

**JUN 2016
BIL : 67**

Sorotan **DARAT**



JURNAL TENTERA DARAT MALAYSIA

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Sorotan Darat

JURNAL TENTERA DARAT MALAYSIA

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JAWATANKUASA DOKTRIN TENTERA DARAT

Sorotan Darat adalah Jurnal rasmi Tentera Darat (TD) yang untuk meningkatkan budaya ilmu dalam kalangan warga TD. Sebanyak dua keluaran diterbitkan setiap tahun iaitu setiap enam bulan sekali. Skop penulisan merangkumi bidang yang luas antaranya ialah perkara-perkara Peperangan, Latihan, Pengurusan, Sains dan Teknologi dan seumpamanya.

Jurnal ini menjadi satu forum khas untuk membincangkan pelbagai perkara yang berkaitan dengan isu ketenteraan dan keselamatan. Ianya bertujuan untuk mempertingkatkan profesionalisme seluruh warga TD, amnya dan para pegawai TD, khususnya. Berlanjutan dengan itu, bagi membantu usaha untuk merealisasikan aspek berkenaan, seluruh warga TD yang mempunyai pengetahuan serta pengalaman dalam hal ehwal ketenteraan, keselamatan dan perkara-perkara yang berkaitan adalah disarankan untuk menyumbangkan ilmu dalam bentuk artikel. Pada dasarnya, sekiranya perkara-perkara konvensional dikongsi bersama para pembaca ianya akan meningkatkan kepakaran dan keupayaan warga TD. Namun begitu, jika penulisan artikel melibatkan isu peralatan, kelengkapan dan perkara-perkara yang mempunyai darjah keselamatan, ianya akan dinilai dan dibuat tapisan keselamatan. Bagi memastikan kesinambungan keluaran Jurnal Sorotan Darat, Bahagian Pembangunan Doktrin, Markas Latihan Tentera Darat, telah diberi tanggungjawab dalam aspek pengurusan, penerbitan dan pengedaran. Para pembaca budiman, segala artikel, persuratan dan sebarang pertanyaan sila hubungi:

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DARI MEJA EDITOR

Dengan Nama Allah Yang Maha Pengasih Lagi Maha Penyayang.
Assalamualaikum dan Salam Sejahtera.

Syukur Allhamdulillah, Edisi ke-67 Jurnal Sorotan Darat dapat dikeluarkan seperti mana yang dirancangkan. Sidang Redaksi merakamkan setinggi-tinggi penghargaan kepada semua penulis artikel yang telah menyumbang hasil penulisan masing-masing bagi edisi pada kali ini. Artikel-artikel ini pastinya akan menjana minda para pembaca dalam usaha kami untuk mencungkil idea-idea yang bernas bagi dapat memacu Tentera Darat untuk mencapai tahap prestasi yang lebih cemerlang di masa hadapan.

Mulai penerbitan edisi ke 66, Jurnal Sorotan Darat telah berubah wajah supaya lebih menarik dan lebih mudah untuk dibaca. Ia selaras dengan pendekatan jurnal akademik terkemuka yang dikeluarkan oleh institusi yang lain. Diharap dengan perubahan ini akan memudahkan pembaca untuk menghayati setiap artikel yang ditulis oleh penulis-penulis yang menyumbangkan artikel mereka kepada Jurnal Sorotan Darat ini.

Artikel-artikel lain yang diterbitkan pula menyentuh berbagai aspek penting dalam organisasi Tentera Darat seperti isu keselamatan, peperangan siber, pengurusan serta konflik peperangan yang berlaku di serata dunia. Artikel-artikel ini merupakan sumbangan penulisan serta buah fikiran para pegawai dan anggota Tentera Darat yang berpengalaman luas serta mempunyai pengetahuan dan kepakaran dalam bidang masing-masing. Adalah diharapkan agar pembaca merebut peluang ini untuk memanfaatkan ilmu yang dapat diperolehi dari artikel-artikel tersebut.

Akhir kata, sidang redaksi sentiasa mengalu-alukan sumbangan penulisan artikel dari kalangan warga Tentera Darat untuk dimuatkan dalam Jurnal Sorotan Darat yang akan datang. Mudah-mudahan sumbangan penulisan yang berkualiti akan menyumbang kepada kemajuan Tentera Darat sebagai sebuah organisasi yang unggul. Sebarang pendapat, komen, idea bernas serta maklum balas dari kalangan pembaca amatlah dialu-alukan untuk meningkatkan lagi kualiti penerbitan Jurnal Sorotan Darat.

Sekian, terima kasih.

Membaca Inspirasi Pengetahuan.



PENDAHULUAN

Semenjak berakhirnya era Perang Dingin dan pengaruh ideologi komunisme, senario keselamatan antarabangsa dan serantau telah memasuki satu era baru yang amat berbeza dengan keadaan sebelumnya. Ini kerana masyarakat antarabangsa mula melihat bahawa isu keselamatan dunia hari ini bukan lagi berpunca daripada pertembungan ideologi-ideologi utama dunia seperti kapitalisme, komunisme dan sosialisme semata-mata tetapi lebih kepada pertembungan fahaman dan kepercayaan agama. Peristiwa serangan ke atas Menara Berkembar New York pada 11 September 2001, Stesen Kereta api Madrid pada 11 Mac 2004 dan di kota raya London pada 7 Julai 2005, telah menyedarkan masyarakat dunia bahawa ancaman kumpulan militan merupakan suatu bentuk ancaman baru yang sukar diramal tetapi ianya adalah nyata. Senario keganasan ini diperhatikan terus berkembang dan menjangkau batas sempadan yang lebih luas. Kewujudan kumpulan militan *Islamic State (IS)* yang bermula dengan pelbagai nama seperti *The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)* dan *The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)* dengan pelbagai aktiviti kekejamannya telah menambahkan lagi kebimbangan masyarakat dunia terhadap kumpulan-kumpulan militan ini.

Keupayaan kumpulan militan *IS* mengembangkan pengaruhnya bukan hanya di negara-negara Arab seperti Syria dan Iraq tetapi turut tersebar ke seluruh pelosok dunia termasuk Malaysia. Lebih membahayakan lagi apabila pengaruh kumpulan militan *IS* ini dilihat telah secara perlahan-lahan berjaya menyelip masuk ke dalam organisasi Angkatan Tentera Malaysia dan Tentera Darat. Sesungguhnya warga Tentera Darat perlu peka dan bijak dalam menangani isu pengaruh kumpulan *IS*. Warga Tentera Darat tidak boleh terpengaruh dan menjadi pengikut atau penyokong kepada kumpulan militan *IS* kerana ia akan memberikan implikasi yang buruk kepada organisasi serta boleh menghilangkan kepercayaan masyarakat terhadap kredibiliti Tentera Darat. Justeru, dua persoalan akan dibincangkan iaitu melihat sejauh mana pengaruh kumpulan militan *IS* telah menyelip masuk ke dalam Tentera Darat dan mencadangkan formula penyelesaian untuk dilaksanakan oleh Tentera Darat bagi membendung pengaruh kumpulan militan *IS*.

PENGARUH KUMPULAN MILITAN DALAM TENTERA DARAT

Bagi membincangkan isu sejauh mana pengaruh kumpulan militan telah menyelip masuk ke dalam organisasi Tentera Darat, di dapati sejarah keterlibatan anggota Tentera Darat dengan kumpulan militan di negara ini telah memang ada. Contohnya penglibatan beberapa orang anggota Tentera Darat dalam Kumpulan Al-Maunah dalam

insiden rampasan senjata dan bahan letupan di Pos 2, Kuala Rui dan di Kem Batalion 304 Askar Wataniah, pada 2 Julai 2000 sehingga mencetuskan tragedi berdarah di Bukit Jenalik, Sauk, Perak. Walaupun peristiwa ini telah dapat diatasi tetapi ia telah mencalarakan maruah dan nama baik Tentera Darat. Peristiwa ini menunjukkan anggota Tentera Darat turut terdedah kepada bahaya dipengaruhi oleh kumpulan militan tempatan atau luar negara termasuk daripada kumpulan militan IS. Memang terdapat segelintir warga Tentera Darat yang telah terpengaruh dengan perjuangan kumpulan militan IS (Lt Kol Syed Zulkifli bin Syed A. Rahman, syarahan pada 21 Apr 15). Walaupun bilangan anggota Tentera Darat yang terlibat tidak begitu jelas tetapi kejadian seorang anggota berpangkat Koperal yang dikesan telah berada di Syria dan terlibat secara langsung dengan perjuangan kumpulan militan IS serta beberapa anggota tentera yang disabitkan oleh mahkamah kerana memiliki dokumen berkaitan kumpulan militan IS perlu dijadikan petunjuk bahawa penglibatan itu memang ada dan nyata.

Mengambil petunjuk daripada perkembangan yang berlaku yang melibatkan warga Tentera Darat dengan kumpulan militan IS ini, ancaman kumpulan militan IS ini terhadap organisasi Tentera Darat perlu diberikan perhatian dan pengawasan sewajarnya. Ini kerana walaupun setakat ini kadar keterlibatan warga Tentera Darat dengan kumpulan militan IS ini sama ada sebagai pengikut atau penyokong masih terlalu kecil jika dibandingkan dengan kekuatan keseluruhan Tentera Darat namun Tentera Darat tidak boleh leka dan memandang mudah terhadap isu ini. Bahaya pengaruh kumpulan militan IS terhadap negara dan organisasi Tentera Darat sekarang ini adalah umpama api di dalam sekam. Situasi ini menjadi lebih membimbangkan apabila seramai 177 orang rakyat Malaysia telah ditahan semenjak tahun 2013 kerana terlibat dengan kumpulan militan IS ini (Khalid, The Star, 25 Mac 16, p6). Peningkatan jumlah ini perlu diperhalusi oleh Tentera Darat kerana ia mungkin turut melibatkan warga Tentera Darat.

Esei ini akan membincangkan kaedah mengekang pengaruh kumpulan militan IS melalui formula 5P iaitu Pemilihan, Pendidikan, Pemantauan, Penguatkuasaan dan Persekitaran. Kaedah ini dibentuk berdasarkan hasil kajian oleh Bahagian Staf Perisikan Pertahanan dan Cawangan Risik Tentera Darat yang merumuskan antara punca anggota tentera terpengaruh dengan kumpulan militan IS ini ialah kerana cetek pengetahuan agama dan beramal mengikut tafsiran sendiri, mengikut pertubuhan atau kumpulan yang songsang dan taksub kepada pemimpin, terpengaruh dengan kawan-kawan dan media sosial serta mempunyai masalah disiplin.

FORMULA 5P

Pemilihan

Formula yang pertama iaitu Pemilihan. Ia merujuk kepada semua proses pemilihan kemasukan pegawai dan anggota ke dalam perkhidmatan. Proses pemilihan yang dilaksanakan oleh Sel Pemilihan Tentera Darat dan Angkatan Tentera Malaysia perlulah dilaksanakan secara ketat mematuhi segala prosedur dan pra syarat yang telah ditetapkan oleh perkhidmatan. Tim Pemilihan yang dilantik perlu telus semasa membuat

pemilihan. Sebarang bentuk penyelewengan, jalan belakang, dan ketidakjujuran mesti dihentikan. Ini kerana sebarang kelemahan yang berlaku semasa proses pemilihan akan mendedahkan Tentera Darat kepada bahaya kemasukan orang awam yang mempunyai hubungan atau kaitan dengan kumpulan militan IS atau mana-mana kumpulan militan yang lain. Proses pemilihan dan penapisan yang melibatkan Tapisan Keselamatan Kasar dan Tapisan Keselamatan Halus oleh pihak-pihak bertanggungjawab perlu dilaksanakan secara menyeluruh, sistematik dan terperinci. Ini bertujuan bagi mengelak sebarang bentuk cubaan penipuan yang ingin dilakukan oleh bakal-bakal calon terutama daripada segi pemalsuan data-data peribadi, rekod jenayah serta penglibatan dalam kumpulan-kumpulan yang tidak sah dapat dikesan dan ditangani secara berkesan.

Bagi memperkasakan lagi proses pemilihan, dicadangkan supaya platform psikologi digunakan sepenuhnya supaya calon-calon yang dipilih menyertai Tentera Darat adalah terdiri daripada mereka yang benar-benar berminat, berjiwa kental serta mempunyai tahap kesetiaan yang tinggi terhadap negara. Tim Psikologi Tentera Darat perlu menggunakan segala kemahiran, kepakaran serta kemudahan yang ada untuk menguji setiap calon dalam semua aspek psikologi supaya ia akan memberikan gambaran yang lebih jelas mengenai profil calon-calon yang dipilih. Ringkasnya, proses pemilihan yang telus, berintegriti dan cekap akan dapat membantu Tentera Darat memiliki anggotanya yang benar-benar berminat, bersemangat serta tidak mudah terpengaruh dengan dakwah kumpulan militan IS.

Pendidikan

Formula kedua ialah Pendidikan. Formula ini mengfokuskan secara khusus kepada usaha untuk mendidik dan memperkasakan warga Tentera Darat dalam dua aspek utama pengurusan modal insan iaitu pengukuhan nilai-nilai ketenteraan dan pengukuhan nilai-nilai kerohanian. Ini penting kerana kedua-dua aspek ini merupakan platform utama bagi melahirkan warga Tentera Darat yang mempunyai jiwa ketenteraan yang kental, menghormati dan menyayangi organisasi, ikhlas, berakhlak mulia serta mempunyai pengetahuan yang mencukupi dalam hal-hal agama yang boleh menjadi benteng bagi mengelak anggota-anggota Tentera Darat dipengaruhi oleh dakwah-dakwah yang disebarkan oleh kumpulan militan IS dan penyokong-penyokongnya.

Proses mendidik warga Tentera Darat supaya mempunyai jiwa ketenteraan yang kental, menghormati serta menyayangi organisasi perlu dilaksanakan secara terancang dan konsisten. Ia mesti bermula dari hari pertama memasuki perkhidmatan Tentera Darat. Dalam konteks ini, setiap warga Tentera Darat perlu selalu diindoktrinasikan dengan nilai-nilai murni ketenteraan seperti etos kepahlawanan, semangat setia kawan (*esprit de corps*), budaya hormat menghormati dan lain-lain nilai rejimental yang digariskan dalam Sistem Pemerintahan Rejimental Tentera Darat supaya nilai-nilai murni ini hidup subur dan menjadi sebahagian daripada budaya hidup anggota dan pasukan. Hanya dengan memiliki, memahami serta mempraktikkan nilai-nilai murni ketenteraan yang dimaksudkan ini sahajalah seseorang warga Tentera Darat itu akan

berupaya menjadi seorang warga Tentera Darat yang mempunyai jati diri yang kental dan sanggup menggadaikan nyawa demi mempertahankan organisasi. Penyuburan nilai-nilai ketenteraan ini boleh dilakukan di peringkat pasukan dan formasi menerusi aktiviti-aktiviti rejimental seperti perbarisan, hari pengajian, aktiviti sukan, aktiviti riadah, aktiviti budaya, dan aktiviti kekeluargaan. Lagu-lagu patriotik perlu dijadikan lagu-lagu selingan di dewan-dewan makan, majlis-majlis keramaian kekeluargaan serta aktiviti-aktiviti kesukanan di pasukan bagi mencetuskan semangat warga Tentera Darat untuk menjadi warga tentera yang kental dan berjiwa besar.

Selain daripada memperkasakan pendidikan yang bersifat ketenteraan melalui penghayatan Sistem Pemerintahan Rejimental Tentera Darat, usaha memperkasakan pendidikan kerohanian perlu dikemaskan supaya ia mampu melahirkan warga Tentera Darat yang mempunyai asas kerohanian dan pengetahuan agama yang kukuh. Warga Tentera Darat khususnya yang beragama Islam perlu diberikan pemahaman yang jelas mengenai pengertian jihad. Ini amat penting bagi menangkis dakwah yang dikemukakan oleh kumpulan militan IS bahawa perjuangan mereka merupakan satu jihad yang benar dan wajib disokong atas nama membela kesucian agama dan masyarakat Islam sejagat. Dalam konteks ini, peranan Kor Agama Angkatan Tentera (KAGAT) amat ditagih untuk menyampaikan maklumat yang tepat mengenai ajaran Islam khususnya yang berkaitan dengan pengertian istilah jihad, hubungan sesama manusia serta nilai-nilai murni yang dibawa oleh agama Islam itu sendiri. Adalah dicadangkan agar penganjuran bengkel, seminar atau simposium berkaitan Islam yang diterajui oleh KAGAT perlu diperbanyakkan sama ada di peringkat pasukan atau formasi. Adalah diyakini bahawa dengan mempunyai pengetahuan agama yang kukuh serta pemahaman yang jelas mengenai konsep jihad dan perjuangan dalam Islam maka ianya akan mampu untuk menangkis segala dakwah atau propaganda yang kurang tepat mengenai perjuangan kumpulan militan IS ini serta tidak menimbulkan kekeliruan dan kekeliruan di kalangan warga Tentera Darat khususnya yang beragama Islam.

Pemantauan

Pemantauan ialah formula ketiga untuk mengekang penyebaran pengaruh kumpulan militan ini di kalangan anggota tentera. Pemantauan melibatkan semua usaha atau langkah untuk memantau aktiviti-aktiviti anggota terutama di luar waktu kerja. Walaupun usaha ini agak sukar kerana ia melibatkan ruang lingkup masa dan tempat yang tidak terbatas namun ia amat penting untuk menentukan anggota-anggota pasukan tidak terlibat dengan sebarang aktiviti yang bertentangan dengan undang-undang dan peraturan semasa yang telah ditetapkan oleh negara dan perkhidmatan. Justeru, bagi menentukan usaha pemantauan ini dapat dilaksanakan secara berkesan maka ia memerlukan satu kerjasama dan kesepakatan yang menyeluruh di peringkat pasukan bagi mewujudkan satu jaringan penyampaian maklumat yang cepat dan boleh dipercayai. Ini kerana hanya dengan mempunyai maklumat yang tepat dan cepat serta daripada sumber boleh dipercayai sahajalah maka usaha pemantauan akan dapat dilaksanakan dengan sempurna dan mampu menghasilkan satu pencapaian yang positif.

Dalam hal ini, jaringan penyampaian maklumat yang sedia ada di pasukan seperti anggota Polis Pasukan dan anggota Sel Risik pasukan perlu sentiasa digembleng dan berhubung rapat dengan Pegawai dan anggota bertugas pasukan seperti Pegawai Medan, Pegawai Bertugas, Odeli Bertugas di Kompeni atau setaraf bagi memantau serta melaporkan setiap penglibatan anggota khususnya yang mempunyai kaitan dengan aktiviti-aktiviti yang tidak sihat. Ini termasuklah penglibatan anggota dengan kumpulan yang diharamkan seperti kumpulan gengster, ajaran sesat atau kumpulan penjenayah. Pemantauan terhadap anggota-anggota yang terlibat dengan kumpulan seperti ini amat penting bagi mengelakkan mereka ini menjadi tali barut kumpulan-kumpulan ini dalam menyebarkan pengaruh mereka di kalangan anggota-anggota yang lain di pasukan. Lebih jauh daripada itu, kita juga tidak ingin melihat anggota-anggota ini sanggup mencuri dokumen berdarjah, senjata api dan bahan letupan untuk dibekalkan kepada kumpulan militan terbabit. Untuk memperkasakan strategi pemantauan ini, agen-agen pemantauan di peringkat pasukan seperti Polis Pasukan, Sel Risik Pasukan serta anggota-anggota bertugas di pasukan perlu sentiasa berhubung rapat dengan agensi pemantauan di luar pasukan seperti Detasemen Keselamatan Medan, pihak Cawangan Siasatan Jenayah Tentera, unit Polis Tentera serta agensi-agensi penguat kuasa awam yang lain terutamanya pihak Polis Diraja Malaysia. Melalui jaringan pemantauan dalaman dan luaran ini, adalah diyakini bahawa langkah-langkah untuk memantau aktiviti-aktiviti anggota pasukan akan menjadi lebih terancang dan berkesan.

Selain daripada itu, usaha-usaha pemantauan ini juga boleh dilakukan menerusi komunikasi berkumpulan seperti *buddy-buddy system*, program mentor serta pengurusan keanggotaan yang kemas kini menerusi Sistem Pengurusan Psikologi Anggota Tentera Darat (SisPA), rekod peribadi serta sesi temu duga sama ada di peringkat pasukan, kompeni, platoon atau seumpamanya. Dalam masa yang sama semua anggota juga perlu digalakkan menyertai kumpulan-kumpulan riadah atau budaya yang telah dikenal pasti sebagai 'sihat' dan pendukung kepada nilai-nilai murni negara. Pilihan dan ruang ini perlu diberikan kerana dewasa ini sudah menjadi satu trend kebanggaan bagi anggota untuk menyertai pertubuhan awam. Justeru pertubuhan atau kelab yang 'sihat' dan pendukung nilai-nilai murni negara perlu dikenal pasti ataupun Tentera Darat melalui formasi-formasi menubuhkan persatuan atau kelab riadah dan budaya. Melalui kaedah seperti ini, pihak pengurusan pasukan akan dapat mengawal dan memantau aktiviti-aktiviti luar anggota tentera dengan lebih kemas dan sistematik.

Dengan adanya sistem pemantauan yang sempurna dan berkesan yang dilakukan di peringkat pasukan maka adalah diyakini bahawa pasukan akan dapat mengenal pasti secara jelas anggota-anggota yang melibatkan diri dengan aktiviti-aktiviti yang tidak sihat termasuk menjadi pengikut atau penyokong kepada kumpulan militan IS ini. Kejayaan pasukan mengenal pasti anggota-anggota yang terlibat akan membolehkan pihak pengurusan pasukan mengasingkan kumpulan ini untuk tindakan selanjutnya iaitu formula Penguatkuasaan.

Penguatkuasaan

Penguatkuasaan adalah formula ke empat yang merujuk kepada semua usaha atau tindakan yang boleh dan perlu dilakukan oleh pasukan khususnya untuk menyekat penyebaran pengaruh kumpulan militan IS di pasukan. Adalah disarankan agar semua polisi, dasar serta arahan yang telah dikeluarkan oleh Tentera Darat berhubung dengan prosedur penyertaan anggota tentera dalam sebarang perkumpulan atau organisasi awam perlu dikuatkuasakan sepenuhnya di peringkat pasukan. Sebagai contoh, garis panduan yang terkandung dalam Perintah Majlis Angkatan Tentera (PMAT) Bilangan 3/1980 mengenai kegiatan anggota-anggota tentera dalam perkumpulan, persatuan dan pertubuhan perlu diberikan penjelasan dan pemahaman yang sewajarnya kepada semua peringkat anggota. Ini bertujuan supaya mereka mengetahui secara terperinci mengenai peraturan-peraturan yang perlu mereka patuhi serta implikasi yang bakal mereka hadapi sekiranya mereka gagal mematuhi peraturan-peraturan tersebut.

Proses memaklumkan semua arahan yang dimaksudkan di atas boleh dilaksanakan menerusi prosedur yang sedia wujud di pasukan seperti pengisytiharan melalui Perintah Bahagian Pertama dan Perintah Harian Pasukan, pemakluman semasa perbarisan atau mesyuarat pasukan, kompeni dan platoon, dan perbincangan semasa Hari Pengajian Pasukan. Pemakluman semua arahan yang berkaitan secara berkesan dan difahami oleh anggota akan memudahkan pihak pengurusan pasukan mengambil tindakan tatatertib mengikut peraturan-peraturan yang telah ditetapkan terhadap mana-mana anggota yang mengingkari arahan atau peraturan tersebut. Dalam konteks yang sama, tindakan tatatertib terhadap anggota-anggota yang terlibat perlu dilaksanakan secara telus, menyeluruh serta tidak berlakunya sebarang bentuk pilih kasih dan ketidakadilan sehingga boleh menimbulkan rasa tidak puas hati di kalangan anggota-anggota pasukan. Ini amat penting kerana sebarang rasa tidak puas hati akan mendorong anggota yang terlibat dan rakan-rakan yang bersimpati dengannya untuk lebih cepat menyertai kumpulan militan IS ini atas tujuan membalas dendam atau menzahirkan rasa tidak puas hatinya. Semua pemerintah pasukan perlu menggunakan semua kuasa perundangan yang telah diperuntukkan kepada mereka oleh Tentera Darat untuk menguatkuasakan semua peraturan, perintah atau garis panduan yang telah dikeluarkan oleh Tentera Darat berkaitan dengan kumpulan militan IS. Penguatkuasaan amat penting supaya semua peraturan, perintah serta garis panduan tersebut mampu mencegah anggota-anggota pasukan daripada melibatkan diri mereka dengan sebarang bentuk aktiviti yang mempunyai kaitan dengan kumpulan militan ini. Perlu diingat bahawa semua peraturan, perintah atau garis panduan walau selengkap mana sekalipun tidak akan memberikan sebarang makna sekiranya ia tidak atau gagal dikuatkuasakan oleh mereka yang diberikan amanah serta kuasa untuk menguatkuasakannya.

Persekitaran

Bagi menambahkan keberkesanan empat formula yang telah dibincangkan, formula yang kelima iaitu Persekitaran perlu dilaksanakan. Formula ini adalah merujuk kepada keperluan semua pihak dalam Tentera Darat khususnya di kalangan pemerintah untuk

berusaha mewujudkan satu persekitaran kerja yang kondusif, ceria dan harmoni di pasukan. Ini amat penting kerana persekitaran seperti ini akan mampu menarik minat anggota-anggota untuk bekerja dengan ikhlas serta mempunyai rasa bangga terhadap pasukan. Usaha mewujudkan persekitaran yang kondusif, ceria serta harmoni di pasukan ini akan dapat dicapai sekiranya pemerintah pasukan mengamalkan sistem pengurusan serta pentadbiran yang berkesan berteraskan integriti, telus, profesional serta berusaha menyumbangkan yang terbaik untuk pasukan. Kekurangan peruntukan kewangan, kesibukan penugasan serta kekurangan sumber logistik tidak boleh dijadikan alasan untuk mana-mana pemerintah pasukan membelakangkan usaha untuk membuat yang terbaik untuk kebajikan anggota dan keluarga mereka. Perlu diingat bahawa pemerintah yang berjaya akan turut melahirkan warga kerja atau anggota bawahan yang berjaya kerana setiap kebaikan serta keselesaan yang diberikan kepada anggota bawahan akan mengundang rasa hormat, sayang serta komitmen mereka kepada organisasi dan pemerintah.

Dalam konteks ini, persekitaran yang kondusif, ceria serta harmoni ini juga perlu diwujudkan di kalangan keluarga anggota melalui aktiviti-aktiviti BAKAT supaya keluarga anggota merasakan bahawa diri mereka juga sebahagian daripada warga pasukan. Persekitaran yang kondusif, ceria dan harmoni akan menjadi platform kepada pembentukan persefahaman, kerjasama, toleransi serta kasih sayang antara warga pasukan termasuk keluarga mereka dan ia adalah merupakan teras kepada kejayaan sesebuah pasukan. Sesungguhnya keceriaan pasukan adalah cerminan keceriaan warganya dan warga yang ceria akan berupaya serta mempunyai ketahanan untuk menangkis sebarang bentuk dakwah atau propaganda yang cuba disebarkan oleh anasir-anasir yang mempunyai niat jahat dan ingin merobohkan organisasi termasuklah pengaruh yang cuba diserapkan oleh kumpulan militan IS ini.

KESIMPULAN

Adalah jelas bahaya penyebaran pengaruh serta ancaman kumpulan militan IS terhadap warga Tentera Darat dan negara adalah sesuatu yang nyata dan perlu diberikan perhatian. Sekiranya isu ini tidak ditangani secara serius dan berterusan, ia akan melemahkan Tentera Darat pada masa akan datang. Isu ancaman kumpulan militan IS terhadap Tentera Darat ini merupakan satu bentuk ancaman yang baru dan ianya berpotensi untuk mempengaruhi sesiapa sahaja warga Tentera Darat tanpa mengira pangkat, jawatan, bangsa, warna kulit, jantina atau batasan geografi. Justeru, lima formula yang dicadangkan untuk mengekang penyebaran pengaruh kumpulan militan IS dalam organisasi Tentera Darat perlu diperhalusi dan dilaksanakan dengan segera bagi menghalang penyebaran pengaruh kumpulan militan IS di kalangan warga Tentera Darat. Perlu diingat bahawa warga Tentera Darat tidak boleh dipengaruhi atau terpengaruh oleh sebarang bentuk fahaman atau kegiatan yang bertentangan dengan peraturan dan undang-undang negara serta perkhidmatan. Warga Tentera Darat perlu kekal berdiri teguh pada sebarang masa sebagai benteng pertahanan nasional yang rela berkorban demi kepentingan agama, bangsa dan negara tercinta.

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LEFTENAN KOLONEL ABDUL RASEK BIN ISMAIL telah menyertai Perkhidmatan Tentera Darat Malaysia semenjak tahun 1980 dan sekarang ini berkhidmat di Institut Pegawai Kanan Tentera Darat, Port Dickson, Negeri Sembilan sebagai Pegawai Staf 1 Latih/R&D. Dari segi pengalaman bekerja, di sepanjang tempoh perkhidmatannya selama hampir 36 tahun, beliau telah diberikan kepercayaan untuk menjawat pelbagai jawatan di peringkat pangkatnya sekarang. Ini termasuklah sebagai Ketua Platoon Infantri, Pegawai Staf Pasukan, Ketua Kompeni Infantri, Pegawai Staf di Markas Formasi, Penolong Pegawai Memerintah Infantri, Timbalan Komander Rejimen Askar Wataniah, Pegawai Memerintah Infantri, Pegawai Staf di Majlis Keselamatan Negara serta staf di Pusat Latihan Tentera Darat.

Berkelulusan Diploma Pengajian Strategik dan Pertahanan serta Sarjana Pengurusan dari Universiti Malaya, beliau menjadikan bidang penulisan ini sebagai platform untuk beliau mengutarakan pandangan serta pendapat beliau mengenai isu-isu semasa dalam ATM yang mungkin mampu menyumbang sesuatu untuk kebaikan ATM.



INTRODUCTION

Military organizations around the globe responded to the challenges of information age warfare which happened currently. Any military power who can conquer the information will gain advantages on manipulation of information towards the tactical and strategic planning of warfighting. Malaysia Minister of Defence, Dato Seri Hishamuddin Tun Hussein mentioned that the MAF need new narrative in accordance to the current global security and defence landscape. MAF need radical change according to game changers factors. Modern communication had changed the global perspective in making world more peaceful due to wider communication. Crisis in North Korean and South Korean and also Iran and Pakistan conflicts, still continues and didn't show any sign of solution in this short time despite of easier and wider communication medium available as a medium for peace resolution between countries. Vast development in defence communication technology creating a threat to Malaysia and we are worried we might be penetrated and paralyzed through cyber platform. It is so sophisticated until some extend that terrorist can recruit new member including what proved by ISIS terrorist. Therefore, investment in this field is vital in order to enhance our communication and cyber warfare ability.

NETWORK CENTRIC OPERATION (NCO)

Despite its promising pros, the implementation of NCO would bring great challenges to MAF including the challenges in term of technical and human dimension. The implementation of NCO by United State of America troops in major combat operation in Afghanistan and Iraq on 2003 has proved the successes, weaknesses, and recommendation of improvement by the forces. With the implementation of NCO, US Fleet were able to integrate the information and communications systems and procedures to accomplish a mission with less effort, energy and faster time. Based on this successful experience, supported with other related evidence, MAF is moving forward and optimistic in turning our conventional force into a more credible and lethal 'networked-force' through the optimization of knowledge and information sharing with the implementation of NCO.

The term used for Network Centric Warfare may vary for each country. As example, Network Centric Warfare (NCW) used by United States, Network Enabled Capability (NEC) used by United Kingdom, Network Based Defence (NBD) used by Sweden, Net-Centric Operations (NCO) used by United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while Malaysian Armed Forces used the same term, Network

Centric Operation for network centric warfare terminology to narrow down the NCO capabilities and to make it suitable to our MAF. In the context of MAF, NCO can be defined as an information superiority enabled concept of operation that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers and shooters to achieve shared situational awareness, increase speed of command, higher tempo of operation, greater lethality, increased survivability and a degree of self-synchronization in achieving mission effectiveness.

In addition, NCO is a concept that optimizes the application and implementation of ICT in Information Age to speed up communications and increase situational awareness through networking. This application of communication technology will then be resulting in both the efficiency and effectiveness of MAF combat operation and during the peacetime. This will allow military units of smaller in size to operate more independently and effectively and complete different range of missions than non-networked forces which are using current communication system. The NCO was designed taking into consideration of few tenets including robustly networked force, information sharing, quality of information, shared situational awareness, collaboration and self-synchronization, sustainability and speed of command and mission effectiveness.

ESTABLISHMENT OF NETWORK CENTRIC OPERATION IN MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES

The idea of forming NCO in MAF has been officially initiated in August 2008. Previous or current operation is using platform centric operation which uses mainly on voice communication and less data communication involved. Compared to the NCO, platform centric operation practices less or nearly none data integration. The proposed NCO represents a transformation of the present state of MAF Command and Control (C2) capabilities, with its many challenges, as re-affirmed in the joint workshops and stock-take exercise conducted between August and November 2008 by the MAF. The joint workshop has discovered that our communication has few drawbacks including fragmented information structure, limited seamless communication which resulted in limited integration of sensor to shooter, manual updating and data entry and also non real-time information sharing which lead to limited operation visibility.

The proposed NCO for MAF is mainly aimed to enhance the MAF ability to collaborate and share information, which will then result in increased shared situational awareness and provides a degree of self-synchronization to meet the need and function in Military Operations and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Other than that, NCO will also function to provide the capability to coordinate Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition (ISRT) of the land, sea, air and cyber space involving the services of MAF which are Malaysian Army, Royal Malaysian Navy and Royal Malaysian Air Force.

CHALLENGES

However, despite its promising advantages, the implementation of Network Centric Warfare is relatively challenging. The future challenges of Network Centric Operation to Malaysian Armed Forces involved two major aspects which are challenges associated with the technical aspects and integration including security, real time, mobility and interoperability, while the second aspect is challenges related to human dimension including organizational structure, organizational culture, trust and teamwork. Based on a research conducted by Cisco, a worldwide leader in IT and networking, other challenge will be faced by military agencies in developing and implementing NCO including inaccessibility where the legacy systems and networks offer limited capability, information accessibility, and scalability. They do not provide the necessary network intelligence to support advanced communications, security, and wireless capabilities, incomplete system because of the military information domain is scattered between disparate systems, it is difficult for decision makers to obtain a complete picture. Insight and planning are hampered by proprietary enterprise systems; Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) Systems; weapons and sensor systems; and service provisioning or logistics systems each focusing on only limited areas. And lastly, implementation and development of NCO also irrelevant because of different lines of service and coalitions use systems that are deliberately segmented, due to security constraints. Sharing relevant information between these systems in a timely manner is difficult or impossible¹.

Implementation of NCO in MAF will definitely need high capacity of data storage to store the data from the integration of communication and information through this system. In NCO systems, communication between soldiers on ground and commanders from a remote and far place require usage of wide range of data involving voice, text, file transfer, video, and also usage of bandwidth and memory to fulfill the execution of operational task. If before this communication is limited and data usage is moderately high during an operation and exercises, it can be predicted that the data will significantly increase in accordance of the implementation of NCO. Thus, this data storage definitely requires high level of protection in term of data security.

It is still unclear whether the data storage will be stored in a closed or open network, but the fact is the risk of the data storage being attacked by the intruders or hackers is higher if it is stored in an open network, making it vulnerable to several kind of attack such as Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) attack, unauthorized access of the data, data manipulation and also identity fraud. In order to protect the security of the system, three principle of computer security which is confidentiality, integrity and availability must be put into serious consideration. Any attack to the system including what mentioned above is vulnerable and will deny the principles of computer security. As example, Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) attack will paralyzed the system hence deny it to

¹. Cisco Systems White Paper: Network Centric Operation, 2005, page 45.

be accessed and use when needed. All the data also need security measures to support encryption of the data to protect it from being used and manipulated by the enemy, while the monitoring and assessment capabilities is vital to create credibility and confidence on the integrity of the data.

During war or armed conflict, the focus will be to collect information and real time battlefield data to assist effective tactical and operational decision-making processes by commanders at all levels. These elements closely related to four tenets in NCO MAF, which are shared situational awareness, information sharing, and speed of command and mission effectiveness. NCO is based on real-time operation model designed to deliver live critical mission information securely throughout the chain of command at anytime and anywhere in order for the commander to do a fast and precise appreciation. According to the MAFJD 6-02 – Network Centric Operations, the efficiency of the shared situational awareness is based on the near real time information that is shared among units, aircraft, ships or Headquarters which enables the increase of combat power. The robust networking of sensors, C2 or decision makers and shooters provide the force with the capability to generate the quality of shared awareness. Thus it will enable the cooperative execution and self-synchronization of forces.

Real time information will expose the combat unit to experience micromanage, an action when superior commander involve in giving instruction and orders to small unit and go beyond the chain of command. Micromanage of small unit by higher commander in taking control over small details will make the instruction to be redundant. As real-time battlefield information passes to all level of commanders, there will be possibilities to over-direct small units and lose focus on important aspect by higher commander level. Malaysian Army, as example well known on its ability and expertise in jungle warfare and counter insurgency warfare. This initiative and strength was proven based on the small-unit commander ability to command the unit itself. But if the higher commanders decided to over control from above, they may be hesitant and indecisive in the decision and action they take. Other than that, the reliance of forces to the real-time information resulting to a risk on how a small unit might be paralyzed without it. For example, the use of real-time information to lock a target for air strike or air support by small infantry unit on ground might be jeopardize if the system is fail and not functioning in the situation.

The next future challenge of NCO to MAF would be mobility. Deployment of NCO to the ground might be very challenging in our country as our earth surfaces covered with several types of jungle, mountainous and hilly features and also long ocean of Malacca straits and South China Sea. Based on the increased mobility and dispersion of forces on future battlefields, wireless communications will be the primary means of providing “last mile” connectivity. Radio-frequency wireless communications will be the major source of tactical bandwidth (vice optical communications due to weather and other impairments). Unfortunately, the optimal spectrum for line-of-sight and satellite communications is already crowded. While we are taking steps in the right direction, and indeed are making useful progress, unless we take appropriate action now, we will fall short in both areas, hampering our ability to make further progress. First, the info structure we can reasonably expect, given current plans, investments, and acquisition

processes will have shortfalls in several significant dimensions. We can expect continued vulnerabilities, a lack of connectivity and bandwidth, particularly for that stubborn last mile, and problems with mobility and survivability.

Whether in traditional military engagements, asymmetrical engagements, or in a variety of operations other than war, the MAF will be working in coalition environments or can be called as interoperability with other forces. Basic to the conduct of these operations is the ability to develop and maintain a shared perception of the situation, develop coherent plans that leverage the available resources, and execute them. This requires a level of information exchange, systems that can understand one another, a coalition-based planning process where all may participate, a common concept of operations, and a set of compatible procedures to carry out operations.

Given that future coalitions will be of the willing, and that they, at times, will contain former and future adversaries, achieving these prerequisites will be difficult indeed. Of greatest concern to some is that the armed, with its relatively enormous investments in technology, will become too sophisticated to interoperate with even its closest allies who cannot afford the price tags associated with the latest technologies. The need for a sufficient level of backward compatibility needs to be recognized, along with finding a way to achieve this without degrading our own performance. This is a major challenge, both technically and operationally. In addition to developing common plans and operational concepts for NCO, MAF faces an on going challenge in developing interoperable systems, and bringing them on line at the same time.

The Joint Staff's new Force Capability Board tracks network-oriented programs across individual service acquisition systems, identifies cases where funding or capability levels are mismatched. In order to communicate and interoperate between the commander with soldier and ground and In preparing MAF personnel's to operate NCO, training is vital in developing experts in handling and operating both hardware and software integration of NCO. Army, Navy and Air force personnel's must be equipped with relevant skills and knowledge especially in Information Technology, Communication engineering and also satellite communication in order to ensure MAF is capable in facing new challenges of NCO.

Nonetheless, human dimension will also be a future challenge of NCO to MAF. The first key element in human dimension challenge is organisation. The MAF has long been organised to maintain unity of command, ensure an efficient span of command, assign resources and demonstrate clear responsibilities. NCO provides a concept to make best use of new ideas and technology to modify the MAF's current structure and command relationships by stressing cooperation across boundaries and shared doctrine. For commanders and staffs, NCO will create an environment where they will have considerably more information than today, a situation that poses significant challenges for using Mission Command. Commanders will need to create trust with their peers and subordinates, and encourage trust between subordinates. While both C4I interoperability and C4I security are more technical and operational in nature, instilling the right culture and developing key competencies among the supporting personnel are

important aspects to exploit the leverage afforded by C4I technology to its fullest potential.²

The organisational features structure, purpose and policies must align with the network centric support strategy to cultivate the necessary culture and competencies. Leadership emphasis and persistence are important factors to shape the right culture. At the top management level, there is a need for senior leadership to be aware of information technology as a transformation enabler in doctrine and operations and to set a clear and committed vision to drive cultural change, so as to take full advantage of C4I technology. Leaders must ensure that personnel have the necessary knowledge, skills, and values to maximise these changes. Moreover, there is a need to institute the right processes and linkages to coordinate capability development thrusts and foster the right culture for jointness and interoperability. Focus groups must be formed to tackle issues faced in NwSOS, so that they can respond rapidly and effectively to cross-domain situations.

Other than organization challenge, trust issue will also be the future challenge of NCO to MAF. NCO is mainly on integration of information to be accessible by war fighter and also commander on ground. Thus, this element will involve great trust between those whom involved in this implementation and operation of NCO. It will also be extremely important to give people an adequate opportunity to build trust in the information and tools that will be developed, and to develop a capability to absorb new and enhanced capabilities as they become available. Thus, it is important to obtain a better understanding of how to develop modeling and simulation of human behaviour and how it relates to trust, beliefs and other highly context specific attributes of NCO. This needs to include the ability to understand how underlying demographic change and social trends can affect NCO outcomes and war fighting performance. This also includes the ability to understand and develop the modeling and simulation of performance under conditions of confusion, stress and rapidly changing command and control arrangements. Professional mastery binds competent individuals into a seamless team. It also creates the basis for trust between people, which is critical to effective war fighting.

Last challenge in term of human dimension of NCO is teamwork. Teamwork is essential to the success of any organisation and it is more so in a network centric environment. Within this context, it is useful to understand the difference between the terms 'team' and 'teamwork', and to recognise that the concepts captured by both terms are prerequisites for productive collaborative work. 'Teamwork' means an individual is accountable; it means sharing information, and working better together. On the other hand, in a 'team' everybody holds themselves and each other accountable and performance is measured against collective output (Drucker, 1999). Teamwork is a skill, and the lack of it can be a barrier to effective performance. Bowman & Pierce (2002) conducted research aimed to delineate and better understand the cultural barriers to

². POINTER, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces Vol.40 No.3, page 7

teamwork. They identified several cultural barriers to teamwork, cognitive and organisational. They found that culture influenced cognitive fundamentals of teamwork, such as communication, coordination, and decision-making. Culture also influenced the organisational barriers, through rules and procedures for training and personnel selection.

Future recommendation to prepare the MAF in facing the future challenges of NCO would mainly involve training. In preparing MAF personnel to operate NCO, training is vital in developing experts in handling and operating both hardware and software integration of NCO. Army, Navy and Air force personnel's must be equipped with relevant skills and knowledge especially in Information Technology, Communication engineering and also satellite communication in order to ensure MAF is capable in facing new challenges of NCO. NCO requires significant changes in mind set and much greater understanding of the information that is available and the processes, tools, and agents that turn this collection of information into battle space knowledge. Individuals will need to know more about the battle space and the roles of others in that battle space. Training in all of its forms builds confidence between people across the organisation. Training helps to build an understanding of how others in the team will act, and also helps people to cope with the uncertainty and danger of combat. In the future, our people must be trained to make best use of the available information. This will involve discouraging an attitude where people wait for one last piece of information, and encouraging action in ambiguous or unclear situations.³

CONCLUSION

As a conclusion, as we can now predict the future challenge of NCO, MAF should take early actions and step in preparing the personnel to face this challenge. Nowadays threats to our countries are real, and we should take pre-emptive step in creating a full spectrum force equipped with efficient command and control system and communication. The implementation of NCO in MAF will surely bring better than harm and parallel to our mission in creating strong and credible forces to defend the sovereignty of the country.

³. The Network Centric Warrior: The Human Dimension of Network Centric Warfare by Leoni Warne, Irena Ali, Derek Bopping, Dennis Hart, and Celina Pascoe, 2010.

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Lieutenant Wan Nurhidayat bin Wan Muhamad, of the Royal Signal Regiment is a graduate from National Defence University of Malaysia in Bachelor of Computer Science (System Security). He was commissioned on 1st March 2014 and his first unit is 93rd Royal Signal Regiment (Electronic Warfare). During his study and military training in NDUM, Lieutenant Hidayat actively participated in public speaking, debate, speech competition and was appointed as President of Student Representative Council. Currently he served in 1st Royal Signal Squadron as Radio Troop Commander after completed his Royal Signal Regiment Qualification Course in Army Institute of Communication and Electronics.



PENGENALAN

Teknologi Maklumat dan Komunikasi (ICT) merupakan teknologi yang diperlukan untuk pemprosesan data. Ia merupakan satu subjek yang sangat luas, meliputi segala aspek dalam pengurusan dan juga pemprosesan maklumat. Secara tepat dan mudah ICT melibatkan penggunaan komputer dan perisian untuk mengubah, menyimpan, melindungi, memproses, memindah, melihat, dan mendapatkan maklumat tanpa mengira tempat dan waktu. Pembangunan ICT di Malaysia berkait rapat dengan Wawasan 2020 yang diilhamkan oleh Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad. Aspirasi negara yang dicatat dalam Wawasan 2020 ialah pencapaian taraf sebuah negara yang maju menjelang tahun 2020. Ini bermakna kemajuan penuh dalam semua aspek kehidupan termasuk daripada segi ekonomi, politik, sosial, kerohanian, psikologi dan kebudayaan.

Menurut Wawasan 2020, hasrat mencapai taraf yang benar-benar maju hanya boleh dicapai dengan mengatasi sembilan cabaran strategik. Kemajuan keupayaan Sains dan Teknologi termasuk bidang ICT adalah cabaran yang keenam di antara sembilan cabaran yang disenaraikan. Malaysia mesti mempunyai keupayaan untuk memaju dan menyelaraskan sumber-sumber yang ada dalam negara supaya mencapai hasrat menjadikan Malaysia sebuah masyarakat yang berasaskan sains dan teknologi yang progresif, iaitu masyarakat yang berdaya cipta dan berpandangan jauh. Sebuah masyarakat yang maju bukan sahaja dapat memanfaatkan teknologi masa kini tetapi turut menjadi penyumbang kepada kemajuan peradaban sains dan teknologi pada masa hadapan.

PERUBAHAN DINAMIK TEKNOLOGI

Matlamat meningkatkan keupayaan berasaskan kepada hasrat untuk membentuk satu ekonomi yang cekap teknologi, mampu melakukan penyesuaian, pembaharuan dan pelaburan yang berteknologi intensif dan bergerak ke arah penggunaan teknologi yang canggih. Oleh hal demikian juga, Angkatan Tentera Malaysia (ATM) juga tidak terkecuali daripada menghadapi cabaran dalam pelaksanaan ICT demi pemodenan serta pembaharuan institusinya.

Sejak awal penubuhan hinggalah pada hari ini, ATM telah mengalami pelbagai pembaharuan serta pemodenan. Hal ini termasuklah dalam pelbagai perkara berkaitan pelaksanaan ICT. Jika pada awal era penubuhannya dulu banyak perkara yang perlu dilakukan secara manual tetapi pada hari ini, hampir semua perkara telah ditukarkan kepada sistem automatik. Contohnya, sistem surat-menyurat dan penggajian. Jika

dahulu kerani terpaksa menggunakan mesin taip untuk tujuan surat-menyurat tetapi pada hari ini telah ditukarkan kepada penggunaan komputer. Jika dahulu bagi membuat salinan terhadap kertas-kertas berkaitan hal-hal tertentu, maka anggota ATM terpaksa mengotorkan tangan dengan menggunakan dakwat dan dibuat salinan secara manual dan lambat tetapi pada hari ini perkara tersebut telah ditukarkan dengan mesin cetak, mesin fotokopi dan sebagainya. Hasil kerja yang dihasilkan juga lebih kemas dan cepat.

Begitu juga dalam perkara persenjataan serta peralatan lain. Telah banyak revolusi yang telah berlaku. Kalau dahulu kebanyakan kenderaan dan peralatan perang ATM adalah dikendalikan secara manual tetapi hari ini kebanyakannya telah ditukarkan kepada sistem komputer berteknologi tinggi yang memerlukan semua peringkat anggota berpengetahuan tinggi demi mengendalikannya.

CABARAN MENGHADAPI TRANSFORMASI ICT

Antara cabaran yang ATM hadapi dalam pembangunan dan penggunaan ICT yang dikenal pasti ialah untuk menjadikan ICT sebagai satu *enabler tool* dalam sistem penyampaian maklumat dalam ATM melalui ketiga-tiga cabang perkhidmatan. Bagi menyahut cabaran ini, ketiga-tiga cabang perkhidmatan perlu memastikan perancangan dan pelaksanaan ICT mengikut dasar-dasar dan prosedur-prosedur yang telah ditetapkan seperti yang dikeluarkan oleh Markas ATM – KOMLEK, MAMPU dan Arahan Perkhidmatan Awam. Selain daripada dasar-dasar ini, ATM juga perlu merangka, menggubal dan mendokumentasikan dasar-dasar ICT di peringkat perkhidmatan.

Selain daripada itu, ATM perlu membangun dan mewujudkan pangkalan data maklumat berpusat dalam talian. Ini amat penting kerana semua maklumat yang diperlukan pihak atasan untuk tujuan perancangan, penilaian dan pemantauan boleh didapati dari pangkalan data. Melalui pangkalan data juga, kerja kemasukan data, pengemaskinian data dan penyemakan data dapat dikendalikan dengan cepat dan mudah kerana ia adalah *internet web-based*. Ini juga akan mengelakkan masalah pertindihan data, keraguan data dan membantu mempercepatkan pengeluaran laporan-laporan. Pewujudan pangkalan data ini akan membantu memastikan maklumat atau perkhidmatan yang hendak disampaikan kepada semua pihak yang berkenaan menjadi cepat dan mudah.

Antara cabaran lain yang dihadapi adalah dari aspek taraf pendidikan. Kebiasaan yang dihadapi ialah komuniti anggota bawahan ATM lazimnya mempunyai taraf pendidikan yang tidak tinggi untuk menandingi dan menghadapi kemajuan teknologi masa kini. Keadaan ini telah menyukarkan usaha pegawai-pegawai atasan untuk menyampaikan sesuatu pembaharuan teknologi atau inovasi kepada golongan sasar ini sekali gus menyukarkan lagi pemodenan yang drastik dilakukan di dalam ATM.

Cabaran seterusnya yang dihadapi ialah keyakinan, kepercayaan dan kesedaran pemimpin-pemimpin negara kita dan pihak pemerintah bahawa bidang ICT boleh dan mampu membawa perubahan, pemodenan dan transformasi dalam ATM. Perkara ini adalah amat penting kerana program pembangunan dan penggunaan ICT dalam

institusi ATM melibatkan dasar dan strategi nasional dan idea serta komitmen pemimpin-pemimpin atasan dan pertengahan adalah penting dalam penggubalan dan pengemaskinian dasar dan strategi nasional ini. Di samping itu, program pembangunan dan penggunaan ICT dan komunikasi moden dalam ATM memerlukan sumber kewangan dan perbelanjaan yang tinggi serta komitmen dan kelulusan pemimpin adalah sangat mustahak. Tanpa sokongan padu dan komitmen daripada pemimpin, sebarang projek ICT akan menghadapi kegagalan.

Pembangunan modal insan dan *capacity building* juga merupakan satu cabaran yang dihadapi kerajaan dalam usaha pembangunan dan penggunaan ICT dan komunikasi moden. Kerajaan melalui semua Kementerian dan Jabatan telah menitikberatkan perkara ini dan sering ditekankan oleh Perdana Menteri di peringkat kebangsaan dan antarabangsa. Menurut Perdana Menteri, perkara yang penting ialah semua rakyat Malaysia mesti mengamalkan prinsip pembelajaran seumur hidup *life long learning* untuk mempelajari ilmu dan kemahiran yang baru. Bagi setiap cabang perkhidmatan ATM, semua anggota mesti bersikap ingin belajar dan mengetahui ilmu yang baru terutamanya dalam bidang ICT dan komunikasi moden yang berkembang pesat setiap hari.

Cabaran keenam ialah ketidaksediaan *availability* kemudahan infrastruktur rangkaian seperti rangkaian talian sewa (*dedicated leased line*), rangkaian jalur lebar (*broadband*) dan kos yang tinggi terutamanya bagi kem-kem yang terletak di kawasan luar bandar. Masalah ini adalah serius memandangkan ianya boleh mengganggu kadar kelajuan capaian ke Internet. Masalah ini menjadi lebih teruk kerana ketiga-tiga cabang perkhidmatan sudah mengadakan portal sendiri dan menggunakan banyak aplikasi yang *webbased*. Penggunaan sistem *dial-up* dan *streamyx* juga tidak dapat mengatasi masalah ini kerana dengan bilangan pengguna dan trafik yang bertambah, capaian internet masih lambat dan terganggu.

Struktur organisasi dan bilangan pegawai ICT dalam ketiga-tiga cabang perkhidmatan ATM kini tidak mencerminkan keperluan dan tidak dapat menampung keperluan ICT pada masa sekarang. Di sesetengah tempat ada di kalangan pegawai ICT yang diberikan tugas sebagai pegawai ICT secara *ad hoc*. Ada juga pasukan-pasukan yang belum ada perjawatan Pegawai ICT dan hanya memberikan tugas Pegawai ICT kepada mereka yang tidak berkelayakan sebagai memenuhi syarat. Perkara ini akan membantut perkembangan ICT di pasukan-pasukan dan harus ditangani dengan segera bagi melancarkan usaha pembangunan ICT dalam ATM.

STRATEGI MENANGANI CABARAN

Dalam pada itu, beberapa langkah boleh diambil oleh Angkatan Tentera Malaysia melalui Markas ATM – KOMLEK di mana ia perlu merangka beberapa strategi dan program pembangunan ICT dan komunikasi moden. Ianya bertujuan meningkatkan tahap dan kemahiran penggunaan ICT di kalangan pegawai dan anggota melalui ketiga-tiga cabang perkhidmatan ATM. Strategi dan program yang sedang dilaksanakan oleh Markas ATM – KOMLEK ini boleh diambil oleh ketiga-tiga cabang perkhidmatan

dalam menangani cabaran-cabaran seperti yang telah dinyatakan.

Strategi pertama yang perlu diambil oleh Bahagian KOMLEK dalam menangani cabaran ini ialah dengan membangunkan satu Pelan Strategik ICT (ISP). ATM membangunkan sesebuah agensi untuk kegunaan ICT bagi jangka masa 3 hingga 5 tahun. Ia merupakan pelan ICT yang kos efektif dan menyelaraskan keutamaan mengikut kehendak pengurusan dan operasi ATM. Pembangunan ISP ATM merupakan satu cabaran yang perlu ditangani secepat mungkin oleh Jabatan.

Strategi kedua dalam menangani cabaran ini ialah dengan membangunkan pangkalan data berasaskan teknologi *web-based*. Sebenarnya strategi ini telah diguna pakai oleh ATM dengan pembangunan projek Portal melalui tiga perkhidmatan Darat, Laut dan Udara yang telah dimulakan pada tahun 2006 dan siap sepenuhnya pada 2007. Projek yang dibangunkan ini mengintegrasikan semua aplikasi dan maklumat dalam ketiga-tiga cabang perkhidmatan akan menjadi Pusat Rujukan Sumber Maklumat Angkatan Tentera Malaysia. Ini akan membantu menjimatkan kos, masa dan tenaga serta memastikan kehendak perkhidmatan ATM dapat disampaikan dengan lebih efektif dan efisien daripada peringkat atasan kepada anggota bawahan.

Strategi ketiga ialah dengan menggalakkan lebih ramai pegawai dan anggota menyambung pelajaran ke peringkat yang lebih tinggi dalam bidang ICT. Ini adalah penting supaya semua projek serta perancangan berkenaan ICT dapat direalisasikan dengan lebih berkesan dan efektif.

Strategi Keempat ialah menggunakan peluang yang disediakan ICT untuk mempertingkatkan lagi peranan sebagai *Lead Agency* dalam memberi perkhidmatan pengembangan kepada agensi lain melalui Cawangan Peperangan Siber Markas ATM. Cawangan ini boleh mengenal pasti teknologi-teknologi terkini yang boleh diguna pakai demi memajukan ketiga-tiga cabang perkhidmatan ATM dan akan disebarkan menggunakan kaedah ICT. Untuk tujuan ini Cawangan Peperangan Siber ATM perlu mengenal pasti dan membangunkan aplikasi-aplikasi ICT yang boleh membantu mempertingkatkan lagi sistem penyampaian ATM. Dalam konteks ini, cawangan ICT ketiga-tiga perkhidmatan perlu merangka dan membangunkan aplikasi-aplikasi ICT dengan bantuan pihak-pihak yang berkemampuan secara *in-house* atau *outsourcing* yang boleh disalurkan melalui Internet atau media komunikasi lain seperti radio dan *television*.

Untuk meningkatkan kesedaran, keyakinan dan komitmen dalam bidang ICT dan komunikasi moden semua peringkat anggota dalam ketiga-tiga cabang perkhidmatan, ATM perlu lebih memahami tentang kepentingan ICT. Maka perlu untuk menitikberatkan pelaksanaan dasar dan garis panduan ICT yang dikeluarkan oleh MAMPU dan agensi lain yang berkaitan. Ini untuk memastikan ATM tidak ketinggalan dari segi penggunaan teknologi dan pembudayaan ICT di kalangan pegawai dan anggota. Kesedaran, keyakinan dan komitmen semua pihak adalah penting untuk memastikan peruntukan pembangunan yang cukup dan wajar dibelanjakan kepada projek-projek ICT.

Dari segi peruntukan pembangunan yang dibelanjakan di atas projek-projek ICT, didapati jumlah dan peratusan peruntukan pembangunan (1.35% hingga 3.59%) yang dibelanjakan kepada projek-projek ICT adalah jauh lebih kurang daripada syor-syor Badan Bertauliah ICT Antarabangsa seperti KPMG, Deloitte, dan Earnest dan Young, iaitu antara 5% hingga 10% daripada jumlah peruntukan pembangunan sesebuah agensi. Oleh yang demikian, Ketua-ketua Jabatan perlu memahami perkara ini dan mengambil tindakan pembetulan agar pulangan dari pelaburan atas projek-projek ICT dapat dimanfaatkan sepenuhnya oleh ATM.

Dalam usaha mengatasi masalah ketidaksediaan kemudahan rangkaian jalur lebar, *wide area network* dan perhubungan, ATM boleh membina *InternetProvider Virtual Private Network* (IP VPN) yang merupakan satu *dedicated wide area network* menyambungkan Markas ATM ke semua Markas TD, Markas TL dan Markas TU serta semua markas bawahan yang lain.

Strategi seterusnya ialah ATM perlu mempertingkatkan usaha dalam *capacity building* dan menambahkan *critical mass ICT* atau sumber manusia yang mahir dan terlatih dalam bidang ICT. ATM mungkin perlu melihat semula struktur organisasinya dari segi keperluan ICT. Untuk memastikan kejayaan dan keberkesanan program ICT ATM, setiap cawangan atau sel ICT perlu dilengkapi dengan sumber tenaga yang terlatih dalam bidang ICT yang berkaitan. ATM perlu mengkaji semula keperluan kepakaran ICT bagi melaksanakan projek-projek ICT yang teknologinya berkembang dengan begitu pantas.

Bagi setiap peringkat anggota ATM, mereka mesti bersikap ingin belajar dan mengetahui ilmu yang baru terutamanya bidang ICT dan komunikasi moden yang berkembang pesat setiap hari. Latihan secara *hands-on* dan bengkel ICT dan komunikasi moden perlu sentiasa dianjurkan oleh agensi yang berkaitan agar pegawai-pegawai dan anggota-anggota ATM adalah celik ICT dan ilmunya terkini. Latihan secara berterusan ini perlu sentiasa diadakan untuk mengemas kini ilmu dan kemahiran pegawai dan anggota. Di kalangan pegawai dan anggota ATM yang buta ICT, usaha latihan secara berterusan dan praktikal perlu diperbanyakkan di peringkat formasi dan pasukan. Aktiviti promosi, kempen penggunaan kemudahan ICT dan program seperti bengkel kesedaran ICT perlu diadakan dengan lebih kerap untuk mengurangkan jurang digital terutamanya bagi pasukan-pasukan yang terletak di luar bandar yang kurang kemudahan ICT.


KESIMPULAN

Justeru itu, peranan bidang Teknologi Maklumat dan Komunikasi (ICT) dalam menambah baik sistem penyampaian maklumat sesebuah agensi memang tidak dapat dinafikan. Dalam era globalisasi sekarang, semua agensi sama ada sektor awam atau swasta termasuk semua peringkat anggota ATM mesti mengambil peluang meningkatkan tahap pengetahuan ICT untuk membantu mencapai teras perkhidmatan masing-masing. Kegagalan berbuat demikian akan menjadikannya tidak relevan dan

perkhidmatan diberikan kurang berkesan. Oleh itu, setiap peringkat anggota ATM perlu sentiasa peka dan berwaspada tentang peranannya sebagai sebuah agensi yang bertindak sebagai benteng pertahanan negara. Pihak yang terlibat perlu merangka strategi ICT yang mantap dan praktikal untuk memastikan ianya terus relevan dalam alaf baru bagi memastikan pemodenan ATM dapat dicapai.

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Kapt Mohd Eskandar Mirza bin Mohd Yusof merupakan lulusan dari Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia dalam bidang Ijazah Sarjana Muda Kejuruteraan Elektrik dan Elektronik. Beliau telah ditauliahkan ke dalam Kor Rejimen Askar Melayu DiRaja (RAMD) pada 28 Februari 2012. Semasa di university, beliau aktif di dalam berbagai kegiatan sukan terutamanya Tae Kwon Do. Sekarang sedang berkhidmat di Pusat Latihan Mekanise sebagai Pegawai Kenderaan.



"A leader is one who knows the way, goes the way, and shows the way"

(John C Maxwell)

INTRODUCTION

Over half a century has passed since the fall of Singapore in February 1942 in the package of Malaya Campaign and still the questions of why the British and his allies can not sustain the 'Jap' has not been answered. General A.E Percival led over 85,000 troops of the Allied forces and the Royal Malay Regiment to defend Malaya fortress area from Japanese troops, which is less than corps strength. The British with his allies was pictured as undefeated forces, only can lasted to defend Malaya for 70 days. And surprisingly on the 15 February 1945, Lt General Percival has led the allied (British, Indian and Australian) and surrendered to the Japanese while the remaining of 1st and 2nd Royal Malay Regiment are preparing their fight till last blood defence in Mount Faber after withdrawal from Bukit Candu. The issues are still attracting attention among scholarly and historian circles.

In Malaya Campaign, the mistake or wrong decision keeps repeated form battle to battle. There are more than 20 strong defence position was left unattended during the Japanese attack. Most of the discussion has put the blame on the GOC of Malaya, General A.E Percival. As stated by Sun Tzu, "...in any battle or war, the leadership role is significant in determining the eventual outcome..." In wartime, Leaders are measured by their troops. Their enemies measure them too. They are measured by the media. And they are measured by the citizens of the world. However, the failure of British in Malaya Campaign is not totally because of the Percival and it is not fair to put the blame on his alone. It is because of series of mistakes, misinterpretation, wrongly assumed the enemy and situation and the main factor is the diversion of British Empire intention into theatre of war. Churchill is not seriously taking the Malaya Campaign because there are another theatre, the Middle East and Soviet Union.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the General A.E Percival as a failure commander in Malayan Campaign. Three areas will cover: the General and his career, the 'backbone' of commander in affecting the campaign, the issues of Matador Plan, Jitra Line and Southern defence.

LT GEN A.E PERCIVAL

To study leadership, we must know the background of the leader. It is start from his family background, education background and up to the working experience. For military

leaders study, a few combatant elements are necessary such as the battles that he involved before and the unit that he served.

Arthur Percival was born on 26th December 1887. In 1907, he has started working as a clerk for an iron merchant in London. On the first day of the World War I on August 4th 1914, Percival has joined the Officers Training Corps at the age of 26. In 1915, he was sent to France and in 1916 was fought at the Battle of the Somme. In September 1916, he was badly wounded by shrapnel as he led his men into battle near Thiepval. Percival was awarded the Military Cross for his bravery. While recovering from his wounds, Percival was offered a full time commission. In October 1916, he became a captain in the Essex Regiment and in 1917 was promoted to major and then to lieutenant colonel. During the 1918 Spring Offensive, Percival has saved a French artillery unit from attacked and was awarded the Croix de Guerre. He was awarded the DSO for his leadership. When World War 1 ended, Percival was put forward for Staff College.

Between the wars, Percival went with the British Military Mission to Archangel, Russia and then he served in Ireland. He gained a reputation for brutality against republicans and the IRA put a bounty of £1000 on his head. There were two unsuccessful attempts on Percival's life. Between 1923 and 1924, Percival has attended the Staff College at Camberley. He was selected for accelerated promotion. Percival spent four years in West Africa with the Nigeria Regiment and in 1929 was promoted to lieutenant colonel.

After a year at the Royal Naval College Greenwich, Percival became a tutor at the Staff College, Camberley from 1931 to 1932. The commandant at the college, General Sir John Dill thought highly of Percival and referred to his ability as "outstanding". Dill used his influence to get Percival command of the 2nd Battalion, Cheshire Regiment, a post he held from 1932 to 1936. Between 1936 and 1938, Percival has served in Malaya where he was working as a Chief of Staff to GOC Malaya, General Dobbie. In March 1938, he has returned to Britain to work with the General Staff at Aldershot with the rank of brigadier.

Percival has served in the British Expeditionary Force between 1939 and 1940 and after Dunkirk was given the task of commanding 44th (Home Counties) Infantry Division. He was put in charge of defending 60 miles of England's coastline. In April 1941, he was promoted to lieutenant general and appointed GOC (General Officer Commanding) Malaya. This was a significant promotion for him, as he had never commanded an army Corps.

Percival has returned to Britain in September 1945. He has retired from the army in 1946 with the honorary rank of lieutenant general but the pension of his substantive rank of major general. Unusually for a British lieutenant general, Percival was not awarded a knighthood. Percival died on 31st January 1966 at the age of 78 in King Edward VII's Hospital for Officers, Beaumont Street in Westminster and was buried in Hertfordshire.

ANALYSES

Analyses 1: The Percival Backbone.

To answer the accusation on Percival as a failure commander in Malaya Campaign, we should answer five important questions as a military commander. They are; who is Lt Gen A.E Percival? Did he is a successful military officer? Did he involve in any war or battle? What kind of education background that he has?

Percival's career started as a clerk in iron merchant in London. He has joined the Officer Training Corp at the age of 26 during the World War I. As a military officer, he has an excellence experience. He has involved in the Battle of the Somme, wounded badly during led his men at Thiepval¹, served in Russia, Ireland France and West Africa. He has received A Military Cross² and 'Croix de Guerre'³ bravery medal holder. Percival is a Camberley Staff College alumni and was a tutor over there. By reading the biography of Percival, we automatically will conclude that Percival has gained enough and excellence training above usual as a military officer. He has gained a valuable experience in war and proven his bravery and leadership in war. Therefore, on his capability as a GOC in Malaya Campaign is unquestionable and not to forget the Military Cross and 'Croix de Guerre'. He has not been fast promoted because of he is a son of a general or somebody, sending for overseas courses and serve outside by using 'cable' or married to general widow or daughter. Percival has proven that he was an excellence leader in war and peace by his own, a clerk in iron merchant.

In term of Malaya experience, the appointment of GOC Malaya is not his first tour. He has served Malaya twice; for two years (1936 to 1938) as a Chief of Staff to General Dobbie (GOC Malaya). In addition, in 1941, he returns to Malaya for his second tour as a GOC Malaya (Percival, 1948). Based on this information, logically that Percival has completed his task as a Chief of Staff to General Dobbie at par excellence. Therefore, he was recommended and promoted to hold his formal boss appointment. On the other

1. The Battle of Thiepval Ridge was the first large offensive mounted by the British Reserve Army during the Battle of the Somme and was designed to coincide with British Fourth Army's Battle of Morval by starting exactly 24 hours after that. The objective laid out by British was to push the Germans off of the high ground of the Thiepval Ridge including the heavily fortified Stuff, Zollern and Schwaben redoubts

2. The Military Cross (MC) is the third level of military decoration awarded to officers and (since 1993) other ranks of the British Armed Forces and formerly also to officers of other Commonwealth countries. The MC is granted in recognition of "an act or acts of exemplary gallantry during active operations against the enemy on land to all members, of any rank in Our Armed Forces".

3. The **Croix de guerre** (*Cross of War*) is a military decoration of both France and Belgium. It was first created in 1915 in both countries and consists of a square-cross medal on two crossed swords, hanging from a ribbon with various degree pins. The decoration was awarded during World War I, again in World War II, and in other conflicts. The Croix de Guerre was also commonly bestowed on foreign military forces allied to France and Belgium. The Croix de Guerre may either be bestowed as a unit award or to individuals who distinguish themselves by acts of heroism involving combat with enemy forces. The medal is also awarded to those who have been "mentioned in despatches", meaning a heroic deed was performed meriting a citation from an individual's headquarters unit. The unit award of the Croix de Guerre was issued to military commands who performed heroic deeds in combat and were subsequently recognized by headquarters.

hand, Percival is the only qualified and officers who have the Malaya experience. He is the right man to take over General Dobbie. Otherwise, if Percival did not do well in his first duty in Malaya and for sure the British Government will not promote him as a GOC Malaya. Percival is good in his office and field.

However, because of the surrender tragedy in Singapore, Percival became the scapegoat for others. Percival has been blamed for the failure of the British to defence Malaya. Sadly, Percival has retired as Maj Gen instead of Lt Gen and has not been awarded as a British Knighthood⁴ as usual in British military culture. The findings on the Percival 'backbone' analyses are still not conclude anything yet until we have completed other analyses. At this point, there is nothing wrong with Percival idiosyncrasies or leadership.

Analyses 2: Percival Mistake Matador Plan

Even though, the lost of the British troops in Malaya Campaign has caused by various factors but the leadership factors have also significant correlation. The famous Chinese General, Sun Tzu has stated, "...If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, the general is to be blamed. But if his orders are clear, and the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers..." (Cantrell, 2001). Other than poor cooperative among the leaders or failed to control his lower commanders; the Percival leadership itself have also contributed to the lost. During the campaign, Percival had made series of mistake, miscalculation and wrong decision. His planned to defence Malaya was founded on a series of poor assumptions (Mohd Radzi, 2009). This led to the decision to base the defence of the Peninsular on the protection of air and naval bases and forced a thinly spread disposition of forces that were unmatched to the Japanese advance. The conduct of chaotic withdrawals from Pantai Badang and Jitra until Singapore has showed how unorganised Percival operation. On top of that, there are few important locations along the line of Japanese advance have not defended. At some locations, the well prepared defend locations have been ordered to vacate before the arrival of the Japanese troops. So, who should take this responsibility or who suppose to be blamed off? In military ethic and custom, the leader must stand-up to take the responsibility. Therefore, Percival cannot point finger to his lower commander for not fully supporting his planned. Those situations have showed a weakness of Percival in commanding and controlling and leadership attributes at the campaign level. Percival probably good or lucky enough in Thiepval and Battle of the Somme but as a leader in Malaya Campaign, Percival has failed to accomplish his last duty. Not to forget by having an excellence 'backbone' will not guarantee successful in battle. Percival has failed to follow Sun Tzu advise "...speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions..." (Cantrell, 2001).

⁴. The Order of the British Empire is perhaps the most common knighthood given today. It's frequently awarded to civilians for public service and contributions to the nation. Many British scientists, educators, doctors, nurses, charitable and social workers, business people, athletes, writers, actors, musicians, and artists have received this distinction.

The simple calculation to his failure clearly merged into two significant events during the Malaya campaign. Firstly, at the beginning of the campaign, Percival has refused the permission to put 'Operation Matador'⁵ into being operated. This was a plan to setup first layer of defence at Singgora in southern Thailand before Japanese forces to get into it. 'Operation Matador' would take this option away from the Japanese or the fighting for it would be reduced to such a state that the Japanese could not use it operationally (Ong Chit Chung, 1997). Even though, Percival's stand is based on the War Office (led by Churchill) decision, which is not sanction the plan, but as a ground commander Percival should be more firm or reassured on this capable plan. Kurk Hack (2001), claims that Matador would have worked, and its failure left British troops disorganised, demoralised and without adequately prepared fall back positions, so that the failure to launch Matador was the most important cause of the Malaya disaster, if not the fall of the British Empire. So Hack sees Matador as a sensible plan, not carried out because of lack of nerve, or miscalculation by commanders on the spot. However, if Matador had been implemented the Japanese had a counter worked out. They would use the Bangkok airport and the airfields of Southern Siam to enable air cover to be established and then invade.

Analyses 3: Percival Second Mistake Jitra Line.

Secondly, is the defence of Jitra Line. Instead of first line setup of defence in Siam as a buffer before reaching Jitra Line, Percival did not line up anything, which could delay the Japanese advance. According to Lippman (1998), "...Japanese troops storm into Malaya across the Thai frontier and find no resistance. The British are falling back to the Jitra Line..." Some war strategies have commented on Percival first line of defence in Jitra. The Jitra battle should never have been fought precisely because its rear was under threat from the Patani-Kroh exist. Percival was aware that Jitra was not an ideal set-up for a defence against the Japanese, but he had to fight there due to circumstances beyond his control such as the poor quality of the forces in contrast to the "excellent fighting machine". The right locations are a bit down south such as Gurun and Sg Petani, which had the added attraction of better anti-tank ground.

⁵. Operation Matador was a plan of the British Malaya Command to move forces into position (Songkhla) to counter a Japanese amphibious attack on Malaya. In 1937 Maj Gen Dobbie, GOC Malaya (1935-1939), predicted that landings could be made at Songkhla and Pattani. He recommended large reinforcements to be sent immediately. In August 1941 the Commander-in-Chief of British Far East Command Air Chief Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham submitted a plan code named Matador to London for approval. On the December 5, 1941 when the threat of Japanese invasion became more likely, the plan was modified to use the forces available, it was to be put into action as soon as an attack was imminent. The plan was that if an enemy attacked, or were invited into, Siam, troops under British command would rush to Songkhla and defend it against a sea borne attack. This job was allocated to Indian 11th Infantry Division who also had to defend Jitra, this over stretched his resources and made it a difficult task to do. On the December 5, London has given permission for GOC Far East Command to decide if Operation Matador should be activated. The chief strategic decision to be decided whether Siam should be invaded in a pre-emptive move before a Japanese landings took place. The Malaya Command was responsible for the detailed planning of Operation Matador and on December 6, 1941 it had reworked the plan and allocated forces for immediate deployment. Which is what GOC Malaya Arthur Percival recommended that evening in meeting with the Thomas and Popham decided it is premature to launch the operation, which included the pre-emptive move into Siam. With hindsight, this was the wrong decision.

British have prepared Jitra Line for more than six months. It was the monsoon seasons during Japanese troops reach the Jitra Line. Barely 500 Japanese troops attack the British defence locations. As Percival (1948) cited in his report, the troops flees in panic. More than 3,000 British and Indian troops have surrendered. The Japanese has captured 50 field guns, 50 heavy machine guns, 300 trucks and armoured cars, and three months provisions, ammunition, and fuel, to the great relief of Japanese supply officers. Historians describe the battle of Jitra as "a major disaster, a disgrace to British arms" (Lippman, 1998).

According to Lippman, the cause of this debacle is the poor training of the British and Indian troops for jungle warfare, poor equipment (British guns can only fire 12 rounds a day) and weak British leadership. Lt. Gen. Sir Lewis Heath, leading the 3rd Corps has a "withdrawal complex." Australian Maj. Gen. Gordon Bennett is only concerned with providing snappy quotes for reporters and his own escape. Lt. Gen. Arthur Percival, the army commander, is an unimaginative staff officer who refuses to build entrenchments on Malaya because it would be "bad for morale." (Mohd Radzi, 2009).

Analyses 4: Percival Third Mistake Southern Defence.

Percival original plan, Heath's III Corps will defend the Western Sector. However the plan was not materialised because of intervention command by his Supreme Commander, General Wavell. For example, to defend Johor, Wavell's has allotted the key western sector to a commander (Gordon Bennet) who was totally unfamiliar with Japanese fighting methods⁶. He has also cancelled the in-depth defence concept by Percival with lateral defence. Percival who is in charge, instead of arguing his case to his Supreme Commander, Percival had meekly accepted this plan. Other than that, Percival has also wrongly decided when to reject the proposal to construct a series of fixed defence in Johor. According to Summer and McGregor (2003), the historical record shows that Wavell was wrong; indeed it was a miracle that the 45th Brigade has lasted as long as it did against the Imperial Guards, in the process of buying time for 27th Brigade and 9th Indian Division to withdraw from Gemas after the coastal flank had been turned. The biggest error was allotting the key western coast sector to the 45th Indian Brigade. It was newly arrived, totally un-acclimatised and was under-equipped and under-trained. Allen (1997), has stated that, in defending of Singapore; General Wavell had accurately predicted the location of the Japanese attack, but which Percival had disagreed. Percival was refused to build defences along the northern shore of Singapore. He had 6,000 engineers at his disposal and could have done so with some ease. However, Percival did believe that "defences are bad for morale" (Smyth, 1971). Therefore, the Japanese has managed to conduct beach landed with little resistance, when later has make the British defence in chaos and unorganised withdrawal.

⁶ Percival had difficulties with his subordinates Sir Lewis "Piggy" Heath, commanding Indian III Corps, and the independent-minded Gordon Bennett, commanding the Australian 8th Division. The former officer had been senior to Percival prior to his appointment as GOC (Malaya) and found it difficult to serve under him. Bennett was full of confidence in his Australian troops and his own ability, but faced a mixed reaction in Australia when he escaped from Singapore immediately after its surrender.

Beside did not get a full corporation and respect by his subordinate commanders, Percival is a bit weak in his command. At the critical time, Percival same as confuse and under pressure after shocking by Japanese attack from the beginning. At the last defence in Singapore, Percival is very much demoralise and did not have brevity or hesitated to fight. Percival just waited and see. As per Malay proverb '*apa nak jadi, jadilah*'. However, Percival did not except those mistakes as he mention "...we faced a lack of strength in air and naval power. This was the main cause of defeat..." (Jenny, 1997). The point here, there are thousand of logistic supply especially ammunitions, petrol, foods, water and defence equipments was left behind during the withdrawal. Japanese troops has an advantages on those was left behind in safe. Percival should realised his current state logistic support capabilities, and then decide the troop should take together important equipments during the withdrawal. Or hide it for the future use. Percival should make a full used of local resources for food and water. Those weaknesses in logistic support become the main reason for Percival to decide to surrender. It stated in his last message to his troops.

IMMEDIATE.
Commander 3rd Corps.

"G" 1.,
Staff Message Control,
Chief Cipher Officer.

It has been necessary to give up the struggle, but I want the reason explained to all ranks. The Forward troops continue to hold their ground, but the essentials of war have run short. In a few days we shall have neither petrol nor food. Many types of ammunition are short, and the water supply, on which the vast civilian population and many of the fighting troops are dependant, threatens to fail. This situation has been brought about partly by being driven off our dumps and partly by hostile artillery and air action. Without these sinews of war, we cannot fight on.

I thank all ranks for their efforts throughout the campaign.

"G" Ops.
15 Feb 42.

(Sgd) A.E.PERCIVAL, Lieut.Gen.,
G.O.C. Malaya Command.

Percival Last Message before Surrender.

Source: Malaysian Army Museum.

Overall, in defending southern Malaya, he has failed to take the two actions, which might have given him the time he required to hold back the invasion. Firstly, he has failed to concentrate his ground forces in vital areas to meet the main enemy thrust as his forces were, at the outbreak of the war, scattered all over Malaya in the defence of airfields. Secondly, he has failed to make every effort to construct field and anti-tank defence at the bottlenecks on the north south lines of communication and to ensure that adequate defences covered the three approaches to Johore Bahru.

CONCLUSION

Malaya was lost for many of the above contributing reasons. In summary, the commanders and ideas were poor and unprepared to meet the challenges of committed, aggressive, well-prepared, focused and experienced Japanese Army leaders. This led to indecisive, out-maneuvred and embarrassing defeat of the Allied forces.

It is true that Percival was often fighting the campaign under extremely adverse conditions; the problems in his relationship with his subordinate commanders, the problems in dealing with the Colonial Governor and his office and the problems with his Supreme Commander. Perhaps what Percival would be needed to do was to be more forceful. It is true that these relationships were a constant problem and hindrance to Percival in his attempt to fight the Malaya Campaign and it would be tempting to speculate what the end result could have been had Percival to deal with these problems in a more forceful manner. However, the fact is that he failed to tackle these problems, that he allowed these problems to fester throughout the campaign and distracting his attention from the more pressing matter of defending the peninsular and the island. To some historians, the main factors of the British failures are diversion attention between two theatres of war; Malaya and the Britain's defence at the Middle East and the Soviet Union. Therefore, Middle East and Soviet Union theatres had received higher priorities in the allocation of men and material⁷.

Before I end this discussion, we must remember that in the modern warfare, leadership cannot gain the victory alone. It must be supported with others factors such as the followers (soldiers), faith and the enemies. As George S. Patton famous quote "don't tell people how to do things, tell them what to do and let them surprise you with their results". Perhaps no commander could have saved the Malaya Campaign; certainly, Percival was unable to. Whether history will eventually see Percival in a more positive light, however, remains to be seen. The question of 'WHAT IF' cannot be discussed because it is history and real, so reject 'What If'. So Percival has to face the reality "A real leader faces the music, even when he doesn't like the tune".

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⁷. The Japanese invaded with over two hundred tanks and yet the British Army in Malaya did not have even one. Indeed, Churchill himself had diverted some 350 older model tanks from Malaya to the Soviet Union, following the German invasion, as a show of good faith between the allies. As they were more than a match for the light and medium Japanese tanks used in the invasion of Malaya, their presence could well have turned the tide of battle.

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PENDAHULUAN

Statistik Jabatan Perangkaan Malaysia, menunjukkan jumlah pengangguran negara meningkat daripada 351,400 ribu orang (2010), kepada 418,000 ribu orang (2016). Dalam hal ini, pesara tentera juga terlibat dalam masalah pengangguran ini apabila gagal mendapat sebarang pekerjaan setelah meninggalkan perkhidmatan. Data pekerjaan oleh Jabatan Hal Ehwal Veteran (JHEV) menunjukkan jumlah pesara tentera yang berjaya dikesan dan bekerja semula adalah di sekitar 24%. Bilangan ini adalah sangat kecil berbanding 48% pesara tentera yang telah berjaya menamatkan latihan kemahiran di pusat-pusat latihan PERHEBAT, 24% daripada pusat latihan awam dan 28% menjalani latihan persendirian. Jumlah tersebut menunjukkan pesara tentera yang bekerja masih lagi rendah berbanding dengan pesara tentera yang tidak bekerja atau sedang mencari pekerjaan walaupun mereka telah menghadiri latihan kemahiran yang sama. Pelbagai bentuk bantuan telah diberikan oleh kerajaan kepada pesara tentera seperti bantuan kewangan dan pelancaran 1VETERAN yang bertujuan menyediakan peluang pekerjaan kepada pesara tentera yang secara holistiknya menjaga kebajikan pesara tentera.

Permasalahan ini dilihat berpunca daripada kurangnya kemampuan untuk mengurus kerjaya dengan betul. Malah, pesara tentera dilihat masih tidak dapat merancang pekerjaan yang diinginkan, kurang berupaya untuk mengadaptasi pengalaman semasa dalam perkhidmatan dengan kehidupan selepas bersara. Latihan kemahiran vokasional yang diperoleh sekadar sebagai syarat sebelum bersara walaupun bidang latihan kemahiran vokasional tersebut adalah atas pilihan sendiri. Mereka masih mencari-cari pekerjaan yang bersesuaian dengan kemahiran yang ada, tidak mendapat sokongan terhadap pekerjaan yang dipilih, faktor umur, dan kurang berdikari dalam menguruskan kerjaya. Secara tidak langsung memberi gangguan terhadap psikologi pesara tentera daripada segi emosi, mental dan tindakan untuk memenuhi tuntutan pasaran pekerjaan dan peluang pekerjaan dalam pasaran buruh.

PERKHIDMATAN ANGKATAN TENTERA MALAYSIA

Sebagai anggota lain-lain pangkat di dalam Angkatan Tentera Malaysia, sama ada Tentera Darat, Tentera Laut dan Tentera Udara, mereka diberi pilihan untuk berkhidmat dalam Angkatan Tentera Malaysia dalam tempoh tertentu. Tempoh perkhidmatan dalam angkatan tentera bagi anggota lain-lain pangkat ialah 10 tahun, 13 tahun, 15 tahun, 18 tahun, 21 tahun, 22 tahun dan 23 tahun. Walau bagaimanapun, kini anggota tentera boleh berkhidmat sehingga 25 tahun sekiranya khidmat mereka masih

diperlukan. Taraf pendidikan yang paling minima diterima pada satu ketika dahulu ialah darjah enam, Sijil Rendah Malaysia (SRP) dan Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM). Setelah sampai tempoh tertentu, anggota tentera akan melalui proses persaraan. Persaraan terbahagi kepada dua iaitu bersara wajib atau bersara pilihan. Ini bermaksud mereka boleh bersara apabila tamat atau sebelum tamat tempoh perkhidmatan. Bagi anggota tentera yang mempunyai masalah kesihatan serta tidak berupaya menjalankan tugas, mereka akan dinasihatkan untuk bersara awal. Akhir sekali ialah anggota yang mempunyai masalah disiplin dan rekod yang buruk, akan diberhentikan dan tidak layak untuk menerima latihan pra-persaraan.

Sebelum bersara, pesara tentera ini perlu melalui program peralihan kemahiran. Contohnya program pendidikan teknikal dan vokasional. Program peralihan kemahiran ini bertujuan memperoleh satu kemahiran tambahan selain daripada pengalaman semasa dalam angkatan tentera untuk digunakan bagi menghadapi cabaran kehidupan sebagai orang awam. Pendekatan ini mempunyai pelbagai bentuk perlaksanaan, tetapi objektif utamanya adalah membekalkan pengetahuan dan kemahiran yang diperlukan kepada pelatih untuk berinteraksi secara terus kepada tempat pekerjaan. Latihan kemahiran vokasional ini bermula dalam tempoh dua tahun dan tempoh program peralihan ini adalah berbeza mengikut kategori dan pangkat. Program latihan kemahiran vokasional untuk bakal pesara tentera ini bukan sahaja diwujudkan untuk pesara tentera di Malaysia tetapi juga di beberapa buah negara luar seperti di Britain, Amerika Syarikat, Singapura, Taiwan dan India. Walau bagaimanapun, setelah pesara tentera menamatkan program peralihan kemahiran, bermulanya cabaran yang perlu dilalui oleh pesara tentera dalam meneruskan kehidupan mereka selepas bersara. Cabaran yang paling utama ialah menguruskan kehidupan terutamanya dalam mencari pekerjaan untuk menyara keluarga. Peralihan kerjaya ini dianggap sebagai sukar oleh pesara tentera kerana kehidupan dan pekerjaan yang dilalui semasa dalam alam ketenteraan adalah jauh berbeza berbanding dengan kehidupan sebagai orang awam. Mereka juga kurang berpengetahuan untuk mendapatkan bantuan dan sokongan daripada mana-mana pihak.

PENGURUSAN KERJAYA SELEPAS MENAMATKAN PERKHIDMATAN

Berdasarkan kepada kajian lepas, pesara tentera turut menyatakan bahawa kesulitan yang dialami bukan sahaja pada diri sendiri malah melibatkan keluarga. Kajian menjelaskan bahawa kebanyakan pesara tentera berhadapan dengan alam persaraan tanpa pengurusan kerjaya yang sempurna sukar untuk menyesuaikan diri dengan dunia persaraan. Kesukaran ini disebabkan pesara tentera memilih profesion yang berlainan atau tidak menjurus mengikut apa yang dipelajari ataupun masih tidak mempunyai pekerjaan dalam jangka masa yang lama setelah bersara. Ini jelas dilihat apabila saban tahun jumlah pesara tentera yang masih menganggur meningkat dan tidak mampu melihat peluang-peluang yang ada di sekeliling mereka. Masalah ini berterusan apabila latihan kemahiran yang diikuti tidak bersesuaian dengan jawatan yang dimohon, penguasaan bahasa Inggeris yang lemah dan masalah lebihan umur. Kecenderungan majikan untuk memilih calon-calon yang lebih muda juga menyebabkan pesara tentera berhadapan dengan kesukaran untuk memperoleh pekerjaan. Terdapat juga kejadian di

mana kegagalan untuk mendapat pekerjaan selepas bersara adalah disebabkan persepsi majikan yang stereotaip dalam sektor pekerjaan seperti kemampuan untuk bekerja terutama bagi golongan pekerja yang sudah lanjut usia. Ini menyebabkan pesara tentera sukar mengaplikasikan pengetahuan dan kemahiran mereka yang diperoleh semasa berkhidmat dan semasa latihan kemahiran.

Kajian lepas juga menunjukkan terdapat pesara tentera yang memiliki kemahiran yang tidak selari dengan kehendak pasaran pekerjaan, tidak mengetahui strategi kerjaya yang berkesan, kurang panduan daripada mereka yang berjaya, kurang sokongan dari pusat latihan kemahiran dan Jabatan Kebajikan Veteran. Selain itu, terdapat sebahagian pesara tentera tidak menghadiri sebarang latihan kemahiran yang ditawarkan sebaliknya memilih untuk menjalani latihan kemahiran sendiri. Mereka beranggapan tempoh persaraan sebagai tempoh berehat dan tidak sanggup berjauhan dengan keluarga. Segelintir daripada mereka memilih bidang latihan yang dijalani sekadar memenuhi syarat perkhidmatan, tidak serius ketika menghadiri temu duga dan terlalu memilih dalam mencari pekerjaan. Sikap dan pemikiran sebegini selalu dinyatakan oleh pesara tentera apabila pemantauan dijalankan untuk mengenal pasti punca mereka gagal memperoleh pekerjaan. Secara tidak langsung menunjukkan bahawa masih terdapat segelintir pesara tentera yang tidak ambil peduli tentang pembangunan kerjaya mereka selepas bersara. Kajian juga menunjukkan bahawa pesara tentera yang menganggur adalah mereka yang tidak membuat pengurusan kerjaya yang rapi ketika berhadapan dengan peralihan kerjayanya sebelum bersara. Kajian lepas menunjukkan kebanyakan pesara tentera tidak mampu melihat peluang-peluang yang ada di sekeliling mereka sedangkan peluang pekerjaan yang ditawarkan adalah melebihi 20 jenis jawatan dalam pelbagai sektor seperti pertanian, perikanan, peruncitan dan perhotelan serta hospitaliti. Mereka terpaksa menjalani perubahan corak penghidupan sebagai orang awam secara tiba-tiba setelah lebih 20 tahun menjalani kehidupan sebagai anggota tentera.

Bagi pesara tentera yang memperoleh pekerjaan selepas bersara, biasanya mereka adalah terdiri daripada orang yang berkemampuan untuk menguruskan kerjaya sendiri. Pengurusan kerjaya yang betul dapat membantu pesara tentera ini mengetahui sejauh mana kemampuan mereka dalam memadankan dengan pekerjaan baru, malah mereka juga mampu untuk menyesuaikan diri dengan situasi pekerjaan baru. Namun, menyesuaikan diri dengan situasi baru adalah agak sukar pada peringkat awal, apatah lagi jika pekerjaan yang baru diceburi cukup berbeza daripada bidang pekerjaan sebelum ini. Kekangan dalam memperoleh pekerjaan akan timbul sekiranya pesara tentera ini sukar menyesuaikan diri. Ini adalah kerana mereka memerlukan masa untuk menghadapi situasi yang berbeza dan seterusnya mempunyai hubung kait dengan psikologi dan sikap sebagai bekas tentera. Permasalahan ketidakjelasan terhadap kompetensi diri dalam menguruskan kerjaya juga menyebabkan mereka keliru terhadap potensi diri terutama yang berkaitan dengan penerokaan peluang dan pembangunan kerjaya kedua.

PENYEDIAAN DAN APLIKASI KEMAHIRAN DAN PENGALAMAN

Pengadaptasian pengalaman dan kemahiran yang dimiliki dapat memberi perubahan kepada tingkah laku, sikap dan pemikiran agar bertindak balas dengan tuntutan. Secara tidak langsung ia satu proses perkembangan seseorang individu di dalam meningkatkan potensi diri, bakat, nilai, personaliti dan kapasiti diri untuk mengikuti aliran masa dan usia. Sehubungan itu, pesara tentera perlu berusaha untuk melengkapkan diri dengan sesuatu kerjaya yang dapat memberikan makna kepada kehidupan mereka. Bagi menangani situasi ini, pesara tentera perlu memperlengkapkan diri mereka sebaik mungkin bagi menembusi pasaran kerja dan merebut peluang pekerjaan yang ada kerana usia mereka yang masih muda untuk bekerja. Di samping memperlengkapkan diri dengan ilmu pengetahuan di dalam bidang yang diceburi, kemahiran-kemahiran teknikal juga diperlukan supaya mereka berkompetensi untuk mengurus kerjaya mereka sendiri. Ini berikutan kajian mendapati institusi latihan vokasional yang melatih pesara tentera masih kurang menekankan elemen pengurusan pekerjaan walaupun setelah tamat latihan kemahiran. Berdasarkan kepada Laporan Eksekutif Kajian Pengesanan Pesara pada tahun 2015, ia menyatakan bahawa penilaian pesara tentera terhadap pengurusan kerjaya khususnya dalam aspek pembentukan sikap, personaliti dan kompetensi mengurus kerjaya masih tidak mencapai tahap memuaskan.

CABARAN PESARA TENTERA

Terdapat tiga permasalahan utama yang dibangkitkan oleh pesara-pesara tentera iaitu pemberian tanah dan perumahan mampu milik, kadar pencen bagi pesara tentera golongan orang kurang upaya (OKU) dan kemahiran di dalam ATM yang tidak diiktiraf.

Bantuan Pemilikan Rumah

Bagi permasalahan pertama yang berkaitan dengan pemberian tanah atau rumah mampu milik kepada pesara tentera, Persatuan Bekas Tentera Malaysia (PBTM) menggesa kerajaan negeri mempertimbangkan pemberian tanah atau rumah sebagai tanda menghargai pengorbanan pesara. Menurut Muhammad Abdul Ghani, bekas Presiden PBTM, sebilangan besar bekas tentera di negara ini didapati tidak memiliki harta selepas bersara. Justeru itu, beliau mencadangkan agar sebuah perkampungan pahlawan ditubuhkan di atas sebuah tapak yang diluluskan kerajaan negeri bagi membina rumah dan menjalankan aktiviti ekonomi. PBTM sentiasa bekerja dan berusaha untuk membantu anggota tentera yang telah bersara, terutama mereka yang tidak berharta agar diberi tanah (bagi membina rumah mereka) oleh kerajaan negeri masing-masing supaya mereka akan merasakan kebajikan mereka dijaga oleh kerajaan.

Pesara tentera hendaklah mendaftar dengan PBTM negeri masing-masing supaya persatuan dapat mengendalikan kes-kes kebajikan dengan bantuan kerajaan negeri. Pesara juga dicadangkan supaya melibatkan diri dalam koperasi supaya koperasi terbabit dapat membantu pesara untuk memulakan atau melibatkan diri dalam

perniagaan. Keputusan Kerajaan Negeri Perak untuk memperuntukkan sebanyak 7,000 lot tanah untuk bekas tentera harus menjadi contoh kepada negeri-negeri lain di negara ini. Kakitangan bekas tentera tidak pernah meminta banyak daripada kerajaan sebagai balasan kepada perkhidmatan mereka. Bagaimanapun, negara mesti menetapkan *standard* untuk mengiktiraf pengorbanan mereka supaya generasi muda tahu peranan penting bekas tentera dalam menjaga keamanan dan kemakmuran negara yang telah kita capai pada hari ini. Secara tidak langsung, inisiatif ini mungkin mampu menarik minat golongan belia untuk memilih tentera sebagai kerjaya masa depan mereka.

Kadar Pencen Untuk Anggota Kurang Upaya

Permasalahan kedua ialah kadar pencen pesara tentera yg terdiri daripada orang kurang upaya (OKU). Seramai kira-kira 337 orang pesara Angkatan Tentera Malaysia (ATM) yang cedera semasa operasi dan latihan bermula dari 1970 hingga 1989 amat mengharapkan pembelaan daripada kerajaan. Ini kerana JHEV sehingga kini masih tidak meluluskan permohonan mereka untuk menaikkan kadar pencen orang kurang upaya (OKU) yang kini berada pada kadar lama iaitu antara RM120 hingga RM300 sebulan mengikut jenis kecederaan. Adakah anggota badan bekas tentera seperti kaki, tangan dan mata yang telah dikorbankan itu bernilai ratusan ringgit sahaja? Adakah itu nilai yang wajar dibayar kepada bekas tentera yang telah berjuang bermati-matian sehingga pengganas komunis menyerah kalah pada 1989? Walaupun dilayan sedemikian rupa, pesara tentera tidak pernah mempersoalkan kenapa pengganas komunis yang telah menyerah kalah diberikan tanah dan penempatan khusus untuk mereka. Pesara tentera akui kerajaan ada memberi perhatian terhadap nasib mereka termasuk memberi kaki palsu percuma setelah keluar dari hospital dan dibenarkan terus berkhidmat dengan ATM. Cuma selepas bersara, sokongan yang diberikan kepada mereka hilang secara beransur-ansur. Antara punca pencen OKU yang diterima pesara tentera sangat kecil kerana kaedah pengiraan lapuk yang masih digunakan berdasarkan amalan tentera Inggeris. Bayangkanlah perbezaannya apabila elaun yang diberikan Jabatan Kebajikan Masyarakat (JKM) kepada OKU adalah lebih tinggi berbanding yang elaun diterima oleh mereka sebagai OKU pesara tentera. Oleh itu, mereka berharap masalah ini dapat diatasi segera. Berikutan masa yang berlalu, sebahagian daripada mereka telah dikategorikan sebagai warga emas yang sudah tidak larat lagi untuk bekerja. Sudah sampai masanya kadar pencen berkenaan ditambah baik atau pesara tentera OKU terbabit diberikan elaun khas sekurang-kurangnya RM500 sebulan serta dibayar sugu hati sekali sahaja mengikut jenis kecederaan masing-masing.

Pengiktirafan Kemahiran

Permasalahan ketiga adalah kemahiran yang diperoleh oleh pesara tentera dalam perkhidmatan ATM tidak diiktiraf oleh majikan luar. Kepakaran seperti dalam bidang kejuruteraan, memandu tidak laku untuk digunakan ketika memohon kerja selepas bersara benar-benar menimbulkan kekesalan kepada pesara tentera. Perkara utama yang menjadi persoalan ialah sijil kemahiran kebanyakan pesara tidak diiktiraf agensi kerajaan atau swasta. Ini termasuk dalam bidang kejuruteraan, perubatan dan pengendalian kenderaan, sedangkan anggota tentera juga menjalani kursus kemahiran

sama seperti yang dipelajari oleh orang awam. Ini telah menyulitkan mereka untuk mendapatkan kerja terutama setelah menamatkan perkhidmatan dengan Angkatan Tentera Malaysia (ATM).

Seorang tentera yang baru menamatkan perkhidmatan akan mula menyedari masalah di sekelilingnya. Contohnya, kepakaran mereka tidak diiktiraf seperti dalam bidang kejuruteraan elektronik. Kalau diikutkan, sukatan pelajaran yang mereka pelajari adalah hampir sama seperti dikeluarkan Institut Kemahiran MARA. Persoalan sekarang adalah kenapa ianya tidak diselaraskan dengan sijil kemahiran yang dikeluarkan kerajaan ataupun mana-mana institusi berkaitan. Belajar di pusat latihan tentera tidak banyak bezanya dengan pusat latihan awam yang lain. Bezanya dengan kakitangan kerajaan yang lain, kerjaya tentera perlu meninggalkan perkhidmatan pada usia muda. Menurut Sukaيمي Sungep, 59, "Saya ada sijil radio elektronik. Pernah saya ke Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam (JPA) meminta supaya sijil saya diiktiraf setaraf seperti yang dikeluarkan oleh Majlis Latihan Vokasional Kebangsaan (MLVK). Selepas bertekak dengan kakitangan JPA, akhirnya dikeluarkan sijil yang setaraf dengan MLVK pada tahap kemahiran tertentu". Contoh lain seperti kemahiran memandu kenderaan. Pesara tentera hanya memandu trak ketika berkhidmat tetapi tidak diiktiraf kemahiran itu setelah berhenti daripada perkhidmatan tentera disebabkan lesen yang mereka miliki bukan dikeluarkan Jabatan Pengangkutan Jalan (JPJ). Hakikatnya, mereka belajar undang-undang memandu yang sama, melalui jalan raya yang sama. "Kenapa lesen memandu mereka tidak diiktiraf JPJ sedangkan mereka menghabiskan masa tiga bulan di Taiping untuk latihan sebelum mendapat lesen memandu. Malah mereka turut diajar kemahiran mengenai enjin, membaca peta dan kemahiran lain yang berkaitan sebagai persediaan seandainya berlaku sebarang kemungkinan," ujarnya.

Bantuan Sara Diri, Perubatan Dan Pendidikan Anak-Anak

Selain itu, masalah yang melibatkan kebajikan pesara tentera ialah gagal untuk mendapatkan bantuan sara diri, perubatan dan pendidikan anak-anak. Kebanyakan pesara kes ini terdiri daripada pesara awal yang tidak berpencen. Masalah pesara awal sering dipaparkan di akhbar dan kebanyakannya tinggal di kawasan kampung dan melakukan kerja bercucuk tanam serta menternak kambing atau lembu. Kebanyakan Pesara awal tidak bekerja kerana disebabkan faktor usia dan kesihatan. Ada juga yang berniaga tetapi gagal. Ada yang cuba mendapatkan bantuan tetapi jika isteri bekerja, mereka tidak layak untuk mendapat bantuan kerana syarat utama pendapatan isi rumah mesti di bawah RM700 sebulan. Apa yang menimbulkan rasa tidak puas hati kelompok ini ialah kenapa mesti dikaitkan pemberian bantuan dengan pendapatan isteri? Bagi pesara berpencen pula, mereka memendam rasa dalam soal kenaikan pencen. Ini adalah kerana penyelarasan pencen untuk pesara tentera tidak sama seperti bekas kakitangan awam yang lain. Kenaikan diterima kakitangan awam hampir 70 peratus, sedangkan pesara tentera hanya menerima sagu hati sebanyak RM50. Malah, mereka turut mempertikaikan pengiraan kadar pencen. Ini kerana wang pencen itu adalah wang

simpanan di Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT), selain soal wang imbuhan persaraan awal yang membabitkan anggota yang berkhidmat selama 13 tahun, 15 tahun dan 18 tahun.

Seharusnya tidak wujud masalah kaedah pengiraan wang imbuhan, yang didakwa tidak dikira bermula dari tarikh mereka menyertai perkhidmatan iaitu semasa menyertai Perajurit Muda di pusat-pusat latihan ATM dan bukannya setelah tiga atau empat tahun berkhidmat. Keadaan ini amat mengecewakan kebanyakan pesara, terutama yang berkhidmat kurang dari 21 tahun. Satu Akta khusus perlu dirangka untuk membantu pesara terutama mereka yang tidak berpuas hati. Dengan Akta itu, sudah pasti nasib kebanyakan pesara tentera akan terbela dan dapat menyelesaikan pelbagai masalah yang timbul membabitkan bekas tentera. Akta Veteran Angkatan Tentera Malaysia (ATM) harus dibawa ke Parlimen untuk dibahaskan bagi menjaga kebajikan anggota tentera yang telah meninggalkan perkhidmatan. Menyentuh soal pengiktirafan sijil kemahiran tentera, tidak boleh disangkal lagi kemahiran asas untuk bidang tertentu seperti jurutera, pemandu lori/trak seharusnya diiktiraf bagi membolehkan mereka mendapat pekerjaan selepas bersara. Sekalipun tujuan asal kemahiran yang dibekalkan kepada anggota tentera mahupun pengetahuan yang diperolehi adalah untuk tujuan peperangan, tetapi ada kemahiran tertentu yang boleh digunakan selepas mereka bersara. Akta ini akan mampu memberi nafas baru di dalam membela nasib 300,000 pesara tentera di seluruh negara yang ketika ini masih mencari-cari peluang pekerjaan selepas mencurahkan bakti setia kepada negara tercinta dalam Angkatan Tentera Malaysia.

KESIMPULAN

Kesimpulannya, permasalahan-permasalahan yang dihadapi oleh pesara tentera ini haruslah diselesaikan dengan cara yang terbaik agar semua pihak akan berpuas hati dan kebajikan pesara tentera lebih terjaga. Kepakaran yang ada pada pesara semasa berada didalam perkhidmatan seharusnya diambil kira bagi memudahkan peluang mendapat pekerjaan selepas meninggalkan perkhidmatan seterusnya menjalani kehidupan yang lebih selesa selepas bersara. Kebajikan mereka seharusnya menjadi keutamaan oleh kerajaan sesuai dengan jasa dan pengorbanan yang telah diberikan oleh mereka kepada negara.

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Kapt Mohd Izzuddin bin Khamarolman telah ditauliahkan ke dalam Rejimen Askar Melayu DiRaja (RAMD) pada 17 Januari 2009 selepas menamatkan latihan sebagai Pegawai Kadet di Kolej Tentera Darat, Ulu Tiram Johor. Beliau kemudiannya berkhidmat di Pasukan 10 RAMD selama lebih kurang enam tahun iaitu sehingga 11 Januari 2015 sebelum bertukar keluar ke PALAPES UPM sehingga sekarang.



INTRODUCTION

ISAF is one of the biggest coalitions in history, which is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) most challenging mission. It involved not less than 130,000 personnel from more than 50 various countries inclusive their partnerships was deployed in Afghanistan.¹ The Afghan government recognize the ability of Malaysia as a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), is actively involved in a humanitarian assistance mission, such as at Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and



Figure 1: Location of Bamiyan Province in Afghanistan²

1. NATO ISAF, <www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html>.retrieved on 23 Mac 2015

2. Map World, <http://www.mapsofworld.com/afghanistan/> retrieved on 30 Jun 2015
<http://www.mapsofworld.com/afghanistan/>

Sudan. Malaysian Contingent International Security Assistance Force (MALCON ISAF) was stationed in Bamiyan, Afghanistan together with the New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team (NZPRT), as part of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (Hardi, 2010).

The MALCON ISAF was first established in July 2010 through the solicitation of the Afghan government³. This mission is extraordinary, as its essential obligation is to assist in Nation Building and Reconstruction particularly in the Bamiyan Province. Thus, the Contingent would comprise of specialists undertaking both medical and engineering task in a region seriously harrowed by clash. Unnecessary to specify that nation building and reconstruction are not new to the Malaysian Armed Forces as these were successfully conducted in our Security and Development strategy or KESBAN against the Communist Insurgency. The key variations would be a different population, more challenging terrain and others. Further to that, MALCON ISAF was required to function in a multinational coalition where a high degree of interoperability is paramount to its success.

MALAYSIA PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

International operations the peacekeepers began to gather around and grow as a result of actions of the United Nations (UN) to address the problem of peace in the world. The mandate of the task of preserving peace is different from one case to another case with its main political task is to determine the local conflict does not spread and invite regional problems worse. Since the UN was established on 24 October 1945, through his/her namely the Security Council, the UN has a lot of play its role in upholding international peace and security (Alan, 1990).

After attaining independence on 31 August 1957, Malaysia who was known as Malaya, have applied to the UN. The inclusion of Malaysia is progressing well after getting support and help from other Commonwealth countries, especially from Britain and Australia. However Malaysia only accepted formally as a member of the UN on September 17, 1957, when Malaya at that time was invited to attend the Conference the 12th session General Assembly as a member of the UN to eighty two and is a member of Commonwealth of Nations into the ten participating.⁴

For a country newly achieved independence, Malaysia's participation in the international operations not only to satisfy his claims as UN members but more its contribution to international peace. For that Malaysia has been actively in its ability in terms of expertise and finance, involving members of the security forces in the UN peace mission. MAF has been involved in the mission and operations of the UN peacekeepers

³. *ibid.*

⁴. Rajmah Hussain, 1998, *Malaysia and the United Nation, A Study of Foreign Policy Priorities*, Heineman Educational Books (Asia) Ltd, Kuala Lumpur, p 132.

since the year 1960 in his first mission in Congo.⁵ The operations of UN peacekeepers is usually divided into two main categories, namely, the first is by placing a combat team (troop) ranging from Malaysian Battalion (MALBATT) who are doing the work of peacekeepers based on the terms of reference given. While second are by sending a team of military observers and the staff to serve in headquarters and at the site where the mission is carried out.⁶ In addition there are also members of the army that was sent as an interpreter such as missions in East Timor.

BACKGROUND OF NATO ISAF

Ahmad Shah Massoud was assassinated by two Arab suicide bombers in Afghanistan on 9 September 2001.⁷ Few days later, around 3,000 peoples being victims of organized attack on Twin Towers of New York on 11 September 2001. This happened when the suicide bombers from Afghan-based Al-Qaeda hijacked planes and fly them to the Twin Towers in New York and Pentagon Building in Washington DC. Due to that, US President (George W. Bush) has accused Osama bin Laden and his friends Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the men behind the attacked.⁸ Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin Laden to US authorities or to disband al-Qaeda base in Afghanistan. This was led US and Allies to launch “Operation Enduring Freedom” against the Taliban.

Security Council of the United Nations in Resolution 1386 established the ISAF where NATO was given responsibility to lead security mission in Afghanistan. ISAF was established in accordance with the Bonn Conference in December 2001.⁹ Leaders of the opposition from various parties in Afghanistan attended the conference working together with the ultimate objective to setup a new government framework called the Afghanistan Transitional Authority. The concept is to aid UN to support Transitional Authority to create a secure environment in Kabul and help them continue with its plans to redevelop Afghanistan.¹⁰ This agreement has given way to the establishment of three joint networks between the Afghan Transitional Authority, the United Nations Assistance Mission Agency (UNAMA) and ISAF.

ISAF headquarters came from 3rd United Kingdom Mechanized Division, which arrived in Afghanistan in December 2001. The Division consists of small group Div headquarters and a brigade to control the capital Kabul known as the Kabul Multinational Brigade. This Brigade acts as the Tactical Command and contains three

⁵. Rajmah Hussain, op cit, p 12.

⁶. ibid.

⁷. Der Spiegel, 2007, *Inside 9-11: What Really Happened*, Macmillan, p 43. Leigh Neville, 2015, *The British Army in Afghanistan 2006-14: Task Force Helmand*, Osprey Publishing, p 23.

⁸. ibid.

⁹. Leigh Neville, 2015, *The British Army in Afghanistan 2006-14: Task Force Helmand*, Osprey Publishing, p 23.

¹⁰. John Pike, 2003, *Bamian*, Global Security Article.

Fighting Groups. ISAF headquarters acts as the control center of the mission. At first, ISAF Chief Government rotated every six months among the countries involved. However, the rotation rule has caused many security problems.¹¹

Then, on August 11, 2003, under the control of NATO ISAF handed over in full and terminates the rotation rule. NATO is responsible for the administration, coordination and planning, including the armed forces and appoints the Chief Military Headquarters in Afghanistan. On 13 Oct 2003, the UN Security Council grants ISAF a broader role includes all of Afghanistan. Process control throughout Afghanistan (See Figure 2) is divided into 4 stages as follow:¹²

- a. Stage 1: Mastery of Northern Afghanistan was completed on October 1, 2004.
- b. Stage 2: Mastery of the Western Region of Afghanistan was completed in September 2005.




Figure 2: ISAF Expansion from 2004 to 2006¹³

¹¹. *ibid.*

¹². NATO, 2014, *ISAF: Key Fact and Figures*, NATO Article.

¹³. NATO ISAF, *loc cit.*

c. Stage 3: Mastery of the Southern Region of Afghanistan was completed in July 2006.

d. Stage 4: ISAF took responsibility for the whole of Afghanistan was completed in October 2006.

ISAF's success is not just mastery of the entire territory of Afghanistan but managed to attract more countries to participate to help Afghanistan rebuild the country has been ravaged by war and restore the country's system of government. There are more 50 NATO and non-NATO countries, including Malaysia, are in Afghanistan.¹⁴

MALAYSIAN CONTINGENT INVOLVEMENT

Based on the expertise, commitments and excellence of Malaysia's involvements in international humanitarian relief mission track record, it encourages Afghanistan government to invite Malaysia to participate in a humanitarian assistance mission in their country. Malaysia's involvement in ISAF is the result from the official visit of the Defense Minister of Afghanistan to Malaysia.¹⁵ He invites the government to assist in capacity building and redevelopment areas in Afghanistan.

The sense of caring towards the suffering, pain and distress felt by the peoples of Afghanistan, Malaysia responded to the invitation and extended a hand compelled by providing assistance to the building and reconstruction of Afghanistan. In order to meet the government requirement, the Malaysia Armed Forces has been task to establish a team to give humanitarian assistance aid to Afghanistan in medical and health aspects. Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) has been instructed to carry out this responsibility.¹⁶ The JFHQ has mobilized a team known as the Malaysian Contingent International Security Assistance Force or MALCON ISAF to join Operation Interim National Support and Assistance to Afghanistan (OP INSAF). MALCON presence in ISAF is accordance with the decision by UN Security Council to balance the presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan. MALCON territory entrusted to carry out that mission in Bamiyan Province. Malaysia placed under the tactical control of the NZ troops whose overseeing the redevelopment process in Bamiyan Province.¹⁷

The first group, known as MALCON 1 ISAF was sent to Bamiyan, Afghanistan led by advance party on 24 July 2010, while the main group on 21 October 2010. MAF contingent consists of a total of 40 team members from Medical Teams, security team,

¹⁴. *ibid.*

¹⁵. JF HQ, 2010, *MALCON ISAF Afghanistan*, JF HQ article

¹⁶. *MALCON ISAF Afghanistan*, *loc cit.*

¹⁷. BERNAMA, 2010, *Kerajaan Hantar 40 Anggota ATM ke Afghanistan*, BERNAMA News, 14 Jul 2010.

administration and logistic elements.¹⁸ Malaysian contingent mission is to carry out humanitarian assistance in the health and medical aspect, the reconstruction efforts and redevelopment capabilities of Bamiyan province. In order to achieve this mission, the Medical Training Team, Medical Team and Dental Team has been assigned to a government medical centers to implement humanitarian aid to the local people. In addition to that, these teams also conducted health education, training and mentoring as capacity building for medical staff in District Hospitals, Comprehensively Health Centres (CHC), Health Posts (HP), Medical Training Centre, Security Forces of Afghanistan National Police (ANP), Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and the National Defense Security (NDS).¹⁹

The pioneer MALCON 1 ISAF has been initiated the task of OP INSAF starting from July 5, 2010 and ended on April 29, 2011. The continuation of the mission continued by MALCON 2 ISAF from April 29 until Nov 1, 2011. The last group involved in Op INSAF is MALCON 5 started from October 26, 2012 to April 8, 2013. A summary of each deployment of MALCON ISAF as follows: ²⁰

- a. MALCON 1: 5 Jul 2010 – 29 Apr 2011.
- b. MALCON 2: 29 Apr 2011 – 1 Nov 2011.
- c. MALCON 3: 1 Nov 2011 – 30 Apr 2012.
- d. MALCON 4: 30 Apr 2012 – 26 Oct 2012.
- e. MALCON 5: 26 Oct 2012 – 8 Apr 2013.

In Afghanistan, MALCON ISAF was placed under the tactical control of the NZPRT at Kiwi Base Camp, Bamiyan. Bamiyan is a region in central Afghanistan which has the potential to be developed in terms of infrastructure and services for the local Muslim community. The security of the province is under control of New Zealand PRT became the main focus of Malaysia Contingent is to built good relations and cooperation between the two countries in various aspects. The Afghanistan government sees Malaysia as the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which actively participate in humanitarian aid mission such in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan. In this regard, Afghanistan has sought Malaysia's help in the redevelopment of the destroyed country as a result of the long war ²¹.

The main task of MALCON ISAF is to implementation of humanitarian assistance mission in the medical and health aspects as a reconstruction efforts and redevelopment capabilities of Bamiyan Province. It involved training and mentoring approach in terms

¹⁸. *ibid*.

¹⁹. Hasbullah Salleh, 2012, *Lambaian Bamiyan: Pengorbanan Bakti MALCON 3 ISAF*, MAB, pp 33-38.

²⁰. Bernama, 2013, ATM Teruskan Penugasan ke Afghanistan, News from Sinar Harian, 10 Apr 2013.

²¹. Syukri Shaari, 2010, Misi MALCON ISAF ke Afghanistan, Utusan Malaysia, 27 Jul 2010.

of the reconstruction of health services by collaboration with the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) and relevant government agencies. Each MALCON ISAF shall draw up plans for six month deployment requirements and review the plan in the middle of the mission. However, for MALCON 5 ISAF, the mission has been shortened to five months due to the closing of Kiwi Base in April 2013.²²

The operation of MALCON ISAF focuses on capacity building of health, dental and mentoring in Bamiyan Province. Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) projects also carried out based on observation and current needs as well as the application of the relevant agencies. However it depends on the status of allocation. Nucleus Team of MALCON ISAF was established in Battalion 17 Royal Malay Regiment (RMR) Para, Terendak Camp, Malacca. A total of 40 permanent members and 8 members as reserve were reported for duty at 17 RMR Para to undergo medical checkup and Force Integration Training (FIT). During the implementation of FIT, officers and members were trained with related tasks to be implemented in Afghanistan.

To accomplish these missions, MALCON must plan what kind of health education (medical and dental) that need to be taught and who target groups, training, mentoring and other aspects that it considers necessary. To this end, the MALCON Commander will hold Weekly coordination meeting in order to know current developments, planning and coordination of all activities for the following week. MALCON Commander will also provide the feedback of all development projects and activities to the Governor during the Governors weekly meeting.²³ To carry out the MALCON was entrusted, some strategy has been arranged such as visits and discussions with a number of implementing agencies like Ministry of Public Health, Police Recruit Training Centre (RTC), the ANA, Afghan NDS, Ministry of Education (MoE), Midwife Training Centre, Nursing School and Bamiyan District Hospital.²⁴ It is meant the implementation of training to the staffs, design the for long-term infrastructure development and the other things that can help long-term capital development of Bamiyan province. After consolidation, MALCON take first step by go around Bamiyan province and give health assistance, training and mentoring team to the groups which were identified. MALCON has already set up strategy for the implementation the tasks according to the specified team:²⁵

- a. Medical Team 1 - Public Health.
- b. Medical Team 2 - Training.
- c. Medical Team 3 - Medical/Training for Women.
- d. Medical Team 4 - Dental.

²². *ibid.*

²³. Hasbullah Salleh, *loc cit.*

²⁴. *ibid.*

²⁵. *ibid.*

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Malaysia as a the UN Member States since 7 Sep 1957 will continues to contribute the peace of the world by providing all effort for the benefit of all UN members. Aware as a small developing country with limited natural resources, Malaysia need the patronage of the UN so that voice and her view be accepted. This is because the UN provides an opportunity for small countries, such as Malaysia to take care of their interests under the auspices of the UN Charter. Malaysia's participation in the missions of the NATO coalition (ISAF mission) opened space to Malaysia to foster new relations with many countries, especially with the countries where Malaysia has limited number of diplomatic relations. Involvement in missions enables Malaysia for engaging with other countries in providing help and support. It also enables Malaysia to deal with more closely with countries where it has a fragile diplomatic relations. For example relations with Somalia and Mozambique are not established ties before this and has been strengthened, thus the country's top leaders have been visiting Malaysia to obtain technical advice and economic expertise to develop their country. Malaysia believes that even as a small country but it has the same important responsibility with great power like the United States to contribute to peace and stability in the world. Malaysia has shown the willingness to serve jointly by participating in multinational force as peacekeepers and capacity building in conflict countries.

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PENDAHULUAN

Rusia sejak Penyatuan Semula dengan Crimea pada 11 Mac 2014 dan penglibatannya dalam konflik di Ukraine khususnya di Timur Ukraine sejak 26 Feb 2014, sebagaimana disabitkan oleh Amerika Syarikat (AS), memang terlibat secara langsung membekalkan kelengkapan tentera dan bantuan anggota tentera dalam membantu pemberontak atau militia yang pro - Rusia dalam memerangi Kerajaan Ukraine. Akibat daripada tindakan Rusia ini telah menyebabkan AS dan negara-negara di bawah NATO (*North Atlantic Treaty Organization*) telah mengenakan sekatan ekonomi ke atas Rusia pada 16 Jul 2014, yang kemudiannya telah menyebabkan kejatuhan mata wang *Ruble* yang amat kritikal sehingga menjejaskan ekonominya.

AS juga telah menuduh Rusia terbabit dalam insiden menembak jatuh kapal terbang Boeing 777 MH 17 milik *Malaysian Airline System* (MAS) pada 17 Jul 2014 oleh Sistem Misil jenis BUK yang di bekal oleh tentera Rusia, di kawasan Timur Ukraine yang merupakan kawasan kubu kuat pemberontak yang pro - Rusia. Bagaimanapun, Presiden Rusia Vladimir Putin tidak berganjak dan berkeras tidak akan menyerah kembali Crimea dan menafikan pembabitan tenteranya dalam konflik di Timur Ukraine serta penglibatan dalam menembak jatuh pesawat komersial awam milik MAS yang mengakibatkan 298 penumpang dan anak kapal terkorban.

KRISIS CRIMEA AKIBAT KONFLIK DI UKRAINE

Crimea pernah berada di bawah pemerintahan Rusia (*Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic*) sejak 1783 sehingga 1954 dan di bawah pemerintahan Ukraine (*Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic*) sejak 1954 sehingga 10 Mac 2014 setelah kejatuhan Soviet Union dan Konflik di Ukraine. Crimea merupakan sebuah negara merdeka dan diberi kuasa autonomi di bawah pentadbiran Ukraine dengan mendapat pengiktirafan daripada Pertubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu (PBB), sehinggalah berlaku revolusi di Ukraine pada 20 Feb 2014. Wilayah Barat Ukraine didiami oleh rakyat berbahasa Ukraine yang mempunyai inspirasi untuk berintegrasi dengan Eropah, manakala rakyat yang mempunyai pengaruh kuat terhadap Rusia pula mendiami di sebelah Timur dan Selatan Ukraine.

Krisis di Crimea berlaku berlanjutan krisis di Ukraine yang berlaku pada Nov 2013 apabila kerajaan pimpinan Presiden Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych yang pro-Rusia membatalkan perjanjian pada saat akhir dengan *European Union* (EU) kerana hendak mengekalkan hubungan rapat dengan Rusia. Perjanjian yang perlu ditandatangani

adalah mengenai hubungan dua hala, menggariskan secara terperinci undang-undang perindustrian dan membincang perkara utama reformasi bagi demokratik di Ukraine. Akibat tindakan Presiden yang membatalkan perjanjian tersebut, telah menyebabkan rakyat yang pro-EU dan Barat mengadakan demonstrasi anti kerajaan di Kiev dengan anggaran 100,000 orang telah membanjiri jalan raya. Pada Dec 2013 jumlah demonstrasi telah meningkat kepada hampir 800,000 orang dan pembantah telah menduduki Dewan Bandaraya dan Dataran Merdeka. Seterusnya pada 20 Feb 2014, keadaan menjadi huru-hara dan berlaku pembunuhan sehingga ke pemberontakan yang di luar kawalan polis dan tentera.

Pemberontak yang pro-Barat telah menawan bangunan-bangunan kerajaan dan menyebabkan Presiden mengambil tindakan meninggalkan Ukraine. Pemberontak dalam Parlimen telah mengundi untuk memecat Presiden daripada kuasa pemerintahan dan menjadualkan pilihan raya pada 25 Mei 2014. Anggota Parlimen juga telah mengundi untuk mengharamkan bahasa Rusia sebagai bahasa kedua Ukraine yang menyemarakkan kemarahan rakyat yang berpihak kepada Presiden Viktor Yanukovych di Timur dan Selatan Ukraine serta Crimea.

Pada 28 Feb 2014, pemberontak bersenjata pro-Rusia telah menawan beberapa buah bangunan penting di ibu kota Crimea, Simferopol. Majoriti rakyat Crimea daripada 2.3 juta adalah etnik Rusia dan mengikut sejarah, Rusia telah menjajah Crimea selama 200 tahun. Rakyat Crimea membantah terhadap revolusi di Ukraine yang g Presiden secara tidak sah. Dalam persidangan tergepar, Parlimen Crimea telah membuat undian untuk bersatu dengan Rusia dan keluar dari Ukraine selain memanggil referendum tergepar. Dalam referendum tersebut, undian sebanyak 97% menyokong untuk bersatu dengan Rusia dan angka tersebut dipertikaikan kerana tiada pemerhati bebas, sehinggalah berlaku kebocoran maklumat bahawa mengikut dokumen asal, undian referendum hanya mencapai 50 - 60% sokongan rakyat Crimea yang menyokong untuk keluar dari Ukraine.

Pada 11 Mac 2014, Crimea mengesahkan secara rasmi untuk keluar daripada Ukraine dan ianya mendapat tentangan hebat daripada Kesatuan Eropah dan AS selain tidak mendapat pengiktirafan daripada PBB. Wilayah Crimea sentiasa menjadi isu pertikaian persempadanan dan hak kawalannya di antara Rusia dan Ukraine sejak 1991 selepas kejatuhan Soviet Union. Kepentingan utama di Crimea mengikut sejarah adalah keutamaan strategik Pelabuhan Sevastopol kepada Angkatan Tentera Laut Rusia kerana dapat mengawal *Black Sea*. Pelabuhan hadapan ini penting bagi Rusia dalam menghadapi ancaman dari NATO sekiranya berlaku konflik ketenteraan.

Penyatuan Semula Crimea dengan Rusia telah menyebabkan AS dengan sokongan sekutunya telah mengambil tindakan sekatan ekonomi terhadap Rusia kerana penyatuan ini tidak mendapat pengiktirafan masyarakat dunia. Ketegangan politik yang membawa kepada penglibatan konfrontasi ketenteraan di antara Rusia dan AS serta Negara-negara di Eropah termasuk NATO mengenai isu Crimea telah mencapai ke tahap kritikal, apabila beberapa provokasi ketenteraan oleh Rusia telah menyebabkan kestabilan di rantau Eropah sukar diramalkan.

AS, EU dan NATO bimbang dengan peningkatan *Military Buildup* oleh Tentera Rusia di Crimea dan pembinaan jambatan menghubungkan Tanah Besar Rusia dengan Crimea telah meningkatkan lagi kerisauan mereka akan strategi selanjutnya Rusia di negara tersebut. Oleh itu, EU telah mengingatkan semua anggotanya untuk menghalang mana-mana organisasi di bawah EU untuk membuat pelaburan di Crimea dalam sektor minyak, gas atau perniagaan.

PENGLIBATAN TENTERA RUSIA DALAM KRISIS DI UKRAINE

Pada Feb 2014, Rusia telah menghantar anggota tentera dan peralatan ketenteraan ke Ukraine berikutan revolusi Ukraine. Bermula dengan Krisis Crimea, tentera Rusia telah mengambil alih posisi strategik dan infrastruktur di wilayah Crimea yang kemudiannya telah disatukan sebagai sebahagian daripada Rusia pada 11 Mac 2014. Pada awalnya Presiden Rusia menyangkal pembabitn anggota tenteranya tetapi kemudiannya mengakui pada Apr 2014 yang anggotanya telah berada di Crimea untuk tujuan keselamatan dan seterusnya menjadi asas kepada *Crimean Status Referendum*.

Selepas Penyatuan Semula Crimea, demonstrasi oleh kumpulan yang pro-Rusia di kawasan Donbass, Ukraine telah bertukar menjadi pemberontakan bersenjata antara pemberontak bebas Donetsk dan Lugansk *People's Republics* dengan Kerajaan Ukraine. Pada Ogos 2014, kenderaan Tentera Rusia telah menyeberangi sempadan di beberapa lokasi di Donetsk Oblast, mengumpul seramai 40,000 anggota tentera berhampiran sempadan Ukraine. Rusia menyangkal tuduhan ini yang menyebabkan pihak tentera Barat dan Ukraine mengelarkan *Russia's involvement a 'stealth invasion'*. Pencerobohan oleh tentera Rusia dilihat sebagai punca kekalahan tentera Ukraine pada awal Sep 2014.

Pada Nov 2014, tentera Ukraine melaporkan pergerakan intensif trup-trup dan peralatan dari Rusia ke kawasan kawalan pemberontak di Timur Ukraine. *Associated Press* melaporkan sebanyak 80 kenderaan tentera yang tidak bertanda bergerak dalam kawasan dikawal pemberontak. Pihak *Special Monitoring Mission* pula memerhati pergerakan konvoi yang membawa senjata berat dan kereta kebal dalam wilayah kawalan pemberontak tanpa tanda nama pasukan. Berdasarkan pada maklumat analisis bebas yang dihantar kepada *The Daily Beast* pada 11 Nov 2014, ada lebih kurang 7,000 tentera Rusia dalam Ukraine pada awal Nov 2014 dan di antara 40,000 dan 50,000 trup lagi berada di sempadan Timur Ukraine. Kenderaan-kenderaan tersebut dipercayai digunakan untuk mengangkut anggota tentera yang terbunuh atau cedera melintasi sempadan Rusia-Ukraine.

Pada Feb 2015, Surat khabar Bebas Utama Rusia melaporkan yang ia memperoleh dokumen penting yang menunjukkan bahawa kerajaan Rusia telah merancang strategi untuk memasuki dan memecah belah Ukraine sebelum Viktor Yanukovich turun daripada tampuk pemerintahan. Dokumen tersebut menggambarkan penyatuan semula Crimea dan wilayah selatan Ukraine termasuk Donetsk dan Luhansk dan wilayah di kawasan Kharkiv yang menggambarkan secara terperinci aktiviti sebelum kejatuhan Yanukovich. Dokumen tersebut juga menggariskan justifikasi dalam kempen

perhubungan awam mengapa tindakan agresif tersebut perlu dilaksanakan.

Kebanyakan organisasi dan komuniti antarabangsa termasuk *Amnesty International* telah mengutuk tindakan Rusia selepas revolusi Ukraine dan menyalahkan Rusia kerana melanggar undang-undang antarabangsa dan kedaulatan Ukraine. Banyak negara telah mengenakan sekatan ekonomi terhadap Rusia, individu-individu di Rusia atau syarikat-syarikatnya. Tindakan sama diambil oleh Rusia terhadap negara yang mengenakan sekatan ekonomi terhadapnya.

KRISIS EKONOMI DI RUSIA

Krisis Kewangan Rusia 2014 - 2015 dan kemerosotan ekonomi Rusia adalah disebabkan oleh kejatuhan mata wang Ruble pada pertengahan tahun 2014. Akibat ketidakpercayaan akan ekonomi Rusia, ramai pelabur telah menjual aset-aset Rusia yang mengakibatkan nilai Ruble jatuh lebih teruk dan berlaku panik akibat krisis kewangan di Rusia. Presiden Rusia menuduh AS sebagai dalang dan arkitek untuk menjatuhkan ekonominya akibat tindakan penyatuan semula Crimea dan pembabitan Tentera Rusia dalam krisis di Ukraine.

Dua faktor penyebab kemerosotan ekonomi Rusia adalah pertama, penurunan harga pasaran minyak mentah pada 2014 yang turun 50% sejak Jun 2014 yang mana ianya merupakan sumber eksport utama Rusia dan kedua akibat Sekatan Ekonomi Antarabangsa terhadap Rusia yang dikenakan disebabkan tindakan Rusia ke atas Ukraine. AS dan sekutunya berharap sekatan ini mengakibatkan kemerosotan mendadak terhadap ekonomi Rusia dan memaksanya untuk menyerahkan kembali Crimea dan menarik balik pembabitan Rusia dalam krisis di Ukraine khusus di Timur Ukraine. Bagaimanapun, rancangan ini tidak Berjaya dan sebaliknya Rusia dengan sokongan rakyatnya terus bertahan dan mencari alternatif baru dalam menangani masalah ekonominya dengan bekerjasama dengan China, Korea Utara, Iran, Syria dan Asean sebagai rakan dagangannya.

KERJASAMA EKONOMI RUSIA DAN CHINA

Bagi mengekang pengaruh AS dan sekutunya yang mempengaruhi market ekonomi dunia sehingga boleh mengawal kedudukan kuasa sesebuah Negara melalui sekatan ekonomi, maka Rusia telah bekerja sama dengan China untuk bergabung mempromosi *Just World Order* dengan menandatangani banyak perjanjian perdagangan merangkumi pengeluaran tenaga sehingga ke bidang kewangan.

Perdana Menteri China Li Keqiang yang dalam rangka lawatan pertama ke Rusia telah menandatangani 38 perjanjian termasuk membuka urusan utama *a yuan-ruble swap line* bernilai 150 billion yuan (\$24.5 billion) dalam usaha untuk mengurangkan pergantungan kepada US dollar. Ini membolehkan kedua-dua negara ini menggunakan mata wang mereka dalam semua urusan tanpa membelinya di market antarabangsa. Rusia yang sedang menghadapi sekatan ekonomi serius secara terpencil sejak tamat *Cold War* juga telah beralih untuk bekerja sama erat dengan Asean, dengan harapan

dapat mengikis sekatan oleh EU dan AS.

PERHUBUNGAN RUSIA DAN AMERIKA SYARIKAT

Sebelum ketegangan hubungan dua hala mengenai krisis di Ukraine berlaku pada awal 2014, kedua-dua negara kuasa besar mempunyai hubungan baik *bilateral relationship* selepas tamat Cold War dan bekerjasama dalam agenda untuk sama-sama memerangi kebangkitan ancaman pengganas atau militan secara global. Bagaimanapun keadaan ketegangan sedia ada di antara kedua Negara mengenai Isu Sistem Anti Misil Di Eropah, sokongan Amerika Syarikat terhadap Georgia dalam memerangi Rusia pada 2008, Isu Perang Saudara di Syria, Isu Nuklear di Iran dan terkini Krisis di Ukraine dan Crimea, serta disabitkan penglibatan tentera Rusia dalam membantu dan membekal serta melatih pemberontak/militia yang pro - Rusia telah menyebabkan hubungan diplomatik kedua-dua Negara, menjadi amat dingin dan dilaporkan berada di tahap *Cold War II* dengan beberapa urusan perdagangan dan pelaburan telah dihadkan sepenuhnya.

Berikutan kejatuhan kerajaan Ukraine pimpinan Viktor Yanukovych yang pro-Rusia pada Feb 2014, di mana Rusia menuduh sebagai satu tindakan *coup d'état*, Rusia telah merancang penyatuan semula Crimea atas dasar *local referendum*. Penyatuan semula Crimea tidak diiktiraf oleh pemimpin-pemimpin Barat malah dikatakan sebagai melanggar undang-undang antarabangsa. Status negara ini sebagai sebahagian Rusia juga tidak disahkan atau diiktiraf. Perpecahan yang tidak terkawal di Ukraine telah merebak ke Timur Ukraine. Sokongan Rusia ke atas pemberontak yang berperang dengan Tentera Ukraine telah menarik perhatian AS untuk mengenakan sekatan ekonomi terhadap Rusia pada 16 Jul 2014.

Hubungan antara kedua negara terus bertambah buruk pada 17 Jul 2014 apabila pesawat Boeing 777 MH 17 milik MAS yang dalam perjalanan daripada Amsterdam ke Kuala Lumpur melalui Timur Ukraine telah ditembak jatuh oleh Sistem Misil dipercayai BUK buatan Rusia di perkampungan Grabove, Donetsk dalam wilayah kubu kuat pemberontak yang pro - Rusia yang persempadanan dengan Rusia. AS menuduh Rusia membekalkan peralatan ketenteraan yang canggih kepada pemberontak dalam memerangi Tentera Ukraine selain melatih mereka. Bagaimanapun, tuduhan ini disangkal oleh Presiden Vladimir Putin dan setakat ini tiada bukti sah dapat diketengahkan oleh AS dan sekutunya atau Kerajaan Ukraine.

PERANG DINGIN 11

Perang Dingin 11 atau *Cold War II* adalah istilah diperkenalkan pada tahun 2010an yang merujuk kepada ketegangan berterusan, hostilitik, dan persengketaan politik antara Rusia yang dipimpin oleh Vladimir Putin dan sekutunya di satu pihak dengan EU dan AS di pihak lain pula. Asal usul *Cold War* atau Perang Dingin adalah pertelagahan geopolitik antara dunia Barat dan sekutunya dengan negara –negara blok Komunis di bawah kepimpinan Soviet Union. Ianya berlanjutan daripada pertengahan tahun 1940an sehingga tahun 1991. Maksud *Cold War II* adalah penyambungan pertelagahan di

antara NATO dan Rusia suatu ketika dahulu adalah Negara bekas Soviet Union.

Bekas Mantan Presiden Rusia iaitu Mikhail Gorbachev telah memberi amaran pada 2014 akan keburukan hubungan konfrontasi politik di antara Rusia dan Barat atas Krisis Ukraine. Beliau menegaskan yang dunia telah menuju ke arah petunjuk *New Cold War*. Ketegangan terbaru antara Rusia dan Barat mempunyai kesamaan ketika berlaku *Cold War*, di mana persaingan untuk mendapat pengaruh di Eropah kecuali di era Rusia Baru, terdapat peningkatan hubungan ekonomi dan politik dengan dunia luar. Dalam konfrontasi politik baru ini, melihatkan kemunculan Jerman pertama kali bangkit sebagai penggerak geopolitik utama di Eropah selepas tamat Perang Dunia Kedua.

Insiden beberapa ejen perisikan Rusia telah ditangkap dan dibicarakan di Mahkamah London atas kesalahan *espionage* yang mana, fokus misi adalah untuk mendapatkan maklumat mengenai polisi tenaga Negara-negara Barat dan ianya tidak melibatkan kebocoran maklumat dari aspek politik dan perisikan tentera. Russia berminat untuk mendapat maklumat polisi tenaga daripada Barat kerana untuk persaingan perdagangan selain mengekalkan kepentingan minyak dan simpanan gas aslinya dan maklumat tersebut akan digunakan sebagai alat dalam Polisi Perhubungan Luar Negara (Instrument of Foreign Policy).

KEBIMBANGAN NATO

Kebimbangan NATO adalah berikutan Rusia yang kurang senang dengan pengembangan pengaruhnya di Eropah, lebih-lebih lagi dengan kemasukan beberapa negara bekas Soviet Union yang menjadi anggotanya seperti Georgia dan Moldova. Hubungan antara Rusia dan NATO yang terjalin sejak 1990an telah merosot secara mendadak. Pada hujung 2014, Presiden Rusia telah meluluskan satu kajian semula *National Military Doctrine* yang menggariskan *NATO's Military Buildup* berdekatan sempadan Rusia sebagai satu ancaman utama ketenteraan. Doktrin baru ini membimbangkan NATO yang menyebabkan pakatan ini perlu bersiap sedia untuk menghadapi Rusia sekiranya peperangan tercetus.

Beberapa insiden provokasi oleh tentera Rusia telah berlaku pada 7 Mac 2014, di mana Tentera Udara Turki telah *scrambled* 6 x pesawat pejuang F-16 selepas sebuah kapal terbang tinjau Rusia dikesan terbang di persisiran pantai *Turkey's Black Sea*. Ini merupakan insiden kedua yang mana pada 6 Mac 2014, pesawat yang sama dikesan terbang di ruang udara antarabangsa. Satu laporan yang dikeluarkan pada Nov 2014 telah menunjukkan bukti beberapa pertembungan rapat ketenteraan di antara Rusia dan Barat (kebanyakan negara-negara NATO) telah mencapai ke tahap *Cold War*, dengan 40 insiden sensitif dan berbahaya direkodkan dalam tempoh lapan bulan sahaja. Peningkatan luar jangkaan aktiviti Tentera Udara dan Tentera Laut Rusia di jajahan Baltic telah menggerakkan NATO untuk meningkatkan aktiviti rondaan pesawat pejuang di kawasan terbabit secara bergiliran.

Pada awal Feb 2015, diplomat-diplomat *NATO* menggambarkan kebimbangan mengenai peningkatan strategi nuklear Rusia dan indikator yang kebanyakan konflik, Rusia kemungkinan menggunakannya.

ANALISA

Berdasarkan kepada krisis yang berlaku di Ukraine dan Crimea, sekatan ekonomi terhadap Rusia, hubungan Rusia dan China dan tindakan ketenteraan di *Baltic Sea* serta tindakan *espionage* yang dilakukan di London oleh ejen perisikan Rusia menjurus kepada analisa seperti berikut:

- a. Rusia selaku kuasa besar di bawah kepimpinan Presiden Vladimir Putin, ingin menguasai semula negara-negara bekas Soviet Union dengan menggunakan taktik mendapatkan sokongan rakyat negara tersebut untuk bersatu semula dengan Rusia secara mendapatkan *Referendum* daripada anggota Parlimen dan sokongan rakyat. Apabila majoriti sokongan berpihak kepada Rusia, maka tindakan *aggression* akan dilaksanakan walaupun mendapat tentangan masyarakat dunia. Tindakan penyatuan semula dengan Crimea dilakukan kerana Crimea penting bagi Rusia kerana Pelabuhan Sevastopol merupakan pangkalan hadapan strategik bagi Angkatan Tentera Laut Rusia di Black Sea dalam menangkis ancaman daripada *NATO* khususnya.
- b. Sekatan ekonomi terhadap Rusia yang sebelum ini bergantung kepada urusan perdagangan menggunakan mata wang *US dollar* telah menyebabkan kemerosotan mendadak ekonominya, khususnya apabila eksport minyaknya yang menjadi sumber pendapatan utama merosot sehingga 50%. Rusia menuduh AS sebagai arkitek dalam kemelut menjatuhkan ekonominya. Bagaimanapun, Rusia tidak panik dan beralih untuk bekerjasama dengan China dalam urusan mata wang Rusia-China dan mungkin bersama Asean agar tidak bergantung kepada *US dollar* yang mana pasarannya dikuasai sepenuhnya oleh AS dan sekutunya.
- c. Tindakan Rusia dalam hal ketenteraan di *Baltic Sea* adalah sebagai tindak balas ke atas sekatan ekonomi yang dikenakan ke atasnya dan sebagai menunjukkan kuasa ketenteraannya boleh menggugat keselamatan dan kestabilan di rantau Eropah dan berharap AS, EU dan sekutunya akan menarik balik sekatan ekonomi terhadapnya dengan syarat Rusia tidak melakukan provokasi ketenteraan dan berbincang di meja rundingan secara diplomatik untuk menyelesaikan isu-isu berbangkit.
- d. Rusia tidak berniat untuk menyerang Negara lain atau *NATO* dan tindakan *espionage* yang dilakukan oleh ejen perisikan membuktikan mereka hanya fokus untuk mendapatkan maklumat mengenai polisi tenaga negara-negara Barat bagi tujuan persaingan perdagangan dan bagi maksud kegunaan Polisi Perhubungan Luar Negara.

e. Rusia hendak mengekalkan pengaruhnya khususnya dengan Negara-negara bekas Soviet Union dan mengembangkan pengaruhnya di Eropah dan lain-lain Negara secara Global dalam bersaing dengan AS. Rusia bimbang yang AS dan NATO akan mempengaruhi Negara-negara bekas Soviet Union khususnya untuk menyertai NATO dan seterusnya mengancam keselamatan di sempadannya.

f. Rusia cuba mengekalkan keadaan keselamatan yang seimbang bagi mengelak berlaku peperangan dengan AS khususnya NATO kerana peperangan akan memusnahkan pembangunan dan kemajuan yang telah di kecapi oleh Rusia selama ini. Oleh itu sebagai bekas agen KGB, Vladimir Putin menggunakan sepenuhnya pengalamannya memerangi musuhnya secara peperangan psikologi seperti dalam era Perang Dingin dengan harapan AS dan sekutunya akan mengalah dan berbincang secara diplomatik.

g. Sekiranya keadaan ekonomi Rusia terus terjejas teruk walaupun tindakan pemulihan terakhir telah dilaksanakan dengan kerjasama China dan Negara-negara lain dan atas desakan rakyat dan keperluan sumber asli yang terhad untuk menjana negaranya, tidak mustahil Rusia akan mengambil tindakan ketenteraan ke atas AS khususnya, yang di tuduh oleh Rusia sebagai arkitek menjatuhkan ekonominya serta perancang kepada revolusi dan krisis di Ukraine. Maka tidak mustahil Perang Dunia Ketiga boleh berlaku bermula di Eropah dan merebak ke seluruh dunia apabila berlaku kerjasama Pakatan di Blok Barat di terajui AS dan di Blok Timur di terajui Rusia. Isu-isu ketegangan di Eropah perlu diselesaikan segera oleh PBB sebagai badan pengaman yang diamanahkan untuk menyelesaikan segala isu global secara diplomatik.

PENUTUP

Krisis di Ukraine dan Crimea tercetus akibat perang saudara di Ukraine antara rakyat yang pro - Barat dan rakyat yang pro - Rusia selepas Presiden Ukraine digulingkan secara tidak sah dan berlaku revolusi dan tuntutan hingga Crimea bersatu dengan Rusia. Rusia di bawah kepimpinan Presiden Vladimir Putin ingin mengembangkan pengaruhnya di Eropah serta menguasai semula Negara-negara bekas Soviet Union yang mempunyai nilai strategik kepada Rusia kerana sekiranya Negara-negara ini menyertai NATO, keselamatan di sempadannya akan terjejas.

Tindakan sekatan ekonomi oleh AS dan sekutunya telah menjejaskan teruk ekonomi Rusia dan mengakibatkan Rusia melakukan konfrontasi ketenteraan dan seterusnya bekerjasama dengan China dan Asean untuk mengukuh semula ekonominya. Pengalaman Presiden Vladimir Putin sebagai bekas agen KGB semasa era Perang Dingin telah memberi kelebihan kepada Rusia dalam memerangi AS dan sekutunya secara peperangan psikologi dengan melaksanakan konfrontasi ketenteraan, politik dan perdagangan yang menjejaskan keselamatan di rantau Eropah dan meletakan NATO dalam keadaan tekanan dan bersiap sedia menghadapi ancaman peperangan.

Secara amnya, Rusia tiada niat untuk berperang kerana tindakan itu akan mengulangi kemusnahan menyeluruh kemanusiaan dan infrastruktur yang telah dibina selama ini secara global dan sejarah tidak perlu berulang seperti dialami dalam Perang Dunia Kedua. Bagaimanapun, keadaan sebaliknya boleh berlaku sekiranya ancaman ke atas negaranya terjejas teruk akibat sekatan ekonomi yang dirancang oleh AS dan sekutunya tidak mencapai perdamaian dan seterusnya berlaku ancaman di sempadan, manakala PBB juga gagal dalam menyelesaikan permasalahan secara diplomatik, maka tidak mustahil Rusia tiada pilihan dan terpaksa melakukan kekerasan ketenteraan untuk *survivalibility* negaranya.

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Lt Kol Mohamed Ridzuan bin Zainal Abidin sekarang berkhidmat sebagai Ketua Bahagian Bantuan Latihan di Pusat Latihan Tentera Darat. Beliau ditauliahkan dalam Kor Artileri pada 18 Dis 1982. Beliau telah berkhidmat di beberapa unit Artileri Medan dan Artileri Pengesan sebagai Penolong Pegawai Memerintah. Beliau juga pernah berkhidmat sebagai Pegawai Staf 2 Gerak/Latih di MK Arti Div 2 Div. Beliau mempunyai kelulusan Diploma Pengajian Strategik dan Pertahanan (UM) dan Sarjana Pengurusan daripada Universiti Malaya.



INTRODUCTION

As the center of power to emperor that have embraced religion other than Islam, and put aside the biasness of views of the defeat, the achievement by Muhammad Al-Fateh is somewhat reminiscence of the exemplary leadership of the Prophet Peace Before Him and similarly, the companions of the Prophet PBH that reflects Muhammad Al-Fateh military comrade and with all that in his hands, he was able to return the investment of Islam believers to the image of the utmost when he finally freed that land for other people to be free to embrace Islam of one own freewill.

It is unjustified if the narration of this essay not start with a brief introduction about Muhammad Al-Fateh. He was born on 27th Rajab, 835 A.H., and 30th March, 1432. He was brought up under the supervision of his father, Sultan Murad II, the seventh Ottoman Sultan. His father prepared and trained him to shoulder the responsibilities of the position of a Sultan. Muhammad Al-Fateh memorized all the Quran, learnt the Prophetic narrations, Islamic jurisprudence, mathematics, astronomy and the skills required for war. He also learnt Arabic, Persian, Latin and Greek languages. He joined his father in his battles and conquests¹.

ANALYSIS OF MUHAMMAD AL FATEH LEADERSHIP

The analysis of the leadership of Muhammad Al-Fateh and to would able to determine the leadership qualities that he did possess. The analysis starts with the understanding the concept of leadership and identifying the leadership model as a comparative base line against Muhammad Al-Fateh's leadership. In order to grasp the wisdom of his detail leadership qualities, comparison is conducted between the baseline leadership qualities with the actual leadership qualities practiced by Muhammad Al-Fateh.

To note, the focus of the analysis is on the relationship between Muhammad Al-Fateh and his peoples who were with him in 25 military campaigns throughout the 30 years as a Sultan of Ottoman Empire . Outcome of the analysis will show that Muhammad Al-Fateh is a good leader and indeed he was a statesman and a great military commander.²

1. ibid, pg5.

2. Mehmed The Conqueror. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mehmed_the_Conqueror

LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS FROM THEORETICAL AND PRACTICE EYES

The concept of leadership has seen its own evolution. What constitutes a leader and leadership in fields of study and in various contexts have changed over the decades. Over the years some concepts have proven better, more accurate, than others. The reason that leadership is too difficult to define because is about dealing with human beings which are a very complex creature of God. Leaders, being human, are not always perfect. They have strengths and weaknesses. A correct assessment of a particular situation requires looking at both strength and weaknesses

On the top of the leadership list is that leadership is "the ability to lead and to direct the course of, by going before or along with" (Neufeldt, 1991). True leaders are more than men who have a commanding presence or attain greatness through achievement; leaders have character and integrity that endure challenging situations, obstacles and the passage of time. The men who are true leaders exemplify this ability to lead, direct and support by being the example of what they instruct others to do. Robert E. Lee was one of history's most celebrated leaders. His self-proclaimed aim, to achieve "the satisfaction that proceeds from the consciousness of duty faithfully performed," reveals his commitment to personal greatness (Crocker, 1999).

Set aside any major setback before any great leader is molded to upkeep with upcoming success stories, a great leader have been associated with many exemplary characters. There are schools of thought who argue that great leaders are born naturally others argue that they are made; still others believe that great leaders are both born naturally and also have to be developed to reach their leadership exploitation levels. For the purpose of analysis, this paper will use the 'model' as described by two renowned scholars which are Lee and John Boldino that have listed six essential traits of leadership of a great leader. Brief explanations of the traits are explained below:

SELECTED TRAITS OF LEADERSHIP

Great leaders have been known to have great determinations. They seem to have some sort of fire burning from within which pushes them to keep on fighting towards achieving their objectives. According to Lee (2010), a great leader is one who has, "inexhaustible stock of determination". Lee (2010) also argues that a great leader takes the initiative of an idea and in most cases never gives up but in case he does he is usually the last one to do that. Such ideas are usually not far-fetched from the ordinary people and in most cases the ordinary people usually identify with the ideas. The leader's determination makes it possible for the leaders to accomplish their projects (Lee, 2009).

Flexibility of great leaders is known to adjust to various situations. Flexibility makes it possible for leaders to fit into different into different situations and offer different solutions which are viewed from different points. Adjusting appropriately to a situation makes it possible to solve it no matter (Lee, 2009).

One of the great virtues of great leaders is known to be resourceful. This makes them to be looked upon as the source of inspiration as well as guidance by the followers. Being resourceful makes it possible for the leaders to be great leaders. Resourcefulness of a leader is exhibited during crisis times and in extraordinary circumstances. Lee (2010) views resourcefulness as a, "powerful leadership tool". Closely related to resourcefulness is creativity. According to Lee (2010), creativity can be defined as, "being able to solve a problem with the least amount of time, money and effort. Just like resourceful, creativity is manifested during crisis times when there are much to meet that the means available to satisfy the needs (Lee, 2009).

Effective and alluring communication skills are the imminent characteristics of a great leader in all time. He inspires through communication with his/her subjects or subordinates. Clear communication makes it possible for the leader to inspire the followers and pass on the vision to them. Communication is very significant because without communication it is not possible for a leader to have followers. Followers form an equally important element of leadership as the leader because without the followers, their leadership does not exist (Lee, 2009; Baldon, 2003).

Self-confidence is the trait that shapes a great leader to be confident with bravery and wisdom. This is important because it will it possible for the followers to confidently and obediently follow their leader in the course. Self-confidence will also entail having a positive attitude towards the course the leader is pursuing. The leader should also be very responsible of the people he/she is leading. Being responsible of the people you are reading gives the followers a sense of belonging. A great will always safeguard the interest of the followers. This is quite significant as it will make the followers to be committed towards the course of action of their leaders (Lee, 2009; Baldon, 2005).

Consistency and fore casting is a great leader is able to display consistency in his work and goals. This persistency motivates the followers to keep on pursuing the vision of their leader. Persistency calls for the leader to be forecasted. A great leader knows what is ahead and that knowledge keeps the fire to achieve his/her goal burning within him/her (Lee, 2009).

In a nutshell, generally a great leader might not possess all this qualities but at least he/she should have many of them. These traits set great leaders apart from just leaders. They help the great leader to respond swiftly respond to extraordinary situations. The second section examines three great leaders and discusses how the above traits were exploited by great leaders in pursuing their goals.

ANALYSIS OF ORIGINS OF MUHAMMAD AL-FATEHS LEADERSHIP

Inductively and deductively, the model of child rearing that sets by his late father was shape by firm but not harsh disciple but the implicit guidance of series of critical incidents in Muhammad Al Fateh childhood, shaped the character that he has and wisdom of knowledge are as one of the backings of his character. Therefore, this is the basis of the

fundamental of his leadership of which translated into heart quotient, intelligent quotient, emotional quotient and spiritual quotient that demonstrate Muhammad Al Fateh as the most intelligence man on earth at that time, yet at the same time, he was the most submissive mortal being to Allah as the Creator.

Muhammad Al-Fateh was raised since his early childhood on the importance of heroicness, leadership, preaching and right house. The father of the Sultan Mourad II used to raise his children to carry on his job after him. His father left him to a number of teachers and scientists to raise him on the Islamic manners and principles. His father noticed his desire to play and have fun and his inattention to his teachers, so he asked Mourad II for a teacher that could control this boy Muhammad.

The father of Muhammad Al Fateh was told that the scientist Ahmad 'ibn Ismail Al-Kori was the best to do the job. Mourad II summoned him and gave him a rod to beat Muhammad with if he didn't learn from him. So Al-Kori went to Muhammad -with the rod in his hand- and told him your father has sent me to teach you and beat you if you disobey me. Muhammad laughed, so he beat him severely until he was afraid of him and recited the whole Qur'an in a short period of time. He then taught him Islamic sciences and read to him books of history³. In sum, after getting a rough model in analyzing the leadership, the focus is on the leadership qualities of Muhammad Al-Fateh throughout his life as a young prince, a young sultan and his achievement of transforming the Ottoman state into an empire.

BECOME KNOWLEDEABLE YOUNG SCHOLARS

Muhammad excelled beyond all of the other princes and managed to learn to speak three languages: Turkish, Persian and Arabic. When he became a teenager, he was sent by Sultan Murad (II) to Adrionaple (Edirne) to become the governor for the Ottoman Empire there. His father took this decision to reveal to his son about the knowledge of administration. Muhammad al-Fateh was appointed as the governor with the assistance of two ministers, Zaganos and Sihab al-Din. They were the person that gives the guidance to the young governor. They also sometimes influenced Muhammad al-Fateh to conquer the Constantinople⁴.

PARENTING UPBRINGING INFLUENCES HIS CHARACTER

From examining Muhammad's behavior in his early childhood, we can see two of the major aspects that dominated his leadership style. The first was communication where his ability to speak in three languages had given him advantages to gain the knowledge of administration and a respect as a young governor of Adrionaple. The second was determination and ambition. Muhammad was motivated by his teachers that he was the

³. Arm Khalid, "How To Raise A Religious Leader?",pg 1. Retreivedfrom<http://www.daraltarjama.com/dt/pdf/Amr%20Khaled%20-%20Islamic%20figures%20-%20How%20to%20raise%20a%20religious%20lead.pdf>.

⁴. Ibid pg 2.

chosen one to conquer Constantinople provided he became a very good Muslim leader. He took his teacher advice and seriously mastering all Islam sciences and history⁵.

YOUNG SULTANATE OF OTTOMAN EMPIRE LEARNT FLEXIBILITY

After his father, Murad II made peace with the Karaman Emirate in Anatolia in August 1444, his father abdicated the throne and gave it to him at the of 12-year. He succeed in his first reigned when he defeated the crusade led by János Hunyadi after the Hungarian incursions into his country broke the conditions of the truce Peace of Szeged. Cardinal Julian Cesarini, the representative of the pope, had convinced the king of Hungary that breaking the truce with Muslims was not a betrayal.

At this time Muhammad Al-Fateh asked his father Murad II to reclaim the throne, but Murad II refused. Angry at his father, who had long since retired to a contemplative life in southwestern Anatolia, Muhammad Al-Fateh wrote, It was only after receiving this letter that Murad II led the Ottoman Army and won the Battle of Varna in 1444. He then returns the throne to his father Murad II in 1446 after accepted the advice from his Grand Vizier, CandarliHalilPasa.

So, the leadership analysis of Muhammad Al-Fateh as a young and inexperienced sultan, he was smartly applied his leadership quality of flexibility and fore casting. Example for flexibility quality was when he ordered his father to lead the Ottoman Army against the Christian Army lead by Janos Hunyadi in the Battle of Varna. For the fore casting quality, the example was when not hesitate to return back the throne to his father for the reason of strengthen the Ottoman State from external threats.

After the death of his father SultanMurad II on 7th. February, 1451 A.C., Muhammad Al-Fateh took over and became the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire for the second time. He was a strong young man, only twenty years old, very enthusiastic and ambitious. His first and great achievement was the conquest of Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire in 1453 followed by others 24 battles which he personally lead his army during his 30 years tenure as a Sultan⁶.

SECOND TOUR AS SULTANATE OF OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Leadership analysis of Muhammad Al-Fateh during his second time as a Sultan will be based on all traits of leadership of the baseline model such as self determination. Muhammad Al-Fateh was a leader with a great sense of determination. Under his administration, he was really determines to conquer the Constantinople City and others European states. Evident of his determination to conquer Constantinople City are as prevailed when he managed to gather 250,000 Muslim armies and sailors which are

⁵. MehmedThe Conqueror. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mehmed_the_Conqueror.

⁶. Ibid

very good in disciplines, well-trained in using many types of weapons and also trained in war strategies⁷.

Many known as a wise strategist of his time, he constructed the Romali Hisyar Fort at the Strait of Bosphorus with the function to block the military aid to the Byzantine forces inside the Constantinople City⁸. With science and technology of his time, he utilized the latest and most powerful weapons such as very big cannon that can launch 300 kg of cannonball up to 2 kilometers to expedite and materialized his initiative to conquer Byzantine Empire.

The success of his leadership is shown not only to the trophy list of the European states that he had been conquered⁹, but we need to learnt on how tacit he manage to win the heart and mine of the place he conquered. To the advantage of any new Islam believers, it is fact that not known to them as that are shield with blasphemy and the truth of true teaching of Islam were hidden to their heart and souls. If one cross checked with achieve of these places, we definitely find trace of new hereditary line of descendants of the local that embraced Islam at that time. The nation states were Serbia (1454), Morea (1458), Wallachia (1459), Bosnia (1463), Karaman (1464), Albania (1466), Genoese Crimea (1475) and Expedition to Italy (1480).

As a not fierce but brave military commander, Muhammad Al-Fateh was known as a furious temper in the battlefield, but his administration was very accepted by the non Muslim due to his flexibility leadership traits where he made a very fair policy to all the people of the Constantinople, appointed Patriarch Gennadius Scholaruis as the Bishop of the Catholics and gave freedom for the other religions to do their rites and rituals without any disruption¹⁰.

As a great military leader, Muhammad Al-Fateh shown his resourcefulness ability during a crisis times in the Battle of Constantinople when his navy failed to cross the Straight of Crysoceras and he implemented his idea by transferring 70 warships over the land in one night in order to avoid the chain boom at the entrance of the Straight of Crysoceras. His strategy was recognized as a best military strategy in the history of warfare¹¹.

7. Usamah bin Abdul Latif, "The Contribution of Muhammad Al-Fateh: Conquering The Constantinople", UIAM, 2011, pg 5. Retreived from <http://www.scribd.com/doc/100340854/The-Contribution-of-Sultan-Muhammad-Al-Fateh>.

8. Ibid, pg6.

9. MehmedThe Conqueror. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mehmed_the_Conqueror.

10. Usamah bin Abdul Latif, "The Contribution of Muhammad Al-Fateh: Conquering The Constantinople", UIAM, 2011, pg 6. Retreived from <http://www.scribd.com/doc/100340854/The-Contribution-of-Sultan-Muhammad-Al-Fateh>.

11. Ibid, pg 7.

Muhammad Al-Fateh also poses a strong self-confidence trait of leadership where he himself led his army in all 25 military campaigns to conquer the European states. His present in the battle reflects his self-confidence in the eyes of his soldiers as a very responsible leader and a sense of belonging of the cause of the battles.

Muhammad Al-Fateh also poses the ability to communicate fluently in 6 main languages namely Turks, Arabic, Hebrew, Persian, Greek and Urdu. He used his communication ability for effective communication to all levels of peoples which include his army, peoples and enemies. Examples of his excellent communication were shown in two occasions during the starting and final attack on Constantinople where he gave a sermon to boost the morale of his army to fight and overrun the Byzantine forces.

Muhammad Al-Fateh was known as a very pious Muslim and consistency followed the rules and regulation of Sharia Law in his administration. These consistency characters gave him a high respect and loyalty from his peoples.

From the brief discussion of Muhammad Al-Fateh's leadership characteristics, it is clear that he was a great leader that poses positive characters in all the traits in the leadership model. As a summary this paper will briefly examine each of the six traits described in the model in an effort to assess Muhammad Al-Fateh's leadership qualities.

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt Muhammad Al-Fateh has a strong determination where he successful in conquering many European states from his 25 military campaigns. Muhammad Al-Fateh was very excellent in practicing flexibility in his military maneuvers and administration of Ottoman Empire. Muhammad Al-Fateh is not only known as a military leader with exceptional military strategies but also loved art and literature to growth in his Ottoman Empire. Muhammad Al-Fateh poses a strong self-confidence when he personally led his army in 25 military campaigns. Muhammad Al-Fateh ability to communicate in 7 languages gave him a free access of effective communication to his peoples and enemies. Muhammad Al-Fateh consistency in practicing Islamic Law gave him a credibility and legitimacy as a Muslim leader in the Ottoman Empire.

Great leaders such as Muhammad Al-Fateh influenced people not just in their time but also in the future when his achievement inspires many people to analyze the leadership of him. His achievement was quite balanced between the territorial expansion through military campaigns and modern civilization through religious tolerance and knowledge growth. Therefore, it is concluded that Muhammad Al-Fateh is a good leader and indeed he was a statesman and a great military commander.


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4. Retrieved from <http://www.daraltarjama.com> Arm Khalid, "How To Raise A Religious Leader?"



Mej A.Lazim bin Amat (3005303) has been in Royal Service Corps (RSC) for 25 odd years. He had hold appointments in units, formations, directorate and logistics headquarters and currently as DS at G3 Wing in Army Academy He has Diploma in Computer Science (1999), Diploma in Strategic and Defence Studies (2009) and Master of Management (2012). He had served UN ISAF MALCON (2013) in Afganistan. The lesson brought in his essay is about an Islamic leader who had been envisioned by Prophet Muhammad PBH that only a great leader with excellent marksmanship military force who come from trustworthy citizens are the fundamentals for Islam to widen its wings in this world.



INTRODUCTION

The convergent and discriminate traits of thoughts and methods of how a military organization handles its information leverage, knowledge building and wisdom sharing its strategic resources would demonstrate of how up to date its knowledge superiority over its adversaries in comparison to other military organization in the world. From military history, usually the critical incidents of battlefields are transformed into lessons learnt that were captured from individual or groups intuition and experiences en-route up to become aspirations transform in the outline of doctrines, policies and directives. It is universal practice for any military archive to document any past lessons learnt as military manuscripts as evidence to social organizational learning, yet military strategists would enquiry to what extent that the information gathered is useful for future aspirations development and how best to exploit the knowledge compiled shared and leveraged throughout the hierarchy and complex environment of military organization.

Therefore, in order to gain organizational knowledge superiority, the military environment needs to assist not teaching but discovery to new insights and thoughts as according to its own new natural environment and experience. By having advantage with such leverage system, the innate and embedded individual or organization wisdoms, a military force is able to learn to adapt, sustain and cope up with the threat of its adversaries in immediate or future encounters. Then, it is reasonable to state that most valuable strategic resource on a battlefield is to have the knowledge advantage over its adversaries to orchestrate practical solution to multifaceted and diverse hostile situations with reliable complex responses to overcome the threat.

However, the divergence of leverage as a strategic tool in military organization is the hierarchical and complex nature of military organizations that are dissimilar with civilian organizations governance. In contrast to civilian organizations that have the luxury of time to strategize its pacing, the military requires robust, reliable and rapid pacing; baring that those timely responses is the product essentials for any success military task or operation executions. So, in order to realize the needs of transformational strategic shift from the traditional leverage system, a network centric paradigm leverage system is required. On the other word, MAF is strategically transforming its environment in knowledge management to be well-suited with the era of modern knowledge and technological warfare.

INFORMATION LEVERAGE PROCESS

In the MAF, the information leverage through knowledge transfer is from the top-bottom; the hierarchy is from strategic to operation to tactical level or from strategic to tactical level. The complexity of the environment is added not only the hierarchical from top to down, but the complexity of its environment that signify the various seniority of the departments or command headquarters within the MAF. Notably, the strategic and tactical level role and function are straight forward and unambiguous of which strategic decision making process then product are the construct of strategic level whereas the implementer to realize the strategic decision making process and product is the tactical level groups.


To highlight this case, the translation and interpretation process on strategic decision making product such as aspiration, desires and hopes is routinely conduct in overlapped manner in both strategic and operational group level depending on strategic intensity and priority need in executing strategic decision. One of the identifiable challenges of MAF is strategic knowledge transfer from top to bottom, that ended up in misinterpretation of translation in action planning and its misguided process developed into mistaken objectivity with wrong operation tasks or operation, that surely the process and product of its are not in accordance to strategic aspirations transpired early on at the strategic level. In avoiding that, MAF must acknowledge the product and process of knowledge transfer, preservation and extrication as strategic tools to transform its information leverage system yet not altering the existing organizational structure.

Notably, in actual correct processes, when a strategic aspirations is transpire through written or verbal means, it cascades down from strategic management to operational, the operations need to translate the aspirations into action planning for them to push down to the tactical as implementer to the strategic aspirations. So, in order to moderate the process of transpire strategic aspirations to translate action planning to implement tasks and operation, a knowledge management system can be as useful strategic tool to facilitate as well as to control the smooth and dynamic flow of the information. If there is no knowledge management system, it is possible that all this while, the flow is being compensated with unknown subconscious organizational knowledge processes that able to leverage the information from top to bottom management yet difficult to replicate and duplicate the leverage process that at the end taxed future leverage processes that could be timely inappropriate to standing requirements.

The confusion is assessed to be more at the operation level (Ismail Manuri, 2016) as compare to strategic and operation level uncertainty. The operational level is the level that holds the organization and acted as the middle body of one military organization. To briefly explain the basic operational meaning of the levels needed to be grasped to avoid misinterpretation by other people than military especially who dealt directly with military organization.

For strategic level, all defence departments under the auspicious of Ministry of Defence and MAF (MAF) Headquarters are the designed strategic management level which are organics to National Defence Security Council. All strategic departments react to National Defence Policy A, B or C and answerable to National Security Council (NSC) who chairperson is the Prime Minister, the advisor to the king as the ruler of the nation. Then, MAF Council (MAT) is the lower strategic council function at ministerial level that members comprise of Minister of Defence, CMAF, Defence Secretary as the senior members of the council. At the middle in strategic are Department of Defence Personnel, Defence Intelligence, Defence Operation and Training, Defence Logistics, Defence Planning, and Defence Communication. Moreover, the office under respected service chiefs have departments mirroring the departments under CMAF office and these service chiefs departments are at the bottom of MAF strategic level

Figure 1: Hierarchical Order of Military Organization



The second hierarchy level is branched into four which are the Army, Navy, Air Force and Joint Forces. The headquarters involved are Army Field Command, Naval Fleet Command, Air Operation Command, Naval Support, Air Support, and Joint Force. In addition to that the training wing has its own headquarters such as the Army Training and Doctrines, Naval Education and Training and Air Education and Training. All these are headquarters responsible for action planning for any desire, hope and aspirations transpire by strategic level. The operational level is delicately is the level if unsorted

leverage on hope, desire and aspirations available, the translation of action planning for the tactical level group may be misguided not according to the intention of the strategic level.

Lastly, tactical level is the bottom hierarchy of MAF organization that comprise of Army Divisions and its organics, Command Naval Regions Headquarters and its organics, Air Division and its organics, and the most recent established Joint Forces Headquarters and its organics. The complexity of manoeuvre and its operations of these fighting elements denote to complexity nature of any military organizations. The tactical level is where the main bulk of the strengths of the MAF collated and dispersed around Malaysia. The army divisions and its organics, the fleet squadrons and the air squadrons are the fighting elements that determine any aspirations transmitted by the strategic level are implemented accordingly.


INFORMATION LEVERAGE NETWORK CENTRIC PARADIGM

The concept of strategic aspirations controlled the details in action plan and action and the sub concept of action plan is controlling the details of the action. The logical sequence of the knowledge process of knowledge transfer is more efficient and time saving. Diagram A is acceptable practice with **Diagram A** as ideal situation. In order to maintain composure of my case, the identification of which sub organization with its department and staff within the MAF should be responsible for preserving organizational knowledge, the writer like to highlight the feeder organization that prepare their personnel, that is, Military Development and Strategic Institute (MIDAS) at strategic level, Joint Operation Training Centre (JOTC) at joint operational level and three services training commands, that is, Army Training and Doctrine Headquarters (TRADOC), Naval Education and Training Headquarters (NETC) and Air Education and Training Headquarters (AETC) at AF tactical level.

The boundaries for action plan are somewhat unexplained though the process of translation into actions is normal routines for the MAF. In addition to that, the translation of the strategic decision making in the MAF requires complex responses from two different bandwidth groups that are operational and logistics support. To add to the tangled to the phenomena, the success integration of both group complex responses however depending on thorough action plan either prepared by their own tactical group or pre-planned action plan at operation level. Bear in mind if the planning of the action plan is conducted at operational level, the actions are approved by the operation level headquarters but if the action plan is designed at the tactical level, it need to seek approval from the originator of the action planner which can be either strategic or operational level. To sum, MAF is able to produce any strategic aspiration translated into actions but how MAF manage to leverage the information through knowledge transfer need to be capture for future undertakings.

By judging at the product at the strategic level, the intangible and tangible matters are the product of knowledge are documented and captured. Yet, the needs to connect the dots between the strategic, operational and tactical level in order to identify the

Figure 1: Hierarchical Order of Military Organization



logical sequence of the knowledge process is crucial in order to give accurate picture of knowledge process in MAF. The cognitive mapping is drawn to ensure the knowledge process has the potential to be utilized as strategic tool to MAF as strategic level management.

KNOWLEDGE PRESERVATION CONCEPTUAL MAPPING

This conceptual mapping of knowledge preservation is a framework to identify the location for knowledge preservation process and product should be kept in such as an archives that other people can learnt and transform the learning into discovery not merely repetition of the past critical process of product. But yet, we need to remember though how complex the knowledge may appear, the best lesson learnt on any knowledge preservation is it need to be simple, practical and easy to execute or implement the specified tasks or responsibilities successfully.

However, a framework of knowledge preservation would identify the location for knowledge preservation process and product should be kept in such as an archives that other people can learnt and transform the learning into discovery not merely repetition of the past critical process of product. But yet, we need to remember though how complex the knowledge may appear, the best lesson learnt on any knowledge preservation is it need to be simple, practical and easy to execute or implement the specified tasks or responsibilities successfully. The values, attributes, skills and able to act effectively is what matter most in military operations to whatever level the origin and impact it may effect.

Figure 3: Conceptual Mapping of Knowledge Preservation





Figure 4: Conceptual Mapping of Knowledge Extrication Process and Product



In sum, the attributes of what being documented in knowledge preservation must be continue with knowledge continuation in process and product so that it does not become merely become historical artifacts that not permitting MAF to exploit knowledge extrication..Knowledge extrication is conversion of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge articulating thoughts language or diagrams. On the other word, knowledge extrication is the next step beyond knowledge preservation of which transforms cognitive and attitudinal experience into explicit knowledge or applied knowledge that become as tool to problem solving process that provides solutions to new circumstances, states and condition able to response accordingly with complex successful responses. Bear that, it is not repetitive and copying the exact history of knowledge as in controlled academic conditioning but able to act effectively i.e. with different resources and constraint able to response reliably in efficacious manner.

Moreover, the learning plateau that change cognitions and behaviors of an individual and groups in AF need new enculturation process that needed to be make viable the process by giving alternative model for existing MIS and IM to become network centric as tool for organizational learning in AF. With correct understanding on the potential future practice and application of knowledge management as strategic tool to transform a hierarchical and complex military organization as efficacious and competent as world class MAF, it would benefit MAF in positioning as future strategic force to be reckoned with in this region.

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT IN MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES

In current era of information, knowledge has been acknowledged as strategic tool for organization efficiency and relevancies, MAF as human organization that core business to protect the sovereignty of Malaysia, need to apply KM as strategic tool to be current with other military forces in this region as well with its bilateral or multilateral partners. In addition to that, at the moment, there is no specific individual and department that focused on knowledge management as their primary role and responsibility in MAF, and has scarce research of KM in MAF. So by the produce these timely knowledge process and its leverage frameworks, it enables MAF to close the gap in its complex organization and high bureaucracy between the strategic, operational and tactical level management. Furthermore, it will create new awareness to have the appropriate tool and mechanisms for managing knowledge in a system retrievable for the consumption of knowledge process in knowledge transfer, knowledge preservation and knowledge extrication.

Though there are barriers to recognize and implement KM throughout military services, KM initiatives are acknowledged to be vital to increase efficiency of their command and control and intelligence superiority This KM effort is essential since other military super powers of the world are currently practicing network centric when disseminating information-knowledge-wisdom from top to down level when implementing any strategic decisions as evidence shown in US and Australian Defence System military initiatives. As for Malaysia, though this research is conducted in military setting, other organizations such as government or non-government organization can benefits the lesson learnt retrieved from this KM effort. In a nutshell, KM research in

military setting is must be robust, reliable and timely according to the demand of operational pace which is different from corporate company considerations and it must in accordance to situation and requirement to revolutionize the military affairs in Malaysian environment.

As the results of the current worldview of diverse economics and politics landscape, knowledge is recognized as a strategic resource for knowledge exploitation and knowledge making organization of which no exception for military to shift their paradigm from traditional to network centric in information leverage and collective knowledge for decision making (Crawford et al, 2009). This paradigm shift may position any military force that is capable to identify, create distribute, adoptive on insights and experience of individual and organization (Nonaka, 1991) of its own forces and adversaries as having knowledge superior in making appropriate decision making timely and effectively.


Furthermore, with knowledge advantage over adversaries, the military force is able to act or respond or adapt timely to any multiple or complex threat or hostile situation successfully fitting to the level of operational pacing and fighting intensity (McIntyre *et al*, 2003). Ironically, though most of deliberate strategic planning has the desired returns, there are also war stoppages because of certain factors not considered when deliberating the action plan or unseen circumstances at execution phase, of which not only the product but the process can be captured and transformed into valuable knowledge for future interpretation and implementation (Crawford et al, 2009; McIntyre et al, 2003; Bartzack, 2002).


Figure 5 : Knowledge Process Flow Adapted From TC Melewar Theoretical in Branding



The theoretical framework for identity, communication and performance process is taken from Melewar (1985) theoretical framework in strategic management and performance management in order to tap to gauge the observable, non observable, yet to observe and expected in the future to capture the qualitative data of knowledge transfer on information leverage. Therefore, in order to understand organizational learning, Kimble (1961) redefined learning as permanent change in behavior or behavior potentially that results from experience and cannot be attributed to temporary body states such as induces by illnesses, fatigues or drugs.


Figure 6: Knowledge Process Flow Adapted From Hergenhahn & Olson Learning Theories





In application of that statement, the following are the basic concept of learning (change in behavior potentially) and performance (translation of that potential into behavior) that expected to be captured from the three different setting, which are supposedly to be different from sensitization and habituation which are not consider as learning (Sharpless & Jasper, 1956 in Hergenhahn & Olson, 1993, p4). In addition to that, learning because of survival as a result of physical equilibrium or homeostatic mechanism or reflexes because of painful experience and learning process took place because of critical period and it is called imprinting or one trial learning process that combined explicit learning and instinctive learning (Thorpe, 1963 in Hergenhahn & Olson, 1993, p9).

Figure 7: Cohesiveness of Knowledge Product Flow for 10 Divisions at Operational Level



Note:

- 1: Knowledge Product Flow in Personnel Strategic Aspiration
- 2: Knowledge Product Flow in Intelligence Cycle Strategic Aspiration
- 3: Knowledge Product Flow in Operational Division Strategic Aspiration
- 4: Knowledge Product Flow in Logistics Division Strategic Aspiration
- 5: Knowledge Product Flow in Planning Division Strategic Aspiration
- 6: Knowledge Product Flow in Communication Division Strategic Aspiration
- 7: Knowledge Product Flow in Training Division Strategic Aspiration
- 8: Knowledge Product Flow in Military and Public Affair Division Strategic Aspiration
- 9: Knowledge Product Flow in Reserved Force Division Strategic Aspiration
- 10: Knowledge Product Flow in Medical Division Strategic Aspiration
11. Knowledge Product of Translation of Strategic Aspiration into Action Plan

The divisional and departmentalizing knowledge as according to SMA and SME as status quo to traditional practice are as hindrance to network centric paradigm practice in hierarchical and complex military environment. If one wants to develop a framework in such conditions and organizations, one needs to be aware of the sub-organization cultures at the three levels of management that affect not only the knowledge process but also the knowledge product in KM. So, KM effort in MAF is crucial since other military superpowers of the world are currently practicing network centric paradigm when disseminating information-knowledge-wisdom in their organization such as in Canadian, United States and Australian Defence System.

There are multiple information management and information system (which is different from knowledge management (Crawford *et al*, 2009) in a modern military organization that facilitate day to day strategic decision making in getting desired results for operational efficiently, yet one need to be analytic that the very strategic concept of a current technological era military organization needs to be at upper hand in knowledge superiority over its adversaries. (McIntyre *et al*, 2003). Though transformation from industrial era to knowledge era of which evidently, any information can be reached at one fingertip, there are barriers on issues made on security clearance, hierarchy and bureaucracy obstacles, bandwidth differences, robustness, intensity, reliability (Bartzak, 2002) and internal-external barriers from individual or groups that resist to change which arise to a conclusion that the obstacles are make issues to put aside the idea to implement KM in military context.

To the advantage of the nature, structure and culture of modern military, these suggested frameworks are needed to understand how KM would benefit military organization and to put it into realization a team of KM needed to be formed (Ismail Manuri, 2016). Initially, the application of KM theory and practice originated from multi discipline and fields of study toward pragmatic approach as problem solving and decision making (Raihan, 2016) mapping framework emerging theories in productivity, knowledge exchange, learning, and knowledge nature and investigate practice system

such as MIS, IT, library science and business system (McIntyre, 2002) that can be integrate with KM. Bartzack (2002), McIntyre *et al* (2002) and Crawford *et al* (2009) shared the importance and barriers of KM implementation in United States, Canadian and Australian Defence Force of which extract KM principles to benefit their own defend forces.

To the interest of this initiative, the regularities and patterns of information-knowledge-wisdom leverage of information leverage through knowledge transfer, preservation and extrication in three different settings are examined to determine conformity and differentiation across different organizational levels. At the end, the predictive impact factor for cohesiveness of knowledge product flow is analyzed based on the expected knowledge management framework designed at operational level that is, ***'to have better capability to translate strategic aspirations into action plans at operational level'***. With that operational statement, it is expected to aid in designing suitable KM framework for hierarchical and complex organization like MAF. Furthermore, the framework would be based on assumption on the determinants and motivating factors that translate aspirations into action plan as supposedly expected to be found at operational level.

Since, there is a gap between strategic and tactical level, knowledge management is expected be able not only to bridge the gap but change the dynamic of knowledge management in the military organization in new network centric paradigm so that it enhance the performance of the organization that made possible through efficient management of organizational learning in knowledge process and knowledge product. Therefore, when the gap is closed between strategic and operation and, between operation and tactical, and a new identity, an updated communication process, and an efficient organizational performance of information leverage in knowledge transfer, knowledge preservation and knowledge extrication can be utilized as tools of KM for organizational efficiency.


On the other word, when network centric is applied in between strategic, operational and tactical level, facilitating information leverage on strategic aspirations in hierarchical complex military environment through knowledge transfer, knowledge preservation and knowledge extrication is seemingly achievable. In a nutshell, though there are barriers to recognize and implement KM throughout military services, KM initiatives need to be acknowledged to increase the efficiency such as in command/control and intelligence superiority, so that, a military force is able to progress its position as one of the leader of military superpower.

CONCLUSION

As for Malaysia, though this new perspective is regarding military setting, other organizations such as government or non-government organization can benefits the lesson learnt from KM efforts in such organization. Consequently, MAF is suggested to adapt the network centric paradigm in order to allow efficiency in facilitation of

information leverage processes. By doing so, it gives assurances that the information leverage is in congruence to its original desire, needs, hope and aspirations that transpires from the top, and then translates accurately to the middle and bottom military hierarchical level. At this juncture, it is concluded that if future KM initiatives needed to be implemented in military settings like MAF, the nature of its must be robust, reliable and timely according to the specific operational pacing. It must be treated differently from civilian organization considerations, since its holds unique organization features and nature.

Figure 8: New Military Organization Order in Knowledge Process & Product Management



In addition to that, in envisioning the future implementation, it is necessary for hierarchical and complex organization like MAF to viably find an integrated system as the tool to process tons of information which able to accurately leverage, transmit, select and develop information into practical knowledge product. Furthermore, when this knowledge processes grow to be organizational habits or culture; those organizational knowledge can be converted into organizational wisdom, of which, is exceptional achievements for one organization to hold ownership. So, with the magnitude of the knowledge process and product impacts described, knowledge management is unquestionably is one of the key strategic tool which able to transform as well as to rebrand MAF (MAF) as one super organization (Melewar, 1985) that has great qualities well-matched for its survival cause in nowadays information and technological era.

No	Description of Steps	Notes
(a)	(b)	(c)
1	Facilitate strategic view knowledge process from strategic aspiration to scoping to action plan and then translate actions using knowledge transfer, knowledge preservation and knowledge extrication	Step One
2	Capture the differences of strategic view knowledge process by deriving from knowledge transfer, preservation and extrication using KM conceptual mapping to close barriers in hierarchical and complex military environment	Step Two
3	Create mitigating knowledge management framework from communication, sociology, economy, philosophy, library science, organizational behavior, information system, learning and organizational psychology as strategic tools for organizational efficiency	Step Three
4	Assist knowledge transfer process through information-knowledge-wisdom mapping for the organization to be at the edge in building learning, sustainable and adaptive for robustness, reliable, valid to tempo organizational pacing for appropriate complex response	Step Four
5	Enable adoption of insights and experiences of individuals or groups from strategic view knowledge extrication by providing logical problem solving for conflict resolutions and logical cognitive process for effective decision making through discovery learning styles	Step Five
6	Facilitate shift of doctrines, policies and directives that have affect on tangible and intangible knowledge in improving situation awareness, information gathering, sense making and decision making in future operations, interoperability, intelligence, training and acquisition	Step Six



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INTRODUCTION

The State of Israel has some 6.9 million peoples¹. The most prominent characteristic of Israel is its high diversity. The main division of the country's population is Jews (80%) and Arabs (20%). Israel country is a densely populated country which is some 300 persons per square kilometer. The most of peoples live in towns and cities down to Rishon le-Tsion in the south. The most common language in Israel is Hebrew, which is spoken by six million people and secondly is the Arabic, which is spoken by over a million people. Since Israel is a land of immigration there are also an additional languages are spoken among the various immigrant communities. The major languages being Russian (some 900,000 speakers), Jewish Arabic (300,000 speakers) and Yiddish (200,000 speakers).

The Republic of Lebanon² is a small country which is about 10,452 sq km. The population of Republic of Lebanon is around 3.7 million peoples. Lebanon country is within the Middle East region which it's capital town at Beirut. The most popular group or illegal arms in Lebanon country is the Hezbollah group where the conflict always occur between Israel and Lebanon until now.

THE CONFLICT AND THE BEGINNING OF INVASION

The Israel - Lebanon conflict on 2006 was happen in Lebanon and call as the July War³ and for Israel it is the Second Lebanon War⁴ was a military conflict in Lebanon and also northern Israel. It conflict primarily between Hezbollah paramilitary forces and Israel Defense Force (IDF). It started on 12 July 2006 and ended when a United Nations brokered ceasefire went into effect on 14 August 2006.

The conflict started when Hezbollah regime fired Katyusha rockets and mortars at Israeli military positions and also border villages in order to divert attention from another Hezbollah unit that crossed the border and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers and killed three. Israel attempted to rescue the abducted soldiers although five more were killed by

¹. Israel-Lebanon Conflict - //E:/2006 Israel-Lebanon Conflict-Wikipedia encyclopedia.htm.

². Mideast Crisis - http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2006/mideast_crisis

³. The Daily Star. Retrieved on 15 Sept 2006. Page 1.

⁴. Yaakov Katz, @Halutz officers discuss war strategy@,Jerusalem Post, Sept 5, 2006 Page 2.

the Hezbollah military during the rescue mission. Israel responded with massive airstrikes and artillery fire on Lebanese civilian infrastructure. Israel said that Hezbollah was using an air and naval blockade and also uses a ground invasion of southern Lebanon. Hezbollah in turn launched rockets fire into northern Israel and engaged the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in guerrilla warfare from hardened positions.

The conflict killed over 1,500 people and many of whom were Lebanese civilians. It also severely damaged Lebanese infrastructure and displaced about 900,000 Lebanese and 300,000 Israelis⁵. The conflict also effected and disrupted normal life across all of Lebanon and northern Israel. Even after the ceasefire about 256,000 Lebanese remained internally displaced and also much of South Lebanon remained uninhabitable due to unexploded cluster bombs.

UNITED NATION INTERVENTION

On the 11 August 2006, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved UN Resolution 1701 in an effort to end the hostilities. The resolution which was approved by both Lebanese and Israeli governments need for the disarming of Hezbollah and for the Israel is to withdraw from Lebanon territory. The resolution also included the deployment of Lebanese soldiers and an enlarged United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) force in southern Lebanon.

During the South Lebanon conflict (1982 – 2000) Hezbollah, was created as a result of Israel's invasion of Lebanon. Along with Hezbollah, the mainly leftist and secular groups in the Lebanese National Resistance Front, waged a guerrilla campaign against Israeli forces occupying Southern Lebanon as well as their allies in the South Lebanese Army (SLA), following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The conflict ended on May 24, 2000 when the Lebanese Resistance, also known as Hezbollah forced the Israelis to withdraw from South Lebanon after decades of occupation.

It ended with Israeli withdrawal in accordance with 1978's United Nations Security Council Resolution 425, The Israelis withdrew from most of Southern Lebanon, and one area still under Israeli occupation is the Lebanese Shebaa Farms. Subsequently Hezbollah was able to extend its control of Southern Lebanon, and while other militias disarmed in accordance with the Taif agreement, Hezbollah continued to maintain a sizable fighting force after the Israeli withdrawal. The conflict has been described as a sub-conflict of the Lebanese Civil War which is known to have been provoked by foreign forces, Israeli, Syrian, Palestinian and American (1982-1990). In 1993, after a month of Hezbollah shelling and attacks on its soldiers, Israel conducted a seven-day operation called Operation Accountability in order to destroy Hezbollah. Then in 1996, the fighting culminated during Operation Grapes of Wrath in April 1996 when Israel launched an assault and air-campaign against Hezbollah. The campaign did not succeed and

⁵. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2006. Retrieved on 2 Oct 2006 - <http://www.israelministryofforeignaffairs>.

resulted in the deaths of more than 150 civilians and refugees in the shelling of a United Nations base at Qana. On 30 May, two staggered road-side bombs killed four Israeli soldiers and injured several others at Marjayoun, where the IDF had their headquarters in southern Lebanon. On 10 June, all 13 members of an Israeli patrol north of the Litani River were killed or wounded in an ambush by Hezbollah. In retaliatory fire after the 10 June incident, Israeli artillery killed one Lebanese Army soldier and wounded one civilian.

In January 2000, Hezbollah assassinated the commander of the South Lebanon Army's Western Brigade, Colonel Aql Hashem, at his home in the security zone. Hashem had been responsible for day to day operations of the SLA. On 24 May "after the collapse of the SLA and the rapid advance of Hezbollah forces, Israel announced that it would withdraw its troops from southern Lebanon and completed its withdrawal the next day, more than six weeks before its stated deadline of 7 July." This was widely considered a victory for Hezbollah and boosted its popularity hugely in Lebanon.

Israel considered this move as tactical withdrawal since it always regarded the Security Zone as a buffer zone only to defend Israel's citizens. With an end to the occupation, Israel could assume it would improve its worldwide image. A captured SLA Army tank, featuring a wooden portrait of the late Ayatollah Khomeini now on display in southern Lebanon.

THE IMPACT OF FAILURE TO CONTROL COUNTRY BORDER

The Lebanon country has failed to control militancy within its borders. Israel has had a history of using force in Lebanon in response to militant attacks. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was committing cross border attacks from Southern Lebanon into Israel as far back as 1968. That area became a significant base following the arrival of the PLO leadership and its Fatah brigade after their 1971 which is expulsion from Jordan. This situation exist a demographic tensions over the Lebanese National Pact which divided governmental powers among religious groups and leading in part to the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990). Concurrently, Syria began a 29 year military occupation. The Israel's in 1978 invasion of Lebanon failed to stem the Palestinian attacks. But Israel invaded Lebanon again in 1982 and forcibly expelled the PLO. Then Israel withdrew to a slim borderland buffer zone and held with the aid of proxy militants in the South Lebanon Army (SLA).

After that in 1985, a Lebanese Shi'a militia calling itself Hezbollah declared armed struggle to end the Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory. When the Lebanese civil war ended and other warring factions agreed to disarm, Hezbollah and the SLA refused. The combat with Hezbollah regime weakened Israeli resolve and led to a collapse of the SLA. An early Israeli withdrawal is in 2000 to their side of the UN designated border. The Israeli was controlled of the Shebaa farms territory and the Lebanese prisoners in Israel make Hezbollah continued cross border attacks and successfully used the tactic of capturing soldiers from Israel as leverage for a prisoner exchange in 2004.

As a Syrian-backed Lebanese government refused to demarcate its border with Israel, Israel worked with UN cartographers led by regional coordinator Terje Rod-Larsen to certify Israel has withdrawn from all occupied Lebanese territory. On June 16, 2000, UN Security Council concluded that Israel had indeed withdrawn its forces from all of Lebanon, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 425 (1978).

The tentative peace, resulting from the withdrawal, did not last, as Hezbollah rejected UNSC 425, and a weak Lebanese government did not deploy its forces along the Israeli border as required by UNSC 425. On October 7, 2000 Hezbollah attacked Israel. In a cross-border raid, three Israeli soldiers who were patrolling the Lebanese border were attacked and abducted. Their bodies were returned to Israel in a 2004 prisoner exchange. During this exchange, it was also agreed that the price for the release of Lebanon's longest-held prisoner Samir Kuntar would be solid information on the fate of captured Israeli pilot Ron Arad. As Hezbollah failed to provide any solid evidence as to Arad's fate, Kuntar remained incarcerated for his crimes. In July 2006, in response to Israel's failure to release the Lebanese prisoners in Israel, Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers and killed eight others. In disproportionate retaliation Israel began the 2006 Lebanon War to rescue the abducted soldiers and weaken Hezbollah.

At around 9:00 am local time (06:00 UTC), on 12 July 2006 the Hezbollah initiated diversionary rocket attacks toward Israeli military positions near the coast and near the border village of Zar'it as well as on the Israeli town of Shlomi⁶. At the same time a ground military of Hezbollah regime crossed the border into Israeli territory and attacked two Israeli armoured Humvees which patrolling on the Israeli side of the Israel-Lebanon border (near Zar'it) killing three, injuring two, and capturing two Israeli soldiers. Five more Israeli soldiers were killed later on the Lebanese side of the border during an attempt to rescue the two kidnapped soldiers⁷.

THE ACT OF WAR CAMPAIGN

The Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert described that the capture of the soldiers as an "act of war" by the sovereign country of Lebanon and promised that Lebanon a very painful and far-reaching response. The Israel quickly blamed the Lebanese government for the raid and as it was carried out from Lebanese territory. In response, the Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora denied any knowledge of the raid and stated that he did not condone it.

During the campaign, the Israel's began attack and invade Lebanon on 13 Jul 2006. The Israeli's Air Force flew more than 12,000 combat missions. The Navy fired 2,500

⁶. Lebanon Crisis, BBC, July 19, 2006 - <http://news.bbc.co.uk>

⁷. Amnesty International, Sept 14 2006 - <http://web.amnesty.org/library>

shells and the Army fired over 100,000 shells⁸ and destroying large parts of the Lebanese civilian infrastructure. There are 400 miles of roads, 73 bridges and 31 targets such as Beirut International Airport, ports, water and sewage treatment plants, electrical facilities, 25 fuel stations, 900 commercial structures up to 350 schools and two hospitals were destroyed as well as some 15,000 homes. Some 130,000 more homes were damaged⁹. Additional to that the Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz ordered commanders to prepare civil defense plans. One million Israelis had to stay near or in bomb shelters or security rooms and with some 250,000 civilians evacuating the north and relocating to other areas of the country¹⁰.

During the campaign, the Hezbollah regime were fired between 3,970 and 4,228 rockets, about 95% of which were 122 mm (4.8 in) Katyusha artillery rockets carrying an up to 30 kg (66 lb) warhead and having a range of up to 30 km (19 mi)¹¹. An estimated that is 23% of these rockets hit built-up areas, primarily civilian in nature. The cities hit included Haifa, Hadera, Nazareth, Tiberias, Nahariya, Safed, Afula, Kiryat Shmona, Beit She'an, Karmiel, Maalot, Kibbutzim, Moshavim, Druze and Arab villages as well as the northern West Bank¹². The Hezbollah regime also engaged in guerrilla warfare from well fortified positions with the IDF. These attacks done by a small, well-armed units caused serious problems for the IDF especially where hundreds of sophisticated Russian-made anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) were used. The Hezbollah force also destroyed 14 Israeli Merkava main battle tanks and damaged about 50. Also six tanks were destroyed by anti-tank mines. Hezbollah caused additional casualties using ATGMs to collapse buildings onto Israeli troops which is sheltering inside¹³.

After the initial Israeli response, the Hezbollah declared an all-out military alert as soon as well. Hezbollah was estimated to have 13,000 missiles at the beginning of the conflict. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that it was a trained, skilled, well-organized and also a highly motivated infantry that was equipped with the cream of the crop of modern weaponry from Syria, Iran, Russia, and China¹⁴. The Lebanese satellite TV station Al-Manar also reported that the attacks had included a Fajr-3 and a Ra'ad 1 missile which both these is liquid-fuel missiles developed by Iran.

It is assessed that the high number of civilian deaths in the conflict has been one of its most controversial aspects with 1,187 Lebanese. Many of them is civilians and 44

⁸. The War In Numbers, Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 August 2006.

⁹. Amnesty report accuses Israel of War Crimes, 3 Sept 2006 - <http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/story>

¹⁰. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 31 August 2006 - <http://www.jcpa/brief>

¹¹. Hezbollah's rocket force, 14 Sept 2006 - <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/middleeast>

¹². Major attack in Lebanon, Israel and Gaza Strip, 14 August 2006 - <http://www.nytimes.com/packages>

¹³. The War In Numbers - Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 August 2006.

¹⁴. 31 Jul 2006 - <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages>

Israeli civilians were killed in the conflict. It was making up the vast majority of the casualties¹⁵. The almost of one third of the Lebanese civilian casualties were children under 13 years of age. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) initially estimated about 35,000 homes and businesses in Lebanon were destroyed by Israel military force in the conflict while a quarter of the country's road bridges or overpasses were damaged. According to Jean Fabre (a UNDP spokesman) it is estimated that overall economic losses for Lebanon from the month-long conflict between Israel and Hezbollah totaled at least \$15 billion and may be more¹⁶. The Israel however says that, it only attacked buildings and infrastructure used by Hezbollah to launch rockets or receive re-supply from Iran and Syria.

The Hezbollah also fired hundreds of rockets, sometimes more than 200 per day throughout the conflict, which landed in all major cities of northern Israel, including Haifa, Nazareth, and Tiberias, as well as dozens of kibbutzim, moshavim, Druze, and Arab villages. The Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah defended the attacks, saying that Hezbollah had started to act calmly and they focused on Israel military bases. They were didn't attack any settlement however since the first day, the enemy attacked Lebanese towns and murdered civilians therefore the Hezbollah militants had to destroyed military bases while the Israelis killed civilians and targeted Lebanon's infrastructure.

Israeli officials accused Hezbollah of intentionally using the civilian population as human shields, and several reports have alleged that Hezbollah fired rockets from residential areas to draw Israeli fire on those areas, which maximised civilian casualties. Moreover, the IDF said that Hezbollah had blocked village exits to prevent residents from leaving the war zone. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel points to Israeli attacks on roads, bridges and vehicles transporting refugees as preventing civilian evacuation. The Israeli Air Force bombed the Jiyeh power station, 30 km (19 mi) south of Beirut, on 13 July 2006 and 15 July 2006, resulting in an environmental disaster. The plant's damaged storage tanks leaked 20,000 to 30,000 tonnes of oil into the eastern Mediterranean Sea, comparable in size to the Exxon Valdez oil spill. A 10 km (6 mi) wide oil slick covers 170 km (105 statute miles) of coastline, and was threatening Turkey and Cyprus. The slick was reportedly causing breathing problems, killing fish, and threatened the habitat of the endangered green sea turtle, as well as increasing the risk of cancer. The Lebanese government estimated the time necessary for a complete recovery to be 10 years. The UN estimated the cost for the initial clean-up at \$64m.

Hezbollah rocket attacks caused numerous forest fires inside northern Israel, particularly on the Naftali mountain range near Kiryat Shmona. As of 8 August as many as 9,000 acres including 3,000 acres of Israel's few forests, were damaged by fires caused by Hezbollah rockets, and at least one forest has lost nearly 75% of its trees. The Jewish National Fund estimated that it would take 50 to 60 years to rehabilitate the forests.

¹⁵. Articles - Reuters 23 Jul 2006 - <http://today.reuters.com/News/Crisis>

¹⁶. The Daily Star, 24 August 2006, page 1.

This conflict indirectly effect worldwide concerns over infrastructure damage and the risks of escalation of the crisis as well as mixed support and criticism of both Hezbollah and Israel government. The Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, and Canada was asserted Israel's right to self-defense. The United States government further responded by authorizing Israel's request for expedited shipment of precision-guided bombs, but did not announce the decision publicly. Among neighboring Middle Eastern nations, Iran, Syria, and Yemen voiced strong support for Hezbollah, while the Arab League issued statements condemning Israel's response and criticizing Hezbollah's action. Many worldwide protests and demonstrations appealed for an immediate ceasefire on both sides and expressed concern for the heavy loss of civilian life on all sides. Other demonstrations were held exclusively in favor of Lebanon or Israel. Numerous newspaper advertising campaigns, SMS and email appeals, and online petitions also occurred. Various foreign governments assisted the evacuation of their citizens from Lebanon.

Terms for a ceasefire had been drawn and revised several times over the course of the conflict and yet successful agreement between the two sides took several weeks. Hezbollah maintained the desire for an unconditional ceasefire while Israel insisted upon a conditional ceasefire including the return of the two kidnapped soldiers. Lebanon frequently pled for the United Nations Security Council to call for an immediate unconditional ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah.

CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT

By 11 August 2006 the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved UN Security Council Resolution 1701, in an effort to end the hostilities. It was accepted by the Lebanese government and Hezbollah on 12 August 2006, and by the Israeli government on 13 August 2006. The ceasefire took effect at 8:00 AM (5:00 AM GMT) on 14 August 2006. Before the ceasefire, the two Hezbollah members of cabinet said that their militia would not disarm south of the Litani River, according to another senior member of the Lebanese cabinet, while a top Hezbollah official similarly denied any intention of disarming in the south. Israel said it would stop withdrawing from Southern Lebanon if Lebanese troops were not deployed there within a matter of days. It is seen that the Hezbollah forces successfully to inflict some casualties on to the Israel forces by conducted a guerilla's tactic along the border side. They are well train in guerilla's warfare and very familiar with the battlefield in Lebanon territory. Otherwise the Israel force was more concentrated on the conventional warfare battle. It is also define that both forces was significantly use mass support weapon such as artillery, mortar and rocket fire to create maximum impact and desire effect on to the target.

In this regard, both parties derives it lessons learnt from the 2006 Lebanon war and conflict as Israel when it was in a relatively weak position as it negotiated UN Resolution 1701, which ended the 33 days of fighting with the radial Shiite Hezbollah movement. During that crisis, ground troops, which entered only at a late stage, were unable to advance very far into Lebanon and suffered heavy casualties when repelled by Hezbollah fighters. Hamas has also drawn lessons from that war and is using Hezbollah

as an example. Its defiant leaders have repeatedly stated that Israel can expect “a second Winograd.” Israel’s Winograd Commission harshly criticized the Olmert government’s handling of the inconclusive war - not least because the Israeli premier failed to define clear and realistic goals of Israel’s offensive against Hezbollah and because ground troops were prepared only at a very late stage.

Since its take-over of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, Hamas has gradually transformed its armed wing, the al - Qassam Brigades, into a well-disciplined and well-trained semi-official army, with an estimated 16,500 fighters. The Brigades have trained systematically for the scenario of a major Israeli ground invasion of Gaza. Hamas has admitted that it has periodically been sending groups of fighters to Iran, where several hundred have already completed intensive training at a closed military Revolutionary Guard base in Tehran. Those who excelled returned to Gaza as instructors and trained thousands more in urban fighting, sniping and making explosives from household’s goods. Hundreds more Hamas fighters have trained in Syria under instructors who learnt their techniques in Iran.

CONCLUSION

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL, is one of the UN’s oldest peacekeeping operations. Its nearly 2,000 troops and 50 unarmed military observers are tasked with seeking to maintain a ceasefire along the 70-mile (121 km) United Nations “Blue Line” between Israel and Lebanon, by patrolling, observing, reporting violations and liaising with the parties. UNIFIL was established in 1978 by the United Nations Security Council (Resolution 425). The Council authorized “a *United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area*”. UNIFIL is currently deployed in Southern Lebanon (south of the Litani River) and primarily along the United Nations-drawn Blue Line, which is the border between Israel and Lebanon. The force’s activities have centered on monitoring military activity between Hezbollah and the Israeli Defense Forces with the aim of reducing tensions and allaying tension along the border. UNIFIL has also played an important role in clearing landmines, assisting displaced persons and providing humanitarian assistance to civilians in the underdeveloped region of Southern Lebanon.

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