedia ada. Doktrin TD yang digariskan adalah sebahagian dari skop kekuatan tempur yang akhirnya akan mengembangkan inovatif dalam menangani keadaan semasa. Bagi komponen moral pula adalah bagi menentukan kebolehan dan keupayaan untuk anggota bertempur yang juga merangkumi motivasi, kepimpinan atau pengurusan yang berkesan. Manakala komponen fizikal pula untuk diguna penuh sebelum dan semasa bertempur yang merangkumi kekuatan anggota, peralatan, logistik, latihan dan konsep siagaan.

Perang terbuka kini banyak bergantung pada pemprosesan secara mikro dari peralatan canggih. Pertambahan penggunaan komputer, perisikan dari jarak jauh disamping pemerintahan dan kawalan seperti penggunaan simulator bagi latihan perlu diimbangi dengan sempurna. Medan Tempur kini berubah kepada satu dimensi baru terhadap kelajuan, ruang dan masa. Pada hari ini pertempuran yang terjadi mengalami rentak yang pantas bagi menguasai tanah agar ia berterusan samada siang atau malam dalam semua cuaca. Keupayaan ini perlu direalisasikan dalam membentuk sistem pertempuran moden yang lebih gencar dari segi kuasa tembakan.

Ciri Doktrin

Bagi menentukan keupayaan telus dari doktrin yang digariskan ia perlulah seimbang dengan keperluan yang berterusan dan boleh diubah mengikut keadaan. Doktrin juga perlu menggambarkan operasi mendatang yang kebanyakannya akan dilaksanakan secara gabungan dengan pasukan lain atau yang berpasangan. Selain itu doktrin juga perlu dapat disesuaikan disamping doktrin tidak hanya difokuskan hanya mengikut kawasan atau tahap konflik yang ada. Kita tidak dapat mengetahui siapakah musuh atau sahabat yang akan membantu atau bila masa untuk melaksanakan operasi berkenaan. Doktrin mestilah cukup lengkap untuk digunakan dalam sesuatu hal yang lebih luas penerimaannya untuk kita menghadapi operasi mendatang. Untuk itu pengubahsuaian doktrin mestilah realistik.

Maju Kehadapan

Doktrin merupakan camtuman nadi ke jantung yang akan memberi kesan kejayaan

kepada kumpulan TD keseluruhannya. Mengambil bahagian dalam mewujudkan dan proses pengubalan doktrin ini sangat penting dan semua pihak perlu memikir atau memberi pandangan yang bernas terhadap doktrin itu sendiri. TD sentiasa melihat ke hadapan dalam menuju keunggulannya. Kita sedang melangkah ke hadapan dengan segala persiapan yang ada menuju wawasan dan doktrin akan memandu kita menuju arah berkenaan.

PENUTUP

Bagi menentukan keupayaan dan keunggulan tercapai, semua pihak perlu menentukan agar garis panduan yang ada digunakan sepenuhnya. Walaupun kita belum menghadapi suasana perang terhad namun kita perlu belajar dan dapat membuat perbandingan sewajarnya. Kerjasama semua pasukan samada pasukan tempur dan bantuan tempur perlu direalisasikan secara berkesan untuk menentukan matlamat akhir satu-satu konflik. Sebagai sebuah angkatan yang bersepadu dalam TD pengwujudan dan keberkesanan gabungan pasukan tempur juga perlu direalisasikan bagi menentukan kita mencapai kejayaan bersama. Memandangkan hal ini penting maka penyelarasan doktrin ini akan menjadikan TD sebagai sebuah organisasi yang mantap.

Rujukan:

1. Pamplet Doktrin TD.
2. Pergolakan Antarabangsa Perhubungan dan Isu Utama-Chamil Wariya 1989.
3. Granvilee-JAS A World History Of the 21st Century, Vol 1 1900-1945.



Kapt Hamalik bin Adnan telah ditauliahkan dalam Rejimen Askar Melayu DiRaja pada 11 mei 1986. Selepas berkhidmat di batalion beliau bertugas sebagai PS 3 rancang Bahagian Pasukan Simpanan di KEMENTAH. Kini sebagai PS 3 di bahagian Doktrin Markas Latihan dan Doktrin TD.

"Masa depan kita bergantung kepada kesanggupan kita bekerja, dan bekerja dengan rajin, bukan sebagai hamba kepada upahan tetapi kerana tanggungjawab dan kesayangan kepada kebebasan dan maruah kita"

Dr Mahathir Mohamad