SOROTAN DARAT

JURNAL TENTERA DARAT MALAYSIA
THE HOUSE JOURNAL OF THE MALAYSIAN ARMY

SISTEM BANTUAN TEMBAKAN
ARTILERI MEDAN
UNTUK REJMEN ARTILERI MALAYSIA

OGOS 84

BIL 5

Kandungan

Pelbagai jenis meriam yang kini digunakan oleh Rejimen Artileri Malaysia. Lukisan kulit muka disediakan oleh Jabatanarah Artilery Kementerian Pertahanan, Kuala Lumpur.

This article was originally published in a professional journal. With the kind permission of the author, and as a service to the many officers and the men who are directly involved, we publish it in the hope that we all become that much wiser in fulfilling our tasks.

The article deals with the "revised" position of the military viz-a viz the civil powers, the unlawful assembly and crowd dispersal. While the author suggests that there is no radical change to the existing military stand, the law deems it fit to see it all in a different light by making amendments to the laws, hitherto prevailing.

POWERS TO DISPERSE UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLIES UNDER THE CPC — a question of law

Kolonel Hj Wan Nordin
Bin Hj Wan Mohammed

INTRODUCTION

This primary role of the military is to fight war or to put it mildly, to defend the homeland against all forms of aggression or threats that come from within or without. Its secondary role is to assist the

civil authorities in any way it can to uphold internal sovereignty and security. In this role, the military is said to be assisting the civil authorities, namely the Royal Malaysia Police, the Judiciary and the Executive in the preservation of public order. In theory, since the military is under the service of His Majesty the Yang DiPertuan Agong and not of the Government, the Police, the Judiciary or the Executive, it can only provide the aid or can only intervene if there are provisions in the law for them to do so. This law may either be with the civil authorities or with the military.

The legal powers under which the military may provide military assistance to the civil authorities are not given in the Armed Forces Act 1972[1] but instead they are spread in various non-military statutes such as the Protected Areas and Protected Places Ordinance 1959[2], the Public Order (Preservation) Ordinance 1958, and the Criminal Procedure Code (FMS Cap 6)[3], abbreviated as CPC.

The use of the word "civil" in the context of a military situation must be understood. While other definitions of the word are well known amongst those trained in law, this additional meaning given to it must also be recognised. So as to contrast and distinguish the military from the non-military things or affairs (be it law or otherwise) the word "civil" is adopted. Thus, it will include even the Criminal Courts, the Police and all laws pertaining to or remaining outside the military law. Civil law, here, therefore means the laws (including criminal laws) that not directly applied to the military or its personnel **per se.**

AIM

This article is mainly concerned with the Criminal Procedure Code (FMS Cap

6) and in particular with regards to the powers of the military to disperse crowds of unlawful assemblies under the amended law effected by the Criminal Procedure (Amendement and Extension) Act 1976[4]. See Figure 1.

ENHANCED POWERS UNEFFECTED

At the outset, it is considered appropriate to discuss the powers and the law that are available under the Public Order (Preservation) Ordinance 1958 or PO (P) O as it is usually referred to, since the Ordinance is uneffected by the said amending Act. Under the PO (P) O, the powers of the military and the police are enhanced. For example, the military, on its own, may established a road block to check traffic for 24 hours, search or arrest offenders once the use of the military is sanctioned within a defined proclaimed area[5]. The Police any do things without warrant, for example, enter and search any premises if he holds a rank higher than a Sargeant[6]. Such Police powers are extended to the military, **mutatis mutandis,** engaged on a duty connected with the maintenance or the restoration of public law and order[7]. These powers under PO (P) O continue to exist until now, unaltered, as the amending Act does not touch the Ordinance.

PUBLIC ORDER SITUATION DEFINED

A "public order situation" is regarded as a situation of a civil disorder short of an armed insurrection situation. The latter is deemed to be an "internal security situation" which means that the situation had gone beyond the stage of mere crowd dispersal by the military.

MILITARY POWERS ONLY STUATU-TORY

Outside the powers contained PO

(P)O, the military do not have the statutory legal right (except under the Penal Code to defend himself or other in need of defending himself or his property) to disperse an unlawful assembly [8] although the Police may do so under the Criminal Procedure Code (FMS Cap 6). This inability is conditional.

If there is no civil authority [9] around or is not contactable in time to disperse the unlawful assembly (and if there is, the military must proceed only in accordance with his instructions), a military officer (of any rank) or a Warrant Officer Class I or Class II is empowered by Section 87 of the Criminal Procedure Code to do so on his own initiative to order the unlawful assembly to disperse and to use reasonable force if the unlawful assembly refuses to disperse after being so ordered by the appropriate military officer.

CIVIL POWERS OVER THE MILITARY

The situation may be such that the civil authorities may not be able to cope [10] and the unlawful assembly refuses or cannot be dispersed by the use of civil force, they [11] are legally empowered to demand any military commander [12] to disperse the stubborn crowd. Such a requirement, if properly made, must be obeyed by the military. If not, that military commander or his superior to whom he refers to, is answerable in later proceedings, if any, in which he can justify his decision not to intervene.

DEFENCES

In order to protect the professional soldier or military officer, either acting by himself or on requisition by the civil authorities to disperse an unlawful assembly and during which action he may resort to the use of force considered "minimal" in the circumstances, the law

provides [13] ample cover so as to enable the military to do what it is trained to do in the way only it knows how.

This Section 88 defence covers anything done by the military for the sole purpose of the civil Procedure Code [14] This protection or defence is two-fold:

a. No criminal proceeding can be instituted against a military commander unless a prior written sanction is given by His Majesty The Yang Di-Pertuan Agong permitting such a prosecution. This obviously is a procedural obstacle commonly adopted to give the Executive the right to choose a policy that would not embarrass itself.

b. No member of the military acting in **good faith** (even to the extent of using firearms) to disperse an unlawful assembly shall be deemed to have committed an offence. This "defence of good faith" is all embracing and powerful defence indeed. The burden of proof - to prove **mala fide** - lies on the prosecution as the court must assume that the defendant had acted in good faith at the material time. This burden is a heavy one considering the circumstances, the occasion and the standing **modus operandis** of a military force.

In sum, the legal powers to disperse an unlawful assembly lie either with the civil authorities or with the military. If the civil authorities fail to do so, they have the legal powers to order the military and the military is duty-bound to do so. Also, in the absence of any civil authority, the military can in fact act on its own if it deems it necessary to intervene and to disperse the crowd. In this last instance, no guideline is given as to the precise moment when the military can intervene. A discretion is exercised only by the

military commander on the spot. His decision to intervene and acts done thereafter or pursuant to a legal requisition, are protected by written laws.

THE AMENDING ACT

The Akta Kanun Acara Jenayah (Pindaan dan Perluasan) 1976 [15] was passed in 1976 and promulgated as Gazette Notification Volume I Number 1 of the same year. Significant changes were made by this amending legislation which have yet to be recognized by those effected by it. See Figure 1.

THE EFFECTS OF THE AMENDING ACT

In general, the amending Act has amended various provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code (FMS Cap 6) and in the process it has re-shaped the whole outlook of the civil authorities' and the military's legal right to disperse an unlawful assembly in a public order situation.

This **nav kalpana** or new look can be seen from the extent to which the old CPC is amended. The whole of Sections 85, and 88 are reworded to reflect the corresponding provisions in the CPC and to incorporate, it seems, the spirit of the deleted provisions.

The old Section 83 which lists those police officers who can order (or command) a unlawful assembly to disperse now includes an **Inspector** (a non-gazetted rank which does not have a silver braid on the peak cap) as opposed to Gazetted Officers only (Assistant Superintendent of Police or above). This however does not preclude a policeman in charge of a police station (whatever his rank) to do so, for example, in a remote area where only a Sargeant (as the

highest rank) is around. Others who are authorised include a Magistrate or a person who has the power of a Magistrate, but it is pertinent to note that no mention is made about a military commander (whatever his rank) at all. It means that, **the military has no power whatsoever to command an unlawful assembly to disperse** under this section, either on their own or as required by the civil authorities as before.

SITUATION 1

However, the importance of this section must not be overlooked by the military as a legitimate call properly made by the proper authorities (listed in Section 83 as amended) to a crowd to disperse either under this section or Section 5 of the PO (P) O establishes the required **pre-condition** to enable the **military to act without** further requisition. In other words, even though the military is not listed as an authority to command an unlawful assembly to disperse, it can do so once the lawful command is given by a proper civil officer authorised by Section 83. This "fight" to act in support of the civil authorities comes into play only when **an order or command to** disperse has already been given by the proper authority [16]. This military right to disperse is, therefore, subject to a **condition precedent.**

At this instance, even though only "reasonable force" may be used, it may well include the use of weapons (what else would the military use?) termed as "small arms" as opposed to canons, artillery guns, rockets or mortars. But under PO (P) O, it seems that the use of "lethal weapons" is legitimate and perhaps reasonable, as well. There is no

**SUMMARY OF AMENDED LAWS UNDER THE
REVISED CPC (FMS-CAP 6)**
(By CPC (AMDT AND EXTENSION) ACT 1976-ACT A324)
(AS NOTIFIED IN GN JIL 1/NO 1 OF 1976)

Old Provisions: Section 83, 84, 85, 86, 87 and 88 (See POMAN).

New Provisions: Section 83 (as amended)-who can "command" dispersal (i e Civil Powers).
Section 84 (as revised)-see opinion
Section 85)
Section 86) Deleted.
Section 87)
Section 88 (as revised)-see opinion

FIGURE I

definition anywhere as to what constitutes "lethal weapons" from the military angle. Even a finger is lethal to a commando!

SITUATION 2

The only other occasion in which the military can now intervene to disperse an unlawful assembly **without any prior command** given under **Section 83,** is spelt out in **Section 84.** This "right" exists all the time, but, again, the military can only act, if and only if, **"the unlawful assembly conducts itself in a manner as to show a determination not to disperse".** The question is whether this is a **pre-condition** different to the **pre-condition** in **Situation 1** or whether it is one of the same kind. It may be that before the military can react to a situation where a lawful command has laready been properly given, this second **pre-condition** must exist. If so, Situation 2 is also subject to a **condition precedent.**

FIGURE 2   MILITARY POWERS TO DISPERSE UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLIES
UNDER SECTION 84 (REVISED) CPC (FMS CAP 6)
"FORCIBLE DISPERSAL OF UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLIES"

In other words, does each of the **pre-conditions** combines into a single **pre-condition,** or **two** separate and distinct pre-conditions, to enable the military to react? The better view seems to be that they are **two distinct pre-conditions covering two situations.** Althought Situation 1, perforce, is immediately followed by Situation 2, it is **non sequitor** to say that Situation 2 must be preceded by Situation 1. This is the spirit of the old CPC and in all probability, also the aim of the amending legislation. To interpret differently will only lead to a situation where the military can NO longer act on its own in a grave situation where no civil authority is present, or exists beforehand.

In this second situation, any member of the Armed Forces (but usually an NCO [17] may use **reasonable force** to disperse the unlawful assembly. The same principle applies as to the types of force which can be categorised as "minimum force" in the military sense.

Regardless of the interpretation, **Section 84** has become the most important section in the amended version of the CPC, as far as the military is concerned.

DELETED PROVISIONS

Section 85 has been deleted completely. Under this section, then, it was provided that a civil authority which has the statutory powers to order an unlawful assembly to disperse, also has the corresponding statutory power to "order" the military authority to disperse the crowd instead. This is an act of a last resort.

In view of the deletion of this all important **Section 85** by the amending Act, do the statutory powers of the civil authority continue to exist under the amending Act or can it be said to have been in permanent existence under the common or

other law, **albeif** its emergence under the deleted section of the Criminal Procedure Code as it was?

Following the heirachy of the military forces and studying the law of Malaysia, in particular the provisions in the Armed Forces Act 1972 [18], there seems to be no other authority that can order the military forces except His Majesty The Yang Di-Pertuan Agong himself or through his properly constituted agency, namely the Armed Forces Council [19]. Apart from the non-existence of an external personality or office to move the military, there are recognized political and administrative procedures, although indirectly so, by which, the top echelons of the military heirachy can be 'forced' to act. This procedure may be followed down to the ground level under the statutory powers bestowed upon the higher commanders [20] and powers inherent in their commissions [21].

CIVIL POWERS OVER MILITARY ERODED

There seems to be no common law powers that can make the military "obey" the civil authorities to disperse an unlawful assembly. It is therefore correct to conclude that, with the amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code in 1976 by the amending Act, the old right disappeared together with Section 85. The effect is that, now, the Police or the Magistrate or those having the powers of a Magistrate can no longer legally request a military commander to disperse an unlawful assembly, but instead the military, perforce, in theory at least, have to act on its own initiative based on the two pre-conditions discussed earlier, namely, **firstly** that a prior command to disperse had been given by a proper civil authority, and **secondly, "the unlawful assembly conducts itself in such a man-**

ner as to show a determination not to disperse". Either or both of these pre-conditions must exist before the military can be said to have the statutory powers to force the unruly crowd to disperse.

The deleted Section 86 (which prescribes the procedure and formalities to request military aid under the defunct Section 85) followed Section 85 into history.

Section 87 is also deleted. Originally this section empowers the military forces (officers and warrant officers only) to act on its own initiative without recourse to any powers held by a civil authority or in the absence of any written request from the Police or a magistrate or a person having the powers of a magistrate to disperse an unlawful assembly. The powers seem to cover all acts made to disperse, arrest and confine unlawful rioters or any one forming part of an unlawful assembly. This power is not absolute since the section requires the military to communicate with and follow instructions of a proper police officer or a magistrate (those who can lawfully order dispersal).

With the deletion of Section 87, the amending Act does not appear to have eroded the powers of the military; provided one or both of the pre-conditions exist before intervening, the military still have the power to disperse an unlawful assembly on its own initiative.

STATUTORY DEFENCES

Section 88 is retained but a minor modification is made by the emending Act. Statutory defences previously enjoyed by the military remain unaltered. See figure 3.

Basically, there are three distinct and unrelated defences contained in Section 88, namely, **procedural, technical or legal** and **statutory.** The Code refers to the defences as "protection against prosecution" for acts done with regard to unlawful assemblies.

FIGURE 3 PROTECTION AGAINST PROSECUTION/CIVIL CLAIMS DEFENCES

PROCEDURAL

Before a prosecution can be taken against a military personnel ("officer [22]" or "serviceman" [23] of the Armed Forces defined in the Armed Forces Act 1972), prior **sanction in writing** must be obtained from the Public Prosecutor [24] **personally.** This is a procedural requirement and a trial may not commence unless this statutory requirement is satisfied; otherwise, it would be an irregularity.

TECHNICAL DEFENCE

The second protection is legal or technical one. Section 88 simply incorporates into statute the "defence of good faith". So, even if the Public Prosecutor correctly sanctions a prosecution, the accused member of the Armed Forces and still prove and justify his "good faith" in doing the act or acts alleged against him. Acts of good faith or the "defence of good faith" is wide and varied in law and may be read in any good law books on almost any branch of the law [25]. It cannot be

described here in this short space but suffice to say that the two pre-conditions that must exist before the military can act are issues of fact, which, once proved, will justify the alleged or related acts. This legal burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove acts of bad faith (mala fide) on the part of the member of the Armed Forces.

DEFENCE OF SUPERIOR ORDERS

The third protection, exclusively for members of the Armed Forces, is contained in the phrase "defence of superior orders" [26] .

This phrase entails a wide knowledge of military law (or service law) as practised and as laid down in statutes [27]. In brief, it means that, if a member of a military force obeys a lawful command or orders properly given by his superior (and the subordinate member does not have the time nor the opportunity to question whether such an order is lawful or not) he is deemed to be innocent of acts done pursuant to that order. He also retains the "defence of good faith".

But, the question is whether the superior member issuing out that order is equally protected. The better view, arguably, is that he is also protected under the same ruling and provision applicable to his subordinate. In his case, however, he may or may not have a "superior order".

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, one can say that while some radical changes have been made by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment and Extension) Act, 1976 to the Criminal Procedure Code (FMS Cap 6), no significant handicap is imposed upon a member of the Armed Forces. **A Fortiori,** the military is now relieved of the

legal burden to disperse an unlawful assembly on a proper request by the civil authorities. Nevertheless, a requisition may still be made and the military is still bound to react notwithstanding the absence of any legal basis for such a request. In the extreme cases, the military may use its discretion not to comply, but such refusal by a military commander may be unreasonable in the circumstances and therefore may lead to a military-style dressing-down by his superior!

The military may continue to act on its own initiative, like before, but such action may only be made if and when either or both or the two conditions precedent exist. Any act done in the process of dispersing an unlawful assembly remains protected by law, including the Armed Forces Act 1972 itself.

References:

(1)   Act 77.

(2)   Extended to Sabah and Sarawak by LN 232/63.

(3)   CPA Cap 58 for Sarawak and CPC Orinance Number 4/59 for Sabah.

(4)   Act A324 published as Gazette Notification Volume I Number 1 of 1979.

(5)   Under Section 3 (1) of PO (P) O.

(6)   S15 (1) of PO (P) O.

(7)   Ibid, S20 (1).

(8)   See The Penal Code S 141 (FMS Cap 45), Sabah Penal Code S 141 and Sarawak Penal Code S 141 and as modified by The Police Act 1967 S 27 SS(5) for the definition of an "unlawful assembly".

(9)   Civil authority here means the designated Police Officers or a Magistrate, or a person with magistrate powers.

(10) Under S 83 and S 84 of the CPC.

(11) The magistrate present of The Chief Police Officer (by proxy).

(12) The senior military member (of any rank) present with and **in command** of troops, regardless of whichever Service he belongs to.

(13) See S 88 of CPC.

(14) Chapter VIII only.

(15) Act A 324.

(16) See Stuation 1 in the Diagram at the end of the article.

(17) Abbreviation for Non-Commissioned Officers, a group of rank holders below a commisioned rank.

(18) Act 77.

(19) Established by and under the Federal Constitution.

(20) Armed Forces Act, S 50.

(21) See, Second Schecdule, Malay Regiment Enactment (FMS Cap 42) which unfortunately is not dreproduced in the replacement Act.

(22) "Officer" means any person of or above the rank of midshipman, naval cadet, officer cadet or flight cadet who has been **appointed** to or **commissioned** in the regular Armed Forces.

(23) "Serveceman" means any person, other than an officer who is **enlisted** in the regular force.

(24) The Director of Public Drosecutions in Sabah and Sarawak.

(25) See for example the same protection given to trustess acting in good faith, although the burden of proof is on him.

(26) See Smith and Hogan's Criminal Law, Fourth Edition, 1978, pp 209-210.

(27) In Malaysia, it is laid down in the Armed Forces Act 1972 (Act 77) Sections 50 and 51 (disobeying superior officer and standing or other orders).

Kolonel Hj Wan Nordin Bin Hj Wan Mohammed is an old putra of RMC. He was commissioned into the Royal Malay Regiment in 1961 at OCS Portsea Australia; did his post-graduate studies at DSSC, Wellington, India in 1971. A law graduate of Faculty of Laws, King's College, University of London, where he obtained a Second Class Honours degree in laws, he possessed a post-graduate professional degree of Barrister-at-Law with Honours at Gray's Inn, London, where he was called to the English Bar in Trinity Term (July) 1981. He is presently the Director of Manpower in the Ministry of Defence.

SISTEM BANTUAN TEMBAKAN ARTILERI MEDAN UNTUK REJIMEN ARTILERI MALAYSIA

Jabatanarah Artileri

PENGENALAN

Stalin pernah mensifatkan artileri sebagai "God of War". Artileri merupakan tulang belakang kepada taktik peperangan tentera British dan Russia di dalam Perang Dunia Kedua. Ianya digunakan secara besar-besaran di dalam peperangan Korea. Artileri juga telah memainkan peranan penting di dalam peperangan di Dien-Bien Phu. Di sepanjang peperangan Vietnam, kedua-dua belah pihak telah menggunakan artileri masing-masing dengan efektif. Bolehlah dikatakan bahawa kekuatan dan keupayaan artileri digunakan sebagai pengukur bagi menentukan sejauh manakah efektifnya sesebuah tentera moden itu. Tentera Soviet Russia yang masih mengekalkan tradisi ketenteraannya, mungkin mempunyai kekuatan artileri yang terbesar sekali di dunia. Dalam Peperangan Dunia Kedua dahulu, bagi setiap empat orang anggota tentera Russia seorang daripadanya adalah anggota artileri. Berhampiran dengan negara kita, Vietnam juga mempunyai kekuatan artileri yang besar. Persenjataan artileri tentera Vietnam adalah lebih besar dari kesemua persenjataan artileri negara-negara Asean bila dijumlahkan.

KEJAYAAN GERAKAN DARAT

Kejayaan gerakan-gerakan darat di dalam peperangan konvensyenal adalah hasil dari koordinasi yang rapat di antara pasukan-pasukan infantri, perisai dan artileri. Sekurang-kurangnya separuh dari kekuatan tembakan, tidak termasuk tembakan udara, adalah dari tembakan artileri. Sumbangan sebegini dari artileri dilakukan tanpa terjejas oleh cuaca buruk, di waktu siang atau malam. Tindakbalas dari pasukan artileri terhadap sebarang panggilan artileri adalah serta merta. Ini berbeza sekali dengan bantuan tembakan udara. Selain dari menghadapi ancaman pertahanan udara moden yang amat efektif, bantuan rapat udara dari kapal terbang pejuang tidak dapat memberi bantuan sertamerta seperti bantuan yang dapat diperolehi dari artileri. Senjata-senjata artileri kini boleh membinasakan jumlah sasaran-sasaran yang banyak dan berselerak di sekitar medan perang ataupun menumpukan kekuatan tembakan yang padat dan di jarak jauh ke atas sesuatu sasaran penting. Artileri adalah senjata yang sentiasa boleh digunakan oleh seseorang pemerintah di dalam menghadapi keadaan taktikal yang berubah-ubah. Bagi

Teknologi moden telah menghasilkan perkembangan yang dramatik dari sudut peluru meriam medium. Di antara peluru-peluru moden khas yang telah dihasilkan termasuklah:

a. *Projektil Pandu Penamat (Terminally Guided Projectiles).* Peluru jenis ini telah dialu-alukan oleh Asian Defence Journal sebagai "Magic for the Artillery". Peluru yang dilancar pandu dari meriam medium ini mempunyai, dari segi statistik, 96• kemungkinan kena kepada sasaran kecil seperti sebuah kereta perisai. Sistem ini mempertingkatkan artileri kepada sistem senjata anti-armour berjarak jauh. Pelurunya dipandu oleh satu alat laser yang diarahkan kepada sasaran sama ada dari satu pos pemerhati biasa atau dari udara.

b *Projektil Artileri "Area Denial" (Area Denial Artillery Munition -ADAM).* Peluru ini adalah peluru jenis "anti personnel" yang dilancarkan dari meriam medium 155mm. Tiap-tiap butir peluru boleh mengeluarkan dua belas periok api di sekitar kawasan sasaran yang seterusnya menjadi hidup selepas impek dan termusnah sendirinya pada satu masa yang spesifik kelak.

c *Projektil Periok Api "Remote Anti Armour" (Remote Anti-Armour Mine-RAAM).* Peluru ini juga dilancarkan dari meriam 155mm dan tiap-tiap butir mengandungi 9 periok api anti-tank. Satu misi tembakan RAAM berupaya mengwujudkan dengan sertamerta satu kawasan periok api "anti-tank" berukuran 250 x 350 meter persegi.

Pada kesimpulannya artileri medium dapat memberi segala kemudahan untuk melaksanakan satu-satu rancangan perang seorang pemerintah. Meriam medium memusnahkan sasaran-sasaran yang jauh di belakang dan terkeluar dari keupayaan jarak artileri ringan. Dari kedudukan pertahanan utama, artileri medium dapat memberikan bantuan tembakan kepada pasukan pelindung. Juga, oleh kerana kejituannya yang tinggi dan kebolehannya untuk melancarkan pelbagai jenis peluru yang lebih berat, meriam medium boleh melaksanakan peranan-peranan yang lazimnya dilakukan oleh artileri ringan tetapi dengan lebih efektif lagi. Di atas kesedaran tentang betapa penting dan bergunanya artileri medium, beberapa tentera asing telah mengstruktur pasukan artileri mereka dengan menggunakan artileri medium bagi kedua-dua tujuan bantuan rapat dan bantuan am.

MORTAR BERAT

Betapa berkesannya mortar berat sebagai senjata bantuan rapat telah dapat dibuktikan sejak beberapa tahun yang lalu. Walaupun mortar berat tidak dapat mencapai jarak yang boleh menandingi meriam, jarak maksima yang dapat dicapai oleh mortar ketika ini telah dapat diperbaiki dengan menggunakan bom-bom yang bersistem roket. Dengan menggunakan bom-bom yang bersistem roket, jarak yang dapat dicapai hampir setanding dengan jarak yang dicapai oleh meriam ringan. Kebelakangan ini teknologi pembinaan mortar telah diperbaiki untuk menjadikan mortar sebagai senjata bantuan rapat yang ringan dan tangkas. Mortar mempunyai kadar tembakan yang tinggi dan paling berkesan digunakan di kawasan-kawasan berbukit dan tertutup di mana mobiliti dan keperluan kedudukan tapak yang kecil amat diutamakan.

membolehkan artileri melaksanakan tugas-tugasnya, ianya mestilah mempunyai satu sistem bantuan tembakan yang mengandungi pelbagai jenis meriam, mortar dan roket dengan kaliber yang pelbagai juga. Dari segi artileri pengesan pula ianya mesti mempunyai elemen-elemen pembantu seperti ukur, kaji-cuaca, perisikan artileri dan sistem pencari sasaran. Campuran sistem sedemikian mestilah dapat mencirikan keringanan bagi tujuan mobiliti, kadar tembakan yang tinggi untuk keupayaan pemusnahan, tembakan yang kuat dan jarak jauh untuk memusnahkan sasaran yang jauh di belakang.

Sistem-sistem persenjataan artileri mestilah menukuktambah satu sama lain supaya satu kombinasi yang paling berkesan dapat digunakan untuk menyerang satu-satu sasaran. Sebarang sistem artileri yang tidak mempunyai keupayan-keupayaan sedemikian dan hanya bergantung kepada satu sistem persenjataan sahaja ternyata tidak akan berupaya menyerang satu-satu sasaran dengan berkesan. Seseorang pemerintah akan kehilangan kelonggaran ikhtiar (flexibility) untuk menggunakan senjata yang betul-betul sesuai bagi satu-satu jenis sasaran. Dalam hal ini semua sasaran akan diserang oleh senjata artileri yang berjenis sama dan dari itu tidak dapat memeranjatkan musuh dan hasilnya tidaklah berkesan. Seterusnya persenjataan artileri yang tidak pelbagai akan mengikat inisiatif, rancangan pergerakan dan tektik di sekitar keupayaan yang terhad sistem senjata tersebut. Sistem artileri sedemikian tidak akan dapat mengalahkan sistem artileri lawan yang berkeseluruhan.

KEUTAMAAN

Rejiman Artileri Malaysia ketika ini hanya dilengkapkan dengan artileri ringan sahaja. Ianya tidak mempunyai bentuk artileri yang lain seperti artileri pengesan, dan juga tidak mempunyai markas medan artileri untuk memerintah dan mengawal meriam-meriam lebih dari satu rejimen. Dalam perkembangan Tentera Darat Malaysia adalah difikirkan penting untuk menganalisa beberapa sistem dan organisasi artileri yang sepatutnya diberi keutamaan yang tinggi di dalam rancangan pembangunan Tentera Darat supaya Rejimen Artileri Malaysia dapat melaksanakan tugasnya dengan berkesan.

ARTILERI MEDIUM

Artileri medium kerap dirujuk sebagai barisan bantuan kedua, biasanya dipanggil artileri bantuan am. Meriam medium boleh mencapai jarak maksima 24 km dengan menggunakan peluru piawai dan 39 km dengan menggunakan peluru jenis khas. Artileri bantuan am lazimnya digunakan untuk memenuhi peranan strategik dengan menembak sasaran-sasaran yang tidak mampu ditembak oleh meriam-meriam ringan, sambil menambah kepadatan tembakan dan kedalaman kepada meriam-meriam ringan. Ciri-ciri artileri medium adalah keupayaannya menembak dengan jitu peluru yang lebih berat, lebih kurang 95 lbs, di kedua-dua sudut rendah dan tinggi dan di jarak yang jauh.

Gambar 1   Meriam Medium

Gambar 2   Mortar Berat

KELEMAHAN MORTAR

Kelemahan mortar yang paling utama ialah ianya terhad kepada tembakan sudut tinggi, oleh yang demikian bom mortar mengembara lama di udara kerana londarannya tinggi. Dengan itu ianya amat tertakluk kepada keadaan cuaca yang berubah-ubah dan akibatnya menjejaskan kejituan dan prestasinya. Tembakan sudut tinggi jarang-jarang digunakan untuk tembakan ramalan (predicted) kerana tidak mampu mencapai kejituan yang diharapkan. Kelemahan lain untuk mortar ialah bahawa oleh kerana bom berada lama di udara, proses pelarasan mengambil masa yang lama juga, oleh kerana itu tindakbalas mortar ekoran dari panggilan tembakan tidaklah begitu spontan. Bom-bom mortar di udara juga amat mudah dikesan oleh radar pengesan kerana trajektorinya tinggi dan peluru bergerak di halaju subsonik. Dengan ini kedudukan mortar mudah dikesan. Untuk mengelakkan pengesanan dari musuh, mortar mestilah bersedia untuk sentiasa bergerak dan menukar kedudukannya.

MORTAR CEPAT TINDAK

Mortar sebaliknya ialah sejenis senjata yang cepat bertindak. Ianya ringkas, amat ringan dan mudah dikendalikan. Zon penyerakan dari serpihan bom yang hampir membulat adalah lebih besar jika dibandingkan dengan senjata artileri yang mempunyai alurpusar (riflings) dan dengan ini mortar amat berkesan sebagai senjata kawasan. Tidak seperti peluru

meriam di mana dinding peluru sengaja ditebalkan supaya dapat menahan tekanan pelancaran peluru, bom mortar pula mempunyai dinding yang agak nipis. Keadaan ini membolehkan lebih banyak kandungan bahan letupan kuat diisi ke dalam tiap-tiap bom dan dengan itu bom-bom mortar mempunyai serpihan peluru yang lebih baik jika dibandingkan dengan saiz dan beratnya yang lebih rendah. Dengan kekuatannya ini, disusuli pula dengan trajektori akhirnya yang hampir mencancang dan kadar tembakan yang tinggi, bom mortar amatlah berkesan untuk menyerang musuh yang tidak mempunyai perlindungan. Keistimewaan mortar adalah saiznya yang kecil, mobiliti yang tinggi, murah dari segi kos mudah dikendalikan dan kadar tembakan yang tinggi. Jika digunakan di dalam peranan tembakan dan gerak, mortar adalah sukar untuk dikesan dan dibinasakan oleh senjata artileri musuh.

Dari segi reka bentuknya yang mudah dan keringanannya, mortar adalah lebih baik dari meriam terutama di dalam gerakan udara dan laut. Adalah lebih mudah untuk menggerak dan menggugurkan mortar dari udara dari menggerak dan menggugurkan meriam. Nisbah berat mortar dengan berat meriam (105 mm pack how) ialah hampir 1:4. Persediaan untuk pengguguran mortar dari udara dapat dikurangkan oleh kerana ianya memerlukan pelantar yang mudah. Untuk bantuan tembakan bagi gerakan khas di mana mobiliti dan kederasan amat dipentingkan, terutamanya bagi jenis-jenis operasi yang dilakukan oleh anggota gerak khas, penggunaan mortar berat adalah lebih baik. Oleh yang demikian adalah amat menguntungkan jika diwujudkan sistem sedemikian yang mudah dan berkesan ke dalam inventori kita, terutamanya memandangkan keadaan tanah di Malaysia ini yang kerap menimbulkan masalah mobiliti. Russia, Israel dan Viet-

nam yang telah terlibat di dalam peperangan sejak beberapa tahun yang lalu hingga ke saat ini telah menggunakan mortar berat ke dalam artilerinya dengan berkesan. Bagi mereka mortar adalah penambah yang penting kepada sistem-sistem meriam dan roket mereka.

SISTEM ROKET LANCAR BERGANDA (MULTIPLE LAUNCH)

Pada satu ketika dahulu sistem lancar berganda atau Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) lebih popular digunakan di dalam tentera Pakatan Warsaw, di mana tentera, Pakatan NATO menggelarkannya sebagai "Stalins Organ". Negara-negara NATO, di antara sebab-sebabnya yang lain, berpendapat bahawa sistem ini tidak mempunyai kejituan yang baik dan oleh itu tidak mengambil berat untuk digunakan sebagai sistem artileri yang berkesan. Beberapa tahun kebelakangan ini dengan bertambah baiknya teknologi MLRS beberapa perkembangan dan perubahan sikap di kalangan negara-negara NATO telah berlaku. Sistem ini sekarang telah digunakan oleh tentera NATO dan beberapa negara-negara lain.

Gambar 3 Sistem MLRS

MLRS mempunyai kaliber di antara 50mm sehingga 230mm. Sistem roket yang kecil mempunyai jarak maksima sehingga 6 km manakala roket yang lebih besar mempunyai jarak sehingga 40 km. Satu pelancar roket dipasang di atas sebuah kenderaan mengandungi di antara 12 ke 40 roket bergantung kepada saiz roket yang berkenaan. Kesemua roket tersebut boleh dilancarkan di dalam masa kurang dari 30 saat. Roket-roket itu boleh dilancarkan satu per satu ataupun secara sekelumpuk serentak ke atas satu sasaran atau lebih dari satu sasaran, di jarak masa yang boleh ditetapkan. Jumlah berat sebutir roket yang berkaliber besar ialah di antara 150 hingga ke 400 lbs yang mana hanya separuh sahaja merangkumi berat "warhead"nya. "Warhead" yang dimaksudkan boleh mengandungi bahan letupan kuat, kimia, "anti-material, anti-personnel, anti-tank", asap dan periok api.

KUASA PEMUSNAH MLRS

Satu kajian perbandingan yang dilakukan oleh Tentera Amerika melaporkan bahawa satu pelancar sistem roket (MLRS) 230 mm yang mengandungi 12 roket mempunyai kuasa pemusnah di dalam satu minit sama dengan apa yang dapat dihasilkan dari 28 x 8 inci meriam howitzer. Kajian yang lain pula menyebut bahawa kuasa pemusnah dari sebuah rejimen MLRS ke atas satu sasaran kawasan didapati sama dengan kuasa pemusnah 8 x rejimen artileri medium. Dari segi kandungan "Warhead" pula sebutir roket 230 mm mempunyai 644 pecahan peluru (submunitions) berbanding dengan 190 bagi sebutir peluru 8 inci dan 88 bagi sebutir peluru 155 mm. Bolehlah dilihat bahawa tiap-tiap butir roket mempunyai "payload" yang lebih besar dari peluru meriam.

Kelemahan utama sistem roket ialah dari segi penerbangan bebasnya (free flight) yang menyebabkan roket menjadi kurang jitu jika dibezakan dengan peluru meriam. Motor roket dan "Warhead"nya adalah lebih besar dari peluru meriam tetapi halajunya lebih perlahan dan oleh itu amat tertakluk kepada pengaruh angin melintang. Roket juga bukan direka untuk berkeupayaan menembak di sudut tinggi dan oleh itu tidak berkesan jika sasaran yang ditembak berada di belakang bukit. Halaju roket yang perlahan dan sambil itu membakar sewaktu di dalam penerbangan menyebabkan ianya mudah dikesan oleh alat pengesan dan ini membahayakan kedudukan pelancar. Roket juga tidak menggunakan sistem cas untuk mencapai dongakan atau jarak yang lebih tinggi, seperti yang digunakan oleh meriam dan mortar, oleh kerana roket bergantung kepada tenaga penggerak yang tetap, pencapaian di satu-satu jarak bergantung semata-mata kepada sistem dongakan dengan mengubah-ubah dongakan. Cara ini mempunyai had-had kerana di dalam sistem roket yang berjarak jauh, misalnya 30 km, untuk mencapai jarak 10 atau 12 km satu dongakan yang amat rendah terpaksa digunakan.

Walaupun terdapat kelemahan-kelemahan yang disebutkan di atas, roket juga mempunyai beberapa kelebihan yang istimewa di dalam beberapa aspek jika dibandingkan dengan meriam. Jika timbul keperluan untuk memusnahkan satu kawasan luas yang diduduki oleh infanteri atau kereta-kereta perisai musuh maka roketlah sistem yang paling efektif untuk tujuan itu. Keupayaan roket untuk melancarkan peluru-pelurunya di dalam masa yang singkat dan meliputi kawasan yang luas dengan kepadatan tembakan yang tinggi memperbaiki peluang untuk mengenai sasaran. Keupayaan ini dipanggil keupayaan "saturation".

Peluru roket berpandu penamat (terminally guided warhead) ketika ini sedang di dalam proses penyiapan untuk digunakan ke atas sasaran kereta perisai secara "direct hit". Ada juga kemungkinan peluru roket yang boleh dipandu tepat ke sasaran dan mempunyai "payload" yang lebih banyak, jarak yang lebih jauh dan kejituan yang lebih tinggi akan dapat dihasilkan. Tembakan yang sertamerta dari MLRS dapat memusnahkan kawasan yang luas di dalam masa yang singkat di mana tidak ada sistem artileri lain yang dapat menandinginya. Oleh kerana penggunaan strategiknya dari roket yang berkaliber besar maka unit roket patut diwujudkan di peringkat Kor atau di peringkat yang lebih tinggi. Bagaimanapun pembangunan sistem roket boleh diberi keutamaan yang rendah dari meriam medium yang merupakan sumber yang organik kepada tiap-tiap divisyen. Lebih keutamaan patut diberi kepada pembangunan artileri bantuan rapat dan am seperti artileri medium. Sistem roket tidak mempunyai kejituan yang tinggi untuk digunakan sebagai artileri bantuan rapat.

ARTILERI PENGESAN

Artileri pengesan membantu artileri medan di dalam melaksanakan peranannya. Tugas utamanya ialah memperolehi sasaran dan mencari serta membekalkan data perisikan medan. Ianya juga mengeluarkan data-data ukur dan kajicuaca untuk semua bentuk artileri medan. Lazimnya sebuah bateri pengesan membantu sistem artileri medan di dalam sebuah divisyen. Sebuah bateri pengesan mempunyai elemen-elemen berikut:-

- Seksyen perisikan.
- Terup ukur.
- Terup pencari sasaran.
- Terup kajicuaca.

- Seksyen drone.
- Seksyen kalibrasi

Bateri pengesan ialah sumber utama bagi memperolehi maklumat dan data perisikan terhadap sistem persenjataan musuh di dalam satu divisyen. Ianya mempunyai organisasi perisikan artileri yang melaksanakan tugas-tugas berikut:

- Membekalkan data sasaran terhadap artileri dan mortar musuh.

- Memusnah atau membinasakan artileri musuh mengikut dasar "counter-batteri" yang ditetapkan oleh seorang pemerintah.

- Membekalkan staf perisikan dan gerakan dengan data-data perisikan hasil dari penilaian maklumat yang diperolehi terhadap artileri musuh.

- Mengelolakan sumber-sumber pengawasan tempur (combat surveillance) artileri di dalam satu-satu divisyen.

Tanpa bateri pengesan sebuah divisyen dengan secara bersendirian tidak mempunyai cara yang baik untuk memperolehi perisikan terhadap persenjataan artileri musuh. Ianya terpaksa bergantung kepada rondaan biasa yang mana akan menghadapi kerumitan untuk memperolehi maklumat yang pakar dan mendalam terutamanya dari segi kedudukan senjata musuh yang terletak jauh di belakang. Sistem artileri yang ada akan menjadi sia-sia jika alat untuk mencari sasaran-sasaran dan maklumat sasaran untuk sistem artileri tersebut tidak diadakan.

PERINTAH DAN KAWALAN

Artileri medan pada amnya adalah organik kepada divisyen. Divisyen ialah

paras yang paling rendah yang sepatutnya memerintah dan mengawal sumber-sumber artileri. Artileri diperuntukkan kepada briged atau paras yang lebih rendah melalui perintah kawalan seperti dalam bantuan, dalam bantuan langsung dan sebagainya. Unit-unit artileri di dalam satu divisyen, bagi Tentera Darat kita, divisyen infanteri, dikenali sebagai artileri divisyen. Terdapat juga bentuk artileri yang lain, iaitu artileri kor, artileri terup kor, briged artileri dan sebagainya. Sumber-sumber artileri ini dipanggil "Artileri Bukan Divisyen" dan perkara ini tidak akan dibincangkan di dalam artikel ini.

Markas artileri yang tertinggi sekali di dalam Rejimen Artileri Malaysia hanyalah di peringkat rejimen. Kita tidak mempunyai kemampuan untuk memerintah dan mengawal apa-apa pun di peringkat yang lebih tinggi dari peringkat rejimen. Jawatankuasa Doktrin, sejajar dengan konsep kawalan artileri dalam tentera-tentera asing, telah mengakui supaya paras gabungan diasaskan kepada sebuah rejimen artileri bantuan rapat untuk sebuah briged infanteri dan sebuah divisyen patut mempunyai sumber-sumber artileri tambahan. Jika sedemikian maka sebuah divisyen infanteri akan dapat dibantu oleh lebih dari sebuah rejimen bantuan rapat (4 x Rejimen berasaskan konsep 1:4:4) ditambah lagi dengan sumber-sumber medium, pengesan dan pertahanan udara. Oleh yang demikian di dalam sebuah divisyen di mana terdapat lebih dari sebuah rejimen artileri maka penting dan wajib diwujudkan satu organisasi untuk memerintah dan mengawal sumber-sumber artileri yang terdapat di dalam divisyen tersebut. Ketika ini 3 Divisyen mempunyai dua buah rejimen medan di bawah pemerintahannya.

Markas Divisyen Artileri yang merupakan sebahagian dari Markas Divisyen, menyelaras kesemua kegiatan-kegiatan dan sumber-sumber artileri di dalam divisyen tersebut. Ini termasuk tugas memproses perisikan artileri dan perlaksanaan rancangan "counter-battery". Panglima Divisyen Artileri ialah juga penasihat kepada Panglima Divisyen terhadap hal-hal bantuan tembakan dan menyelaraskan semua rancangan tembakan di dalam divisyen tersebut. Tanpa organisasi tersebut sebuah rejimen hanyalah sesuai untuk membantu sebuah briged yang mana rejimen itu telah diperuntukan kepada briged itu di dalam bantuan langsung. Tanpa organisasi begitu maka tidak akan dapatlah kemudahan untuk mengabungkan tembakan dari dua buah rejimen atau lebih ke atas satu kawasan jika keperluan itu timbul. Dalam hal ini sumber-sumber artileri di dalam sebuah divisyen akan bersetempat dengan briged masing-masing, tanpa dapat menggunakan keupayaan membantu briged-briged lain di dalam divisyen yang sama. Dari itu kawasan operasi di bawah pengaruh divisyen dan Kor tidak dapat bantuan artileri bukan sahaja kerana tidak ada organisasi untuk mengawal dan memerintah tetapi juga oleh kerana tiadanya sistem persenjataan artileri yang menukuk-tambah.

PENUTUP

Sistem-sistem bantuan artileri dan organisasi yang dibincangkan di perenggan-perenggan awal bukanlah satu perkara yang baru. Sistem-sistem dan organisasi tersebut telah dicuba dan diuji di dalam suasana perang sebenarnya sejak beberapa tahun yang lampau. Tentera-tentera asing yang berpengalaman, sama ada kecil atau besar telah dan masih menggunakan sistem-sistem tersebut dengan diubahsuai untuk memenuhi keperluan mereka. Terdapat juga sistem-sistem artileri dan organisasi yang tidak dibincangkan seperti artileri ber-

gerak sendiri, artileri berat, briged artiler, artileri terup Kor dan sebagainya. Untuk ketika ini sistem-sistem tersebut bolehlah diberi keutamaan yang rendah bagi Tentera Malaysia.

Satu kekuatan artileri yang utuh mestilah mempunyai kemampuan untuk mengesan sasaran-sasaran dan memusnahkannya dengan berkesan. Ianya mesti mempunyai keupayaan jarak jauh dan mampu menembak peluru yang lebih berat dengan jitu dan konsisten. Untuk memberi hasil yang tinggi kepada sumber-sumber, artileri ini mestilah diwujudkan organisasi untuk memerintah dan mengawal. Tanpa sistem-sistem ini sebuah organisasi artileri tidak akan berkesan kerana kegagalannya untuk memberi tembakan bantuan kepada pasukan kombat di dalam apa fasa peperangan sekalipun.

Tidaklah disarankan supaya Rejimen Artileri Malaysia ditubuhkan sepenuhnya dengan kesemua sumber-sumber artileri yang dibincangkan ke dalam tiap-tiap divisyen infanteri yang wujud ketika ini.

Apa yang penting ialah supaya divisyen satu atau dua, diberi keutamaan dan diwujudkan dengan sistem artileri dan organisasi yang dibincangkan. Dalam divisyen yang lain hanyalah perlu ditubuhkan nukleusnya. Dengan cara ini kita akan mengemaskinikan diri kita dengan "state of the art" (keadaan kaedahnya). Cara ini juga akan membenarkan Rejimen Artileri membangunkan dan berkembang dengan cepat apabila keadaan memerlukan. Untuk membolehkan artileri melaksanakan tugas-tugasnya amatlah perlu sistem-sistem dan organisasi yang disebutkan tadi diwujudkan di kawasan-kawasan yang mempunyai keutamaan yang tinggi dan keupayaan ini seterusnya dipertingkatkan apabila keadaan membenarkan. Jika kita bergantung hanya kepada satu jenis sistem peralatan maka ini akan mengorbankan kelonggaran ikhtiar Tentera Darat dalam usaha memusnahkan musuh, oleh yang demikian kesimpulan yang dapat dibuat ialah Tentera Darat memerlukan bentuk-bentuk bantuan artileri yang sepenuhnya.

"Gunners have been involved in all operations in the Falklands campaign and have responded magnificently to all that has been asked of them. They have operated in what have been appaling conditions and made a major contribution to the final outcome of the campaign. The value of fire support is now firmly implanted and our supported Arms have been lavish in their praise of the support we have provided. All this would not have been possible without the incredible backing we have recieved from our logisticians, pilots, naval gunfire support ships and many other."

Col B T Pennicott
Artillery Adviser to the Task Force Commander
Falkland Islands — June 1982

REVOLUTIONARY WARS

_____ a comparative study

Leftenan Kolonel Soman Selvarajah

Revolutionary wars have occurred throughout the world for various reasons and the methods employed in the conduct of such warfare were as varied as the reasons themselves. However, the twentieth century saw the emergence of a new art of fighting revolutionary wars and the architect of this new art of warfare was Mao Tse Tung himself. This article attempts to make a comparative study of the extent to which Mao's techniques of revolutionary war were employed in certain selected revolutions. It also concludes that regardless of the nature of the revolutions, Mao's techniques have had a marked influence on all these campaigns.

"If you wish for peace understand war, particularly the guerrilla and subversive forms of war."

B H Liddel Hart, 1961.

INTRODUCTION

GUERRILLA WARFARE

Growth of Guerrilla Warfare in the Post World War II era. It is an interesting reflection that until World War I there had seldom been any form of land warfare other than the conventional, namely armies directly opposing each other on the battlefield. In contrast to this, out of the 54 operations in which the British Army for example had taken part since 1945, only Korea and Suez were in conventional form. Most of the other operations launched were against some form of revolutionary movement involving specialized measures and tactics.

The change in conflict was a result of not only the growth of Communism, but by the ever increasing employment of guerrilla tactics. Guerrilla Warfare had also been a common feature of German occupied countries during World War II and since then there have been further examples in Palestine, Cyprus, Algeria, Cuba, Kenya, Greece and Aden. In Asia, guerrilla warfare has had a longer history but again it has only come into its prime during this century.

Guerrilla Warfare and Revolutionary Warfare. Mao Tse Tung, the chief architect of revolutionary warfare, linked the tactics of guerrilla warfare to a wider concept, that of overthrowing a whole nation and changing its goverment to one of the insurgents choosing. It is this that has come to be known as revolutionary warfare. The flames of revolutionary warfare are easily fanned by the winds of social discontent, racial torment and nationalistic fervour, all of which are symptomatic of the twentieth century.

REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

Nature of Revolutionary Warfare. It has become the practice to talk only of Communist Revolutionary Warfare but as professional military officers it is pertinent that we study the wider term "Revolutionary Wafare" since many such wars may be fought without any direct communist influence or backing. To quote Arthur Campbell:

"Revolutionary War, which is a struggle between governmental party and an anti-governmental party in which the latter aims to overthrow the former, generally employing all available means in its attempts to do so; the governmental party attempts to destroy its opponents by some or by all the means at its command. The campaigns

in Indo-China and Malaya were revolutionary wars." [1]

This adds weight to the earlier premise that revolutionary wars need not necessarily be communist wars instigated by militant communists. They can be non-communist in character and inspired by purely nationalistic, religious, social or other aims.

However, regardless of the nature or character of such wars, the principles and techniques advocated and employed by Mao during the Communist Revolutionary War in China, have had a marked influence on all such campaigns.

SCOPE

Although the pages of history are abundant with numerous examples of revolutionary wars, only 4 such wars, namely Malaya (1948-1960), Vietnam (1946-1954), Algeria (1954-1962) and Cuba (1956-1959) will be high lighted in this article for a comparative study of revolutions employing Mao's techniques. This article will also attempt to highlight the main reasons that eventually influenced their outcome.

AIM

To compare the extent to which Mao's techniques of revolutionary wars were employed in the Revolutions of Malaya (1948-1960), Vietnam (1946-1954), Algeria (1954-1962), and Cuba (1956-1959).

MAO TSE TUNG'S TECHNIQUES ON REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Mao's Principles and Maxims. Mao linked the tactics of guerrilla warfare to revolutionary warfare and it is, therefore,

only logical that one should first be aware of what Mao's principles and maxims for guerrilla action were and how he evolved his techniques based on his principles and maxims before one can embark on a comparative study of revolutions employing Mao's techniques.

What then were Mao's principles and maxims? These can be summarized as follows:

a.   The first law of war is to preserve ourselves and destroy the enemy.

b.   Our strategy is to pit one against 10, whilst our tactic is to pit 10 against one.

c.   In all operation ensure the collaboration of the local populace.

d.   Retain the initiative by maintaining the offensive; give the enemy no rest. Harass him continuously until he is exhausted, becomes dispersed and can be annihilated. When he advances, withdraw. When he attacks, disperse. When he halts, harass him: use night attacks to disturb his rest and lower his morale. When he seeks to avoid battle, attack him.

e.   Fight only when victory is certain: run away when it is not. Avoid the strong; attack the hollow. Successes are important to boost morale and to capture arms and equipment.

f.   Plan every operation carefully on the best local intelligence and coordinate your plans with any other units that may be in the vicinity.

g.   Avoid long engagements: always seek a quick decision.

h.   Be alert and act with speed in all phases of combat.

i.   Move secretly and rapidly, mainly by night or in bad weather.

j.   Use every ingenious device to mislead, entice and confuse the enemy. Make an uproar in the East and strike in the West.

k.   To overcome logistic difficulties, live off the country and learn to accept hardships. Avoid reliance on a regular line of supply. Establish and use widely dispersed food and ammunition dumps. Weapons, ammunition, equipment and medical supplies must be obtained from the enemy.

l.   Make every effort to encourage enemy defection. Prisoners should be well treated and, if possible, won over to the cause

Techniques evolved from these Principles and Maxims. Having formulated his principles and maxims, Mao Tse Tung waged his revolutionary war in China adopting techinques which were in line with his principles and maxims. These were:

a.   Propagating his ultimate aim which was designed to take advantage of local popular grievances and aspirations with a view to gaining popular support.

b.   The employment of coercion, intimidation and terrorism to gain the support of fence sitters.

c.   Wide scale sabotage to embarass the government.

d.   The Revolution was nurtured in the rural areas where the people could be persuaded or intimidated into supporting the guerrillas or insurgents. From the rural areas Mao then surrounded the cities.

e.   The infiltration of sympathisers into government organizations, trade unions, youth organizations and schools to establish an intelligence network and to gain support.

f.   Guerrilla action to disrupt all forms of government communications. The guerrillas operated over wide areas in order to disperse the government's forces.

g.   To gain foreign moral and material support, Mao tried to gain the support of Russia and this he did achieve to a certain degree particularly in Manchuria where the Russians provided him with material support in the form of captured Japanese arms and equipment.

The Chinese Communist Revolution (1929-1949) was fore runner to numerous other revolutions in the world. Mao's techniques on revolutionary war had in the end proved successful in China.

Having had an insight on Mao's principles and maxims and the techniques he employed, it will now be appropriate to venture into making a comparative study of revolutionary wars employing Mao's techniques.

Mao Tse-tung photographed in Yenan by Nym Wales during 1937 Born in Hunan Province in 1893, Mao drew numbers of fellow Hunanese into positions of leadership as his own power within the Communist leadership grew. Mao came from a well-to-do peasant family, but he graduated from the Hunan Normal School and later attended the Peking National University.

Mao Tse-tung proclaims the People's Republic of China in Peking, 1 October 1949. According to Chinese Communist statements the new government belonged to the 'people'. But it made clear that the 'people' did not include everybody. The regime was opposed to the 'lackeys' and 'running dogs' of imperialism - the landlord class, the 'bureaucratic capitalists' and the 'Kuomintang reactionaries and their henchmen'.

MALAYA (1948-1960)

Long before World War II the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) directed by the Comintern and based on a small section of the Chinese community in Malaya, started to infect the labour organization with Communist ideas. This was the first step in its attempt to overthrow the British administration and establish a Communist People's Republic. During the War the MCP had helped the British against the Japanese invaders. Its members were armed, equipped and trained to resist the Japanese by guerrilla action. They formed the most effective part of the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA).

Soon after the War the MPAJA was disbanded, but a secret Communist branch of it preserved its arms and began to oppose the Government. Having failed to win sufficient political support from the upper and middle classes in Malaya by trying to form a "United Front", the MCP adopted the techniques of Communist revolutionary war and came out in full military opposition to the Government.

The insurrection was led mainly by Malayan Chinese and the other races in Malaya took little part, except that they were intimidated and silenced through fear to such a degree that they were very reluctant to provide information on the

Communist terrorists. The communists harassed the government forces with guerrilla bands which operated from deep jungle bases and applied both persuasion and force upon the locals to provide funds, food and information. They caused widespread disruption of communications, attacked small bodies of police and troops and began to destroy the economy of the country.

The movement was recruited almost entirely from the Chinese community whose schools had been penetrated and contained many communist teachers. These spread communist doctrine and enlisted recruits for the movement. However, the movement received very little material foreign support and in the later stages of the campaign, when the government forces were able to penetrate to most parts of the jungle, the insurgents were also denied easy access to a foreign sanctuary.

The insurrection was eventually suppressed after 12 years of warfare by the combined effects of appropriate and well-timed political, economic and administrative reforms and widespread military operations undertaken by a large number of troops. In the end these measures were soon to protect and benefit the people whose support was won over.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Military Strategy. The overall Communist strategy for conducting the armed revolutionary struggle against the British in Malaya called for a protracted war to be executed in three seperate phases. In the first phase the MCP planned to weaken the British forces and to preserve and expand its own forces. In the second phase the Communist guerrillas were to drive the British from the hinterland and

to restrict them to such strategic points as supply centres and cities. During this same phase the MCP planned to transform its activities from irregular warfare to mobile warfare. In the final phase the MCP planned to establish strong Communist bases from which to operate, obtain the necessary recruits to expand these bases and finally to join the bases together in order to control the whole of Malaya.

The first phase of the MCP's revolution was launched in June 1948. Small-scale raids, road ambush, murder, robbery, sabotage, terrorist action, skirmishes with government security forces and attacks on police stations were the tactics employed by the small guerrilla bands. Rubber plantations were ruined as the Communists attempted to cripple the country's economic system. Communist terroristic activities so frightened some of the anti-Communist Chinese squatters that the MCP was able to extract large sums of money from them in the form of "protection payoffs" to help finance its war against the British.

Chin Peng (right), leader of the Communist Party, at the Baling talks in 1955.

Popular Support. The main technique employed by the Communists to gain a following was to exploit the vulnerable position of the Malayan Chinese. It was among this group that they were most successful internally whilst external moral support was given by the Communist Party of China.

Communist youth leagues were established in the early years to organize the radical element among the younger Chinese. Combined with this was an all-out effort to spread propaganda among the general public by the distribution of leaflets. The main themes for the propaganda being national liberation and later, independence for the country.

REASONS FOR FAILURE

Three factors limited the revolution's success during the first phase and consequently prevented the MCP from executing its second phase as planned.

a. **Popular Support.** First the MCP failed to gain mass support internally and little support externally.

b. **Militant Force.** Second, it was unable to mobilize a major force and therefore had no alternative but to continue its small scale raids against government supply lines and large estates. Added to this second factor was the crude manner of providing and the unpredictability of receiving supplies from the Min Yuen.

c. **Government Counter-Measures.** Government countermeasures successfully obscured the guerrilla attempts to establish "temperory bases" in the jungle. Without secure base areas from which to operate the guerrillas were forced to seek refuge deeper in the jungle. Thus food and

supply problems were complicated and the MCP communications system was rendered ineffective.

Socialized Warfare. The British waged what can be termed as "socialized resettlement, detention, repartriation and rehabilitation"[2]. The well known "Briggs Plan" was implemented to resettle half a million Chinese squatters into new villages which could be controlled by the government. "It aimed to protect the populated areas, cut the enemy lines of communication, and force him out to battle[3].

Having isolated the squatters both physically and psychologically from the guerrillas, military operations were launched to eliminate the insurgents from the deep jungle areas.

Meanwhile the country was also being prepared for independence and when Malaya finally achieved independence on 31 August 1957 the MCP lost what remaining support it had. With this almost total loss of popular support the insurrection collapsed in 1960.

VITENAM (1946-1954)

In 1941 the Vietnamese Communists formed the Vietminh, a revolutionary organization aimed at overthrowing the French administration, which had governed the country as a colony since the end of the nineteenth century. The history of the colony had been marked by periodic nationalist uprisings which had been suppressed with little difficulty. The last of these was in 1940.

The Vietminh was organized and controlled by Communists who had been trained by the Comintern and led by Ho Chi Minh. It was not overtly Communist but gained the support of many revolu-

tionary factions because it posed as a "United Front" of anti-colonialists and nationalists.

During World War II, Vietnam was occupied by the Japanese who removed control of the country from the French Government. They maintained garrisons in certain strategic areas, but controlled the country indirectly. By allowing Vietnamese to become officials in the administration, the Japanese broke down the machinery of French control.

The Vietminh gained strenght during the war. The Japanese supported it as a nationalist movement which could be used to repel an allied invasion. Surprisingly, it also received support from the United States and Chinese military forces in South China on the grounds that it was resisting the Japanese.

At the end of the War, after the defeat of the Japanese and before the return of the allied and French forces the Vietminh established a government and declared Vietnam an independent state. When the French returned they found that their own administration had largely disintegrated. While they were eliminating Vietnamese and those French Officials who had supported the Vichy government from the administration, the Vietminh continued to control large areas of the country. Eventually the French, faced with immense difficulties in re-establishing effetive control over the country, entered into negotiations with the Vietminh about the future of the country. These negotiations broke down in December 1946 when Vietminh units attacked French army units and open insurrection broke out.

The Vietminh embarked upon a campaign of guerrilla warfare. Since its formation it had already waged an intensive progaganda and psychological warfare campaign. It gathered widespread sup-

Among the arms used by the Viet Cong were American weapons captured in Korea and handed on by China; the guerrilla in the bow of the boat carries a US-made Browning Automatic Rifle.

port among the peasants by progaganda directed against "landlordism". It maintained the support of intelectuals and the middle classes by its opposition to colonialism. Terrorism was also used to remove opponents. The guerrilla forces expanded rapidly as did the areas controlled by them. In 1951, the Vietminh openly sought support from China. Until this time it had maintained and land reform. It now received material and moral support from China and it had also acquired a sanctuary to train new formations.

The war soon developed into mobile regular warfare fought by large formations with substantial artillery support. It culminated with the defeat of the French force at Dien Bien Phu by General Giap in the Spring of 1954. In the Summer of

that year, a ceasefire was arranged and it was agreed to divide the country at the 17th parallel, a line which roughly delineated the respective areas of military control. North Vietnam became a Communist republic, South Vietnam became in independent republic and the French were expelled from the whole country.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Military Strategy. The Vietminh revolution to liberate Vietnam from the French was similar to that of the MCP in Malaya, namely a protracted war conducted in three phases. In the first phase the Vietminh embarked on a self-preservation and expansion posture whilst weakening the French forces. Hit

The battle of Dien Bien Phu 1954

and run tactics were employed to inflict casualties, frustrate and demoralize troops who had to fight a phantom enemy. Those who opposed the Vietminh were also dealt with severely.

As the Vietminh grew in strength and progressively extended their grip on the countryside, the French had no alternative but to withdraw to strategic points. General Giap, a student of Mao, then embarked on his next phase, that of mobile warfare and although he was temperorily defeated at the Red River delta, he was able to withdraw and resume guerrilla activities to further frustrate and demoralize the French.

At this juncture also, 1951, the Vietminh had sought and gained both material and moral support from Communist China. It also provided the Vietminh a safe area to train new formations.

The war once again developed into mobile warfare and General Giap was finally able to deal the counter offensive blow at Dien Bien Phu.

Popular Support. Even before it embarked on its militant activities, the Vietminh had staged an intensive psychological warfare and propaganda campign to marshall support. It posed as a nationalist movement propagating nationalism, anti-colonialism and anti-landlordism. They gained tremendous support from the peasants, intellectuals and the middle classes who were led to belief that "they were fighting against a colonialism in the process of disappearing from the face of the earth. If they died, it would be with a cry of liberty on their lips. 4"

External Support. By careful and subtle manipulation the Vietminh also managed to receive support from the United States and China. Whilst China provided material and moral support as well as a santuary, the United States was instrumental in presuading the French to come to terms with the Vietminh.

Battle of Dien Bien Phu
Date
31 March—8 May 1954
Objective
To draw the Viet Minh into a set battle where French firepower would inflict a decisive defeat.
Froces
French: c.16,000 men, 28 x 105mm guns, 10 light tanks
Viet Minh: c.50,000 men (c.54,000 in support), c.48 x 105mm guns, c.150 lighter artilery pieces
Result
After taking heavy losses, Communist troops overran the French garrison French losses: 2,293 killed, 5,134 wounded, c.11,000 captured (including wounded), 62 aircraft destroyed, 167 aircraft damaged Viet Minh losses: c.8,000 killed, c.15,000 wounded

---

REASONS FOR SUCCESS

The major factors that contibuted towards the revolution's success were:

a.   **Popular Support.** One of the main reasons for the Vietminh's success was its ability to gain mass support from the Vietnamese people themselves. The Vietminh had propagated nationalism and land reform and this so readily appealed to the masses who had been under colonial rule for more than half a centuary. They wanted a Vietnam of their own, a national identity and land to call their own.

b.   **Good Leadership.** The Vietminh was aslo fortunate to have good

leaders, namely Ho Chi Minh and General Giap, who had the determination and ability to analize and react quickly to prevailing situations. The defeat of General Giap by the French commander, General de Lattre de Tassigny, at the Red River delta in 1951 reminded the former that it was not the moment for the counter offensive as yet. He thus withdrew to the northern redoubts and resumed guerrilla activities. The French grew weary of fighting an elusive enemy and finally withdraw and concentrated at Dien Bien Phu. General Giap judged that the could now win the battle offered at Dien Bien Phu and he did by delivering the final all out blow. This was indeed a classic manifestation of his shrewdness and ability to adjust and react as the situation demanded.

c. **Outside Support.** The Vietminh also managed to marshall both moral and material support from other countries especially from China. Apart from the moral and material support, it also provided the Vietminh a sanctuary where could train new formations and seek shelter during unfavourable situations.

ALGERIA (1954-1962)

The object of the Arab (Muslim) uprising in Algeria was to end French rule. Its leaders were socialist in outlook but it was nationalist, not idealogical in character. It was to develop rapidly into limited war involving half a million French troops and to have far reaching political effects of which the most important was the downfall of the Fourth Republic.

Algeria, though in theory a province of France, was in fact a French colony. The white settlers (Colons), who were full French citizens, voted in national election and had a strong say in local

Algerian women voting in the communal elections of February 1967 (Pierre Ferrenbach)

government, forming a privileged class, while the Muslims who were merely French subjects lacked power and owned little property. Since, however, they were not a unified people, nationalism was slow to take root among them. Its growth was further delayed by the appeal that "assimilation" had for their national leaders, a French-educated middle class. It was only when this middle class came to be recognized after 1945 that the European Algerians had no intention of sharing, let alone yielding power that it turned to fledgling nationalist parties.

These parties were numerous and at odds, chiefly over the issue of violence. By 1954, however, they had produced a group of leaders [1] who agreed that violence alone would suffice to make nationalists of the Muslim majority and had organized the nucleus of a guerrilla force.

Ben Bella addressing a crowd in a small town (K. Updegraff)

On the night of 1st November 1954 about 3,000 Muslims attacked French posts and installations throughout Algeria. This was planned as a first stage of a Maoist revolutionary war, which was well known in theory to the leaders and in practice to many of their followers, veterans of Indo-China. Yet although by 1958 the Army of National Liberation (ALN) numbered around 40,000 regulars within the country and thousands more in the neighbouring States of Morocco and Tunisia (to which France had hastily granted independence in 1956) it was never able to carry operations to the counter offensive phase and had by 1960 relinquished the effort.

If the war's outcome was nevertheless the granting of independence to Algeria, this was because the Colon's nominee, General de Gaulle, decided that a military victory could not be made to last. Having brought both them and his dissident soldiers, who had risen against him in protest against the granting of independence to the country, to heel, General de Gaulle concluded agreements with the Algerian Front of National Liberation (FLN) at Evian in 1962. Algeria became an independent State whilst the mass of the Colons chose to emigrate to France.

One of the few French farmers to remain in Algeria after independence teaches an Algerian farmer how to prune vines (K. Updegraff)

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Military Strategy. ALN strategy was drawn on and reversed the *tache de l'huile* (grease spot) strategy of Marshal

Lyautey of France. Lyautey had succeeded in pacifying Morocco in 1925 by massing his troops in settled areas and then spreading "in widening circle French peace". The ALN, on the other hand, planted a few rebels in remote villages outside the French peace. The task of these rebels was to win over and indoctrinate the villages, thus enabling the ALN to acquire recruits, food and hiding places. From these initial "grease spots" the penetration would move in widening circles to neighbouring areas, eventually reaching the settled outposts under French control.

Women of the Kabylia out to greet Ben Bella (Louis Giminez)

In the French controlled areas, the French control on the Muslim population would be broken:

a. By rebel guerrilla and terrorist action (direct attacks on French troops, assassination, bomb throwing, strikes, boycott of French goods, settlers and Francophil Muslims and economic sabotage) which would force the French administration to evacuate the area.

b. The exploitation of French severe and repressive action to cast the population with the ALN. Guerrilla and terrorist actions were made to appear as actions championing the cause of the oppressed.

In the urban areas, which were mainly inhabited by settlers and strongly defended by French forces, terrorism alone was used. Terrorism aimed at Francophil Muslims and rural Muslim politicians and settlers created an atmosphere of anxiety favourable to the ALN. It silenced the Francophil Muslims, drove a wedge between settlers and Algerians and forced the administration to adopt sterner security measures, which meant that more troops were tied down defending the cities and maintaining order.

Ben Bella (with girls) and Boumediene on a tour of the country in 1963 (Louis Giminez)

Popular Support. The FLN which was the political arm of the ALN, placed special emphasis on propaganda both in and out of Algeria to rally support and sympathy. Political officers were attached at all levels of command in the ALN to indoctrinate the soldiers and the public. Special broadcasts, beamed from Tunisia, Cairo and Damascus, and the constant distribution of leaflets, tracts and newspapers constituted some of the other techniques.

Propaganda appeals differed. To the educated Muslim the FLN attempted to explain the cause of the revolution with historical, social, economic and political references. To the masses the FLN represented the revolution as a holy war

in defence of Islam and the Arab heritage.

External Support. In France itself the FLN relied on sympathetic journalists and writers to write books and articles supporting its cause. The main target of FLN propaganda were the French liberals. It attempted to convince them that the war in Algeria was an unjust one and that the FLN action arose from the same principles and aspirations that led to the French Revolution.

In addition, the FLN opened offices of information in the major capitals of the world and through them propaganda literature was made available to the public, while the staffs of these offices made every attempt to establish contacts with the press and important officials and took every opportunity to expound the FLN cause in public speeches and debates.

Thus the FLN had managed to gain massive support internally and at the same time gained the support of a number of other countries. The militant force alone swelled from a mere 2,000-3,000 to a force of about 130,000 in 7½ years. Egypt, Syria and Iraq provided aid and military training. Libya, Tunisia and Morocco provided the FLN with safe bases and acted as sponsors in the international scene and the United Nations. Communist China provided financial help whilst the United States allowed the establishment of an Algerian Office of Information on its territory.

Inspite of the support received both internally and externally, the revolution itself was deemed a failure although France, under General de Gaulle, did eventually grant Algeria independence in 1962.

Crowds in Algiers June 9, 1967, protesting Nasser's decision to agree to a cease-fire with Israel following the Arab-Israeli war (Pierre Ferrenbach)

REASONS FOR FAILURE

This can be attributed to the following reasons:

a.   Firstly, that although the weight of disapproval was successfully invoked by the FLN, it was more than outweighed by the bitter resistence of the White Algerians to any moderation of the military effort. Indeed between 1956 and 1958 France was virtually ruled and the French Army Commanded by the Colons.

b.   **Poor Leadership.** Secondly, the ALN was careless and impatient. Owing to difficulties in communication between their mountain bases, the leaders transferred their headquarters to the towns where they often succumbed to French sweeps. They were also over-anxious to move from the lower to the higher stages of revolutionary warfare and were badly caught out in so doing.

c.   **French Army Counter-Measures.** Thirdly, the French Army proved a skilful and ruthless anti-guerilla force although it was initially taken by suprise by the uprising. Many of the

French officers had fought in Indo-China and welcomed the chance to apply techniques learned there to a situation not yet beyond redemption. The countryside was divided into squares and garrissoned as a beginning. The major engagement of the war came as a result of an attempt by an ALN regiment to break the electrical fence along the Tunisian frontier which ended in total defeat. Meanwhile the cities had been cleared of ALN cadres in a series of ruthless cordon operations, of which the most important was the so-called Battle of Algiers in 1956. In addition, the Army instituted a programme of urban and rural development, of a "hearts and minds" nature, to win Muslim sympathizers away from the rebels. Imaginative in nature, it was, however, of much less effect that the military measures in bringing resistance to a halt.

CUBA (1956-1959)

The Batista regime was a corrupt and inefficient government which had seized power through a military coup d'etat in March 1952. Active opposition to it started mainly among the professional classes, although later it became increasingly unpopular throughout all sections of the community. Several revolutionary movements had unsuccessfully sought to overthrow the government before Fidel Castro emerged as a leader capable of gaining substantial support.

The revolution was initially supported by intellectuals, professionals and students. It attacked the Batista regime by two methods. In the towns an underground movement conducted a campaign of propaganda, sabotage and terrorism. Concurrently a nucleus of guerillas established themselves in the mountains of Sierra Maestra and set about raising and training a revolutionary army and gaining the support of the peasants. The urban underground wing was successful in making Batista use a large portion of his army to support his regime and maintain law and order in the cities.

Che Guevara just after the guerrillas entered Havana in January 1959.

The growth of the revolutionary movement increased as the suppressive measure taken by the government became more violent and oppressive. Propaganda for land reform and revulsion against the government increased Castro's support among the peasants who provided him with invaluable information on the movement of government forces. With guerrilla bases thus secured, the revolutionary forces trained and expanded until they were able to launch attacks designed to disrupt government communications and impair the economy. Raids and ambushes were conducted to capture arms and equipment. Captured government troops were leniently treated; if they did not choose to join the revolutionaries, they were freed. This attitude weakened the morale of the government forces which also suffered as rebel successes increased. Eventually the government was faced with widespread opposition from all sections of the community. It collapsed in December 1958 and Batista fled the country in January 1959.

Throughout, the revolutionary movement was inspired by a desire to free the country from a corrupt and inefficient government that had gained power illegally. It developed in a climate of dissidence and general opposition to the government. It gained support from many sections of the community but particular attention was paid by the guerillas to winning the support of the peasants. The revolution received little support from the highly organized labour movement in the country and from the local Communist Party until the last months of the revolution. The leaders were dedicated Communist who had received training in Communist methods. Although these were applied, the movement never became openly Communist and the government that resulted from the revolution did not proclaim its Communist leanings until some time after it had gained power.

Che Guevara at the time of the battle of Santa Clara; to the left is his comrade-in-arms, Aleida March, whom he married in June 1959.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Military Strategy. Castro's initial plan when he landed in Cuba from Mexico in 1956 with his "army" of 82 men was to link up immediately with other guerilla

Castro with Khrushchev at the Lenin Stadium, Moscow, May 23, 1963.

forces. Together they would then attack the garrison at Manzanillo and seize supplies, weapons and ammunition and make would equip the volunteers expected to pour in whilst sympathizers would create confusion in the cities by bombings and shootings. Castro had hoped that in a short while the country would rally to his cause and a general strike would complete the downfall of Batista.

However, his initial plans misfired and he adopted a new strategy which was

based on a two front attack on the government forces. These were:

a. Guerrilla warfare in the mountains

b. Propaganda, strikes, riots, sabotage, terrorism and subversion in the cities.

The basic area for armed fighting was to be the contryside and Castro hoped that his guerrilla movement in the Sierra Maestra would inspire revolutionary activity in the cities as well'.

Hit and run attacks by small guerrilla bands were conducted against government forces and as the movement grew and received increasing support the revolutionaries became more adventurous and began disrupting the country's economy by wide scale sabotage.

Suburban guerrilla warfare and sabotage in the cities were secondfront diversionary tactics in the final stage of the revolution. The revolutionary force had by then developed into a compact regular army and engaged Batista's forces on defined fronts in regular warfare and gradually gained control over the whole of Cuba.

Popular Support. The revolution gained massive support from the people and this was achieved through the organized and planned use of propaganda. Revolutionary propaganda originated from two sources:

• The civic organizations in the cities.

• The guerrilla bases in the mountains.

Castro talks with Cuban students in Kiev, May 20, 1963.

Leaflets, pamphlets and newspapers as well as word of mouth communication were used to distribute information in the cities. A clandestine radio station was also established. The main themes propagated were land reforms, freedom and unity.

The peasants were convinced that this was a peasants revolution and that they would reap the benefits. Segments of the Roman Catholic hierarchy gave moral support and even the Popular Socialist (Communist) Party which had considerable influence in labour unions eventually came out in support of the revolution during its last few months. An agreement was signed on 20 July 1958 between Castro and the various opposition groups which resulted in the formation of the Civilian Revolutionary Front and this was issued as a Manifesto to the Cuban People.

External Support. One of Castro's greatest assets was the support of foreign correspondents who gave wide and favourable publicity in the United States. This publicity, more anti-Batista than pro-Castro, may have contributed heavily to Castro's victory. As a result of it pressure was brought upon the State Department by some members of Congress and by many citizens to withdraw

military support from the Cuban government. The United States stopped selling arms to Batista in March 1958 and persuaded other countries to do likewise whilst revolutionary sympathizers continued to smuggle arms, ammunition and men to the Castro forces.

It is also alleged that both Russia and China provided material and financial suport to the revolution although the nature and extent of such support cannot be deduced from accounts published so far.

Castro in dress uniform, sporting his new decorations—Hero of the Soviet Union and the Order of Lenin, with Gold Medal—immediately after receiving them. With him are Khrushchev and Brezhnev. The Kremlin, May 23, 1963.

REASONS FOR SUCCESS

The success of the Cuban revolution is attributed to the following factors:

a. **Good Leadership.** The revolution had good leaders in Fidel Castro, his brother Raul Castro and Major Ernesto "Che" Guevera who persevered through initial setbacks and continued the revolution until its eventual success. Fidel Castro was often referred to by his associates as the "Maximum Leader" and his dynamic personality and oratorical skill made him a natural revolutionary leader. He had the ability to assess the prevailing situation and time his activities accurately.

b. "Che" Guevera distinguished himself in the revolution as a guerrilla tactician and he was one of Castro's closest confidants.

c. Raul Castro, Fidel's younger brother, was also actively involved in the revolution. Like "Che" Guevera, he was also one of his brother's closest confidants throughout the revolution and it is said that Raul Castro was the man who was responsible for the numerous secret visits behind the iron curtain for fund raising missions and to arrange for arms supplies.

d. **Popular Support.** The revolution received widespread support from the masses. Land reform, freedom and unity that was propogated by the revolution appealed to the people so much so that Castro was obtaining recruits faster than he could supply them with weapons. Even opposition groups including the Popular Socialist Party eventually supported the revolution which resulted in the formation of the Civilian Revolutionary Front in July 1958.

e. **External Support.** The sympathy and moral support that Castro received from people in the United States eventually led the State Department not only to withdraw military support for Batista's government but also persuaded other countries to do likewise.

In addition the revolution also received material and financial support from Russia and China. With so much support for the revolution and so little if any at all for Batista, his government was doomed to collapse and this it did in December 1958.

CONCLUSION

SUMMARY

The revolutions highlighted in this paper took place in varied circumstances. Their leaders were inspired by various aims. Some were intensely nationalistic and sought independence whilst others were avowed Communists. They were opposed by a very varied set of entrenched administrations. Whilst some obtained substantial foreign support, others had to fight on their own. Two of the revolutions were successful whilst the others were considered failures for reasons which had also been discussed. Yet in spite of all these differences the techniques adopted by the leaders of these revolutions had a marked resemblance of those advocated by Mao Tse Tung. The following features of Mao's revolutionary techniques are common to all:

a.   The published political aims of each revolution were designed to take advantage of local grievances and aspirations. These were exploited by rebel propaganda to gain mass support.

b.   The participation of locals in anti-government acts to ensure their support.

c.   The use of terrorism, sabotage, intimidation and coercion to remove opposition and embarass the government.

d.   Although in some instances there was much rebel activity in the towns, in general the revolution was nurtured in the rural areas from which guerrilla bands were raised and operated.

e.   To provide an intelligence network, rebel sympathizers were infiltrated into government services, youth organizations' trade unions and schools.

f.   Guerillas were used to disrupt government communications. They operated over wide areas to disperse government forces.

g.   Efforts were made to enlist foreign moral and material support. The degree of support obtained often influenced the outcome of the struggle.

SUCCESS OR FAILURE

The final outcome of the revolutions was a result of the following factors:

a.   Popular support within the country.

b.   External support.

c.   Leadership.

d.   Government counter-measures.

For the revolutions that were successful there was support from both within and outside the country. The movement had good leaders and the government counter-measures were weak or ineffective. For those that failed, it was because they lacked one or all three of the first three factors listed coupled with the effective government counter-measures that were taken.

Notes:

1. CAMPBELL, ARTHUR, **GUERRILLAS a History and Analysis** (C. Tinling & Co Ltd Liverpool, London and Prescot, 1967), p. 2

2. **CASEBOOK STUDIES ON SIX NATIONS IN REVOLT.** (U.S. Army Transportation School, Fort Eustis, Virginia, 1967) p. 64.

3. GOH HOCK AUN, **THE EMERGENCY IN MALAYA.** (Sinaran Brothers Limited, 1966) p. 51.

4. GEOFFREY FAIRBAIRN, **REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE AND COMMUNIST STRATEGY** (Faber and Faber, 24 Russel Square London, 1968) p. 235.

5. The ship that Castro and his men used for their expedition into Cuba foundered and much of the food and supplies were lost.

Leftenan Kolonel Soman Selvarajah is a graduate of the officer Cadet School Portsea. Australia and attended the Staff College at Haigate. He is currently the Commanding Officer of the 9th Battalion Ranger Regiment.

FROM OPERATIONS ⚞TO⚟ LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT

Mejar Jeneral Dato' Mohd Yusof Din

From the author's point of view management is a very involved and complex subject; many theories were evolved with military origin. The author has simplified some of the principles and theories involved, into basic military language based on his objectives and goals to enhance logistics in his first 90 days of being the Chief of Logistics Staff. With the onslaught of modern theories in our working environment, the military officer can ill afford to be left out in its development. This article is an attempt to start that ball rolling.

BACKGROUND

The military officer from the day he is commissioned will be required to hold different appointments as part of the Officers' Corps development. Needless to say, any new appointment will be a challenge, more so when it is in a totally new field of responsibility. I was faced with this challenge when appointed as the Chief of Logistics Staff (CLS) on 1 Jan 84. My previous 30 years of logistics experience was centred on combat logistics support in the Army. Now as the CLS, my logistical responsibilities were extended to logistic planning, not only for the Army but also common user logistics for the Navy and Air Force.

SETTING THE GOALS

A study of the CLS responsibilities left me with little doubt on the need to have a sound knowledge of the technical complexities of logistics in order to effectively plan and manage logistics. I had no formal technical logistics training except those I acquired as I went along in my new appointment. The handover briefs were valuable guide but the majority of it had to be acquired. There was now the need to adapt to a totally new environment with an open mind and willing hand. It had been said that "wisdom begins with learning and learning with curiosity, unless you ask, you do not find out." and "success is the progressive realization of a worth with pre-determined goal". With this determination I decided on my predetermined goals:

a. To fully understand the concept of Logistics Support and its Organisation in detail.

b. To fully assimilate the technicalities involved and be fully conversant with the existing regulations governing the defined logistics functions.

c. To expose myself to all my staff, the units under my control and all the related agencies that provide and those that require logistics services.

MAXIMISING AVAILABLE MANPOWER RESOURCES

In the Armed Forces, we are fortunate to have been taught the skill of systematic problem solving in the form of "Appreciation of the Situation". Whatever the problem, be it an operational plan, a logistical problem or a personnel problem the application of the "Appreciation" approach should provide the answer. In its simplest form, the approach is:

a. What is the problem? Ie obtain the facts.

b. What are all the possible solutions to the problem? Ie analyse the facts.

c. What solution do you suggest to justify the act? Ie arrive at a decision.

Thereafter act boldly on that chosen decision.

Over the last 5 years, emphasis was placed on training to further develop the Armed Forces towards becoming a professional organisation for conventional warfare. Whatever training provided would be to waste if the available manpower resources, be it combatants or logisticians are not motivated towards maximum output in their specializations.

The Chief of Army in his address to the Army Commander's Annual Conference on 24 February 1984, among other things, stated that "fundamentally one of our major weaknesses today is our ignorance or failure to appreciate the pattern of behaviour and attidude of the present generation of youth in our society from which we obtain our manpower resources". Very often we talk about our days as young officers and we recollect with great pride the men we had then.

They were excellent men. There is no doubt about it. But they were of a different breed, a different generation of men altogether, brought up in a different social context. They were not as sophisticated as the youths of today. Their requirements and sense of value were simple and so was their sense of almost blind loyalty.

The younger generation of soldiers is completely different. Firstly, they are educated, highly intelligent people and not blindly loyal to the officers, just because the officers hold the Agong's commission. From your action, apprearance and words, the soldiers can assess you either as officers who simply have to be saluted to or as good officers whom they will follow to hell and back. Their norms are different. Increasing economic affluence has given them more apportunities to enjoy material possessions - cars, radios, televisions and countless other benefits. These affects their attitude and they can be more demanding. While the absence of benefits on one hand causes dissatisfaction and resentment, the availability of benefits on the other hand does not necessarily promote a sense of gratitude. "To reason why" is no longer appealing to the younger generation. They want reasons to satisfy their mental faculties. We as their leaders have to provide the answers. This statement requires us to adopt a new leadership approach in order to get the best out of those whom we command.

If we are to get the maximum output, the old approach to leadership based on authorisationism in this corporate setting will have to change to one of "Management by Objective", a "participatory type" of order. Even in every day life, before one acts, one must have subconsciously considered the opinions of

others. So in the modern type of military establishments, effort must be made to invite comments, especially from the staff. No matter how much education or knowledge one may have, however great one's ability may be, one is still only a single individual with definite bounds. Any judgement made solely in terms of one's limited perception and knowledge will lack the understanding of the realities and the true nature of the problem faced. The normal military staff meeting or dialogue is essentially to tap the intellectual resources and collective wisdom available within the organisation. This also enables the commander to make judgements regardless of his own personal preferences or position. So we must not think, decide and act alone. A common goal is what modern leadership entails ie leading united people through sincere and free cooperation and at the same time taking into consideration the human, physical, mental and moral factors in their correct perspective towards a common goal. It is with this in mind that I have created the policy of Monthly and Quarterly Logistics Staff Meetings at all levels.

Irrespective of whether one is in the Combat or Service Support Units, it is still soldiering. Logisticians are many a times referred to as "bottle washers", "storekeepers" and a host of others. In the final analysis the logisticians are not only "soldiers first" in order to provide logistics support under demanding wartime conditions but have the added burden to maintain the Armed Forces during peace time in preparation for war within the defence budget. Every member of the Armed Forces must consider their job as a noble profession. If everyone treats their jobs as a hobby, and the hobby as soldiering, then a sense of worth will be achieved. This outlook will overcome any personal emotional frustration and will provide a clear purpose to serve with confidence, fondness and meaning to achieve any mission.

As officers, it is vital to also develop our soldiers sense of worth and belonging. When dealing with soldiers the essentials of management which must be exploited in order to influence and achieve are:

- His job
- His welfare
- His family's welfare
- His religion and customs
- His material needs and self-satisfaction.

OBJECTIVES AND GOALS

The individual soldier will only be competent if he is taught what soldiering is all about and trained in the job that he is required to perform. Psychologically, human beings must have an ideal to achieve self satisfaction. With an ideal, he will strive to improve himself and develop his potential to the full. We must, therefore have objectives and goals for us to endeavour. In the Logistic Services Division, I have set out the following objectives to be achieved:

a. Plan and purchase items of priority to meet both operational and training requirements.

b. Reduce to the barest minimum all non-essential and luxury items not directly required for operations and training.

c. Meet unit equipment table progressively up to 100% in the long term.

To achieve the set objectives, it is important that subsequent orders and/or in-

structions to the units, staff and individual soldiers must clearly state how units are to function and how their subsequent objectives and goals are to be achieved. Each organization must also have a well thought - out plan to achieve objectives through set goals. As the CLS, without any direct command except technical control authority over the logistics units, I have instituted the issue of CLS Staff Instructions, the Monthly CLS Dialogue with the Logistics Corps Directors and the continuation of Logistics Corps Technical Instruction besides others to monitor progress and achievement.

SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE EFFECTIVENESS

In terms of logistics readiness, I am convinced despite only 3 months as the CLS that our supply and maintenance effectiveness can be further enhanced. The problem areas and weaknesses are normally caused by the following which deserves special attention:

a.　**Command Emphasis.** The Staff and logistics units must be totally committed and involved in logistical matters placing special emphasis on the supply and maintenance status of their user units.

b.　**Technical Control.** The Logistics Corps Directors and Logistics Staff at all levels must oversee and monitor the technical efficiency of their respective service support units.

c.　**Management.** Logistics unit commanders must exercise technical management and control of their units during supply and maintenance operations.

d.　**Skill.** The requirement and training of skilled personnel to perform their actual jobs must be given priority.

e.　**Resources.** Availability of trained personnel, publications, repair parts, specialized equipment and time must be made available.

The problem areas that have caused supply and maintenance weakness can easily be surmounted once the resources are available. The remaining problems are purely management. Once all the resources are obtained, what is needed, is to introduce the "Management by Objective" approach to enhance effectiveness. In other words, the staff and unit commanders should manage as follows:

a.　**Plan.** Set the supply and maintenance objectives. Determine ways to accomplish the objective in terms of who, what, where, when and how. The plans are based on the best estimate of the situation. You anticipate future needs and constraints.

b.　**Organize.** Put together the resources in terms of personnel, repair parts, tools and facilities and set them in motion to accomplish objectives.

c.　**Direct.** Issue instructions to the staff, units and subordinates to tell them what to do.

d.　**Coordinate.** Keep track of the various things going on under your control in terms of supply, movement, storage, salvage and repair.

e.　**Evaluate.** All logistics units especially at the Logistics Directorate and formation staff levels must gather and evaluate information to assess if supply and maintenance is working according to plan. If it is, leave it alone.

If something is wrong, take immediate corrective action.

It is the "Commanders" job to exercise command and control; it remains a problem of which Brigade and Division Commands should always be conscious of. At the unit level, all that is required is for officers to constantly circulate and walk the floor of his stores, workshops and depots, constantly circulating amongst the workers, watching, listening and asking questions. The accumulation of knowledge is a prerequisite to efficiency. So if you have knowledge of the problems, it will make life easier.

CONCLUSIONS

Having sat in the chair for 3 months as the Chief of Logistics Staff, what I had earlier visualized as a difficult task, is not that difficult after all. No doubt, there is still a lot to learn and to put right, more so when logistic over the last five years was only given priority to meet the immediate and essential requirements. My future objective is to fully develop the Army Logistic Organization to achieve the following:

a.   A Concept of Logistics Support that will function fully in concert with the Operational Concept.

b.   A Logistics Command and Control structure that will be fully functional as an extention to the Operational Command and Control structure.

c.   An adequate Logistics Organizations to fully support the above concepts.

d.   A logistics pipeline which is always full without any logistics snowball.

e.   An effective system for technical management and control of logistics resources which will not jeopardize operational logistics readiness for war.

With the Logistics Staff switching to the "Management by Objectives" system and the introduction of computers by the end of 1984, Logistics Service Division and the Base Logistics Units should be able to give its best to the three Services barring any financial contraints. All that is required now is for all concerned to correctly manage our available manpower resources and to instil a sense of urgency, initiative and desire to serve our Comrades-in-Arms. The prime concern of all logisticians is to give good service to all combatants with an open mind and willing hands.

Finally, with the onslaught of modern management theories in our working environment, a military officer can ill afford to be left out in its development. Much thought and research would be required for officers who desire to expand their interest in the subject and materials are available in our libraries. This simple article is intended to start the ball rolling.

Mej Jen Dato' Mohd Yusof Din was commissioned into the Royal Malay Regiment on his graduation from Eaton Hall and RMA Sandhurst between the years 1955 - 1956. Since his commission he has held various staff appointments including the post of Military Adviser Vietnam, and Director of Intelligence at Mindef. Currently he is the Chief of the Logistics Staff.

DEFENCE AGAINST

THE SEA-SKIMMER

Capt Dr. Jee Soon Leong

The threat of the sea-skimming anti-ship missile is a very real one. Events during the Falklands War have shown the vulnerability of ships to these missiles even when operating as a fleet with air cover. Means to counter the sea-skimmer once launched is discussed in this article. Both gun and missile systems already operational on board ships have the capability to destroy or prevent the sea-skimmer from hitting its target. Aside from active means, passive countermeasures are also discussed briefly.

Since the sinking of the Israel destroyer Eilat by a Soviet SS-N-2 Styx missile back in 1967 the Western nations have awaken to the danger of the anti-ship missile. Although the Styx was a large mini-aircraft type of weapon it could be carried by small missile carrying boats giving them the capability to engage larger ships on almost equal terms. Development has progressed rapidly ever since and another encounter at the other end of the globe (Falklands War) has revealed the lethality of such a weapon. Here

again the British Royal Naval fleet with air cover and a mass of ships armed with guns and surface-to-air missiles could not prevent the HMS Sheffield and the Atlantic Conveyor from being sunk by sea-skimming Exocets fired from Argentinian Super Etendard strike aircraft.

The danger posed by the anti-ship missile particularly the sea-skimmng variety that hugs the wavetops, coming in low, allows very little time for thinking much less, room for manouvre. The Shef-

field's Captain had only time to say 'take cover' before being struck by its nemesis. Reports state that the Exocet's warhead did not explode but fires started from the still burning motor of the missile was sufficient to sink the Sheffield. This problem would be compounded if the Argentinian navy were to join the fray armed with missile carrying vessels. After the lessons of the Falklands War an increased effort has been made to try to offer some form of protection against these deadly missiles.

The Threat

The sea-skimming anti-ship misile is a small and light weapon that arms various sizes of ships viz, patrol boats, hydrofoils, corvettes, frigates, destroyers, cruisers, submarines and can also be carried by helicopters and aircraft. Most of the sea-skimmers in service today have similar characteristics. After being launched it will descend down to its preselected height above the wavetops with the aid of a radio-altimeter. Depending on the sea

be steered by inertial guidance. At a certain distance away from its target the sea-skimmer will switch on its own radar to search out the largest target. Finally after lockon the missile will home in on the reflected radar waves.

Some sea-skimmers perform a pop-up manouvre to dive on to the target but most hit the target at right angles. Present anti-ship missiles in service have such characteristics with individual variation. The well known Aerospataile Exocet exists in several versions, the ship launched MM 38 and MM40, the aircraft version, the AM 39 and the submarine launched version, the SM 39. Its competitors are no less formidable and include the US Harpoon, the Italian Otomat, The Israeli Gabriel and Norwegian Penguin.

Most ships are armed with systems to cope with the attacker hopefully before they launch their missiles. However some sort of last ditch measure was sought to deal with the missile in flight and app-

Figure 1. AGM-84 Harpoon showing its various parts

state and tactical situation the missile will skim the surface of the sea three to five metres above, travelling at a high subsonic to supersonic speed. Initial information about the target will be fed in by the launch platform and the missile will

roaching its target. There are two ways with which to handle this problem. Actively, by a Close In Weapon System (CIWS) in the form of a gun or an anti-missile missile or passively with the help of decoys and jamming techniques.

The magnitude of the situation at hand can be seen by taking the Mach 0.9 Exocet as an example. At a distance of eight kilometres it is some 26 seconds from impact, two kilometres only 7 seconds and at one kilometre away less than 4 seconds. With such a short reaction time available everything has to be automated leaving no place for the human response. In real situation this will be multiplied a hundredfold when the vessel is under attack by several missiles simultaneously. To defend oneself a good radar is required to search, acquire and track the threats coupled with an equally fast gun or missile system to destroy or knock off the oncoming missile off its course.

Figure 2. Exocet Missile

The ship launched MM 40 - a longer range version of the MM 38

Problems arise peculiar to such an engagement. For instance at such low levels envisaged the effects of sea clutter will undoubtedly confuse the radar picture making it difficult to track the missile. Computers are necessary to then classify and elucidate the information so as to bring all weapons to bear against the closest threat while assessing other threats on the way.

CIWS guns in practice will fire at each target long enough to establish an adequate kill probability. It would be of no use trying to raise the kill probability from 0.75 to 0.9 if in doing so two other targets were left unengaged. Also it would be very difficult to determine whether effects of the gunfire has adequately disabled the missile sufficiently save for a direct hit.

Once the target has been identified it will be equally hard to destroy it considering the speed at which it travels and the small surface area presented. Both gun and missile systems are in service presently that have the capability to prevent the sea-skimmer from carrying its deadly task.

How effective are they remains to be seen.

Gun Systems

There are a host of gunnery problems associated with shooting at a sea-skimmer. An oncoming missile travelling at a high subsonic speed will have a very small diameter. Rapidly firing guns that can accurately put as many rounds as possible in the shortest possible time, to ensure destruction or sufficient damage to the sea-skimmer is ideal. Guns of such characteristics are of smaller calibre -20mm, 25mm, 30mm or 40mm. The mounts of these guns need to be fast slewing with servoes capable of handling the stresses of the vibrations created while firing and traversing rapidly. They also have to be light and stiff as possible for ease at installation and provide good accuracy with minimum dispersion.

Smaller calibre guns like the U S Phalanx system uses a Vulcan 20mm Gatling gun firing depleted uranium APDS (Armour Piercing Discarding

Sabot) projectiles to ensure a direct kill. Saturation of the target and high number of rounds hopefully will cause some of the APDS projectiles to penetrate the missile and detonate the warhead. Here a direct hit is necessary to destroy the missile and often two to three hits are needed to ensure destruction of the armour protected warhead.

Figure 3. Phalanx

Phalanx CIWS

Protagonists of the indirect fire school point that the probability of hitting small, fast targets is less than compared with proximity — fuzed (PF) ammunition. With a PF round it would be simpler to place the round within a metre or more of the target compared with a direct hit. Drawbacks to PF ammunition lie in the definition of a kill. Sea-skimmers can be disabled in several ways:

a) By damaging the guidance electronics so that it no longer commands the control surfaces of the missile.

b) Control surfaces themselves can be damaged to the extent that the missile will go haywire.

c) Inflicting massive damage to the body of the missile rendering it unstable.

d) Knocking off the powerplant.

Usually a combination of these mechanisms contribute to a kill. Under most circumstances it is the guidance electronic that will be susceptible. Studies done by Breda in Italy show that this is by no means a successful encounter. Once hit, some time will elapse before the electronic failure will cause the missile to draw off course missing the target. Even though the guidance system fails the sea-skimmer is already directed towards its target and may not deviate sufficiently to miss a large target like a ship. For such a reason a minimum range of engagement is necessary to engage sea-skimmers. Also as destruction of the missile too close to the ship will cause the debris from the explosion to hit it.

Proximity fuzes are expensive to produce and susceptible to electronic countermeasures, and can only be fitted into projectiles of 35mm calibre onwards. In service today of such a system is the Breda Dardo installed orginally on the Italian Lupo class frigate sagittario employing a twin Bofors L70/40mm gun in a turret. Trials conducted have shown that the Bofors proximity fuze was ineffective against true sea-skimmers and plans to fit the more sensitive Thomson CSF PF are underway.

Anti-missile System

A more effective way of ensuring a kill would be to use another missile provided it can be accurately placed to do the job.

Here again the range factor comes to play. All missiles after launch need some-time to become fully guided into their flight path. Hence a minimum range arises below which the missile will not have sufficiently time to gather and lock-on to the sea-skimmer. Minimum ranges quoted by manufacturers are about 500m to below one kilometre as in the British Aerospace Seawolf and French Crotale. On the other hand the maximum range exceeds that of gun systems.

Various methods of guidance are available to missiles. The GWS 25 Sea-wolf depends on television tracking at low elevation angles limiting its performance in bad weather. It is the only system bloodied in war but no reports of it down-ing any Exocets have come out from the Falkland War. Tests done in the UK in late November have been fruitful. A Sea-wolf fired from the Type 22 frigate HMS Brilliant successfully destroyed a passing Exocet fired from the Leander class frigate HMS Jupiter that was heading for a barge target. The Exocet was travelling astern the Brilliant and was hit by a pass-ing shot which is a more difficult engage-ment than a head-on one. It was calculat-ed that the operator would have time to fire off two more Seawolves at the same target had the first one missed.

Figure 4. The Seawolf

GWS 25 Seawolf

Other alternate modes of guidance is to use a passive seeker that picks up the ac-tive radar emissions from the sea-skimmer. Infra red guidance offers higher accuracy by homing in on the hostile missile's hot exhaust but lacks range performance. Dual mode guidance can be incorporated to complement each other. General Dynamics of the US is developing the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) to augment the NATO SeaSparrow system. The SeaSparrow, a navalised form of the air-to-air AIM-7 Sparrow, pro-tects US ships from frigates to carriers against intruding aircraft and has anti-seaskimmer capability. RAM is a much smaller missile, using Sidewinder compo-nents, allowing large numbers to be car-ried. Not designed as a replacement, the RAM's range will cover the gap between the SeaSparrow and the Phalanx. Still in the developmental stage, it has yet to see operational service on board U.S. ships.

Jamming and Decoys

Most sea-skimmers in service employ active radar at the terminal homing phase. This exposes the missile to jamm-ing techiques designed to confuse the radar. Difficulties arise as to the type of frequency used and the short time span that the radar is on. The radio altimeter that keeps the missile above sea level is also susceptible causing it to loose ver-tical axis control with the likelihood of the missile ditching into the sea.

Deception is a method employed to lure the missile away from the real target. By producing a larger rader echo using chaff (tiny strips of tin foil), the sea-skimmer will be presented with an ap-parently 'juicer' target not knowing it is a false one. Timing is all important for the

decoy target of chaff must be prepared and ready before the missile's radar has locked on the true target.

Hot flares are used whenever an infra-red seeker is incorporated in the sea-skimmer as in the Penguin. Usually the mode of guidance of the sea-skimmer is not known and a combination of a chaff cloud with an infra-red emitter is ejected once a threat is perceived. Here again systems are automatic and linked to the search radar on board the ship. Once tripped it will automatically fire off its load in the direction of the oncoming missile unless manually overridden. The French Dagaie and Sagaie are examples. Two HDW FS 1500 corvettes ordered from Germany for the Royal Malaysian Navy will have the shorter range Dagaie system for passive protection.

Conclusion

The lessons learnt from the Falklands War recently have opened eyes as to the need to defend ships against sea-skimming anti-ship missiles that can be launch-ed from a remarkable diversity of plat-forms. Aside from detecting and destroy-ing these launch platforms a close-in weapon gun system or an anti-missile missile system coupled with passive coun-ter-measures offer some form of protec-tion against these deadly missiles. How effective such systems are in the heat of war remains to be seen. The fact that they are gradually coming into service with the World's Navies attest to the impor-tance attributed to the sea-skimmer.

References

1. Doug Richardson, The Battle Against The Sea-Skimmer, **International Defense Review.** Vol. 14, 5/81, p. 627-633.

2. Seawolf shoots down Exocet, **International Defense Review.** Vol. 17, 1/84, p. 18.

3. Bill Gunston, **Modern Airborne Missiles.** p. 104.

Kapt (Dr) Jee Soon Leong graduated from the faculty of Medicine, University of Malaya in 1979. He was called up for compulsory service into the Armed Forces in June 1981. Kapt (Dr) Jee left the service to assume private practice in May 1984.

PSIKOLOGI
— satu alat taktik
yang diabaikan

Susunan:
Mejar Yusoff Khan Bin Rahim Khan

Seawal-awal abad ke 5 B.C (Sebelum Masihi) lagi seorang pakar taktik peperangan bangsa China, SUN TZU telah menekankan betapakah musta-haknya penggunaan PSIKOLOGI dalam penyusunan rancangan-rancang-an taktikal. Di dalam bukunya - **The Art of War,** Sun Tzu berulangkali me-nguatkan elemen ini dalam pelbagai suasana taktikalnya. Seperti jua peng-gunaan DESEPSI bagi mengelirukan pihak musuh, elemen psikologi jua perlu dianggap selaku suatu senjata taktikal yang sangat penting dan mesti diamalkan di sebarang pemeringkatan pertelingkahan. Dalam artikelnya. penulis, secara ringkas memberi contoh -yang benar-benar berlaku dan ke-jayaan yang tercapai.

KEPINTARAN MUSUH

Pada tahun-tahun di antara 1960an membawa sehingga ke tahun-tahun 1970an pergolakan di negara Vietnam kian meruncing dan di kala inilah se-orang pegawai Merin Amerika Syarikat telah berpeluang memimpin suatu kompeni kereta kebal yang mengandungi anggota-anggota yang sangat cerdas serta berdisiplin. Selaku Pegawai Meme-rintah, beliau telah berdaya-upaya menyesuaikan diri untuk berfungsi di medan peperangan yang sangat-sangat kompleks itu.

Demi untuk menentukan cara-cara yang terbaik bagi mencapai misinya,

beliau terpaksa, dari masa ke semasa membuat evaluasi ke atas semua tindak-tanduk yang pasukannya selenggarakan sama ada tindakan yang membawa hasil atau sebaliknya. Tanpa mempedulikan betapa banyak kecederaan atau kerosakan yang dialami, pihak musuh masih mara melancarkan tindakan balas mereka. Tiada kira di mana mereka menjalankan operasi musuh tetap mengetahuinya, lebih-lebih lagi mereka (musuh) semacam lebih mengetahui mengenai gerak-geri dan kelaziman-kelaziman pasukan sahabat dari pasukan sahabat mengetahui fasal mereka (musuh).

Kegelisahan Pegawai Memerintah kian memuncak. Kepalanya pening, memikirkan bagaimana pihak musuh mengesan tindak tanduk anggotanya. Beliau lalu yakin, pasti ada sesuatu yang kekurangan pada corak operasinya. Pendapatnya memang benar, pegawai itu yakin hingga ke hari ini, tetapi, apa yang memasyghulkan ialah - mereka (pasukan sahabat) tidak berupaya membawakan perkara tersebut ke suatu kesimpulan yang sempurna. Dengan hal yang demikian pada akhirnya pengorbanan ribuan nyawa dan kekalahan Vietnam pada hakikatnya memang tiada dapat dielakkan.

Di manakah terletaknya jawapan? Sementara askar Amerika Syarikat mengakui yang mereka terlibat untuk memenangi jiwa dan raga penduduk Vietnam, pada praktiknya mereka serba kekurangan untuk menyelenggarakan aktiviti-aktiviti tersebut.

KEJAYAAN MORAL

Kesimpulannya, pegawai-pegawai memerintah AS menggunakan inisiatif masing-masing asalkan boleh menawan perasaan penduduk-penduduk tersebut. Mereka mencuba meleburkan angkatan musuh dengan menggunakan tenaga tembakan dari senjata-senjata Amerika yang lebih teguh dan sofistikated terhadap suatu ketumbukan musuh yang tiada segera berkumpul dengan sewenang-wenangnya atau hingga menyerang-balas tembakan.

Kempen Jiwa-murni di Vietnam

Pihak Marine semacam telah lupa akan implikasi-implikasi dimensi aktif psikologi dalam peperangan; manakala musuh mereka benar-benar ingat akan perkara ini, malah menjalankan tindakan operasi mereka melalui perantaraan ini. Kekalahan taktik bagi pasukannya (musuh) muncul sebagai kejayaan moral di kacamata masyarakat antarabangsa. Serangan besar-besaran TET 1968 misalnya, adalah suatu kekalahan yang amat menakjubkan dari segi pengorbanan nyawa di pihak musuh, tetapi; kejayaan psikologinya telah menjadikan musuh berazam sehinggalah askar-askar Amerika akhirnya meninggalkan medan peperangan. Seorang Pemerintah Batalion Marine pernah melahirkan kata-kata berikut:

"Musuh kami telah membuktikan sekali lagi iaitu kejayaan meneguhkan **Semangat** tentera, meningkatkan **Keazaman** pemerintah-pemerintah dan **Memenangi** jiwa dan raga penduduk-penduduk. Jika satu dari komponen-komponen kejayaan ini tiada wujud, sudah tentu kejayaan akan tidak diperolehi."

> ... kekuatan keazaman atau tenaga psikologi mungkin akan menentukan kejayaan atau kecundangan bagi satu-satu angkatan bersenjata.

"Mengenangkan masa-masa yang telah silam, adalah jelas kepada kita bahawa kita telah 'mengejari' untuk mencapai tujuan-tujuan operasi melalui jalan-jalan yang kusut dan dipenuhi oleh ranjau-ranjau muslihat pihak musuh. Pada asasnya, amalan ini telah melanggar nilai-nilai dasar tanggungjawab profesionalisma tentera, - iaitu penggunaan sebarang ikhtiar yang sesuai untuk mengalahkan musuh.

Dengan menganggapkan Negara Vietnam sebagai satu contoh latar, dan keadaan politik dunia hari ini, adalah wajar sekali kita mengeluarkan PSIKOLOGI dari 'almari' dan menggunakannya sebagai satu unsur dasar dalam strategi dan taktik ketenteraan kita. Ini adalah kerana satu-satu kekalahan dalam peperangan atau kebuntuan keadaan politik itu pada hakikatnya menekankan kepada keadaan pemikiran pihak yang mengalami kedua-dua natijah tersebut," Ujar seorang lagi veteran peperangan Vietnam.

SUN TZU

Keadaan dunia hari ini membuktikan secara lebih jelas akan hakikat ini di mana negara-negara kuasa besar (superpowers) masing-masing menganggap mereka adalah setara kuatnya sama ada dalam bidang persenjataan atau kebolehan penjahanaman. Dengan ini hanyalah ketegasan pemikiran atau psikologi sahajalah yang boleh membekalkan kunci terhadap kejayaan atau kecundangan ketenteraan. Sebenarnya dalam konfrantasi-konfrantasi akan datang, persenjataan fizikal mungkin hanya akan menjadi peralatan bantuan semata-mata.

Sudah berkurun-kurun lamanya penulis-penulis strategi ketenteraan telah mengutarakan iaitu penggantian kepada kita bertanggung penuh kepada tenaga fizikal itu wujud dalam bentuk menggunakan secara besar-besaran, kaedah-kaedah psikologi secara terus-menerus oleh pemerintah medan peperangan sebagai sebahagian dari taktik operasinya. Seawal abad ke 5 B.C., pakar taktik China yang terkenal Sun Tzu telah menekankan betapa mustahaknya meleburkan pasukan musuh melalui penggunaan PSIKOLOGI dalam bukunya, **The Art of War.** Baru-baru ini pula, Dr James Atkin-

son, penulis **The Edge of War,** mengatakan:

"Tetapi, lama sebelum penciptaan senjata nukeliar atau peluru berpandu, peperangan jua adalah idea semata-mata. Senjata nukeliar dan peluru berpandu telah tiada mengubah tenaga yang ada pada idea-idea, sebaliknya, mereka, yakni senjata nukeliar dan peluru berpandu ini telah mempertingkatkan skop idea-idea dan menyegar serta menyuburkan lagi kesedaran manusia. Kini, seperti yang diiktiraf oleh Lenin, idea-idea yang melesukan sebuah negara untuk ditumbuk jatuh sekaligus, menjadikan (yakni idea-idea itu) lebih penting dari tumbukan tersebut."

Memperkatakan mengenai kegunaan psikologi, hanya satu sahaja masalah yang diragu-ragukan. Sebelum menggunakan elemen ini (psikologi) sebagai satu **senjata medan perang** seseorang pemerintah itu mestilah telah serba memahami dan lengkap sama ada dari segi intelek mahupun kecenderungannya mengenai **alat** tersebut. Contoh di bawah ini mempaparkan betapa psikologi digunakan oleh pemerintah di medan perang bagi mencapai kemenangan dalam aspek taktik.

BUKTI KETEGUHAN PSIKOLOGI

Sudah hampir satu bulan lamanya anggota dari satu kompeni itu berada dalam keadaan berjaga-jaga di sebuah bukit. Pada amnya, unit ini telah berpuashati mengenai kedudukan kukuh mereka dan mereka yakin, mereka boleh juga menentang satu serangan besar dari pihak

musuh. Beberapa 'bunker' (kubu-kubu) yang dibina dengan teliti sudah tentu boleh memberi perlindungan yang sangat baik sama ada dari senjata-senjata tembakan terus atau sebaliknya. Bekalan mereka sangat cukup sekali. Walaupun pemerintah kompeni tersebut telah terkorban dalam pertempuran yang terdahulu, pentadbiran pemerintahan (chain of command) tetap teguh seperti sedia kala. Misi unit ini ialah mempertahankan bukit tersebut walau apa berlaku sekalipun. Inilah perintah khas yang diterima oleh mereka.

24 jam yang telah silam beberapa peristiwa berunsurkan psikologi telah berlaku - misalnya: perhubungan radio dengan unit-unit rakan telah terputus. Beberapa anggota kompeni telah melapor yang mereka nampak kereta-kereta musuh telah lalu di lurah berdekatan dan berkumpul di arah belakang posisi mereka. Berasaskan kepada apa yang berlaku suatu kesimpulan yang amat menakutkan mula dirasai - yakni mereka telah terputus hubungan dengan unit utama mereka.

Sementara itu dalam lurah di hadapan kedudukan mereka pula, pemerintah pasukan musuh sedang mencari akal bagaimana hendak menyerang dan menjahanamkan kedudukan mereka di puncak bukit tersebut. Walaupun pasukan di bukit itu sudah terputus, ianya masih berkedudukan teguh dan cukup dengan bekalan. Bagi pihak musuh, jika diserangnya bukit tersebut, sudah tentu angka pengorbanan akan berlipat ganda. Tetapi, pemerintah pasukan musuh tetap dengan arahannya - dalam masa 36 jam bukit tersebut mesti diserang! Bukit tersebut mesti diambilalih - dan beliau (musuh) tahu ianya (bukit) boleh diambil dengan pengorbanan/kecederaan yang amat minima!

Rondaan di kawasan bukit-bukau - Korea 1950

Balik kita ke bukit tadi. Tembakan ber-talu-talu dari meriam-meriam musuh sudah mula meragu-ragukan kedudukan pasukan yang mempertahan. Angka ke-cederaan mula meningkat, **morale** (semangat) sudah mula lemah. Tiba-tiba tembakan berhenti serta-merta! Suatu suara yang jelas dan nyaring mula ke-dengaran oleh anggota-anggota di atas bukit - suara pula dalam bahasa mereka sendiri. Ternyata seperti kedudukan mereka (di bukit) sudah dikepung.

"Kedudukan kamu sekarang sudah tidak berguna lagi. Kamu tidak boleh melepaskan diri - serah diri sekarang dan kami akan tidak mengapa-apakan kamu!"

Tambahan kepada ini, suara tadi mem-beri mereka beberapa perkara lain untuk difikirkan. Suara itu menyebut beberapa nama anggota dari unit tersebut. Mereka seringkali diyakinkan yang jika mereka menyerah diri, layanan berperikemanu-siaan akan diberi. Akhir sekali suara itu dengan jelas menyatakan sekiranya mereka mencuba untuk menyerah diri, mereka (pihak di bukit) akan ditembak dari belakang oleh rakan sejawat mereka; jadi untuk menyenangkan mereka menyerah diri, suatu 'tiraian asap' akan dilepaskan.

Tiba-tiba suatu tiraian asap muncul di hadapan unit di bukit itu. Empat orang askar yang sudah kian tenat mengguna-kan helah musuh ini, lalu berlari-lari anak menurun bukit untuk menyerah diri. Seketika kemudian pembesar suara pun senyap - dan tembakan meriam mula bertalu-talu menghingar-bingarkan suasana. Sekali-sekala tembakan artileri terhenti; diikuti oleh laungan pembesar suara merayu supaya anggota-anggota di bukit itu menyerah diri.

Menunggu musuh menyerah — Korea 1950.

Situasi di bukit pada keseluruhannya sudah menjadi amat gamat dan tegang dari aspek psikologi dan anggota unit itu sudah mula gelisah amat sangat! Tiba-tiba tembakan artileri terhenti dan dengan tidak disangka-sangka pembesar suara mula berdenting lagi - kali ini terdengar suara-suara rakan sejawat mereka merayu supaya menyerah diri dan memberi jaminan tiada suatu pun akan berlaku terhadap mereka. Dengan ini, sebentar kemudian kesemua anggota unit di bukit itu menyerah diri. Dalam jarak-waktu kurang dari 36 jam dan tanpa sebarang kecederaan pihak yang menyerang (musuh) telah mencapai kejayaan yang cemerlang.

Penyerahan — Korea 1951

PSIKOLOGI SEBAGAI SENJATA?

Fiksyen? Sudah tentu tidak. Misalan di atas ini telah benar-benar berlaku di Korea pada bulan Januari 1951. Pasukan di atas bukit itu ialah anggota-anggota China. Pasukan penyerang yang ditugaskan menyerang bukit tersebut ialah pasukan dari tentera Amerika Syarikat. Maaf cakap! Contoh-contoh episod perang seperti yang tertera di atas ini biasanya diketepikan dan dianggap tiada berguna lalu dilupakan sahaja! Mengapakah perkara ini harus berlaku? Sambil manusia bersusah-payah mengatur dan memajukan program latihan dan sistem persenjataan bagi tenteranya supaya dapat mengatasi kekuatan bala tentera musuh, manusia juga bersusah-payah mengenepikan untuk memberi layanan sama ada secara **direct** atau sebaliknya kepada tenaga daya pemikiran dan psikologi pihak musuh.

Sebahagian sebabnya adalah di atas sebab-sebab kefalsafahan dan yang lainnya adalah kerana ketiadaan pengetahuan saintifik tersebut yang boleh membenarnya menambah dimensi psikologi yang efektif kepada operasi-operasi taktikalnya. Ahli-ahli falsafah sering mengkaji 'daya keyakinan' manusia. Elemen inilah yang menyebabkan manusia berbeza dari lain-lain makhluk. Tambahan pula, unsur inilah yang susah hendak difahami. Dengan munculnya psikologi saintifik pada awal kurun ke 20, 'daya keyakinan' manusia telah menjadi suatu perkara yang harus diselidiki. Telah banyak dipelajari mengenai sifat-sifat tabii manusia. Waimma, pemikiran-pemikiran falsafah yang telah lama wujud dan diterima oleh manusia di alam jagat ini, telah jua menghalang dan memincangkan penerimaan pengetahuan yang dibawakan oleh psikologi saintifik.

Di Amerika Syarikat misalnya, peperangan psikologi adalah dianggap sebagai senjata yang **bukan - Amerika** (UN-American weapon). Juga dianggap satu pemikiran yang buntu sekiranya keupayaan militer dihalakan ke sasaran melemahkan jiwa (psyche) dalam satu-satu operasi itu.

Senjata-senjata Amerika adalah dicipta untuk meleburkan musuh secara fizikal. Sebarang efek (kesan) psikologinya adalah tidak penting. Anggapan ini adalah amat merbahaya dan memerlukan suatu debat yang sengit sekali! Strategi militer adalah untuk menjahanamkan keupayaan berfungsi satu-satu pasukan musuh itu supaya ianya tidak dapat melancarkan serangan-serangan. Tidakkah ini, secara tidak langsung melemahkan keyakinan dirinya? Seorang Jeneral Amerika Syarikat yang masyhur Jeneral George S. Patton Jr, pernah merakamkan.

"Peperangan adalah dimenangi dengan menakutkan musuh."

Kenyataan ini amat luarbiasa terutamanya apabila ianya dilafazkan oleh seorang soldadu yang dikenali sebagai seorang yang sering menggunakan tindakan-tindakan yang amat agresif dalam operasi-operasinya.

Pada pendapat saya psikologi di medan-medan peperangan hanyalah dianggap sebagai **senjata bantuan;** terutamanya di Amerika Syarikat. Ini adalah amat ternyata jika kita membaca **"Department Of The Army Manual 33-5 (USAAF), Psychological Operations, Techniques and Procedures".** Buku panduan operasi ini menunjukkan bahawa operasi psikologi itu adalah suatu senjata bantuan kombat dan pemerintah di medan tempur mestilah menggunakannya demi untuk mencapai matlamat dari misinya itu.

Jika begini, amatlah perlu wujudnya pakar-pakar yang boleh mengawasi dan mengawal penggunaan **senjata** yang amat intriket ini. Lazimnya pakar-pakar ini adalah bertempat di peringkat-peringkat pemerintah tinggi - jauh dari medan-medan peperangan.

Biasanya seseorang pemerintah itu dilatih untuk menyalurkan perhatian terhadap **kekuatan** musuh apakala membuat rancangan taktikalnya daripada mengamati musuh itu sendiri. Berapakalikah pemerintah-pemerintah telah membuat hitungan politik dan psikologi dalam aprisiasinya? Pernah seorang Jeneral Amerika Syarikat - Omar N Bradley bersungut,

"Kadangkala, dalam peperangan tersebut kami lupa yang peperangan berlaku adalah untuk mengamankan konflik politik; dan dalam kempen di **Eropah pula, kami kadangkala telah mengenepikan betapa mustahaknya suasana politik di kala itu.**"

Meskipun di kala ini ramai yang berpendapat bahawa rumusan bagi satu-satu kejayaan itu ialah apakala kereta-kereta kebal dan persenjataan musuh dihancurkan, tetapi kita mesti ingat hanya apakala aspek keyakinan (will) itu telah dipunah baharulah akan hilang semangat pemulihan kembali musuh. Untuk mengalahkan musuh, keyakinannya untuk memulih diri kembali mestilah dihancurkan tanpa kira meskipun kekuatan fizikalnya masih teguh untuk berperang.

Pemerintah moden (kini) mestilah mengiktiraf iaitu 'jajahan pemikiran' -(domain of mind) adalah menjadi sasaran utama dan dia seharusnyalah bersedia meneroka segala kelemahan-kelemahannya secara aktif. Demi untuk bergerak ke hala ini dia mestilah memahami mengenai sifat-sifat tabii dan

bagaimanakah hendak menggunakan pengetahuan ini terhadap sesuatu puak yang menentang itu. Tambahan lagi, pemerintah tersebut mestilah menguatkan keyakinan anggota-anggota unitnya untuk mengatasi segala pancaroba penipuan dan tipu-helah yang berunsur psikologi.

Dalam memperkatakan impak psikologi ke atas askar-askar, seseorang pemerintah jua seharusnyalah memahami akan sesuatu medan peperangan itu sebagai satu suasana psikologi dan implikasi suasana tersebut terhadap aktiviti-aktivitinya. Penggunaan kekerasan (application of force) akan terpaksa digunakan demi untuk mencapai tujuan taktikal melalui psikologi. Selain dari itu segala prosedur-perancangan stafnya, dan juga pengertiannya terhadap prinsip-prinsip peperangan mestilah dipulih semuala (reorientated) dan ditakrifkan kembali untuk menerap dimensi psikologi.

Dalam konteks menghadapi segala tekanan-tekanan dan gertakan oleh kuasa-kuasa yang sering mengancam keselamatan dunia, maka sudahlah sampai masanya perancang-perancang tentera mengatur-semula struktur strategi dan pemikiran taktikal mereka supaya terterap ke dalamnya komponen-komponen psikologi yang sangat aktif. Rancangan-rancangan (plans) keterangan pada masa-masa akan datang mestilah mengandungi prosedur-prosedur yang menentukan tekanan psikologi terhadap musuh-musuh, tiada kira di peringkat pertelengkahan apa sekalipun. Dengan menggunakan kaedah ini kelak kemungkinan berjayanya misi-misi taktikal yang diidamkan itu akan meningkat.

Di dunia ketenteraan yang berat sebelah dan penuh dengan persenjataan sofistikated ini, kuat atau lemahnya, se-suatu angkatan tentera (military equation) bukanlah boleh lagi dikata bergantung kepada kekuatan peralatan semata-mata, malah ianya terletak di tangan individu yang mengendalikan peralatan tersebut, ketuanya dan orang-orang yang menyokongnya. Jika semangat atau keyakinan mereka ini dilemahkan melalui penggunaan unsur-unsur psikologi, maka peluang untuk berjaya itu akan menjadi lebih cerah.

Nota:

1 James D. Atkinson **The Edge of War,** Henry Regnery Co, Chicago III, 1960. p I.

2 Elliot Harris, The **"Un-American" Weapon,** M. W. Lads Publishing Co, N. Y, 1967, pp 80-81.

3 Ibid, p 1.

4 George S. Patton Jr, **War as I Knew it,** Houghton Mifflin Co, Boston, Mass, 1947, p 405.

5 Field Manual (FM) 33-5, **Psychological Operations, Techniques, and Procedures,** Department of the Army, Washington, D.C, 1966, p 4.

6 Omar N. Bradley, **A Soldier's Story,** Henny Holt & Co, N.Y, 1951, p xi.

Lain-lain rujukan:

● FM 33-1, **Psychological Operations: U.S. Army Doctrine,** Department of the Army, Washington, D.C, 1971, p 1-1.

● John H. Johns, "Political Development and Modernization", **The National Security Affairs Forum,** Winter 1975, p 84.

● Michael Cole and Irving Maltzman, A Handbook of **Contemporary Soviet Psychology,** Basic Books, N.Y, 1969, p vi.

● Stefen T. Possony, "The Soviet Psychological Approach", **Global Psychological Conflict**, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D. C, 1961, p 50.

● Atkinson, op, cit, p 275.

● Possony, op, cit, p 59.

● W. Timmerman Jr. Lieut Col. US Army.

Mejar Yusoff Khan B Rahim Khan kini berkhidmat selaku editor Sorotan Darat telah ditauliahkan ke dalam Kor Pelajaran Angkatan Tentera pada tahun 1968. Selain dari berkelulusan di peringkat 'tertiary,' beliau jua merupakan Pegawai Pelajaran pertama yang telah lulus kursus Maktab Turus Angkatan Tentera Haigate, dan memperolehi kelulusan Imt (psc).

SISTEM AKHLAK dalam ISLAM

Mej Shamsuddin bin Hashim

Pendahuluan

Masalah akhlak merupakan satu masalah besar yang dihadapi oleh manusia di dunia, kerana akhlak merupakan tonggak hidup atau runtuhnya sesuatu ummat itu. Dipandang dari sudut rialiti masyarakat dunia hari ini, ternyata sekali bahawa dunia sedang menghadapi krisis akhlak yang amat sangat. Nilai-nilai kemanusiaan telah ada sedang tergugat. Neraca yang digunakan oleh masyarakat dan individu dalam menilai sesuatu yang baik atau buruk tidak lagi menurut lunas-lunas yang sepatutnya malah ianya adalah menurut hawa nafsu yang bersifat kebendaan.

Dalam tulisan yang ringkas ini saya akan cuba menerangkan masalah akhlak atau dengan kata lain sistem akhlak menurut kaca mata Islam supaya dengan itu kelak sedikit sebanyak kita bersama-sama dapat membuat pertimbangan.

Akhlak

Demi untuk lebih memudahkan perbincangan tentang akhlak, terlebih dahulu kita harus mengenali akhlak itu sendiri kerana dengan memahami akhlak itu, sesuatu hukuman atau perbincangan tentangnya akan lebih tepat dan jelas.

Istilah Ilmu Akhlak

Menurut istilah ilmu akhlak, kalimah akhlak membawa pengertian, serumpunan nilai-nilai dan sifat-sifat yang sebati dalam diri seseorang.

Baik atau buruknya sesuatu perbuatan atau sesuatu sifat itu, menurut seseorang adalah terletak kepada neraca yang digunakan oleh nilai-nilai dan sifat-sifat yang sebati pada diri seseorang. Sebagai contoh perbuatan membohong itu akan dianggap bukan sebagai suatu perbuatan salah atau tidak baik bagi mereka yang telah sebati dengan sifat pembohong, tetapi sebaliknya perbuatan yang sama dianggap salah dan tidak baik bagi mereka yang telah sebati dengan sifat benar, demikianlah seterusnya.

Pentingnya Akhlak

Akhlak amatlah penting kepada penghidupan manusia kerana akhlak amat besar pengaruh dan kesannya pada tindak tanduk dan gerak langkah seseorang. Sahsiah, tindak tanduk seseorang itu adalah sejajar dengan nilai-nilai akhlak dan sifat-sifat yang sebati dalam dirinya. Begitu juga baik dan buruknya perbuatan seseorang adalah bergantung kepada nilai-nilai akhlak yang terdapat dalam dirinya.

Oleh kerana individu yang akan membentuk satu keluarga dan keluarga pula membentuk masyarakat, seterusnya masyarakat pula membentuk negara maka permasalahan akhlak amatlah penting kepada manusia baik dalam bentuk individu masyarakat dan negara dalam usaha untuk meningkatkan insaniah insan sehingga dengan peningkatan ini suatu ummah insaniah yang benar-benar tinggi akan ujud. Dari dasar inilah maka segala usaha-usaha untuk memperbaiki manusia haruslah dimulakan dengan tindakan-tindakan yang dapat membersihkan jiwa manusia. Apabila jiwa manusia telah benar-benar bersih tindakan-tindakan selanjutnya tidak akan menghadapi masalah lagi.

Akhlak juga dianggap penting kerana sebelum manusia melakukan sesuatu perbuatan atau meninggalkannya beliau akan membuat penilaian terhadap perbuatan tersebut. Penilaian yang dilakukannya ini akan sejajar dengan nilai-nilai akhlak yang terdapat dalam dirinya.

Bertolak dari titik ini salah atau benarnya penilaian yang dilakukan oleh seseorang adalah bergantung rapat dengan buruk atau baiknya nilai-nilai akhlak yang terdapat dalam diri seseorang itu.

Namun demikian untuk sampai kepada peringkat menilai sesuatu perbuatan dengan menggunakan neraca nilai-nilai akhlak yang terdapat dalam diri seseorang tidaklah cukup dengan hanya seseorang itu mengetahui nilai-nilai akhlak, malah nilai-nilai akhlak ini haruslah sebati dan menjadi darah daging kepadanya, di samping itu beliau haruslah merasakan yang nilai-nilai akhlak itu amat perlu pada dirinya. Sejauh mana nilai-nilai itu meresap dan sebati dengan dirinya sejauh itulah penilaian yang akan dilakukannya melalui neraca akhlak yang terdapat dalam dirinya.

Kedudukan Akhlak Dalam Islam

Yang akhlak mendapat kedudukan tinggi dalam Islam ini dapat dilihat dari beberapa sudut:

a.   Islam telah menjadikan akhlak sebagai illat (alasan) kenapa agama Islam diturunkan. Hal ini jelas dalam Sabda Rasulullah s.a.w. **"Aku diutuskan hanyalah semata-mata untuk menyempurnakan akhlak-akhlak yang mulia"**.

b.   Islam menganggap orang yang paling tinggi darjat keimanannya ialah mereka yang paling mulia akhlaknya.

c.   Islam menganggap bahawa akhlak yang baik adalah merupakan amalan yang utama dapat memberatkan neraca amal baik di akhirat kelak.

Adalah jelas kepada kita bahawa timbangan amal baik kita di akhirat dapat ditambah beratnya dengan akhlak yang baik. Di samping itu kita ketahui juga bahawa akhlak dan takwa sama statusnya dari sudut ini, yang mana kedua-duanya merupakan perkara paling berat yang diletakkan dalam neraca akhirat.

d.   Dalam ajaran Islam dinyatakan bahawa mereka yang berjaya memenangi kasih sayang Rasulullah dan mendapat suatu kedudukan yang hampir dengan Rasulullah s.a.w. pada hari akhirat ialah orang yang lebih baik akhlaknya.

e.   Dalam ajaran Islam juga dinyatakan bahawa akhlak adalah merupakan syarat untuk dapat membebaskan diri dari azab neraka dan menikmati syurga.

f.   Banyak terdapat ayat-ayat di dalam Quran menyentuh persoalan akhlak baik dengan cara memerintah supaya berakhlak mulia atau menegah dari akhlak yang rendah dan keji sebagai contoh:

Berbuat baik kepada Ibubapa
Menunai janji.
Tegahan dari bersifat bakhil.

Ciri-ciri khusus Akhlak

Sistem akhlak dalam Islam amat jauh berbezanya dengan sistem-sistem akhlak lain. Perbezaan ini dapat dikesan melalui ciri-ciri khusus yang terdapat dalam sistem akhlak itu sendiri. Di antara ciri-ciri tersebut ialah:

a.   Secara umum

(i)   Firman Allah dalam Surah Al-Imran ayat 110.

"Kamu adalah ummat paling baik yang telah dikeluarkan untuk manusia, kamu memerintah melakukan maaruf dan menegah melakukan munkar dan kamu beriman kepada Allah."

(ii)   Firman Allah dalam Surah An-Nahli ayat 90.

"Dan dia (Allah) menegah dari segala kejahatan dan kemunkaran dan kezaliman. Dia (Allah) memberi ingat kepada kamu mudah-mudahan kamu mengambil peringatan".

b.   Secara Terperinci

(i)   Tuntutan supaya bertolong bantu antara satu sama lain. Sabda Rasulullah:

"Dan Allah akan menolong hambanya selagi hamba itu menolong saudaranya".

(ii)   Tegahan memperkatakan sesuatu tanpa ilmu. Firman Allah dalam Surah Al-Israa ayat 36.

"Janganlah kamu memperkatakan sesuatu yang tidak kamu ketahui. Sesungguhnya pendengaran, penglihatan dan hati - kesemua itu akan dipertanggungjawabkan".

c.   Akhlak, Iman dan Takwa.

Akhlak menurut pandangan Islam mempunyai hubungan yang rapat dengan iman dan takwa.

Di sini kita bawakan sebahagian dari Ayat Quran dan hadis Rasulullah yang dapat menerangkan hubungan rapat antara akhlak dan iman.

(i)   Firman Allah dalam Surah Al-Taubah ayat 5.

"Tunaikanlah janji (kamu terhadap) mereka, sesungguhnya Allah sukakan orang yang takwa".

Dalam ayat ini Allah menerangkan bahawa menunaikan janji itu merupakan sebahagian dari takwa dan disukai Allah. Telah dimaklumi secara umum bahawa manusia adalah berkewajipan melakukan perkara yang diredzai dan disukai Allah.

d.   Akhlak Jalan dan Matlamat.

Oleh kerana Islam amat berpegang teguh dengan nilai-nilai

akhlak maka Islam telah mewajibkan agar nilai-nilai akhlak haruslah ujud pada matlamat dan jalan yang digunakan untuk mencapai matlamat tersebut. Dengan lain perkatan jalan yang digunakan untuk mencapai matlamat itu sendiri mestilah diterima syarak, yakin tidak tertegah pada pandangan syarak. Dalam hubungan ini Islam telah menentukan suatu kaedah umum iaitu.

"Matlamat yang syarii tidak dapat membersihkan jalan yang tidak syarii". Bukan seperti kaedah yang dilariskan oleh fahaman-fahaman bukan Islam. **"Matlamat dapat membersihkan jalan"** sebagai contoh dalam hal ini sepotong ayat Al-Quran yang berbunyi.

"Jika mereka meminta pertolongan kamu dalam agama, maka kamu mestilah menolong mereka kecuali pertolongan menentang kaum yang telah membuat perjanjian dengan kamu. Dan Allah melihat apa yang kamu lakukan".

Dari ayat ini jelas kelihatan bahawa Islam amat berpegang teguh dengan nilai akhlak kerana sekalipun matlamat yang akan mereka lakukan dalam kejadian di atas adalah syarii (membantu orang Islam) tetapi mereka tidaklah dibenarkan memberikan pertolongan kepada saudara muslim mereka secara mutlak, mereka tidak boleh memerangi musuh saudara mereka kiranya musuh saudara mereka itu telah mengikut perjanjian dengan mereka. Ini kerana dengan memerangi musuh saudara mereka yang telah membuat perjanjian dengan mereka bererti mereka telah melakukan jalan yang tidak syarii (melanggar perjanjian) untuk mencapai matlamat yang syarii (membantu saudara muslima).

Balasan

Di antara ciri khusus sistem akhlak dalam Islam ialah ganjaran dan balasan terhadap akhlak. Akhlak yang baik akan diberi balasan baik, menakala akhlak yang buruk pula akan dibalas dengan siksa.

Perkara ini akan jelas kepada kita bila kita memahami bahawa Islam telah menyentuh persoalan akhlak dengan dua cara. Pertamanya dengan bentuk perentah, kedua dalam bentuk tegah.

Telah dimaklumi bersama bahawa mengingkari perentah syarak atau melakukan larangannya adalah menjadi sebab untuk mendapat ganjaran pahala.

Dari sinilah dapat kita fahami bahawa yang dikatakan syariat itu adalah terkandung dalam perentah dan tegah.

Balasan di atas pelanggaran-pelanggaran yang dilakukan terhadap sistem akhlak boleh jadi dilaksanakan Allah dalam penghidupan di dunia seperti balasan kepada saksi bohong dengan menjatuhkan hukuman taksir atau dengan cara Allah menumpaskan sesuatu ummat itu seperti yang terdapat dalam hadis Rasulullah **"Sesungguhnya umat yang sebelum kamu binasa kerana apabila orang yang mulia dikalangan mereka mencuri mereka biarkan apabila orang yang hina mencuri mereka jatuhkan hukuman had ke atasnya".**

Dapatkah Akhlak dicapai dan dibentuk melalui dayausaha?

a.   Islam telah memerintah ummatnya agar berakhlak baik dan dalam perintah-perintahnya Islam tidak memerintahkan sesuatu yang luar dari kemampuan manusia. Sehubungan

dengan ini kita dapati dua kaedah umum dalam Islam iaitu:

(i) Tidak ada taklif pada perkara-perkara yang mustahil.

(ii) Tidak ada taklif pada perkara-perkara yang luar dari kemampuan.

Berdasarkan kepada kaedah-kaedah ini dapat kita fahami bahawa manusia itu mempunyai kemampuan untuk merobah akhlaknya dari yang buruk kepada yang baik demikian juga sebaliknya kerana kalaulah manusia tidak mampu merobah akhlaknya nescaya Islam tidak memerintahkan agar manusia merobah akhlaknya dari yang buruk kepada yang baik.

Kemampuan manusia mengubah akhlaknya memang telah disediakan Allah dalam diri manusia itu sendiri, kemampuan ini samalah keadaannya dengan kemampuan manusia menerima ilmu pengetahuan. Cuma manusia tidak sama - malah berlebih kurang pada kadar kemampuan itu, misalnya A mampu mencapai ke peringkat 90% sedangkan B hanya mempunyai kemempuan mencapai 50% begitulah seterusnya.

b. Boleh jadi manusia itu dijadikan Allah dengan sifat-sifat semula jadi yang menonjol dalam dirinya seperti yang tersebut dalam hadis bahawa Rasulullah telah berkata kepada Asyubah Abdil Qais:

"Sesungguhnya pada diri mu itu terdapat dua sifat yang disukai Allah dan Rasulnya. Asybah berkata:

Apakah saya berakhlak dengan

kedua-dua akhlak itu atau Allah telah menjadikan kedua-duanya sifat semulajadi saya? Rasulullah bersabda "Malah Allah telah menjadikan kedua-duanya sifat semulajadi mu". Asybah berkata "Segala puji bagi Allah yang telah menjadikan aku dengan mempunyai kedua-dua sifat yang disukai Allah dan Rasulnya".

Manusia tidak sama dalam memiliki sifat-sifat semulajadi ini, oleh itu mereka yang memiliki sifat-sifat semulajadi yang tertentu akan merasa mudah untuk memupuk sifat-sifat tersebut, kerana beliau akan dibantu oleh keadaan semulajadi itu. Allah telah berfirman dalam surah Al-Raad ayat 12.

"Allah tidak merobah sesuatu yang ada pada itu sehinggalah mereka mengubah apa yang ada dalam diri mereka.

Dengan keterangan-keterangan di atas jelas kepada kita bahawa manusia memang berkemampuan mengubah akhlak mereka, atau dengan lain perkataan akhlak memang dapat dicapai dan dibentuk melalui dayausaha manusia sendiri.

Bagaimana pembentukan dan usaha-usaha mencapai akhlak dapat dilaksanakan

Akhlak dapat dibentuk dan ditingkatkan melalui:

a. Mengurangkan pengaruh dan menjauh diri dari melakukan tuntutan sesuatu sifat yang keji. Cara ini dapat dilakukan pada sifat-sifat yang dianggap sebagai naluri manusia, seperti sifat-sifat marah, bengis, pemalu dan lainnya.

b.   Menerapkan, melatih dan membuangkan kotoran sesuatu akhlak yang buruk di samping mengarahkannya ke jalan yang diredzai Allah. Sifat berani umpamanya haruslah diarahkan kepada perkara-perkara yang diredzai Allah seperti membela mereka yang dizalimi dan terinaya, bukan untuk menceroboh orang yang tidak berdosa.

c.   Menukar akhlak yang keji dengan akhlak yang terpuji, seperti menukar sifat-sifat dusta dengan benar, mungkir janji dengan menepati janji.

Jalan Pembentukan Akhlak

Di sana banyak terdapat jalan-jalan yang dapat digunakan dalam usaha-usaha membentuk akhlak antaranya:

a.   Ilmu, yakni mengetahui jenis-jenis akhlak yang mulia dan keji. Tanpa ilmu mungkin tidak akan dapat membezakan antara akhlak yang baik dan buruk. Islam telah menjelaskan akhlak yang baik dan yang buruk. Kewajipan seorang muslim hanyalah untuk mempelajari dan memperbetul dirinya, melihat di mana kedudukannya berbanding dengan akhlak-akhlak tersebut dan seterusnya betindak melakukan perlaksanaannya.

b.   Bersungguh-sungguh memperkuatkan pengertian akidah Islamiah dalam jiwa, terutama pengertian-pengertian yang bersangkut dengan hari kiamat dan akan menemui mati lambat laun. Dengan memperkuat dan memperdalamkan pengertian akidah islamiah, akhlak seseorang itu akan kokoh, kerana soal akhlak berhubung terus dengan masalah iman dan takwa. Seseorang yang benar-benar kuat pegangan akidahnya tidak akan merasa hina, kerana beliau sedar bahawa beliau berhubong terus dengan suatu kekuatan yang benar-benar agong iaitu kekuatan Allah. Seseorang yang benar-benar mukmin tidak akan takut kepada sesama makhluk kerana beliau sedar bahawa segala sesuatu itu dari Allah belaka, rezeki, celaka, menafaat dan nikmat malah hidup dan mati adalah di tangan Allah. Dengan itu beliau tidak akan bersikap mengampu, rasa hina diri dan hidup berpura-pura.

c.   Mengetahui betapa pentingnya akhlak-akhlak tersebut pada dirinya kerana permasalahan akhlak berhubung terus dengan masalah iman dan takwa. Di samping itu beliau haruslah mengetahui apakah mudzarat dan keburukan yang akan diterimanya akibat dari akhlaknya yang buruk dan keji.

d.   Bergaul dengan orang-orang mukmin yang berakhlak mulia, pergaulan ini akan dapat menularkan sifat-sifat mereka yang mulia sedikit demi sedikit.

e.   Melakukan perbuatan yang bertentangan dengan tuntutan sifat-sifat keji. Misalnya, untuk mengubati sifat hasad boleh dilakukan dengan mengucap istighfar dan mendoakan kebajikan kepada orang yang didengki. sifat takbur umpamanya dapat diubati dengan bercampurgaul dengan gulungan miskin dan marhin, duduk dibarisan belakang dalam majlis.

f.   Meninggalkan suasana yang telah rosak akhlaknya dan mencampuri suasana atau jemaah yang saleh. Meninggalkan suasana yang rosak akhlak disini bukanlah bererti meninggalkan masyarakat, yang dimaksudkan ialah menghijrahkan perasaan

kita dari masyarakat yang telah rosak itu disamping berusaha mendampingi jemaah-jemaah yang baik akhlaknya.

g.   Melatih diri menerima nasihat orang pada hakikatnya orang yang memberi nasihat berhak menerima terima kasih kita, kerana kita selalunya berterima kasih kepada orang yang menyelamatkan kita dari bahaya. Demikianlah juga orang yang memberi nasihat telah cuba menyelamatkan kita dari bahaya keburukan akhlak yang kita lakukan.

Kesimpulan

Dari perjelasan ini kita dapat membuat beberapa kesimpulan:

a.   Akhlak dapat dicapai dan dibentuk melalui dayausaha manusia sendiri melalui cara dan wasilah untuk mencapai dan membentuk akhlak dalam diri.

b.   Akhlak mendapat kedudukan yang tinggi pada pandangan Islam.

c.   Akhlak amat penting dalam penghidupan manusia memandangkan besarnya pengaruh akhlak kepada tindak-tanduk manusia sehingga pada ketika-ketikanya nilai-nilai akhlak yang terdapat pada diri seseorang itu bertindak menjadi neraca penilai kepada sesuatu perbuatan.

d.   Sistem akhlak dalam Islam dapat membezakan dirinya dengan sistem akhlak yang lain melalui ciri-cirinya yang khusus.

Penutup

Dengan penjelasan ini kita telah mengetahui serba sedikit tentang sistem akhlak dalam Islam. Pengetahuan kita yang serba sedikit ini menuntut kita bertindak melakukan pelaksanaannya dalam kehidupan kita. Kerana dengan tindakan pelaksanaan ianya tidak akan mendatangkan faedah yang diharapkan. Satu-satunya jalan yang masih terbuka untuk membentuk kembali akhlak manusia seumumnyua ialah kembali kepada Islam. Langkah pertama ialah beriman dan taqwa kepada Tuhan.

Mejar Shamsudin B Hashim telah ditauliahkan ke dalam Rejimen Askar Melayu DiRaja pada tahun 1971. Selain dari mengikuti pelbagai kursus profesional, beliau telah juga mengikut kursus dalam bidang perakaunan di ITM dan berjaya mendapat Diploma dalam bidang tersebut. Kini beliau memegang jawatan Pegawai Turus 2 (Kebajikan) di Kementerian Pertahanan.

PROFILE FOR A MALAYSIAN

ARMY COMMANDER

By
Mejar Kassim bin Abdul Kadir

"It is an accepted fact that the Commander is the backbone of any military unit." Much have been said or written by various sectors on the standard of our Army today. The various misdeeds and mishaps during the past two years have in one way or the other implicate the standards of commanders at various levels, officers and NCOs alike. In his article, the writer wishes that we, the Officers' Corps will search our souls and find out where we stand, where we go wrong and make amends for the sake of our image and sacred cause. Hence the article tries to project the type of virtues that a commander should possess or stand for.

INTRODUCTION

The commander is the backbone of any military unit. A commander can be described as the man at the helm who has the legal authority to lead and to direct men under him. Experiences have shown that the success and failure of an operation or campaign depends greatly on the commander. An army that enjoys a high pro-portions of first class commanders, juniors or seniors, has undoubtedly achieved greater success compared with one that lacks good commanders. Research and history have shown that despite the development of highly technological, scientific weapons and equipments, man is still the most important resources in war. Man is required to operate and use these range of modern

weapons and equipments. To correctly employ these men and those weapons and equipments to the best advantage we need good commanders.

In a developing army like ours, the roles played by the commanders at all level are the most important aspect in its development. All those expansion programmes, the new battalions, new systems and equipment are going to waste unless we are able to enjoy a high proportion of first class commanders. The lives of men, the employment of those new weapon systems and equipment to the best advantage and under certain circumstances the outcome of a battle or operations, are to a decisive degree dependent upon the appreciations and decisions of the commander. A grave mistake or a large scale military defeat can never be redressed. The development in the region now and in times to come can only stress for the availability of highly capable commanders and professional men geared up to face those challenge. Unless we are prepared in the basic prerequisite of having first class commanders at all level, the professional men and modern arms and equipment will make little or no impact in the event of an invasion.

The command personnel of an organization constitute the skeleton which holds the separate limbs of that organization together and support them as a single, closely knitted organization. The practical ability of the army, that is the capability, devotion, courage and professionalism are related directly to the ability of their commanders. In this respect we are concerned with the ability of each of their commanders, individually and also where the army as a whole is concerned. No matter at what level the commander is, whether assisted or not in his various duties, the man in command is personally and solely responsible for the unit or operation under his command. He may delegate authority to his subordinates to enable them to do their work more efficiently, but the very nature of his position, it is the commander himself who bears the responsibility for everything that takes place within the bound of the authority given to him. The great Chinese theoretician, Sun Tzu in his book 'The Art of War' states:

> "The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolance, courage and strictness".

It will not be far wrong for us to say that the commander is drawn from among the finest human being available.

AIM

This article tries to expound the type of virtues that a commander should possess or stand for, in pursuing our sacred cause of defending the Nation and National integrity.

DEVELOPMENT OF LEADERSHIP FOR COMMAND

In the development of leadership, these are two aspects of a person that stand out most; his character and his personality. Some claimed that the character development come first and then the personality development. However, in the selection of a candidate for a post of command there is one criterion, his personality. For the man who possesses a complete, harmonious and gifted personality, should lend himself to instructions, guidance and education. His character may be moulded into that of leader during the course of his training and service.

A commander must possess a certain attributes: an able mind and depth of understanding, a wide range of intellectual interest, organizational ability, a natural tendency towards leadership, the

ability to grasp a situation, power to dis-
criminate and deduce, weighs the pros
and cons and comes to a swift decision,
aggressiveness and flexibility. The work
of a commander is varied and can be
complex. He must not simply be con-
tented to accept orders from superiors.
He must think for himself. Let it be tac-
tical or administration matters, social
problems, management, education or
psychology. The ideal commander is one
who can arrange his unit affairs well to
fulfill his duties sensibily, reasonably and
successfully.

KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge and depth of outlook and
interest are precious qualities in any
man. The military commander endowed
with them will carry out his duties and
shoulder his responsibilities, all the more
competently. In the present day warfare
and in future, numerable factors come in-
to play ie. scientific, technical, social,
psychologial, political, strategical and
tactical, educational, administrative and
organizations, cultural and even artistic.
Though the scope of this requirement is
wide it does not mean that higher formal
educational qualifications should be
made a condition for appointment to posi-
tion of command. A person with a higher
formal academic qualifications is no
guarrantee of command ability. Personal-
ity must be at all time takes precedence
over academic qualifications. A man who
is gifted, has a strong personality is
naturally endowed with wisdom, common
sense and qualities of leadership and will
probably turn out to be a first class com-
mander, whether on not he has a higher
academic qualification.

With the expansion of the army and the
large requirement for young officers, we
are unable to get the best of choice when
it comes to educational qualification. Ac-

ceptance into the officer-cadet training
on the strength of academic qualification
will automatically exclude from the rank
of command most of the nation's youth.
The majority of them coming from the
rural schools, economically lower strata
of the population and who through no
fault of themselves could not pursue a
better academic qualification. Such con-
dition if accepted will restrict the area of
choice probably to certain group of peo-
ple or to the urban youth. This would
cause damage to the army and create
social problems to the nation. A formal
selection of this kind would certainly lead
to strict limited elites providing the soul
of officers. On the otherhand we cannot
simply overlook the requirement for
general education in selecting the candi-
dates. The solution to the problem would
to be in choosing officers in the first in-
stance according to their general qualiti-
es and then providing them with the
facilities to expend their general or tech-
nical knowledge, should this be neces-
sary in the course of their service. A
reduction on the academic standard on
entry must be substituted by provisions
to expand their knowledge. This could be
done by making the time and facilities
available for this purpose.

PROFESSIONALISM AND SKILLS

Professionalism and skills are in no way
narrow field. They include the widest
spheres of learning and technical know
how. In a developing nation like ours,
pure military study is insufficient in the
desire to achieve a well trained modern
army. We can consider that military ser-
vice is a social function whether or not it
reaches the stage of war. In addition to
military subjects, both junior and seniors
need to be given a broad introduction to
social science, management, literature
and culture. He must also have a good
knowledge of general history of our Na-

tion and geography of the region including the study of other languages of our neighbour like Thai, Vietnamese and other. The importance of education and psychology for commanders has been stressed earlier. Educated and enlighted commanders will produce soldiers who are equally enlighted and will be thirsty for knowledge. With knowledge, one will achieve professionalism and skill. These soldiers will then understand why they are recruited and for what they must fight for.

SINCERITY HONESTY AND MORAL COURAGE

A good commander is a man who is sincere and truthful in his relationship with his men and fellow officers. This should be obvious for a leader, yet it must be stressed that officers forget this elementary precept. Mutual trust which is the basis of comradeship among the soldiers depends on complete honesty. A commander who is not honest with his men cannot expect to win their trust and full support. Instead of giving the support or telling the truth, the men would formulate stories which have disastrous consequences. Likewise, a commander who conceals his failures from his superiors behind false argument or excuses, may effect the course of events which will eventually be detrimental to himself and the army as a whole. The commander bears responsibility to both success and failure. It is here that courage comes in. There are two kind of courage; the courage to face the enemy and danger and the moral courage to face up to responsibility. A commander who readily admits his mistakes in giving a wrong order and who readily revoke a misplaced order will win the respect of his subordinates. Do not for the sake of prestige try to cover up errors which will dent the confidence of those commander by his seniors and juniors. A man of intrigue, the trouble shooter, whose true intention remains a mystery to his men is the worst of commanders. The higher the rank the graver the consequences. The formation of cliques among officers in order to further their own interests or damage those of others, the exploitation of subordinate or personnel, discrimination against them, vicious gossips and wild allegation among senior officers about one another and other similar manifestations are poisonous in the army. All these would have a far reaching effect on moral standard and the army would eventually crumble.

Commanders at various level have control over enourmous quantities of the nation material wealth in terms of money, vehicles, equipment, arms, ammunition, clothing and other resources. In handling those resources, It is therefore necessary to create and maintain a high moral level in order to avoid theft and corruption. The same principles will also apply to the booty of war and disaster; it is often with small beginning that the roots sets in. No commander can demand discipline from his subordinate, if he himself does not serve as an example. The higher the rank the graver the crime and the more severe the punishment must be.

PERSONAL CONDUCT AND RESTRAIN

The commander at all level of command is expected to show extreme restrain in his personal conduct, hence avoiding any tendency of loose living etc or otherwise, he will find himself in the centre of gossip, jealousy and mistrust. Loose behaviour by junior officers and the more seniors towards young women who have been placed in their charge is not only a violations of the moral code but also an infringement of service discipline and duty. The exploitation of rank in

order to take advantage of innocent young women or helpless subordinates is a disgraceful act which disqualifies its perpetrator from any position of command or instruction. An army unit is no private domain in which the individual may do as he pleases. The junior officer is expected to show self restraint at least within the confine of his camp and among the men of his unit. Yet more is expected of the senior officers, whose habits and activities are often watched and become common knowledge among all his subordinates. A commander who can no longer exert the necessary degree of self control, who is no longer able to overcome his weakness and desires, cannot remain in the realm of authority and responsibility. He must leave his post and the sooner the better, less in the end he be forced to do so by pressure of his superior or public opinion. It is also important that all commanders in our army must apply restraint in their personal conduct, avoid tendency and loose living, think about the culture, feelings and customs and moral values of our men. We cannot run away from the culture, religion and traditions of the Malaysian. A moderate approach, without having to run away from our values and traditions is the best form of tackling or handling one's own personal conduct and tendency. Living in a multi racial society of ours and having to lead men from the various races, a commander not only has to keep in lines by his own values and culture but he has also to respect and understand the values, belief and customs of the others. Only by such conduct can a commander live up to his name and position, enjoying the trust and confidence of those serving under him and the nation that looks up to him.

The commander can be classified as the father of the unit; that is he runs the unit as a family of soldiers and their families, small or large, in accordance with his position and the number of men under him. The commander naturally makes great demands on his men. On occasion especially in war he will demand of them supreme human effort. It is only expected therefore that he will do more than just make demands. He will have to be concerned with the needs of every men and show the same regards for them as for himself. Remember this:

"Regard your soldiers as your children and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look on them as your beloved children and they will stand by you even on to death".

The remarkable thing about this statement is not so much what it says, many would accept the idea but not so many practise it. The remarkable thing is that it was written some 2460 years ago by Sun Tzu who understand the duties of the commander towards his men and the value of morals among soldiers.

COURAGE

Courage, is mentioned earlier as one of the virtues of a commander, is a prior condition for courage in his men and the ability to carry out orders promptly and efficiently. In war, it is incumbent upon him to take risk by seizing the initiative, adopting bold tactics when these are necessary in order to achieve the objective. Victory is rarely achieved without grave risk. The most modest of commanders will on certain conditions too be compelled to make a show of courage. Yet, one fact must be borne in mind; courage comes of cool thought and knowledge, never hotheadedness or lack of knowledge. The kind of courage we need is one that is serious and purpose full, not rash and adventurous. Moral courage is having the ability and conviction to accept ones principles and belief and

courage to air one's opinion when required to do so.

MODESTY AND PUBLICITY

A commander must serve as an example of modesty, these qualities are commendable in every men, more so in the army. A commander who endeavours to get exaggerated publicity and display may easily cause himself to loose his sense of proportion and might make wrong decision. These can disrupt his ability to appreciate a situation and make wrong decision. A responsible commander will not seek publicity at the expense of others, especially his subordinates. It is a very good thing for commanders to come forward to the battle ground to see his men and give them confidence. However it is equally damaging and undesirable that a senior commander should visit a sector if he is not accompanied by the men in charge there. There is indeed no more distasteful sight than that of a group of senior officers visiting troops, pursued by a gang of photographers and reporters. One may ask what is the aim of the visit of the gang of photographers and reporters; are they following every event involving the bases? It must not be a divided thought that such visits need records, hence requires a photographer or a PR man but it does not justify for the group. It is interesting to quote what Sun Tzu has to say:

> **"The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom".**

RECOGNITION

To honour or to recognise junior officers and men in secondary position of command when it is their dues is to the army benefit. This does not only apply to individuals. The unit or subunit may deserve a word of appreciation or praise no less that same individuals. It does not take much from a commander to say "well done" or "thank you" to his subordinate for a job well done of for a good try. Recognitions and appreciations of service and job well done contribute towards high morale, which is needed for the army to keep on moving forward inrrespective of the hardship and danger to be faced. However overdoing or misplaced recognition or appreciation can also be counter productive less it falls on correct soldiers.

COOPERATION

Cooperation between individuals, units or formation and services are the key to military success. The command personnel of a unit or formation and services are the key to military success. The command personnel of a unit is bound to work together as a team, bearing its responsibility as a whole in the whole nation. As a platoon commander, one will have to regard all his section commanders as a team responsible for the whole platoon. The same goes to the company, batalion and higher formations. A commander must share with his assistants the planning and execution of an action while at the same time retaining for himself the authority, time needed to think, supervise and evaluate, the actions. In simple terms a commander must command his unit while keeping before him the general picture in its true perspective.

DELEGATION

A commander must have concern for his unit. However it does not imply that the commander must do everything himself. He must have the organizational

ability which will ensure that everything is done the the way it should be done. It is best that a commander delegates power and allocates work to others, leaving for himself time to ponder and think things out. Nevertheless there is a tendency among commander to delegates work to those he knows who are capable to get a job well done. Such foolish acts have frustrated many a subordinate, depriving him of courses, leave, promotion and other likes, whilst the less capable ones spend more free time to tend to their personal needs. Such acts not only become counter productive but also cause damage to the whole army.

TRAINING

One of the main responsibilities of a commander is training. The ultimate purpose of training is to prepare for war. In this context, our army is spending millions of ringgits on training and in the wake of the present development in the region general emphasis are placed on conventional warfare. The commander at all level must inevitably be responsible for the training process which his men undergo. A battle is more than just a combination of firepower and maneouvre. It is a combination and consciousness. A part from just training his men in tactics and the art of war, a commander must guide his men's mental reactions to battle. Hence, the commander is responsible for the mental preparation of his men no less than for their physical and tactical training. Concern for his men's welfare and well being do not mean pampering. Soldiers in cotton wool will fall helpless victims to the horror of war, being mentally unprepared to meet the most terrible of all dangers. Sincere concern and welfare on the other hand win the soldiers' confidence and will prepare him to face the most trying experiences. The series of Gonzales Exercises are fruitless lest commanders at all level and

men are mentally prepared prior to training. In the context of our army in anticipating to face the challenge of tomorrow we must place a higher priority on the emphasis of mental and moral fibre training prior to fully concentrating merely on the art of war. Undoubtedly such training do involve a degree of mental and morale development. Unless the soldiers understand the cause and mentally accept that the traning is a must, these series of Gonzales would just be another "ordinary training".

When it comes to training, commanders must not try to beat the guns. Prior to the conduct of training it is vital that a commander goes through the correct training process. Training is all but hard work. As a rule, before a commander plans for any forms of training he must ask himself the following questions.

   a.   Where am I going and what must the soldiers do as a result of the training?

   b.   Where am I now and what can my soldiers do now compared with what I want them to be able to do (current level of training against the desired level)?

   c.   How cn I best know from where I am to where I should be?

As a developing army and in view of the threat, it is vital that all commanders understand the purpose of training and its methods. The lack of knowledge and skills in junior commanders and the men cannot be better described than that of the post mortem reports of the Gonzales Exercises. If training is to meet that purpose certain perequisite must prevail. The soldier must:

   a.   Realise the need for training.

b. Understand what he is expected to learn after having realised the need and the level of knowledge he has.

c. Has the opportunity to practise what he has learnt.

d. Get to know that he is learning.

e. Progress through training presented in a logical sequence.

Training must not just be left to the Training Establishments. At every level a commander is responsible to develop and commander is responsible to develop and train himself and having been developed and trained he plans and conducts the desired training for his men. Trained men will go on to battle knowing that it is unavoidable and that everything possible is being done or has been done to ensure its success. They will give their best in executing their mission even beyond the call of duty and honour.

RELATIONSHIP

Soldiers being human and having a highly developed sense are almost never mistaken about their commander. Once a commander has won the confidence of his men he no longer needs to resort to the 'whip' or authority. Punishment given must be able to be accepted by his subordinate as fair and justified. The relationship between men and commanders must be close yet within the service requirement. The commander who is aloof will not be judged of his weakness but he gradually will become a mysterious figure which is equally bad. If he is indeed a weak personality and lacking in certain essential qualities it is best that this should be discovered in good time so that he may be removed from his position of responsibility.

It must be remembered that whatever the commander may do, he is exposed to the discerning eyes of his unit; be it in his work or when relaxing is his room/mess, in his relation with the opposite sex, and in his relation with society. In all instances his behaviour must be exexamplary.

COMPLEXITY OF COMMAND ND EXPERIENCE

Command is a complex amalgamation of theoretical and practical knowledge and the art of leadership. Of no lesser important, however, is the experience acquired over a long period of service. Without experience, the officer will be lacking in one of the most important fields of knowledge a commander should possess. The good commanders must therefore be able to sense every mood and every thought of his men.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, a good commander is a man who is endowed to a greater or lesser degree with certain qualities which will enable him to undertake the vast range of duties and responsibilities. He possesses:

a. Wisdom - an able mind and depth in understanding.

b. Organizational abilities.

c. Natural tendency, towards leadership.

d. Is decisive and quick to make decision.

e. Courage.

f. Qualities of a father and a youth leader.

g. An instructor/trainer.

h. An educator.

i. Good and strong personality.

j. Have personal restraint and constraint on his personal conduct, weakness and temptation.

k. A moderate man with a good knowledge of his country, its people cultures and values.

l. Understand the needs of his men and the nation.

It is the writers contention that the country does not lack potentials for command functions. Nature has provided us with enough talented young men suited to assume the task of commanders at various levels. One only has to discover them, to train and educate them and our future generations will carry on the great traditions which we set for them today. It is here that we accept the leadership theme of our present national government that of "Leadership By Example". What we are today and what one does as commander will be taken as an example for the future.

Mejar Kassim B Abdul Kadir, an ex-putra of MTD, was commissioned in February 1968. Mejar Kassim had served at various levels of commands before being posted as a Staff Officer at the Infantry Directorate, Ministry of Defence. A graduate of Defence Services and Staff College of Bangladesh, Mej Kassim was also awarded a gallantry award of PGB in 1971.

KEPIMPINAN DI DALAM ANGKATAN TENTERA DARAT MALAYSIA

Mejar Hashim Zakaria

PENDAHULUAN

Kemajuan sesebuah negara terletak di atas kebijaksanaan pemerintahan. Pemerintahlah yang boleh membawa segala kejayaan itu ketaraf yang paling rendah dan dihina. Kemerdekaan yang dicapai oleh negara kita Malaysia adalah hasil dari kejayaan yang telah ditunjukkan oleh pemimpin kita yang boleh dibanggakan. Jika dipandang dari sejarah semasa Malaysia masih dijajah di bawah pemerintah Kerajaan British, rakyat seolah-olah ditindas dan tidak mempunyai suara langsung untuk mengesyorkan atau membuat sesuatu terutama dari segi menegak hak asasi kita orang-orang Melayu. Tetapi namun demikian di dalam keadaan yang tertindas kita masih mempunyai seorang anak Melayu yang patut dibangga dan dikenang ia itu Tunku Abdul Rahman Al-Haj yang telah berjuang untuk memulihkan hak kebebasan rakyat Malaysia. Di atas kepimpinannya yang baik maka Kerajaan British telah membebaskan kita untuk berdiri di atas kaki sendiri.

Pada masa ini kerajaan Malaysia telah diperintah oleh pimpinan yang mempunyai semangat kepimpinan yang dinamik dan bercita-cita tinggi yang bercorak membangun dan 'creative'. Pemimpin di bawah pemerintahan 2M (Mahathir dan Musa) tidak asing lagi di dunia khasnya di rantau Asia. Apa yang dibentangkan ini adalah dari segi pemimpin atasan dan pemimpin bawahan yang tidak ada perbezaannya. Berjayanya seseorang ketua pemimpin atau ketua rakyat atau pengikut-pengikutnya adalah tertakluk kepada kepimpinan atau ketua di peringkat bawah. Pendek-kata semua peringkat mempunyai pemimpin masing-masing, cuma perbezaan dari segi kuasa dan tanggungjawab sahaja yang berlainan. Kepimpinan ini selain dari tanggungjawab yang dipikul mengikut taraf jawatan yang disandang bolehlah diibaratkan sebagai bapa, ibu dan guru kepada anak-anaknya.

TUJUAN

Tujuan artikel ini adalah untuk menganalisa corak kepimpinan yang terdapat di dalam Tentera Darat pada masa ini dan mengemukakan beberapa cadangan bagi memperbaiki corak kepimpinan yang ada supaya lebih berkesan dan efektif lagi.

PERKARA-PERKARA YANG BERBANGKIT

LATAR BELAKANG

Pada masa ini Tentera Darat Malaysia telah mempunyai sebanyak 15 Kor yang mengandungi anggota seramai lebih dari 70,000 orang dan dipimpin oleh seorang yang berpangkat Jeneral. Kor yang dimaksudkan ialah Askar Melayu DiRaja, Rejimen Renjer, Kavalari, Artileri, Semboyan, Jurutera, Jentera dan Letrik, Gerak Khas, Bekal dan Angkut, Perkhidmatan Am, Bahagian Perkhidmatan, Gaji, Pelajaran dan Askar Wataniah. Tiap-tiap kor ini mempunyai fungsi dan tanggungjawab yang berlainan serta diketuai oleh pemimpin yang mempunyai pangkat mengikut besarnya kor yang dipimpin.

Di dalam Tentera Darat segala pelaksanaan dan tanggungjawab oleh setiap pemimpin kor adalah berdasarkan kepada arahan-arahan yang telah dikeluarkan oleh Tentera Darat yang berpusat di Kementerian Pertahanan. Arahan ini dikenali sebagai 'General Routine Oders'. Arahan-arahan inilah yang telah menjadi pedoman dan panduan setiap pemimpin tentera samada dari peringkat atas atau pun di peringkat bawah. Diperhatikan juga pada masa ini sebilangan besar dari pemimpin tentera adalah terdiri dari golongan yang muda dan jika hendak dibandingkan dengan pemimpin tentera asing, pemimpin kita adalah kurang kematangan tenteraan dari mereka. Sebab itulah segala arahan yang dikerjakan selalu mendapat rungutan dari pihak bawahan.

PENGERTIAN KEPIMPINAN

Pengertian kepimpinan telah dapat kita takrifkan sebagai satu cara bagaimana hendak mendapatkan orang lain mengikuti dan menjadikan dengan kerelaan hatinya di atas sesuatu yang dikehendaki oleh seseorang itu. Mengikut pendapat Field Marshall Montgomery.

> "A[1] leader is one who gets people to follow him, and that leadership is combination of persuasion, compulsion and example."

Setengah sarjana berpendapat bahawa seseorang pemimpin ia adalah berpandukan usul-usul berikut:

a. Sememangnya telah dilakukan untuk menjadi pemimpin.

b. Dengan cara berusaha dan berlatih, menerusi pelajaran dan ketenangan fikiran.

c. Rakyat menaikkan seseorang itu menjadi pemimpin.

Semua manusia di dunia ini adalah pemimpin-pemimpin secara tidak langsung. Ibu bapa adalah pemimpin kepada anak-anak mereka, guru adalah pemimpin kepada murid-muridnya dan begitu juga dengan Panglima Tentera Darat. Setiap ketua mempunyai kehendaknya sendiri, ada yang ingin menjadi pemimpin oleh kerana berkehendakkan kuasa, wang, kedudukan dan juga ada yang benar-benar berkhidmat untuk kepentingan rakyat atau orang-orang di bawahnya. Di sebaliknya juga kepimpinan terbahagi kepada 5 jenis mengikut Tiori 'H' iaitu 'autocratic' 'democratic' 'paternalistic', 'free-reign' dan 'consultative'. Kelima-lima gaya pimpinan ini adalah tertakluk kepada keadaan dan keperluan seperti darjah kepentingan, masa keperluan, akibatnya dan lain-lain perkara yang dianggap penting untuk seseorang pemimpin itu menghadapinya. Walau bagaimanapun sifat kepimpinan yang baik hendaklah mempunyai prinsip-prinsip seperti berikut:

a.   Merancang kehadapan.
b.   Pendirian sendiri.
c.   Kemahiran politik.
d.   Perhubungan yang baik di antara satu.
e.   Senang didekati.
f.   Kelebihan membuat sesuatu keputusan di dalam keadaan yang tegang.
g.   Berani di segala segi pencabaran/bersuara atas kebenaran.
h.   Keadilan/Kejujuran.
i.   Berupaya dan bertenaga.

ORGANISASI

Struktur pertubuhan Tentera Darat di Kementerian Pertahanan ini telah pun ditubuhkan (Rajah A). Dengan tertubuhnya Tentera Darat sejak 50 Tahun dahulu dan juga dikaji dari satu tahun ke satu tahun mengikut keadaan dan keperluan, tetapi yang masih ujud ia lah pertubuhan organisasi yang secara tambahan kepada

yang telah ada tetapi tidak secara rasmi atau pertubuhan secara 'ad-hoc'. Sememangnya setiap ketua bahagian ada membuat kertaskerja untuk membuat penambahan kepada pertubuhan yang ada memandangkan kesibukan kerja serta kekurangan kakitangan tetapi mengikut perjelasan yang dibuat adalah tidak begitu jelas atau mempersona barang siapa yang membacanya. Setiap pertubuhan yang mana baru mempunyai implakasi yang banyak terutama sekali dari segi kewangan. Di sini jabatan NAZIRAN-lah yang akan menentukan sama ada ianya akan diluluskan atau tidak. Tetapi apa yang diperhatikan kelulusan yang diperolehi adalah amat kecil sekali. Akibatnya departmen yang betul-betul memerlukan penambahan setaf akan merasa kecewa bagi mengatasi keperluan itu. Dengan itulah terdapat setengah ketua jabatan telah menubuhkan secara 'ad-hoc' yang telah melibatkan anggota-anggota dari unit-unit di bawah pemerintahannya.

RAJAH A : STRUKTUR ORGANISASI DEPARTMEN TENTERA DARAT

Setiap organisasi yang diluluskan telah mempunyai fungsi-fungsi yang tertentu dan setiap pemimpin dihadkan bagi melaksanakan tugas harian ini berpandukan kepada arahan-arahan yang telah dikeluarkan. Segala perancangan dan pengendalian yang terkeluar dari apa yang dicatitkan mestilah mendapat kelulusan terlebih dahulu.

PENTADBIRAN SECARA UMUM

Pengaruh Politik

● Banyak pemimpin atasan tentera dewasa ini sangat terpengaruh oleh kata-kata tokoh politik. Perkara ini telah menjejaskan arahan asal di dalam tentera yang mempunyai disiplinnya sendiri dan dilatih untuk menjadi seorang perajurit yang gagah dan kuat, contohnya ialah pengharaman 'ragging' ke atas pegawai-pegawai yang baru ditauliah. Akibatnya diperhatikan pegawai-pegawai tentera yang baru yang ditauliahkan jika dibanding dengan pegawai-pegawai lima tahun yang lepas amat jauh bezanya samaada dari segi mental atau physical.

Keadaan Sekeliling

● Setengah daripada pemimpin tentera suka mencipta perkara-perkara yang baru, konon untuk memperbaiki yang sudah ada. Mithalnya pakaian seragam sentiasa berubah corak dalam tiap-tiap 3 atau 4 tahun sekali terutamanya apabila pertukaran pemimpin berlaku. Setengah pemimpin secara pandai sendiri ingin mengubah atau memperketatkan lagi sesuatu arahan tanpa kebenaran dan sememangnya perkara ini adalah membebankan orang bawahan.

Perancangan Kurang Teliti

● Oleh kerana sememangnya aliran

di dalam tentera mengamalkan sistem 'hierarchy' setiap hukuman yang diterima kebiasaannya diterima bulat-bulat tanpa sebarang bantahan terutamanya apabila menyentuh dari segi perancangan 'strategic'. Misalnya dari segi pembesaran Tentera Darat, segala rancangan yang telah dibuat sehingga 1985 terpaksa dibubarkan dan pembubaran ini telah melibatkan banyak perbelanjaan serta mencetuskan perasaan tidak puas hati terhadap angguta yang terlibat.

SALURAN PERINTAHAN DALAM ANGKATAN TENTERA DARAT

Pada keseluruhannya corak kepimpinan di dalam Angkatan Tentera am nya dan Tentera Darat khasnya berala 'autocratic'. Perkara ini dapat kita lihat dari segi penyelaksanaan-nya segala arahan-arahan yang telah dikeluarkan oleh pihak atasan. Pihak atasan di sini ditujukan kepada pemimpin Tentera Darat yang bertanggungjawab dari segi mengeluarkan segala arahan, polisi dan lain-lain instruksi. Arahan itu telah disalurkan mengikut saluran-saluran tertentu, upamanya dari Kementerian Pertahanan kepada Markas KOR Tentera Darat dan Markas-Markas Divisyen, Markas-Markas Briged dan seterusnya ke unit-unit. Unit-unitlah yang secara langsung terlibat dengan melaksanakan segala arahan dan dasar yang dikeluarkan, sementara Markas-Markas Divisyen dan Briged hanyalah diibaratkan sebagai kumpulan tengah atau pemerhati sahaja. Baik buruk akibatnya akan ditanggung oleh unit-unit yang berkenaan.

Seperti yang telah dijelaskan pertubuhan di dalam tentera darat adalah besar dan mengelirukan. Saluran pemerintah adalah mengikut Markas-Markas Divisyen dan Briged. Pada masa ini Tentera Darat beribu-pejabat di

Kementerian Pertahanan, Markas KOR di Sungai Besi, 5 Markas Divisyen (termasuk satu Markas Divisyen TA) dan 11 Markas Beriged dan unit-unit. Begitulah saluran-saluran yang mesti dilakukan dan diamalkan oleh setiap tentera tidak kira di mana mereka berada sekalipun,

segala arahan yang dikeluarkan akan diedarkan melalui peringkat ini dan sebaliknya segala persuratan dari unit-unit akan disalurkan kuasanya melalui saluran tersebut dan tiada saluran pendek atau 'short-cut' (Rajah B).

```
                    ┌──────────────┐
                    │   KEMENTAH   │
                    └──────┬───────┘
                    ┌──────┴───────┐
                    │   TENTERA    │
                    │    DARAT     │
                    └──────┬───────┘
                    ┌──────┴───────┐
                    │   MARKAS     │
                    │    KOR       │
                    └──────┬───────┘
   ┌──────────┬───────────┼───────────┬──────────┐
┌──┴───┐  ┌──┴───┐   ┌───┴──┐   ┌───┴──┐   ┌────┴────┐
│MARKAS│  │MARKAS│   │MARKAS│   │MARKAS│   │ MARKAS  │
│1 DIV │  │2 DIV │   │3 DIV │   │4 DIV │   │ XI DIV  │
│      │  │      │   │      │   │      │   │  (TA)   │
└──┬───┘  └──┬───┘   └───┬──┘   └───┬──┘   └────┬────┘
┌──┴───┐  ┌──┴───┐   ┌───┴──┐   ┌───┴──┐   ┌────┴────┐
│ BDE  │  │ BDE  │   │ BDE  │   │ BDE  │   │  BDE    │
└──┬───┘  └──┬───┘   └───┬──┘   └───┬──┘   └────┬────┘
┌──┴───┐  ┌──┴───┐   ┌───┴──┐   ┌───┴──┐   ┌────┴────┐
│ UNIT │  │ UNIT │   │ UNIT │   │ UNIT │   │  UNIT   │
└──────┘  └──────┘   └──────┘   └──────┘   └─────────┘
```

RAJAH B

PERINGKAT
ATASAN
(TOP MANAGEMANT)

PERINGKAT TENGAH
(MIDDLE MANAGEMENT)

PERINGKAT BAWAH
(LOW LEVEL MANAGEMENT)

RAJAH C: PERINGKAT PENGURUSAN

Dari segi arahan sama ada arahan ber-tulis atau secara lisan ianya juga mesti melalui peringkat 'hierarchy' ini dan tidak sekali-sekali boleh mencari langkah pendek (Rajah C). Sistem ini dipraktik-kan di dalam pertubuhan dan organisasi sama ada 'formal' atau 'informal'. Segala garis-garis panduan yang telah diedarkan merupakan arahan atau dasar dan ianya tidak boleh sekali-kali menye-leweng kehendak tersebut. Barang siapa yang tidak mengikut arahan tersebut akan didakwa mengikut undang-undang tertera yang telah ditetapkan.

CADANGAN

Kepimpinan di dalam tentera tidak mempunyai banyak perbezaan, cuma cara seseorang pemimpin itu men-gendalikan kuasanya mungkin berlainan halcaranya. Banyak sistem yang telah di-bawah oleh setengah ketua tentera perlu diubah-suai mengikut situasi pada masa ini. Walau bagaimanapun pengubah-suaian sesuatu corak kepimpinan itu mesti diteliti dengan halus sama ada dari segi implikasi nya ataupun penerimaan orang yang dipimpinnya.

'Autocratic' dan 'Paternalistic'

Corak 'autocratic' atau kuku besi dan 'paternalistic' adalah memang sesuai di dalam Angkatan Tentera kerana ia itu salah satu caranya untuk mencapai satu-satu maklumat tanpa sebarang dalih serta bagi mengukuhkan lagi disiplin tentera. Di samping itu juga gaya ini secara langsung melatih tentera supaya patuh kepada perintah ketuanya. Contohnya peristiwa di Pasir Panjang di mana Lt Ad-nan dan orang-orangnya telah terkorban setelah menyerangi kubu musuh yang mempunyai lebih kekuatannya dari pasukan sendiri. Tindakan ini terpaksa diambil oleh kerana bagi mematuhi pe-rintah yang diterima oleh pegawai atas-nya, sungguhpun beliau terkorban tetapi tindakan mereka itu telah membuka jalan kepada tentera di bahagian belakang un-tuk merampas balik tempat tersebut.

'Demokrasi' dan 'Consultative'

Di dalam sistem pemerintahan keten-teraan, gaya pemerintahan ala 'demokrasi' dan 'consultative' perlu juga dipraktikkan terutamanya sekali perkara-perkara yang perlu dinikmati, terutama-nya dari segi kebajikan dan moral. Cara inilah yang membolehkan peringkat bawah membuat pengesyoran dan cadangan di atas apa yang difikirkan perlu untuk kebajikan bersama.

Kepimpinan

a. **Dari Segi Politik:** Sebagai se-orang tentera, penglibatan di dalam politik adalah tidak dibenar sama se-kali. Tambahan lagi untuk dipen-garuhi, tetapi adalah wajib untuk mengikuti perkembangan sebagai pengetahuan. Di sebaliknya juga seorang pemimpin mesti pandai ber-politik untuk menyenangkan mereka melibatkan segala tugas kepentingan

tentera yang tidak menyentuh soal-soal yang boleh menjejaskan imej dan disiplin tentera.

b. **Dari Segi Sosial:** Aktiviti sosial di dalam tentera sememangnya digalakkan tetapi jika segala yang dirancangkan itu kesemuanya bercorak 'formal' maka ianya tidak akan memberi kesan kepada orang yang dipimpinnya. Jadi ianya hendaklah diubahsuai mengikut keadaan sekeliling demi untuk mencapai sesuai objektif dengan lebih berkesan lagi. Tiori kepimpinan yang diutarakan oleh Cecil A Gibb adalah seperti berikut:

'(1) Leadership always depends, on its environment.

(2) The leader is closely related to the goals and aspirations of the group.

(3) Leadership is a result of an interaction which takes place between the members of the given group.[2]

Sifat Seorang Pemimpin: Sebagai seorang pemimpin, pengetahuan dari segi pengawasan adalah penting. Termasuk juga di dalam bidang ketenteraan di mana seseorang pemimpin itu akan menghadapi cabaran dari berbagai bangsa dan ugama. Yang pentingnya beliau mesti memilih jalan yang betul, ke arah jalan ketenteraan yang dinamis dan mendisplin diri sendiri sebelum menguruskan soal orang lain. Apa yang disyor dan difikirkan perlu diketahui ialah:

a. Mempelajari sifat dan kelakuan kemanusiaan.

b. Memperlajari cara perlunya sesama manusia.

c. Memahami serta menghormati ugama orang lain.

d. Memahami keperluan orang bawahan dan masalah mereka.

e. Memupuk kehormonian diri sendiri dan tatasusila yang baik seperti, pendirian, kejururan, keadilan, kecekapan, kebenaran dan memahami di atas sesuatu masalah yang dikemukakan.

Perhubungan: Perhubungan mengikut 'hierarchy' semamangnya diikuti dengan ketatnya di dalam tentera oleh setiap lapisan pemimpin. Sistem ini dianggap 'formal' dan diperhatikan mendapat kurang sambutan dari pehak bawahan. Setengah aspek perlu digalakkan perubungan secara terbuka dan ini telah terbukti apabila diadakan majlis berdialog di antara pemerintah dan yang diperintah dan sambutan dari segi menyumbangkan pendapat dan maklumat adalah menggalakkan. Kajian telah dibuat oleh Rensis Likert yang menunjukkan bahawa 'good leadership behaviour and frequent communication are highly interalated'.

Motivasi: Wang bukan satu-satunya sumber penggerak untuk mencapai sesuatu maklumat dan ini telah dibuktikan oleh sarjana Encik Ferdrick Herzberg yang membangkitkan usul-usul:

a. Faktor kemanusiaan yang menyentuh dari segi keadaan kerja dan pengurus.

b. Faktor 'motivating' yang menyentuh dari segi penghargaan di atas segala kejayaan yang dicapai.

Kepimpinan Melalui Tauladan: Sebagai seorang pemimpin, walau ia nya

mempunyai pangkat dan kedudukan yang tinggi namun tidak seharusnya mereka berkelakuan bongkak dengan kedudukan yang dicapai. Beliau seharusnya menunjukkan contoh yang baik dari segala segi sama ada dari segi tingkah laku, tatatertib, kelakuan, bertutur serta pergaulan dengan orang bawahan. Kerana dengan cara inilah seseorang pemimpin akan dihormati dan disegani. Disebaliknya setiap pemimpin yang baik sudah pasti akan diikuti oleh orang lain terutama angguta-angguta yang baru menceburkan diri di dalam lapangan ketenteraan.

PENUTUP

Pengawasan ke atas corak kepimpinan yang ada sekarang di dalam Tentera Darat Malaysia telah menunjukkan bahawa perlunya corak tersebut diubahsuai mengikut keadaan zaman. Pengubahsuaian ini adalah perlu oleh kerana zaman sekarang semua manusia adalah bijak serta matang berfikir, lebih-lebih lagi dengan pelajaran yang ada serta keadaan alam serba moden membuatkan daya kepimpinan semakin bertambah rumit. Namun demikian, asalkan segala yang dirumuskan melalui urusan di atas, diperhatikan saya percaya mutu kepimpinan akan lebih berkesan dan dinamik. Hidup di dalam sebuah masyarakat yang

berbilang kaum dan ugama, segala pendapat dan cadangan mesti dianalisa dan diperhatikan.

Nota Rujukan

BUKU

1. Pat to Leadership — Field Marshall Montgomery

2. Theory of Leadership — Cecil A. Gibb.

3. Rensis Likert, **New Principles of Management.** New York, Mc Graw Hill Book Company, 1961.

4. Koonz O Donnell Wihrich, **Management.** 7 th Edition ms 659 -685.

PETIKAN/MAJALAH

5. Australia Army Handbook "On Leadership" 1973.

6. Australia Army Handbook "Leadership Theory and Practice" 1973.

7. Nota Kepimpinan oleh Encik Mohamed Sulaiman bertarikh 27 hb. Julai, 1977.

Mejar Hashim B Zakaria telah ditauliahkan di dalam Kor Renjer Malaysia pada tahun 1970. Selain dari menghadiri kursus ketenteraan, juga telah lulus Kursus Diploma Sains Pengurusan INTAN 1983. Pernah berkhidmat di Jabatanarah Infantri sebagai PT 2 Kordinasi. Kini berkhidmat di dalam Batalion Ketujuh Rejimen Renjer Malaysia.

MILITARY LAW & DISCIPLINE

Mej Rahman B Dato' Baginda

The standard of discipline in the Armed Forces determines its efficiency. Claim to justice must yield before claim of military efficiency. Obedience to orders is the cardinal principle of military organization. Disobedience is at one's own risk unless one is sure that the person issuing the order is unauthorised to give or the order goes beyond the bound of military service purpose. The guidelines as to what is lawful or unlawful order is inadequately provided in the Armed Forces Act 1972.

Compliance to superior orders does not provide a defence per se. This situation places a subordinate in a dilemma especially when the order is not manifestly illegal. It is submitted that a soldier should be protected when complying to orders under such circumstances.

INTRODUCTION

The Armed Forces of most countries are administered by codes of military law. Whilst being subjected to the ordinary laws of the land, the members are concurrently subjected to the administration of military justice separate from the civil judiciary. The primary reason lies in the necessity of independent self-sufficiency of the armed forces to move freely within its own country and to project its operation beyond the territorial limits of the state where the jurisdiction of the civil judiciary ceases to function.[1]

A separate system of military justice is further necessitated by the highly specialised nature of justice in any army. By reasons of the requirements from the organization of a civil community. In an army, individual exists for the benefit of the organized fighting group. In order to serve effectively, individual well-being becomes secondary to group efficiency. The military is characterised by the organized use of violence, on behalf of the nation, in order to safeguard and preserve its existence and independence. Under such circumstances a soldier's dedication to duty is a primary requirement.[2]

The administration of the Army is link-

ed by a chain of command. Discipline is the responsibility of military commanders at every level of command. This chain of command exercises its function in the employment of resources through the military hierarchy. The hierarchial system of the army, so essential to its discipline cannot be appreciated unless a person joins the service, is transformed into a disciplined soldier, live in and accept the system as a way of life.

A soldier in the army surrenders his liberty to a large extent and subjects himself to the rigid requirement of military law and discipline. Obedience to orders is his primary function. Military disobedience is amongst the worst military crimes. In the military organization many persons of different skills have to cooperate to attain the military aims and objectives. These tasks are distributed through a complex pattern of orders properly communicated and co-ordinated; the success of which is interdependent. It is pertinent to the commander that his orders will be complied with and that he can claim obedience without which neither he nor the organization could function.

The situation described above gives rise to a number of questions. Must a soldier obey all orders given to him? When can he refuse to obey? What if his compliance to orders results in commission of an unlawful act?

MILITARY LAW

Military Law may be defined as the law regulating the military establishment[3]. The Armed Forces Act 1972 (Act 77) (hereinafter referred to as the AFA 1972) forms the primary source of military law in the Malaysian Armed Forces. "An Act to amend and consolidate the law relating to the establishment, government and discipline of the Armed Forces[4]". The AFA 1972 was passed by both houses of

Parliament, received the Royal Assent on 28th April 1972 and was published in the Gazette on 4th May 1972. It came into force on 1st June 1976.[5]

The AFA 1972 is based on the British Army Act 1955[6], with modifications to suit local situations. The rules and regulations made under AFA 1972 are not comprehensive resulting in references still being made in particular to the British Queen's Regulations for the Army 1961, whenever guidelines are inadequately provided for in the Armed Forces (Court Martial) Rules of Procedure 1976. An area of confusion in the AFA 1972 arises as references to Rules of Procedure in the AFA 1972 referred to the Rules of Procedure (Army) 1956 contained in Part II of the British Manual of Military Law (MML); not the Armed Forces (Court Martial) Rules of Procedure 1976. The Armed Forces (Court Martial) Rules of Procedure 1976 was drafted much later with arrangement of the rules changed; not in accordance with the way it was referred to by the AFA, probably an oversight in drafting.

Whilst civilian criminal law seeks to restrict and regulate behaviour so that people live together in peace, military justice has a similar and yet more positive purposes. Military justice must of necessity promote good order, high morale and discipline. In the military context, the role of law in relation to discipline is to provide a framework for the encouragement of self-discipline. In this way, law supports the military mission, which it must accomplish if the nation's freedom is to be protected and preserved. Military justice, like civilian criminal law, requires the right of the servicemen to be protected and seeks to assure everyone justice under the law[7]. J.A.G. Griffith expressed almost similar view, when he said:

"The purpose of criminal law in a democracy is to prevent crime as anti-social. The purpose of military law is to make the Armed Forces more efficient. The one looks to the betterment of society, the other to the maintenance of discipline. The Armed Forces, no doubt recognises that its efficiency will be impaired if injustice is blatant and its members have a continual grievance, and therefore it relaxes restrictions and tries to avoid individual hardship; but the final emphasis remains unweakened. The antithesis is between the need for discipline and the right to justice ....[8]".

MILITARY DISCIPLINE

Discipline is defined as instant obedience to lawful orders. In the military, the most essential form of discipline is self-discipline ie an individual's willingness to carry out his duties regardless of danger to himself or lack of immediate supervision.[9]

Most fundamental among the new concepts which a soldier must acquire on joining the service is the absolute obedience of orders. An army must be commanded. Military justice can never lose sight of the chain of command and its responsibilities. Hence the rigours of military law regarding insurbodination, the distinction of the officer caste and the importance of relative rank. Command, in turn, is necessitated by the requirement of discipline. The nature of war is essentially such that the military duty of the individual soldier must often require him to act in a way inconsistent with his instinct of self-preservation. Failure of the soldier to perform such a duty may produce dire result to the state if compared to neglect of duty on the part of an ordinary citizen. This hazard results directly from the importance of time and space factors in military operations. It is this consideration which explains the adage of Napoleon that "discipline is the first quality of the soldier, valour is only second". It is discipline which must overcome in the least courageous individual the physical instinct of self-preservation and enable the army to act with the single mind of its commander.[10]

The efficiency of an army undoubtedly depends on its discipline. Even if it had reached the stage each soldier "knows what he fights for and loves what he knows" strict obedience without discussion or argument would still be essential. The value of discipline is not so clear in peace time to the self-respecting soldier but it is amply proved in war when fatigue, misery, fear and death are present. So it cannot be denied that in the ultimate issue individual claims to justice must yield before the claims of military efficiency.[11]

OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS

NATURE OF ORDERS

As stated earlier, military obedience is one of the hallmark of military service. It is the essence of discipline and the cardinal principal of the military organization. Prompt obedience is inculcated in the initial stage on the parade ground through military parade or commonly called 'drill training'. The purpose of drill training is to instil both the individual and collective obedience to orders instinctively.

What is an order? Nico Keijzer[12] discussed this aspect in his work. An order is a word or signal by which a person communicates to another person the project of an action which is to be executed by the other person. The concept of an order, consequently contains the following elements:

(a) The communication of the project of an action.

(b) The operator, ought or ought not.

(c) The purport of establishing an obligation.

(d) Being, issued by an identifiable source.

(e) Concerning the actions of one particular person or a defined category of persons (if one of these persons has complied, the others are normally nevertheless obliged to comply also).

(f) Concerning one determined occasion on which it should be complied with (compliance by all the persons concerned nullifies the order).

The fact that an order has the purport of establishing an obligation does not by itself imply that it actually results in an obligation. This may be the case if the person who gives the order has the means at his disposal for actually compelling obedience because of a prescribed norm being in force. If the prescribed norm is a legal norm, the order is legally binding, or in other words, the person who issued the order has the authorization to do so. Authorization is conceived as the legally granted authority to influence the behaviour of other persons.

MILITARY ORGANIZATION

The military organization has become more sophisticated as a result of technical development. In peacetime, it must maintain a high degree of preparedness for combat in order to prevent war by deterrence and should this fail to be ready to fight it. In actual battles, only part of the force is actively engaged in fighting where management of resources plays an important part. This notion of combat, preparation for battle and actual battle has remained a central military value. The complexity of its organization which is an assembly of groups and individuals whose actions are co-ordinated in an intricate work of divisions, departments, branches, functions, specialization, ranks and many other classifica-

tions. This coordination requires intensive communications between participants by different means. Consultations, reports, briefings, directives, requests, permissions, commands, orders are meant to influence actions of recipients. In the actual battle coordination of activities still take place mainly by means of superior orders; in the preparation stage mutual consultation is more important.

Another feature of the organization is the enormous files of written regulations which prescribe every aspects of behaviour, from the maintenance and administration of each part of the equipment to the type of haircut and the way to salute. In consequence, there is the phonemenon of the recurring conflict between regulations and orders from superiors both of which are suposed to be obeyed.

POSITION UNDER THE ARMY ACT 1955

In the current Army Act 1955[13], section 34 (1) (equivalent to section 51 (1) of the AFA 1972) has been deleted. Section 34 is substantially similar to section 51 (2) of the AFA 1972. Section 36 is similar to section 52 of the AFA 1972.

(1) Relation to Military Service

Keijzer, commenting on provisions of section 34 of the Army Act 1955, states as follows:

"... the offence of disobedience is confined in British law, to lawful orders only ... irrespective of whether or not the circumstances are related to military service, a military person is not authorised to give orders which do not relate to military service purposes. And such an order being unlawful, non compliance would not amount to a punishable offence. The requirement that an order, to be lawful, must be connected with the service should be

interpreted in a general sense, however, an unreasonable command is not necessarily unlawful, although it may be made the subject of a complaint. If a command is manifestly illegal, the persons to whom it is given would be justified in questioning and even refusing to execute it. This (preceeding statement) cannot mean, of course that disobedience to unlawful orders is punishable unless the illegality is manifest, for that would not be in accordance with the statutory restriction of the offence of disobedience to lawful orders. The proper meaning of the statement must therefore be that, unless the illegality of the order is manifest, a person who disobeys an order because of doubt regarding its relation to military duty, does so at his own risk. Therefore, unless he is quite sure that the order goes beyond the bounds of military service, the subordinate who wants to avoid penal liability will have to obey".[14]

(2) **Hierarchy and Functional**

The Army Act 1955 also made no reference to the relationship within which a command must be issued and received for non-compliance to be a punishable offence, with regard to hierarchy of rank, functional position or authority. It is not clear whether the term 'superior' used refers to both seniority and to command, or only to difference in rank or seniority.

POSITION UNDER THE AFA 1972

In the Malaysia Army,[15] there have been very few isolated cases on disobedience to orders tried by the Court Martial. Statistics were only available from the period of 1978 - 1981. In 1978, 25 personnel from an infantry battalion were jointly tried for disobeying a lawful command under section 50(1) of the AFA 1972. However, they were also jointly charged for mutiny under section 47(2) and failing to attend a service duty under section 58 of the AFA 1972. The Court Martial found them guilty and they were sentenced to one year imprisonment and discharged from the service. In 1979 there was another case for an offence under disobedience to superior officer. However, the accused was acquitted on ground that no prima facie case was made out.

As to what kind of test applicable in deciding whether an order is lawful or otherwise, there is no known reported decision on this point. The Record of Proceedings of Court Martials are treated as confidential and trial proceeds on the merit of each case. It is conceived that the order must be for service purposes. In war or under combat situations, service purposes or military activities are more clearly defined but in peacetime, in the preparation-for-war stage, the distinction is less clear. Practically numerous activities are in the circumstances related to, or connected to, or in the interest of service purposes.

POSITION UNDER THE UNITED STATES SYSTEM

Under the military law system of the United States of America (US), as a general rule, an order must be a specific mandate to do or refrain from doing a particular act. The requirement for an order to be specific were decided in a number of court martial cases reported in Court Martial Report (CMR) and the United States Court of Military Appeals (USCMA).[16]

In determining the lawfulness of an order, some basic principles were followed. Firstly, for an order to be legal, it must be issued by a person who has the

authority.[17] Secondly, the order must relate to a military duty. A military duty included any activity that is reasonably necessary to safeguard or promote the health, welfare, morale, discipline and usefulness of members of a command.[18] Thirdly, an order that imposes punishment is unlawful unless issued pursuant to the sentence of court martial and non judicial punishment (summary punishment of minor offences). An order given for the purpose of training is lawful[19]. Fourthly, an order may be lawful even though it provides some limitations on the exercise of personal choice. Such must be reasonable and fair and military necessity governs their lawfulness. However, military necessity cannot justify orders that are arbitrary or unreasonable.[20]

On the position of 'superior' status, the US Manual of Court Martial (MCM) clearly provides that command authority (functional position or appointment) takes precedence over rank authority[21].

The position under the US system is clearer than that of the British and Malaysian situation. The court martial cases have laid down some principles in deciding the lawfulness of an order besides the requirement of being specific. The term 'superior' is specifically enacted.

THE DEFENCE OF SUPERIOR ORDERS

GENERAL SITUATION

A subordinate often does not know all the actual circumstances necessary to judge the legality of an act he is ordered to do. Unless he is sure that the orders go beyond the bounds of military purposes and that the person issuing the orders is unauthorised to issue such orders; he must in most circumstances obey the orders or face the consequences of his disobedience. In compliance to such orders he may commit an unlawful act.

To the question whether a subordinate who has committed an offence, derives a defence from the fact that he acted pursuant to order, theoretically, three answers are possible. Either an order to commit an illegal act would never provide such a defence (doctrine of full responsibility) or it always would (doctrine of respondent superior), or, of all orders to commit illegal acts, a certain category would and the others would not provide a defence (doctrine of limited responsibility). The first doctrine gives priority to law, in the second doctrine the orders of their superiors is given priority whereas in the third the criteria most generally applied refers to the either in a subjective or objective sense, that is, whether the recipient actually knows the act ordered was illegal or should he realized this because the illegality of the act was manifest.[22]

CASES

The question of whether a subordinate could derive a defence from the order given to him, if he had committed an offence in compliance with that order was raised and decided in a number of cases in the British Courts.[23]

From the old cases, a limited responsibility rule has been established that if a soldier honestly complies with an order, that order will provide a defence but not if the act ordered is manifestly illegal. However from recent cases of **R v Taylor**[24] and **R v Ball & Laughlin.**[25] compliance with an order does not provide a defence per se but may serve a factual element in support of negation of mens rea.

COMMENTS BY WRITERS

In Halsbury [26] reliance was placed upon the common sense of judicial authorities:

"Obedience to superior orders is not in itself a defence to a criminal charge. The subordinate is fully protected by the common sense of those responsible for prosecution and the jury, the discretion of the judge in passing sentence and finally by the powers of the Secretary of State" [27]

S.A. de Smith [28] considered the dilemma of a soldier in obedience to superior orders; liability before the ordinary court on one hand and court martial on the other and states:

"... it is not an offence under military law to disobey an unlawful command; ... but since a soldier is a member of a disciplined force conditioned to the habit of obedience, since, moreover, a court martial may well hold the command to be lawful, the dilemma and risk can be very real. Is it reasonable then to assert that obedience to superior orders can never be a defence to an unlawful act in proceeding before the Courts?" [29]

Smith answered the question in reference to the Nuremberg War Crimes trial which proceeded on the footing that superior orders were no defence though may be pleaded in mitigation of punishment. This general proposition is adopted in the Manual of Military Law, though it is conceded that obedience to superior orders may afford a defence to particular offences, for instance, negativating the existence of criminal intent where it is relevant. Doubts as to the content of the rule still persist [30]. A similar position is taken by Smith and Hogan [31]:

"Though there is little authority on this question, it is safe to assert that it is not a defence merely to show that the act was done in obedience to the orders of a superior. The fact that defendant was acting under orders may, nevertheless, be very relevant. It may negative mens rea, for example, showing that he was acting under a mistake of fact ... or, where the charge is one of negligence, it may show that he was acting reasonably" [32]

Cross and Jones expresses the same view and pointed out that the order of a superior may bring other rules of law into play and thus indirectly provide the accused with a defence. In some offences, a person lacks mens rea if he believes that he has a legal right to act as he does and in a servant such a belief may be brought about by the orders of his superior. Moreover, in offences where negligence suffice for liability, a superior orders may operate to shield a servant by showing that he was acting reasonably [33]

Glanville Williams supports the general proposition that superior orders are not generally a defence to a charge of crime but agreed to the suggestion that a limited exception should be recognised for members of the Armed Forces. He assigned, that a soldier, sailor or airman is bound by military law to obey lawful commands without question; but he may not find it easy to decide on the spur of the moment whether a particular command is lawful or not. The Manual of Military Law adopts the harsh view that whatever his dilemma, the servicemen has no defence to a criminal charge if the order is in fact unlawful [34]

The general opinion supports the view that compliance with superior orders does not provide a defence per se and may be relevant as a factual element in

support of another defence, for instance, to negative mens rea where relevant, acting under a mistake of fact or acting reasonably. It had been stated earlier that if a soldier, in a doubtful case, were to be entitled to consider the legality of an order, it would be subversive of all military discipline. The dilemma the soldier is in, under such circumstances, has not been fully taken into consideration. With the increased sophistication of the army, the determination of what is and what is not of military interest has become less clear. The explanatory notes under the Act itself has maintained that circumstances alter cases and that it is possible for the same command to be in one instance lawful and in another instance unlawful.

Under the US system, orders given by a superior are presumed to be lawful. "An order requiring the performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate"[35] . The presumption relieves the subordinate the duty of determining the legality or illegality of the order. Unless the order was manifestly illegal, he would have a defence if he mistakenly took the order as lawful. Even an unlawful order would provide such a defence if it were apparently lawful subject to the objective test that "the order must have appeared lawful to a man of ordinary sense and understanding"[36] . Recent cases have applied the objective test together with the subject test "actually known to be unlawful". In the most controversial case of **US v Calley** [37] , the twin test was applied:

"The acts of a subordinate done in compliance with an unlawful order given by his superior are excused and impose no criminal liability upon him unless the superior's order is one which a man of ordinary sense and

understanding would, under the circumstances, know to be unlawful, or if the order in question is actually known to the accused to be unlawful"[38] .

DEFENCE OF SUPERIOR ORDERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

After the Second World War, two international tribunals for the trial of war oriminals were convened. In addition, military tribunals under the jurisdiction of each of the Allies tried thousands of individual as war oriminals.[39]

Article 8 of Charter For Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT), provides:

"The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires"[40]

The Nuremberg IMT dealth with the problem of obedience to orders in a general way in the following passage:

"The provisions of this Article (Article 8) are in conformity with the law of all nations. That a soldier was ordered to kill or torture in violation of the international law of war has never been recognised as a defence to such acts of brutality, though, as the Charter here provides, the order may be urged in mitigation of the punishment. The true test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations, is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice was in fact possible[41] "

The Tokyo IMT followed the opinion of the Nuremberg IMT on the ground that

both Charters are in all material respects identical[42] .

The statement of the IMT which introduced the "moral choice test" referred to major war orimes; it does not provide solutions on the problem of obedience in general. Various proposals were made by the International Law Commission, Red Cross Conventions, particularly in the Draft Protocal I to the Geneva Conventions prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross, with regards to the defence of superior orders in 1977. However, the proposals were rejected. The conclusion must be drawn that the international community has not yet succeeded in producing an international rule of law with regard to the defence of obedience to superior orders[43] .

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Discipline is the cardinal principle of the military organization and obedience is the hallmark of military service. Unless the illegality of the order is manifest or goes beyond the bound of military duty, disobedience to it would be at one's own risk. The problem lies in determining the ambit of an order which must be for military service purpose. Circumstances may result in a command to be in one instance lawful and in another unlawful. A serviceman would then be in a dilemma whether to obey or not. Further a superior officer is authorised to give orders either by virtue of his seniority of rank or his appointment. Conflict also arise when one is faced with contradictory orders given by a superior who exercise his rank and another by virtue of his appointment. The above situations lead to the serviceman to adopt the attitude of 'obey now, complain later' if he can.

A superior officer may abuse his authority as he can claim obedience. Subordinates are also liable to discrimination and victimisation consequently. A serviceman's ability to withstand the strain by the constant application of the phrase 'this is an order' may reach its limit with undesirable results. It is felt that some very clear guidelines must be given in determining what are lawful and unlawful command. The examples of what are lawful and unlawful command given under the explanatory notes under section 50 of the AFA 1972 are inadequate. In this respect, the principles as enunciated under the US system provide better guidelines than what is prevalent under the AFA 1972. Those principles developed through cases decided and decisions reported. It is unfortunate that in the Malaysian Army, court martial decisions are being shelved as confidential and cases tried on merit of each case. This attitude hampers the development of the military law.

Compliance to superior orders which are illegal does not provide a defence per se. A serviceman is expected to obey orders but he is not protected having obeyed the orders. It is unjust to burden him with full responsibility for mistakes done by his superior. It is unfair to deny the defence of superior orders. Again in this respect, the provisions of the military law of the US are preferred. The important rule which lies in the presumption that orders given by a superior are lawful, protect a subordinate who obeys. Where the illegality is manifest, full responsibility may be justly imposed. Under circumstances where the legality is in doubt, applying the objective test of whether the superior's order is one which a man of ordinary sense and understanding, under the circumstances, would know it to be unlawful and/or applying the subjective test of whether the order in question is actually known to the subor-

dinate to be unlawful may provide a more reasonable approach in determining the legality of an order. A soldier is a soldier, he obeys and execute the order. Command entails trust, obedience should be protected.

Footnotes:

1 C.E. Brand, **Roman Military Law**, *Texas, (1968), p.x.*

2 *Keijzer, Nice,* **Military Obedience.** *Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Netherlands, (1978), p.3.*

3 *Byrne, Edward M,* **Military Law.** *2nd ed, Annapolis Naval Institute, (1976), p.1.*

4 *Preamble to* **Armed Forces Act 1972** *(Act 77), p. 13.*

5 **Government Gazette P.U.** *(8) 271 dated 26th May 1976.*

6 **Manual of Military Law 1965.** *11th ed, London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, (1965).*

7 *Byrne,* **op. cit.,** *PP 71-72.*

8 *J.A.G. Griffith. "Justice and the Army",* **Modern Law Review** *Vol 10 (July 1967), p. 300.*

9 *Byrne,* **op.cit.,** *p. 71.*

10 *Brand,* **op. cit.,** *p. xii*

11 *Griffith,* **op. cit.,** *p. 303*

12 *Keijzer,* **op. cit.,** *p. 31*

13 **Manual of Military Law 1972.** *12th ed, London, (1920)*

14 *Keijzer,* **op. cit.,** *PP. 98-99*

15 *Extracts from statistics compiled by Administrative Branch, Department of Army, Ministry of Defence for period 1978-1981. Statistics prior to stated period are still in the process of being compiled. Figures given does not therefore present a reflective situation.*

16 *See case:* **US v Bratcher** *18 USCMA 125, 39 CMR 125 (1960) cited in Byrne,* **op. cit.,** *p. 145. See also* **US v Oldaher** *CMR (1969), cited in Keijzer,* **op. cit.,** *p. 83.*

17 *See Case:* **US v Marsh** *3 USCM 48, 11 CMR 48 (1953), cited in Byrne,* **op. cit.,** *p. 146.*

18 *See Case:* **US v Martin** *1 USCM 674, 5 CMR 102 (1952) cited in Byrne,* **op. cit.,** *p. 147*

19 *Byrne* **op. cit.,** *p. 48*

20 **Ibid.**

21 **Ibid.** *at p. 150*

22 *Keijzer,* **op. cit.,** *p. 151-153*

23 *See* **Keighly v Bell** *(1866), 4 Foster and Finlason, 763 at p. 790, Case cited in Keijzer,* **op. cit.,** *p. 172 and Asterley, Jones P. & R.I.E. Card,* **Cross & Jones Introduction** *to Criminal law, 8th ed, Butterworth (1976) at p. 371. and p. 805. See also case:* **Regina v Smith** *(1900), 17 Special Court Report of Good Hope 561, cited in Keijzer,* **op. cit.,** *p. 173-174 and Williams, Glanville,* **Textbook of Criminal Law,** *Stevens and Sons, London, (1978) at p. 409. and case:* **Rv Thomas** *(1816), Russell, 12th ed, p. 87; Turner and Armitage Case on Criminal Law p. 67, cited in Keijzer,* **op. cit.,** *p. 176 and Williams,* **op. cit.,** *p. 408.*

24 *(1940), The Law Journal, Dec 7, 1940 Vol XC p. 227.*

25 *(1966), 50 Criminal Appeal Reports 266.*

26 **Halsbury, Law of England.** *Vol x, 3rd ed, London, Butterworth (1955).*

27 **Ibid.** *at p. 620*

28 *Smith, S.A de,* **Constitutional and Administrative Law.** *3rd ed Penguin, (1978).*

29 **Ibid.** *at p. 201.*

30 **Ibid.** *at pp 201-202*

31 *Smith, J.C and Hogan, Brian,* **Criminal Law.** *4th ed, Butterworth, (1978).*

32 **Ibid.** *at p. 209*

33 *Jones and Card,* **op. cit.,** *p. 371.*

34 *Williams,* **op. cit.,** *p. 408.*

35 *Paragraph 169b of Manual of Courts Martial (MCM) US. See Bryne,* **op. cit.,** *p. 146.*

36   Paragraph 216d MCM, See Keijzer, **op. cit.**, p. 154.

37   22 USCMA 534, 48 CMR 19 (1973). See Friedman, **op. cit.**, p. 1703

38   **Ibid.** at p. 1722

39   Trooboff, Peter D., **Law and Responsibility in Warfare.** North Carolina, (1975) p. 20.

40   Friedman, Leon, **The Law of War. A Documentary History** Vol II Random House, New York (1972) p. 940.

41   **Ibid.**

42   **Ibid.** at p. 1036

43   Keijzer, **op. cit.**, pp. 212-214.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. BOOKS

Asterley, Iones P and R.I.E Card, **"Cross and Jones Introduction to Criminal Law"** 8th ed, Butterworth (1976).

Brand, C.E., **"Roman Military Law"**, Texas. (1968)

Byrne, Edward M, **"Military Law".** 2nd ed, Annapolis Naval Institute, (1976).

Friedman, Leon, **"The Law of War. A Documentary History Vol II"** Random House, New York, (1972)

Halsbury, **"Law of England".** Vol x, 3rd ed, London, Butterworth (1955).

Keijzer, Nico, **"Military Obedience"** Sijthoff & Noordhoff Netherlands, (1978).

Smith, J.C. and Hogan, Brian, **"Criminal Law"** 4th ed, Butterworth (1978).

Smith, S.A. de, **"Constitutional and Administrative Law"** 3rd ed, penguin, (1978).

Trooboff, Peter D, **"Law and Responsibility in Warfare".** North Carolina University (1975).

william, Glanville, **"Textbook of Criminal Law"**, Stevens & Sons, London, (1978).

II. ARTICLES

Griffith, I.A.G. "Justice and the Army", **Modern Law Review,** Vol 10 (July 1947).

Mejar Rahman Bin Dato' Baginda, an old putra of the Royal Military College at Sungai Besi, qualified with a Diploma in Law from ITM recently. Haring served in various appointments, including as an instructor at the RMC, is presently attached to the Department of the Army at the Ministry of Defence.

SYSTEMS APPROACH TO

TRAINING

Mej Mushardin Bin Mohd Said

GENERAL

Systems Approach really does not differ much from any formal training objectives and methods that we have been adopting, except that we seldom use the terminology 'Systems Approach' as a method of training. It can be applied to analyse day to day problems, namely those concerning operations, training, administration, logistic and general management. In planning future tasks we are so accustomed with appreciations, but if we are to structure a system or trying to solve current problems, say a training problem, what method should we follow?

AIM

To explain the concept of the Systems Approach briefly and in a simplified manner.

WHAT IS SYSTEMS APPROACH?

Systems Approach is topic-free, it is a way of thinking about the real problems and to put it in training context, it is a way of structuring the approach to the training problem and solving it.

It covers ideas, concepts and methodologies. An **idea** is a single thought, a structured set of related ideas is a **concept** and a way of using concepts in a problem-solving situation is a **methodology.** In order to practice that 'Systems Approach' one has to apply the **'Systems Thinking and Practices'.** which is concerned with system ideas, systems concepts, and with building these into systematic methodologies which can be used to help analyse and solve the multifaceted problems.

SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS

A system is a structured set of objects which attributes together with the relationship between them, in order to produce a desired result. Briefly, characteristics of a system are as follows:

★ Objective - eg to train soldiers in night operation.

★ Mechanism or measure of performance - eg combat effectiveness.

★ Components which are themselves systems - eg Training Departments.

★ Sub components - divisions, functions eg cells of a Training Department.

★ Wider System and or Environment eg the threat, government policy.

★ Resources eg men, money and materials.

★ Decision Taker eg Training Council.

See Diagram 1, an illustration of Malaysian Army as a system.

Diagram 1. Malaysian Army As A System

SYSTEM AS A PROCESS

The Army, Navy and the Air Forces are structures and organization. Within these structures there are latent on-going processes which determine the degree of productivity of that organizations. Training is one of the important mechanisms of that process within the structure.

The training system can be regarded as a **complete processing system** which consists of the following. (Let us take recruit training as a process).

★ **The Customes.** They are the beneficiary; the final receipients of a training module e g units.

★ **Actors.** They are the instructors and student body. They are the agents who carry out the transformation process of the system.

★ **Transformation.** This is the ideal and the spirit that generate the training process to operate, e g to change the attitude of civilians to be soldiers. Motto of a training institution gives the drive to do well and the upkeep the good name of the institution.

★ **Spirit.** This is the inner meaning of a transformation process eg courage, loyalty, honesty, respect etc. etc.

★ **Owner.** The initiator of the training system, who decide the objective, plan and modify and monitor the process.

★ **Environment.** Constraints which determine the level of achievement e g money, materials.

An example of training system -Recruit Processing Centre is at Diagram 2. **Note:** An organizational boundary may not be system boundary.

Diagram 2. The Training System

SYSTEMS APPROACH OR SYSTEM ANALYSIS

If the term **System** is to be applied in our training, from the systems concept and understanding, it is more appropriate to use **SYSTEM ANALYSIS TO TRAINING** and to apply **System Thinking and Practice.** The System Thinking and Practice is an integral part of the **System Analysis.** It is a methodological and logical thinking process.

System Analysis is not a more computerised system machinery but rather a typical human to human consultation bas-

ed on research and investigations. The analysis is only complete if there is the will for subsequent implementation at various levels of command and staff functions.

Stages of Analysis. The various stages are as follows:

★ **The Finding Out Situation.** It is a straight forward investigation of the problem, e g how the training institution conduct the training. See Diagram 3 the checklist for system Analysis.

SER	STAGE	WHAT TO FIND
1.	What is the problems?	1. How did it arise? 2. What is its nature?
2.	What organised effort is needed to tacke it?	1. How many in the study team? 2. Who should they be?
3.	What is the system?	1. What exactly is the system? 2. What sub systems are there? 3. What interactions between them?
4.	What is the wider system?	1. In what environment does the system operate? 2. What are the links between the system and the wider system?
5.	What are the objectives of the wider system?	1. What is the influence of the wider system on the system being studied?
6.	What are the objectives of the system?	1. Can they be clearly stated?
7.	What are the measure of performance?	1. Quantified?
8.	What data and information must be collected	1. What data? 2. Where?

Diagram 3. Checklist for System Analysis

★ **Establish Relevant System.** This is identifying, understanding the present training systems. The problem of poor shooting in operation may be related to command and control system, mental training system and unit shooting system, however the latter is more relevant. The study includes determining the various mechanisms/characteristics of the system and elements of structure and process of the related system i e the unit shooting system. In short it is the analysis of what exists at present in the problem situation.

★ **Root Definations To The Relevant Systems.** This is tha stage where the System Analyst applies System Thinking Concept where he explores his thoughts, postulating a condensed representation of the systems in its most fundamental form. It should be specific to a given problem. The root defination of unit training system may be - the training to enable soldiers engage enemy in conventional and CIW with emphasis in close quarter shooting.

★ **Conceptual Models.** Subsequently models are designed. A conceptual model must derived logically from its associated root defination. Conceptual modelling is thus a verbal process. One assembles a minimum list of activities implied by the root defination and proceeds to structure them into logical sequence. It is a model of the activity system needed to achieve the transformation. This stage is necessary so that their interlinks and connectivities are apparent in the subsequent comparative analysis. Based on the refinement of these activities it will be found that there will be a lot of

mechanism that may not exist in the present system. For example in the present unit shooting system, there is no section firing practice with advancing targets. In order to be detailed and fully systematic in perspective a further reiteration and another system root defination is required to explore the contents and details. Thus conceptual models for tactic training system and weapon system may have to be drawn.

★ **Comparative Analysis.** This is an important part of the whole analysis as it demands detail investigation between the conceptual models with those of the existing systems. The differences in structure, process and function are further analysed for possible changes. In short it is a device for forcing actors to think critically about their present methods/procedural systems.

★ **Changes.** These are the areas which have to be identified before changes can be made with the view of improving the present performance or changing the original objectives or create a new system. However it is the owner of the system who will decide on the actual changes based on the recommendations of the system analyst i e the desirability and the feasibility of some changes, changing the original objectives or create a new system.

★ **Implementation.** At the various levels of the system analysis certain recommendations based on the desirability and the feasibility of changes have to be implemented so that the desired military performances and results are obtained.

EXAMPLE OF AN ANALYSIS. A diagramatic layout of stages of an analysis is at Diagram 4. A simplified example to show the stages of an analysis on the **problem of poor shooting in operations** is shown below.

Stage 1. Finding Out Situation

Examine the following:

> The problem - Poor shooting in operations. Study Team required - 3 officers of Major rank. The Wider system - The Army training system. Objective of wider system - To train Army to be proficient in conventional and CIW. (Is the objective correct? Which is of higher priority to train for war or to train in CIW i e current task? If the latter is priority the system may have to change).

Stage 2. Establish Relevant Systems.

★ The relevant systems:

> Army Unit Shooting System Tactics Training System. Command And Control System.

★ Analyse each of the above system as follows:

> The various **characteristics of the systems** i e the objectives, measure of performance, components, sub components, environment, resources and the decision taker.

> The various **elements of the processing systems** i e the customers, actors, transformation, spirit, owner and environment.

★ Example of **Army Unit Shooting System** Analysis.

Diagram flow (top to bottom):
1 — Finding Out Situation
2 — Establish Relevant Systems
3 — Root Definations To The Relevant Systems
4 — Conceptual Models
5 — Comparative Analysis
6 — Changes
7 — Implementation

Diagram 4. Stages of Analysis

Note: As analysis can be very thorough and lengthy. For illustration purpose only certain examples are shown and they are interrelated — 1 e 1.

FINDING OUT SITUATIONS ①

Examine:
a. The Problem - Poor shooting in op.
b. Study Team Required -
c. Wider System - Army Training System.

d. Objective of wider system - To train soldiers to be proficient in conventional and CIW. Is the objective correct? Which is of higher pri; to train for more or to train for current task i e CIW. If the latter is priority, the trg system may have to change).

ESTABLISH RELEVANT SYSTEMS ②

a. **The Relevant (existing) system:**
   (1) Unit shooting system.
   (2) Tactics trg system.
   (3) Command and control system.

Analyse each system covering all points as follows:
   (a) The system characteristics i e old, measure of performance, components, environment resources * and decision taker.
   (b) Processing system elements i e customers, actors, transformation, spirit, owner and environment *

b. **Analysis of Existing System - Example**

S/No.	SYSTEMS	System Characteristics		Processing System Elements	
		Resources *	etc	Environment *	etc
1.	Unit Shooting System *	a. Wpn - M16 (Effective, however accurate to be equal with shotgun). b. Ranges - Insufficient (More required, 25m and 100m ranges and jungle lanes. To build using Engr resources). c. Ammo, target and publication - insufficient.		a. Economic recession, Army less expenditure, Op and Admin trg have ... and. b. Jungle terrain - close quarter shooting emphasis. c. Need initiate - Dictates type of trg.	
2.	Tactics trg system.		etc		tc

c. Analysis of other systems. Mental trg system etc. Other systems may have interactions with the relevant system, than sofar analysis as above to be made.

ROOT DEFINITIONS TO RELEVANT SYSTEMS ③

Root Definitions for all the systems to be established. In a nutshell, determine what the system should be in a condensed form. Example Root Definition of unit shooting system - The training to enable soldiers engage on effectively in conventional and CIW with emphasis in close quarter shooting.

CONCEPTUAL MODELS ④

a. Models for the various processes and activities of all the systems discussed are to be formulated.
b. For Unit Shooting System there there would be more models e g MIS Practices and Qualification shooting , shotgun Practices, Pistol Practices, Wpn Handling, Fieldcraft etc.

Example of Model For MIS Practices and Qualification Shooting

Recruit Trg Level → Trained Soldier Level → Advance Level
→ Qualification Level

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ⑤

Compare the conceptual models with those of the existing systems.

⑤ — CHANGES (discuss with DTD) ⑥ — IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CORRECTED SYSTEMS ⑦ — MINEQ UNITS

UNIT SHOOTING SYSTEM

The characteristics - For illustration purposes only **two of the characteristics** i e the objective and resources are analysed as show below:

The objective - To train soldiers to engage targets at 300,200 and 100m. **(Note** - No emphasis to our jungle terrain close quarter shooting).

Resources:

Weapon - M16 (Effective, however for better results the scouts should be equipped with shotguns).

Ranges - Classification range, 25m and jungle lane. (Insufficient ranges - Need to construct more ranges especially 100, 25m and jungle lane ranges. In the meantime priority allocation to be given to infantry units.

Ammunition - Insufficient (To procure more).

Targets - Insufficient (To procure more).

Publication - KOD T 3112 -UKMNTD only available (The contents is incomplete - Only shows competitive shooting practice, lacks emphasis in close quarter shooting; Other publications are required to cover Army Unit Shooting System fully).

The elements of processing system. Again for illustration purposes only two elements i e the spirit and environment are analysed as shown below:

The spirit -
"Satu Peluru Satu Musuh" (A good spirit, however it must be treated with caution. All factors must be considered otherwise the catch phrase will become stale).

Environment:

★ Economic recession -
★ Army expansion -
★ Operational and
    Administrative tasks

> Less time and resources available. (Priority to be given to infantry units and the construction of 100m, 25m and jungle lane ranges to be constructed immediately using engineer resources

★ Band System -
> Stipulates type of training. (May have to change)

★ Jungle terrain -
> Dictates emphasis in close quarter shooting (why bother with present 300m, 200m even 100m practices).

★ Type of Weapon -
> Determine success (Thus scouts may have to be equipped with shotguns).

> Other Systems:

> Mental Training System Etc These systems may have interactions with the relevant systems thus further analysis on these systems are required.

Stage 3. Root Definations of The Relevant Systems

The Root Defination of Army Unit Shooting System could be:
"The training to enable soldiers engage enemy in conventional and CIW with emphasis in close quarter shooting".

The Root Definations for the other two relevant systems i e Tactics training and Command and Control Systems are also to be established.

Stage 4. Conceptual Models.
Models for all transformation processes in the systems are to be formulated. Thus for Army Units Shooting System may have the following models:

M16 Practice and Qualification Shooting.
Shotgun Practice.
Pistol Practice.

Model for M16 Practice and Qualification Shooting

★ **Stage 5. Comparative Analysis.**
Compare the conceptual models with those of the existing systems.

★ **Stage 6. Changes.** The system analsyst will discuss with the owner of the system in this case the

PTD/DTD Training Staff on the desirability, the feasibility of changes, changing the original objectives or create a new system.

★ **Stage 7. Implementation.** The implementation of the corrected systems at various levels.

CONCLUSION

Though at first, system analysis is unfamiliar to most of us, however it is not too difficult to comprehend and put into practice. With more exposure to system analysis, it will become second nature just in the case of appreciation which is familiar to us. The idea of system analysis or methodology for problem solving in the real world is a curious one. It tries to face that problem solving is dependent upon the problem structuring. It provides through system ideas a way of seeing diffuse, ill structured problems in a patterned way. The system analysis has been found to be helpful in a wide range of problems of many different types.

Mej Mushardin bin Mohd Said is a singnals officer. Commisioned in 1968 from RMC Sungai Besi. He has attended a one year Telecommunication Engineering Course in England and a graduate of Haigate Staff College. Currently serving in Markas KOR TD as Staff Officer Grade 2 Training.