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

— artikel kulit muka

PROJEK RUMAH RIHAT PANAR LABAN
GUNUNG KINABALU SABAH

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

Gambar kulit muka membayangkan betapa sibuknya wira-wira dari Rejimen Jurutera Malaysia menyediakan pembinaan rumah rihat di Panar Laban, Sabah.

Grafik Oleh
Spr Fatah B Sulaiman

Dicetak oleh:
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

BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND ARMY LEADERSHIP

By Mejar Mohd Chong Bin Abdullah

This article discusses the three behavioral concepts that are considered pertinent to Army Leadership, namely causation in behavior, human needs, frustration and the psychology of learning.

INTRODUCTION

It is axiomatic that a leader's success in getting work done through others depends to a great degree on his knowledge of the basic leadership functions namely, planning, organizing, coordinating and controlling work and his ability to apply that knowledge. Equally evident is the fact that knowledge of human relations is critically related to the functions of leadership. That is to say, understanding the components and process of the leadership functions will not necessary ensure successful leadership. Consequently, to understand the totality of the nature of leadership, it is also necessary to understand human relations. The reason for this is predicated on the fact that human relations, as a body of knowledge, is concerned with the behavior of man. Because the leader's fundamental responsibility in any form of organization is to get work done through people, and because he can achieve this only by successfully influencing the behavior of the human beings to whom work has been assigned, it follows that the leader must be thoroughly acquainted with the forces and factors that cause and influence human behavior. Leaders whether they be commanders, instructors or staff officers, must in their difficult and complex task of directing the efforts of others to achieve a common goal, effectively motivate their subordinates by communicating to them, training and developing them, preparing them for changes, counseling them and so on. For unless they do these things, they cannot possibly hope to accomplish the objectives of the organization. Thus the key to effective army leadership is the understanding of the basic principles, concepts and techniques of human relations.

CAUSATION IN BEHAVIOR

The cause-and-effect relationship is a fundamental concept in human behavior. Generally human behavior is caused. The interaction between person and situation results in behavior leading to mission accomplishment. Frequently the causal elements of a problem are found in the situation. In solving leadership problems, a leader should examine the problem from the position of looking for likely causes or antecedents to the current situation rather than looking for symptoms or what appears to be the major in-dication that there is a problem.

Problem solving through symptom-oriented approach is fundamentally sound but it has at least one weakness. The problem solvers are human, and as human, tend to make value judgements. That is problem solvers judge on the basis of their own value system, right or wrong. Unfortunately all of us make value judgement regularly. Judging on the basis of one's values or reacting to symptoms can create serious interpersonal behavior problem. Since a leader must influence people to accomplish organizational missions, by reacting to symptoms rather than seeking causation in behavior, he is performing his leadership role in a negative manner and inhibiting mission accomplishment. Thus in solving leadership problems, a leader should adopt a scientifically oriented approach which searches for causes rather than reacts to symptoms.

Perception and Behavior

In nearly all problem solving situations there are distorting factors. One of these factors is perception — the way a person sees a given situation. That is to say, in the constant interaction between a person and his environment, the way a person sees or perceives his environment is subject to many distorting influences. Objects, people, any phenomenon frequently appear differently than they are. Therefore, a leader must be particularly careful to avoid jumping to hasty conclusions, especially on the basis of visual evidence.

Problem Situation and Decision Making

An Army Leader is a decision maker. Decision making is simply an act of selecting a choice among existing alternatives. If the leader has some experience in a task, decision making will be relatively simple because he has probably faced most decision situation before. In fact, if these situation recur frequently enough, decision making soon becomes a routine procedure.

But what happens in a situation where there are no established alternatives? In some instances the decision maker will have to form alternatives himself, then select the best from among them. Forming alternatives and selecting from them is called problem solving. Problem solving also has other characteristics. In the psychological context that concern us, a problem situation has three distinguishing characteristics: the person, the obstacle, and the goal.

A problem involves a motivating situation. What does this mean? What do we suggest when we say that behavior is goal oriented, that a person's actions are motivated by his desire to reach some goals?

HUMAN NEEDS

People have varied and complex needs that stem from basic needs to higher order needs. Basic needs one physiological such as needs for food, water and shelter. There are others. In short they are internal a part of a person's original innate mechanism. The higher order needs are the result of learning. Needs for achievement, status, self-esteem, and sense of belonging are included in this latter category.

In addition to having internal needs, people have external goals. Needs and goals can be positive or negative. A need may be desire to do good work or a fear of failure. A goal may be a word of praise or the desire to avoid condemnation. It is thought that needs and goals are the initiating and sustaining forces of behavior.

Motivated behavior results from the interaction between a person's internal needs and his external goals. A problem develops when something interposes an obstacle between the person and the desired goal. To overcome the obstacle a person may try a variety of behavior pattern to develop alternative courses of action to circumvent, penetrate, or remove the obstacle. This variability is one of the dominant characteristics of problem solving behavior.

Since the structure and intensity of a person's needs are critical elements in a problem situation, it is imperative that we briefly discuss some behavioral science concepts regarding these needs.

Accordingly, no two people have exactly the same needs. Even in the same person, needs may vary in intensity at different times. Needs are continuously developing and changing.

Since a person has a variety of needs, at a given time any one need may have dominance over others. The person may be hungry, thirsty and tired at the same time; however, the dominance of one of the needs would probably determine what he would do. For example, he may eat, drink, and sleep in that order.

There have been many attempts to classify or establish a framework for understanding the relationship among needs. Probably the one most cited is Abraham Maslow's hierachy of needs. In Maslow hierachy, human needs develop from lower to higher needs, the lower needs having to be satisfied before higher needs develop. Thus there is a changing pattern of need dominance with certain needs more dominant at a given time. This hierachy includes physiological needs, safety needs, social needs, esteem needs, and self-actualization needs.

An Army Leader must be aware of the relationship between needs and goals in order to stimulate maximum contribution from a person. He must be able to identify factors that satisfy and dissatisfy the individual. One of the areas of relevance to the military is the relationship between needs and job attitudes. Figure 1 illustrates the application of factors that either satisfy or dissatisfy the individual based on the assumption that satisfaction and dissatisfaction with a job or career are on a continuum.

According to Herzberg's theory, job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction are two separate and distinct attitudes, each with a different and separate set of goals and needs. The factors affecting job satisfaction differ from those primarily affecting job dissatisfaction, and both meet needs. Factors that lead to job satisfaction reward the person's need for psychological growth. Herzberg classifies these factors as "Motivators". Factors that prevent job dissatisfaction are called "hygiene" factors. Figure 2 illustrates these factors.

The "hygiene" factors are conditions of the work environment. They have little power to produce satisfaction a person needs from his work A person can obtain rewards that will reinforce his aspirations only by doing the job and performing the task.

Psychological growth is as inexorable a need in man as are biological and social growth. A man's need to get satisfaction out of what he is doing is as, basic as the need to be paid well and to be treated fairly. For a man to achieve psychological growth, he must derive a maximum satisfaction from his work. For work to motivate him, it must have personal relevance for him. Meaningful work motivates; that which is not meaningful does not motivate. In other words, all of us require the motivators to meet our needs for professional development and personal growth. We have corresponding need to avoid dissatisfaction by receiving fair treatment in compensation, supervision, working conditions and administrative policies and practices. Thus the challenge before the Army Leader is to initiate appropriate action to enhance factors that motivate and to minimize factors that dissatisfy. For example the Motivator-hygiene approach is useful for classifying and evaluating command policies and practices, enriching jobs, providing greater opportunity for responsibility, achievement, recognition, etc.

FRUSTRATION

Frustration is one of the most common behavior problem faced by Army Leaders. There are many sources of frustration in our complex organizations. The very routine and procedures that are intended to facilitate efficient administration constantly appears, as potentially frustrating factors. Seemingly, frustration has detrimental effects on individuals and work groups.

As discussed earlier, motivated behavior is the interaction between internal needs and external goals, both positive and negative. This interaction can be extremely intense — there are many instances of persons under stress performing unbelievable tasks against uncountable odds.

A problem arises when there is a barrier or obstacle between the person (need) and the goal (incentive). If a person can display problem

(Pay, Fringe Benefits insecurity, working conditions, Family separation).



Figure 1
CAREER ATTITUDE ON A CONTINUUM



Figure 2
SCHEMA OF PARALLEL JOB ATTITUDE, FACTORS AND EFFECTS

solving or adaptive behavior, he can overcome the obstacle by going around it, through it, or selecting a substitute goal. But what happens when these alternatives are blocked?

Frequently a symptom of frustration – aggression occurs. Other responses to frustration may occur first, and aggression is not always the result, but it is a typical symptom. Hostility, striking out, smashing objects, and other forms of peculiar behavior charaterize aggression.

Another characteristic of frustration – induced aggression often attributed to the military is displaced hostility, often called "Scapegoating". A person may be in a position where he cannot attack the cause of his frustration directly – the person or object may be bigger than he is but he may want to, nevertheless. If his feelings are sufficiently aroused, he may attack irrespective of the consequences, but he often takes out such frustration on another person or another object having to do so nothing with the original cause of his frustration. All too often people direct their hostility at the peers or subordinates who in turn, may vent their aggression on their work groups.

If leaders are to do an effective job, they must be able to identify possible frustration – producing situations and frustrated behavior and take appropriate actions. This requires understanding of the causes and forms of frustration and skill in taking remedial actions.

Frustration Producing Situation

Accordingly, there are three stimulus situations that are said to be frustrating or lead to frustration behavior. There are frustration by delay, frustration by blocking, and frustration by conflict. The first two categories our considered closely associated with one another.

Frustration by delay is likely to occur when some obstacles delay us from attaining a desired goal. This can be normal or unforseen delay depending on the magnitude of the problem situation. On the other hand frustration by blocking occurs when some obstacles prevent us from attaining a desired goal. In any case the level of performance is markedly lower than the level of aspiration.

Frustration by conflict result when the individual must choose between two alternatives that offer competing or conflicting stimuli. There are three types of conflicting situations, namely, *approach-approach*, *avoidance-avoidance* and *approach avoidance.*

Forms of Frustration

One of the most serious forms of frustration is aggression. But aggression is only one of the ways in which frustration can be manifest. If pressures continue and increase, one or more of several forms of frustrated behavior may develop including rationalization, regression, fixation and resignation.

Rationalization involves looking for excuses is a type of behavior where the frustrated person blames someone else for his inability to achieve some goals or talks himself out of a desirability of a goal. Frequently the overt evidence of this form of frustration often happen in the Army is blaming a superior for the person's inability to get a promotion.

Regression is simply the failure to act one's age. Sometimes people regress or "go backwards" in their behavior, behaving more like children than adults.

Fixation is another form of severe frustration. Compulsive, stereotyped, repetitive behavior characterizes fixation. A person may continue to exhibit the same behavior pattern over and over again – so called "Onetrack mindedness" with seemingly no attempt to adapt.

Resignation or apathy is charaterized by loss of hope, escape from reality, withdrawal retreat from the source of frustration.

The five forms of frustration examined here – aggression, rationalization, regression, fixation and resignation are symptoms for which the leader should be constantly aware so that he can take remedial action. However, he must avoid taking a simplistic approach to the problem of frustration. There is no clearly defined hierachy of frustrated behavior in which a person proceeds down a well-defined path, level by level; first being aggressive, then regressive etc. It is equally true that there is a wide range of frustration tolerance. What may be a stressful situation for one person may be stimulating for another and what may induce frustration at one time may not occur at another time.

PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING

One of the primary responsibilities of an Army Leader is to develop his subordinates into more effective member to the work team. Motivation alone is insufficient to insure that people effectively accomplish the mission; the men must have the necessary skills to perform assigned tasks. This means that an Army leader must know and be able to apply the principles of learning in order to establish the proper learning environment for formal on-the-job training or informal coaching. In the Army, personal development must be a continuing process to maintain previously learned skills and to acquire the new skills required to accomplish army mission.

Learning is normally defined as a change in behavior. As a result of a learning experience, a person may change his ways of perceiving, thinking, feeling, and doing. This behavior can be physical and overt, or it can be intellectual or attitudinal, not easily seen.

All learning is by experience, but it takes place in different forms and in varying degrees of richness and depth. Learning a physical skill for instance requires actual experience in performing that skill. A soldier learns to drive a truck only if his learning experiences including driving one. People also form mental habits through practise. If a person is used to sound judgement and solve problems well, he must have had learning experiences which he exercised judgement and applied his knowledge of general principles in the solving of realistic problems.

Instructional Methods

One of the more signficant problems in teaching involves the instructional method to be used in various situations. The best approach or technique requires an understanding of the nature of what the student is to learn. Although the process of learning has many aspects, the main objective for which Army related instruction is the learning of a skill.

The process of learning skills appears to be much the same, whether it is a motor (physical) or a mental skill. Learning is said to be multifaced. While a muscular sequence is being learned, other things ar[illegible]ning as well. The learner's percep[illegible]ged as the sequence become easier. He develops concept of how to perform the skill and changed certain attitudes. Accordingly, learning of skills depend on several factors, including the desire to learn, the patterns to be followed, the actual performance of the skill, the knowledge of results, and the learner's continued progress.

Laws of Learning

The Laws of learning provide useful insights into the learning process. If the instructor understands the Laws of learning, he is in an improved position to deal intellegently with the factors that affect learning. There are six basic laws of learning: Law of readiness, law of exercise, law of effect, law of primacy, law of intensity and law of recency.

- **Law of Readiness.** A person learns best when he is ready to learn, and he does not learn much if he sees no reason for learning. Preparing a person to learn is usually the instructor's responsibility. Readiness to learn can be overshadowed by insoluble personal problems, outside interests or worries.
- **Law of Exercise.** This law states that those things most often repeated are best remembered. It is the basis of practice and drill. The instructor must provide opportunities to practice or repeat, and he must sees that this process is directed toward a goal. Repetition includes recall, review, mannual drill and physical application.
- **Law of Effect.** This law is based on the emotional reaction of the learner. It states that learning is strengthened when accompanied by a pleasant or satisfying feeling and that learning is weakened when associated with unpleasant feeling. If an instructor demands that a recruit shoots well on his first attempt, the recruit is likeiy to feel dissatisfied and frustrating. In terms of the learning objective his experience would be unpleasant.

Whatever the learning situation, it should contain elements that influence the learner positively and give him a feeling of satisfaction. Every learning experience does not have to be entirely successful nor does the learner have to master each lesson completely. But the chance of success is increased if the learning experience is pleasant.

- **Law of Primacy**. Primacy, the state of being first, often creates a strong, almost unshakable impression. For the instructor this means that what he teaches must be right the first time. For the learner, it means that his learning must be right. "Unlearning" is more difficult than learning. If a new recruit learns incorrect weapon handling, his instructor will have a difficult task in unteaching the bad habits and reteaching good ones. The learner's first experience should be positive and functional foundation for all that is to follow.
- **Law of Intensity**. The Law implies that one learns more from the real thing than from substitute. A soldier can learn more about tactics from a demonstration of battle drill than listening to a lecture on the subject. In other words, instructor should use imagination in simulating reality as closely as possible.
- **Law of Recency**. Other things being equal, the things most recently learned are best remembered. The law of recency is used in planning a summary or an effective conclusion for a lecture. The instructor should repeats, restates, or reemphazes important matters at the end of a lesson to make sure that the class remembers them.

Factors That Affect Learning

The three major factors that affect learning are motivation, participation, and individual differences.

- **Motivation**. The learner must have a need to know, to understand to believe, to act, or to acquire a skill. All of these needs, which make up motivation are inseparable from the personal-social needs of the learner. The instructor must first establish learning objectives and then activate forces that influence the learner to work toward them. This is motivation.
- **Participation**. People learn best when they are active. A person who is required to think imaginatively and reflectively learns more than one who merely absorb knowledge passively. To encourage participation an instructor can assign writing, reading, and form discussion groups; invite disagreements and require learners to evaluate one another's work. All of these are forms of participation.
- **Individual Difference**. Because of differences in experience, background, intellegence, interests, desire to learn, and psychological, emotional and physical factors, people learn at different rates. The instructor must recognize these individual differences and gear his teaching to reach all learners whatever their capabilities. He must try to equalize the different levels of understanding.

Transfer of Learning

The learner is frequently confronted with the need to adapt what he has learned to situations that differ from the original learning experience. The purpose of any army training is to prepare its students to function in the situations they will face after they are trained. A training school seldom simulate completely all the conditions that its student will meet. Therefore, the instructor must teach in such a manner that the learner can apply what he learns in a variety of situations.

CONCLUSION

Behavioral Science is associated with every facet of an Army Leader's role. Knowledge of the basic concepts of behavioral science and skill in applying these concepts is absolutely essential the army leader since the leader's primary task is mission accomplishment through the influencing of people. The leader who understands and able to apply the concepts of human behavior, human needs, frustration and learning is better prepared to select the leadership behaviors most appropriate to any given situation. Hence, in his preoccupation with group effort for mission accomplishment, the leader must never lose sight of the needs, capabilities, and aspirations of the individual. Rather, he must concentrate on the development, satisfaction and creative potential of each group member.

Mej Mohd Chong bin Abdullah was commissioned into the Regiment of Engineers in 1972. He holds a Diploma in Management Science and a Master degree in Business Administration. Presently serving in the Logistics Division, Ministry of Defence as Staff Officer Grade 2 Property Management.

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Mobility becomes the decisive element of speed once movement has begun. It must be assumed that the enemy will discover the movement. Therefore, it is essential that he be given the least amount of time to react. This can only be achieved if the fastest means of movement are used. United States doctrine emphasises this, stating: 'The mobility of armoured, mechanized, airborne and aviation and tactical airpower, permit the commander to re-dispose rapidly, and so achieve surprise.

D M Poynton Major, Royal Australian Infantry

Artikel Kulit Muka

PROJEK RUMAH RIHAT PANAR LABAN GUNUNG KINABALU SABAH

Oleh Jabatanarah Jurutera

PENDAHULUAN

Gunung Kinabalu termasyhor sebagai gunung yang tertinggi sekali di Rantau Asia Tenggara mencapai ke paras 4101 meter. Ianya juga merupakan gunung yang termuda sekali di dunia berusia 2 juta tahun dan kini meningkat sekadar setengah ke satu sentimeter setahun. Keindahan dan kesegaran serta kekayaan alam semula jadi sekitarnya menjadikan ianya lambang kemegahan Negara ini. Gunung Kinabalu terletak di kawasan Taman Negara Kinabalu yang meliputi kawasan seluas 767 kilometer persegi. Jarak dari Kota Kinabalu ke Taman Negara ialah 86 kilometer dan memakan masa 2 jam perjalanan dengan kenderaan. Beberapa kemudahan diadakan kepada pelawat-pelawat dan pendaki-pendaki diadakan di Taman Negara. Diantaranya ialah Pejabat Pentadbiran, Bilik Pameran, Restoran serta Asrama-Asrama, Bilik Kediaman dan Rumah-Rumah Chalet. Taman ini boleh menampung kediaman seramai 200 orang pada satu masa.

SEJARAH

Taman Kinabalu telah diwartakan sebagai Taman Negara pada tahun 1964 bagi tujuan memelihara kecantikan alam sekitarnya yang mempunyai nilai warisan sejarah dan nilai sainti. Menurut sejarah Gunung Kinabalu mulai didaki oleh Sir Hugh Low pada tahun 1851. Beliau ialah seorang Pegawai Kerajaan dari Pulau Labuan. Gunung Kinabalu mempunyai hubungan rapat dengan suku kaum Dusun atau Kadasan. Menurut kepercayaan Gunung Kinabalu adalah tempat semadinya roh simati suku kaum tersebut.

LATAR BELAKANG PROJEK

Projek rumah rihat ini telah dicadangkan oleh YAB Datuk Harris Salleh bekas Ketua Menteri Sabah selepas beliau dan rombongan mendaki Gunung tersebut pada bulan May 1983. Beliau telahpun berbincang dengan Panglima 5 Bde di kala itu, Brig Jen Mansor bin Mohammad Yunus untuk mendapat bantuan tentera di dalam melaksanakan projek tersebut. Pada 1 July 1983 satu mesyuarat telah diadakan di Ibu Pejabat Jabatan Kerja Raya bagi perlantikan Ahli Jawatankuasa dan seterusnya merancangkan pelancaran projek tersebut. Pada mesyuarat tersebut Pengarah Kerja Raya Negeri Datuk K. S Fung telah dilantik sebagai Pengerusi. Hadzir dalam mesyuarat tersebut ialah wakil semua ejensi-ejensi yang terlibat melaksanakan projek tersebut. Di antara ejensi-ejensi terlibat ialah:

a. Taman Negara
b. Kementerian Perancangan dan Pembangunan Kewangan Negeri
c. Kementerian Pembangunan Sumber Sumber Negeri
d. Jabatan Kerja Raya
e. Angkatan Tentera
f. Syarikat Penerbangan Sabah

Di dalam mesyuarat tersebut tugas-tugas dan tanggungjawab telahpun digariskan. Di antara tanggungjawab dan tugas yang telah diberikan ialah:

a. JKR — Bertanggungjawab pada keseluruhan di atas projek tersebut. Ini termasuk mereka bentuk bangunan, membuat tender untuk pemborong, menyiapkan peralatan bangunan dan mengawasi dan menyelia projek tersebut.
b. Angkatan Tentera — Khasnya 5 Skn Jurutera di bawah naungan 5 Bde membuat persiapan tapak, membesar tapak mendarat Helikopter dan seterusnya mendirikan bangunan rumah rihat tersebut.
c. Taman Negara — Kewangan untuk projek serta segala bantuan di Taman Negara dan Gunung Kinabalu untuk pihak Tentera melaksanakan projek tersebut.

Mesyuarat juga telah menggariskan jadual perlaksanaan projek tersebut. Jadual adalah seperti berikut:

a. Bulan Julai — Sebut Harga alat-alat pembinaan oleh JKR.
b. Bulan Ogos — Tender dibuka.
c. Bulan September — Oktober — Pemborong menyiapkan dan membekal alat-alat pembinaan.
d. Oktober — Disember — Penghantaran alat-alat binaan dengan udara dan poter.

TUJUAN UTAMA RUMAH RIHAT PANAR LABAN

Tujuan utama di dirikan rumah ini adalah bagi mengadakan kemudahan penginapan yang lebih selesanya lagi bagi pendaki-pendaki. Lazimnya pendaki-pendaki dikehendaki bermalam di Panar Laban sebelum mendaki ke Puncak. Pendakian ke puncak hanya boleh dilakukan pada awal-awal pagi diantara pukul 3.00 — 4.00 pagi. Waktu ini keadaan cuaca lebih baik dan angin tenang. Ini juga membolehkan pendaki-pendaki sampai ke puncak pada waktu matahari terbit diantara pukul 6.00 — 6.30 pagi. Waktu ini di puncak selalunya cerah tanpa kabus dan keadaan angin tenang. Satu perkara yang rumit iaitu dari Panar Laban ke puncak pendaki-pendaki terpaksa bangun awal pagi dan berjalan dalam gelap menuju ke puncak. Selepas berada di puncak selama satu jam atau lebih bergantung pada cuaca, pendaki-pendaki akan turun ke Panar Laban untuk mengambil barang-barang dan terus ke Ibu Pejabat Taman Negara. Lazimnya mereka akan sampai Ibu Pejabat Taman Negara waktu makan tengahari. Boleh dikatakan hampir kesemua pendaki tidak tinggal bermalam lagi di Panar Laban. Ini disebabkan kemudahan-kemudahan yang ada di sana terhad. Jika pendaki-pendaki tinggal semalam lagi maka ini akan menyekat peluang pendaki-pendaki lain. Satu lagi sebab pendaki-pendaki tidak tinggal semalam lagi di Panar Laban kerana mereka terpaksa memasak makanan sendiri. Ini bermakna mereka terpaksa membawa lebih makanan semasa mula-mula mendaki. Akhir sekali keadaan tempat tinggal sekarang adalah tidak selesa. Pendaki-pendaki diberi 'sleeping bag' dan hanya tidur di atas katil-katil dibuat dari papan tanpa tilam. Pihak Taman Negara berpendapat dengan adanya rumah rihat ini yang mempunyai segala kemudahan pendaki-pendaki akan tinggal lebih lama lagi di Panar Laban. Mereka akan dapat menikmati udara nyaman, cuaca yang berlainan serta bersiar-siar di kawasan sekitar untuk melihat keindahan alam semula jadi.

BUTIR-BUTIR RUMAH RIHAT

Rumah rihat adalah dua tingkat berukuran 137 kaki panjang dan lebar 28 kaki. Semua rangka bangunan ini diperbuat dari besi yang telah dipasang siap. Tingkat bawah rumah rihat mempunyai sebuah ruang tamu, restoran, dewan makan dan dua buah bilik kediaman. Di tingkat pertama pula keseluruhannya mengandungi bilik-bilik kediaman. Sejumlah 13 buah bilik kesemuanya dan kemudahan seperti bilik air dan tandas diadakan. Rumah rihat ini dilengkapi dengan alat-alat perabut serba moden dan perhiasan dalam yang indah. Kerja-kerja mencantikan kawasan sekitar (landscaping) juga diadakan di sekeliling rumah rihat ini.



GROUND FLOOR PLAN


FIRST FLOOR PLAN
BEDROOM
CORRIDOR
MALE TOILET
FEMALE TOILET
VIP BEDROOM
BATH
down
DN
9' 0"
11' 0"
12' 0"
17' 0"
10' 6"
5' 0"

PERGERAKAN KE TAMAN NEGARA

Pergerakan ke Taman Negara dibuat pada 24 Oktober 1983. Seramai 1 Pegawai dan 26 lain-lain pangkat dari No 3 Terup 5 Skn Jurutera telah bergerak dengan kenderaan ke Taman Negara. Dalam kumpulan ini termasuk 5 orang anggota dari unit 371 Kompeni Hantaran Udara dari Labuan. Setelah bermalam di Taman Negara kumpulan pendahuluan seramai satu pegawai dan 18 lain-lain pangkat telahpun mendaki ke Panar Laban iaitu di paras 11,000 kaki. Seramai 7 orang anggota telah ditugaskan di Taman Negara untuk tugas am dan membantu pihak Taman Negara dan Syarikat Penerbangan Sabah untuk menghantar stor-stor pembinaan ke Panar Laban.

TUGAS AWALAN DI PANAR LABAN

PANAR LABAN terletaknya di paras 11,000 kaki dan merupakan kaki kepada puncak Gunung Kinabalu. Pendaki-pendaki mestilah melalui Panar Laban sebelum ke puncak gunung. Apa yang lebih aneh iaitu pendaki-pendaki mestilah bermalam di Panar Laban sebelum membuat pendakian ke puncak. Ini adalah kerana puncak Gunung Kinabalu hanya boleh didaki waktu subuh-subuh saja kerana waktu ini puncak itu akan kelihatan tanpa kabus. Kebiasaannya selepas 8.00 pagi kabus telah mula menyelubungi puncak dan kawasan sekitarnya dan ini membahayakan kepada pendaki-pendaki.

Pada 1hb. November, 1983 kompressor yang dibawa dengan pesawat Jenis Bell 212 dari Syarikat Penerbangan Sabah telah siap dipasang semula. Kerja-kerja memecah batu untuk persiapan tapak bangunan dan pembesaran tapak mendarat pun dimulakan. Batu-batu pejal yang tertanam itu diletupkan dengan bahan letupan. Jenis letupan yang digunakan ialah 'plastic explosive' jenis Emulite. Semua letupan dikendalikan secara electrical. Sebanyak 500 lbs Emulite telah digunakan untuk kedua-dua tugas.

Pada hujung bulan November 1983 keadaan cuaca telah mula mengganggu pekerjaan harian dan juga penghantaran stor. Hujan lebat serta kabus tebal hingga sehari suntuk sering dialami. Boleh dikatakan dalam bulan tersebut sekurang-kurangnya tiga ke empat hari seminggu keadaan ini berlaku. Ini sebabkan musim tengkujuh yang selalu berlaku pada hujung tahun. Cuaca juga menjejas 'performance' anggota. Anggota cepat penat dan lapar. Tangan menjadi kebas walaupun menggunakan sarong tangan dan muka akan juga menjadi kebas. Suhu di Panar Laban kalah di antara 2 – 8 degree selsius. Pada bulan Disember 1983 kerja-kerja masih ditumpukan kepada persiapan tapak. Dalam bulan ini tidak ada penerbangan dibuat kerana Syarikat Penerbangan Sabah telah ditugaskan ke Sarawak oleh kerana Pilihan Raya Negeri. Walaubagaimana segala kayu kayan ter- dihantar dengan menggunakan 'porter'. 'Porte:' i. adalah terdiri dari penduduk-penduduk kampung berhampiran. Pada awal Januari 1984 tapak rumah rihat yang dicadangkan terpaksa diubah oleh kerana didapati terlalu dekat dengan tapak mendarat helikopter. Di sini lagi masa dan tenaga terbuang dan lubang-lubang foundation terpaksa digali semula. Sementara menunggu wakil JKR datang membuat kerja-kerja mengukur sebahagian besar dari anggota terup dihantar balek ke Lok Kawi untuk berehat.

PERSIAPAN TAPAK BANGUNAN

Kerja-kerja menggali semula parit-parit untuk membina ground beam dimulakan pada 1hb Februari 1984 selepas anggota bercuti selama 3 minggu. Kerja-kerja ini siap pada hujung Februari 1984. Kerja-kerja menanam reinforcement bar k- dalam parit-parit tersebut serta mencurah konk.. juga dimulakan. Akhirnya pada penghujung bulan April semua 'ground beam' siap dan simennya pun cukup keras. Perlu dinyatakan bahawa oleh kerana keadaan cuaca simen memakan masa yang lama untuk keras. Ianya memakan masa lebih kurang sebulan untuk keras dari masa mula dicurahkan.

Apabila selesai membina ground beam, kerja-kerja membina tiang konkrit (concrete footings) dimulakan. Tiang konkrit ini dibina diatas ground beam tadi. Tinggi tiang konkrit ini tertaklok kepada keadaan tanah. Tiang-tiang konkrit ini juga mempunyai 'reinforcement bars' di dalamnya. Kerja-kerja ini siap pada hujung bulan Mei 1984.



Persediaan Tapak

MENDIRIKAN TIANG BESI

Tiang-tiang besi ini didirikan di atas tiang-tiang konkrit. Kerja-kerja mendirikan tiang-tiang besi ini adalah satu kerja yang sukar dan berat sekali dilaksanakan. Tiang-tiang besi ini seberat 750 lbs dan panjangnya 24 kaki. Tiang-tiang ini berjumlah 30 batang diangkat dari tapak mendarat ke kawasan bangunan. Jarak kedua-dua tempat ini hanya 100 meter tetapi perbedzaan paras tinggi antaranya ialah 50 kaki. Tiap-tiap tiang memerlukan tenaga 16 orang untuk mengangkatnya. Kerja-kerja ini adalah sungguh mencabar lebih-lebih lagi tiang-tiang ini sejuk untuk dipegang.

Kerja-kerja mendirikan tiang-tiang besi ke atas tiang konkrit juga tidak kurang rumit dan mencabar. Kerumitan adalah disebabkan kami tidak mempunyai alat 'Crane' dan juga menara yang sesuai seperti 'scafolding'. Apa yang dilakukan bagi mendirikan tiang-tiang besi tersebut hanya berdasarkan pengtahuan dan pengalaman di dalam Jurutera medan (Field Engineering). Bagi tugas ini kami telah membena menara dari kayu setinggi 20 kaki. Di atas menara kayu ini dipasangkan 'chain block' yang boleh mengangkat seberat 5 ton. Oleh sebab menara ini tinggi kami telah memasang satu lagi 'chain block' di pertengahan menara bagi memberi kemudahan dan mempercepatkan kerja mendirikan tiang besi itu. Kerja-kerja mendirikan tiang ini sebenarnya dilakukan dalam bulan puasa dalam keadaan cuaca yang baik tetapi angin kencang. Kerja ini siap pada hujung bulan Julai 1984.

MEMBINA TINGKAT PERTAMA

Ketika mendirikan tiang-tiang besi kerja-kerja memasang bahagian-bahagian lain dijalankan serentak. Kerja membina tingkat pertama dimulakan pada 7 Julai 84 seminggu selepas Hari Raya Puasa. Dalam kerja ini yang rumitnya ialah memasang 'main beam'. Main beam diperbuat dari besi panjangnya 24 kaki (lebar bangunan) terpaksa disambung dahulu dengan menggunakan bolts dan nuts. Setelah siap dipasang ketiga-tiga bahagiannya akan dinaikkan dengan cara yang sama mendirikan tiang besi. Sebanyak 16 batang beam dan berat tiap-tiap satu ialah 650 lbs. Apabila siap dinaikkan main beam baru perasaan lega dan gembira anggota mula kelihatan. Dengan ini bermakna kerja-kerja berat sudahpun tamat. Apa yang lebih mengembirakan ialah kesemua beam-beam itu lekat pada tiang besi tanpa apa-apa masaalah besar. Ini membuktikan bahawa tiang-tiang besi itu berkeadaan betul dan segala kerja pengukuran di peringkat awal juga tepat. Bayangkan bagaimana jika salah satu beam itu yang dibuat secara pasang siap itu tidak betul-betul sampai ke tiang-tiang besi. Ini bermakna tiang konkrit terpaksa dipecah dan diubah serta tiang besi di atasnya terpaksa juga diubah. Setelah siap main beam dinaikkan kami telah mengadakan satu majlis kesyukuran dan doa selamat.

MEMBUMBUNG, MENDINDING DAN MELANTAI

Kerja-kerja membumbung dimulakan dengan memasang rangka bumbung (rafter) yang juga diperbuat dari besi. Cara memasang 'rafter' ini adalah seperti menaikkan main beam iaitu dengan menggunakan chain block. Kerja-kerja ini mudah berbanding dengan kerja-kerja lain. Hanya satu masaalah yang didapati dalam kerja ini iaitu angin kencang. Kerja-kerja terpaksa diberhentikan kerana boleh merbahayakan kepada anggota-anggota bekerja disebabkan ketinggian bangunan tersebut beserta dengan angin kencang. Setelah rafter siap diletakkan di atas main post maka 'purlin' dipasang diantara rafter-rafter. Purlin yang digunakan juga diperbuat dari besi. Selepas itu seluruh bahagian bumbung ditutup dahulu dengan 'aluminium foil'. Tujuan dipasang foil ini ialah untuk mengurangkan kesejukan atau kepanasan. Selepas dipasang aluminium foil ini barulah dipasang bumbung. Meterial yang digunakan untuk bumbung ialah jenis spendex. Cara melekatkan bumbung spendex kepada purlin dengan menggunakan screw. Screw ini dipasang pada elektrik drill dan ditebok terus dari atas bumbung spendex hingga ke dalam purlin.

Memasang dinding juga senang oleh kerana dinding ini berkeping keping (penel) penel dinding ini dilekatkan kepada bangunan dengan screw. Hanya satu masaalah dalam kerja ini iaitu kepingan dinding ini berat dan tiap-tiap satu keping berukuran 9 kaki panjang dan 4½ kaki lebar. Kepingan dinding ini terpaksa dibawa dari tapak mendarat ke bangunan dengan menggunakan enam orang untuk satu keping. Kerja ini bertambah

Struktur Mula Muncul

rumit lagi jika memasang dinding untuk tingkat atas disebabkan kepingan dinding ini berat.

Kerja-kerja melantai dilaksanakan sebaik saja selepas mendinding. Memasang lantai lebih mudah dari mendinding. Papan lantai yang digunakan ialah jenis berlidah dan berlurah (tongue and groove). Dalam kerja melantai ini anggota-anggota tidak mengalami kesejukan dan tidak kena hujan. Oleh yang demikian keupayaan mereka lebih baik lagi dari kerja-kerja lain.

Kerja-kerja memasang tingkap, pintu dan membuat sekatan untuk bilik-bilik dijalankan serentak dengan melantai. Kerja-kerja lain dilakukan tanpa apa-apa masalah besar. Kerja-kerja ini juga mudah kerana kesemuanya kayu dan papan maka membentuknya lebih mudah dari besi yang telah digunakan terdahulunya.

BEKALAN LETRIK DAN AIR

Kuasa letrik diperolehi dari stesyen pancaran TV dan radio Negeri Sabah. Stesyen ini terletak di Layang-Layang pada paras 9,000 kaki. Sebuah transformer 50 KVA dipasang di rumah rihat ini untuk membekal semua keperluan letrik. Bekalan air pula diperolehi dari sebuah kolam yang berhampiran. Sebuah pam air akan dipasang berhampiran kolam ini dan air akan dimasukkan ke dalam tangki-tangki air. Tangki-tangki air ini diletakan di atas sebuah menara yang dibena khas dan letakkan lebih tinggi dari rumah rihat. Oleh yang demikian air dapat dibekalkan dengan kuasa 'gravity'.

Kerja-kerja pendawaian bahagian luar dan dalam rumah dibuat oleh pihak JKR. Begitu juga kerja-kerja memasang paip dalam dan luar bangunan.

PENGAJARAN YANG DIPEROLEHI

Projek ini keseluruhannya memberi banyak pengajaran dari bidang kejuruteraan khasnya dan dari bidang ketenteraan amnya. Dari bidang kejuruteraan pengajaran yang diperolehi adalah:

a. Ini adalah kali pertama Pasukan Jurutera melibatkan diri dalam kerja-kerja besi (Steel Work). Semua super struktor bangunan

Perkhidmatan "Heli" Tidak Tertinggal

rumah rihat ini diperbuat dari besi yang dipasang siap.

b. Mendapat pengalaman di dalam kerja-kerja 'reinforce concrete'. Dalam kerja ini pengetahuan dan pengajaran di dapati berkenaan dengan cara-cara mengikat dan memasang besi-besi ke dalam konkrit.

c. Mendapat pengalaman di dalam kerja-kerja Jurutera Medan yang digunakan untuk mengangkat tiang-tiang besi.

d. Memberi peluang untuk mengulang kaji pengetahuan yang ada berkaitan dengan kerja-kerja demolisi. Dalam kerja ini perkara pengetahuan teori seperti borehole, charge, stump blasting dan boulder blasting juga dipratikkan.

e. Semua anggota yang mempunyai ketukangan tertentu dapat menambah pengetahuan mereka khasnya dari segi praktikal. Pengetahuan praktikal ini agak luar biasa dan berbeza dari pengalaman praktikal yang selalu dialami. Ini oleh kerana keadaan bangunan serta situasi tempat bekerja yang luar biasa.

Dari bidang ketenteraan pula pengalaman dan pengajaran yang diperolehi adalah seperti berikut:

a. Penyesuaian diri dengan keadaan tempat adalah satu perkara yang penting. Di paras 11,000 tiap-tiap seorang anggota memerlukan sekurang-kurangnya satu minggu untuk menyesuaikan diri.

b. Pakaian yang dibekalkan oleh pihak Tentera tidak mencukupi. Pakaian khas perlu diadakan. Suhu diwaktu siang dan malam terlalu sejuk. Anggota perlu dilengkapi dengan pakaian musim sejuk.

c. Makanan catuan bungkus yang dibekalkan tidak memberi apa-apa kebaikan kepada anggota. Scale catuan bungkus yang ada perlu dikaji jika bekerja di kawasan ini. Anggota cepat lapar dan dahaga. Segala makanan yang dimasak cepat menjadi sejuk dan beku.

d. Alat-alat perubatan serta bekalan ubat yang cukup ada juga penting. Anggota kerap kali mendapat selsema, batuk dan pening kepala.

e. Semangat setia kawan kerjasama yang erat di kalangan anggota sangat penting. Tanpa semangat ini keadaan akan menjadi kacau bilau dan kerja tidak dapat dijalankan dengan licin dan teratur.

f. Kebajikan anggota perlu dititik beratkan sepanjang masa. Perkara rihat dan rekreasi perlu diadakan dari masa kesemasa. Lawatan oleh pegawai atasan seberapa kerap dijalankan.

Terima kasih dari bekas ketua menteri – Datuk Harris Salleh.

PENUTUP

Projek ini adalah yang sangat berharga dan memberi banyak pengalaman dan pengajaran yang sukar diperolihi mana-mana tempat lain. Ianya yang sungguh mencabar dari segi ketahanan mental dan fisikal. Morale dan semangat yang tinggi adalah penting.

Projek ini sepatutnya sudah siap tiga bulan dahulu jika tidak ada gangguan cuaca dan bekalan stor-stor pembinaan. Walaubagaimanapun projek ini tetap dapat dilaksanakan sesuai dengan pantun yang selalu dikaitkan kepada Kor Jurutera.

Permata di betil disangka arang.
Jauhari saja mengenal ma'nikam
Projek mustahil di kata orang
Jurutera Malaysia pasti membinakan.

Sumbangan
Rejimen Jurutera Malaysia

If any single function of warfare can be considered the most important, few would deny that title to mobility. History is filled with examples of outnumbered, outgunned commanders who achieved decisive victory through initiative, surprise and aggressive action, alternately massing or economizing forces as the situation dictated. These common-sense concepts can become reality only when superior mobility is both present and energetically applied on the battlefield.

Major Michael L. Brittingham, US Army

INVERTED TRAINING

By Lt. Kol. Lai Kim Chee

Training forms an important part of any organisation. Various types of training methods are being adopted by different organisations in fulfilling their organisational needs and goals. The current method of training in the Malaysian Armed Forces can be further improved upon by introducing the inverted training method. The author proposes that the introduction of this method will benefit trained soldiers in all aspects of training.

The acquisition of modern technology and sophisticated military hardware by the Armed Forces has enhanced the importance of training in general. To meet the challenge of an ever advancing technology there is an increasing concern for the quality of our personnel rather than their large numbers. It is now clearly recognised that highly trained and skilled personnel or technicians form an important part of the Armed Forces.

At present there is no criterion to measure the true state of readiness of the Armed Forces without it having to go through realistic operations. The alternative is to focus on training, the outcome of which may reflect the performance of the trained servicemen. Observations made on our trained personnel today reflect the following:

* There is scope for mental, physical and professional improvement.
* The lack of dedication to service is noticeable.
* There is lacking in initiative and self-reliance.
* There is need for improved tactical and technical knowledge.

Training techniques and methods are many and varied. Problems, technical information and the situation of human capabilities and relationship all change too swiftly. The main problems being due to:

* Complexities on the explosion of knowledge, resources and their applications.
* The ever changing technologies which are advancing faster than the ability to use them.

* Outdated training methods and aids.

What then, one may ask, is the solution to overcome the problem? There is no clear cut answer to this question. But an offer is made here to discuss a mode of training which may have numerous advantages over the traditional training method.

The traditional method otherwise known as the Authoritarian method of training has been in use since time immemorial. Such method, as illustrated diagrammatically below may be ideal for basic training, that is to impart basic knowledge to new trainees but it is not considered entirely beneficial when applied to trained personnel.



AUTHORITARIAN METHOD OF TRAINING.

This method as depicted by a triangle comprises of the instructor at the apex giving instructions to the trainees at the base. Invariably, such a system involves a one way flow of information, usually, with only the instructor participating in the exercise. Little enthusiasm is generated in this method and with an average instructor the lesson can border on boredom. The centre of activities revolve around the instructor who has little opportunity to assess his student. The trainees' role is essentially a passive one.

Inverted training method is the inverse of the Authoritarian method as illustrated in the above diagram. Here the students become the "instructor", generating maximum participation among themselves. At the same time it allows a two-way flow of information and knowledge between the trainees and the instructor.

Trainees are given the subject to be discussed in advance. They then carry out their own research and investigation on the subject with the guidance of the instructor where necessary. On the day of instruction nominated trainees take the roles of the instructor and demonstrate their skills. This method allows the instructor who is now the supervisor to assess the trainees and show them their shortcomings and weaknesses. In this method the trainees play an active role in the whole system.



INVERTED TRAINING METHOD

The advantages of the inverted training method are enumerated below:

* Trainees make preparation and participate fully on the subject.
* Instructions are clearly and easily understood as preparation would have been made by every trainee before hand.
* Trainees are encouraged to maximise the use of training aids.
* Innovation and improvisation of training contents and methods are inclucated.
* Facilitates personnel assessment closely.
* Leadership training is exercised.
* Cultivates competitive spirit.
* Builds confidence in individual and team.
* Attains recognition and creates sense of responsibility.

A comparison can be made between the Authoritarian method of training and the Inverted Training method and is tabulated below:

COMPARISON – AUTHORITARIAN vs INVERTED METHOD

	AUTHORITARIAN METHOD	INVERTED METHOD
1.	Trainees minimally or not at all prepared.	Trainees well prepared with information and ideas to contribute.
2.	Trainees usually accept what ever is taught.	Trainees tend to discuss subject and may come out with alternatives.
3.	Little enthusiasm is shown.	Given the active role trainees will be enthusiastic and take pride in their work.
4.	Instructors need to be interesting, well informed and knowledgeable to make the method a success.	Initiative, ingenuity and resourcefulness are tapped from the trainee under the guidance of an average instructor.
5.	Being pre-occupied with his teaching the instructor has little time for assessment or guidance of the trainees.	Free from the role of instructing he can assess the trainees effectively and give more attention to details.
6.	Essentially a one-way flow of information.	Allows a free flow of ideas both way and laterally among the trainees.

The success of the inverted training method depends on the committments of the trainee to prepare, listen, think, reason and share the fruits of his work with fellow trainees and the instructor. This activity encourages the growth of individual and allows development of the team. Albeit the inverted training method is not entirely original but its full concentration should contribute to the attainment of our training objectives.

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Lt Kol Lai Kim Chee is a graduate of the Royal Military College, Sungei Besi and the Malaysia Armed Forces Staff College. He also received training at the Royal Military College of Science, UK and qualified as an Ammunition Technical Officer. He is also trained in Work Study and exposed to Supply and Materials Management. Currently he is SO I Maintenance at the Logistic Division, Ministry of Defence.

KEKUKUHAN PERPADUAN dan SEMANGAT SETIAKAWAN dalam TENTERA DARAT

Oleh Mej Jen Nik M F Kamil

PENDAHULUAN

Panglima Tentera Darat, di dalam Perutusan Sempena Hari Ulangtahun Tentera Darat Ke 51, di antara lain-lain, telah menekankan:

"Perkhidmatan kita memerlukan pelaksanaan tugas secara kumpulan. Tidak sesiapa pun yang boleh menghasilkan satu-satu 'Mission' secara perseorangan. Kejayaan adalah bergantung kepada kerjasama, sefahaman, semangat setiakawan di antara anggota-anggota, pasukan, perkhidmatan di antara ketua-ketua di semua peringkat pada sebilang masa. Bermula dari seksyen, seorang ketua seksyen harus melatih seksyennya mempunyai rasa bertanggungjawab terhadap pencapaian dan nasib seksyennya. Begitulah keperluannya bagi Kompeni, Batalion, Beriged, Divisyen dan seterusnya sehingga ke paras atasan Tentera Darat".

Adakah hujjah dan tekanan Panglima Tentera Darat ini memberi makna atau ertikata yang amat jelas dan terang bahawa Tentera Darat kini tidak mempunyai kekukuhan dan keutuhan perpaduan dan semangat setiakawan di kalangan anggota-anggotanya? Jawapannya ada, TETAPI, sepertimana yang kita sedia maklum, apa yang ada sekarang ini tidak begitu padat atau ketat hingga kekukuhan itu didapati boleh retak, dapat dipecah, dan hampir berkecai. Bukti-bukti atau contoh-contohnya banyak, tetapi apa yang terjadi atau peristiwa-peristiwa yang lampau tidak seharusnya dan -tidak perlu disebut atau diungkit-ungkit kembali kerana semua itu sudahpun menjadi sejarah merah yang telahpun mencemar nama baik Tentera Darat. Tetapi kita perlu berjaga-jaga dan waspada kerana sejarah akan berulangi atau *'history repeats itself'*, dan mungkin lebih buruk dan dahsyat akibatnya nanti.

Latarbelakang – Dahulu dan Sekarang. Sebelum saya membentangkan langkah-langkah atau strategi dengan mendalam, elok sekiranya kita merenung kembali beberapa faktor yang dengan secara langsung atau tidak langsung telah memudharatkan perpaduan serta semangat setiakawan di kalangan Tentera Darat, iaitu:

a. **Ajensi-ajensi Terlibat.** Ini terdiri peringkat-peringkat:
   (1) Individu-individu, iaitu Pegawai-pegawai, PTT Kanan, PTT Rendah dan LLP.
   (2) Seksyen, Kompeni dan Batalion (Rejimen).
   (3) Briged dan Divisyen.
   (4) Kor Tentera Darat.
   (5) Kor-kor dan Rejimen-rejimen Tentera Darat.
   (6) Departmen Tentera Darat.

b. **Pertalian (Perhubungan Ajensi-ajensi).** Di dalam ertikata yang senang, apa-apa yang berlaku di peringkat bawah akan dirasai diperingkat atasan hinggalah ke peringkat DTD. Begitu jua apa-apa yang berlaku di peringkat atas melibati individu, pengeluaran dasar, penyampaian arahan dan lain-lain kejadian akan dirasai oleh peringkat bawahan. Oleh yang demikian, keduabelah pihak terbabit dan bukan hanya segelintir individu atau pasukan sahaja yang dikaitkan. Pertalian atau perhubungan ini tidak seharusnya disekat atau diceraikan, malahan perlu dijalin serapat-rapatnya yang boleh. Segala kejadian-kejadian serta peristiwa-peristiwa ganjil yang telah berlaku pada masa-masa yang lampau telah melibatkan individu, pasukan, formasi dan DTD dari masa ke semasa. (Rajah A menunjukkan Perhubungan/Pertalian yang dikehendaki di seluruh Tentera Darat sebagai Bulatan Semangat Setiakawan dan Perpaduan Tentera Darat).

c. **Hakikat Perpaduan dan Setiakawan.** Persoalan tentang mana yang datang dahulu, *perpaduan* atau *setiakawan* boleh didebatkan 'sehingga kucing bertanduk'. Tetapi pada hemat saya, segala pencapaian matlamat perpaduan itu adalah hasil dari memupuk semangat setiakawan di antara individu, di semua lapisan peringkat. Sekiranya hakikat ini tidak tercapai, maka tidak mungkin perpaduan akan dapat tercapai. Malahan individulah merupakan ajensi-ajensi yang akan menentukan pencapaian perpaduan. Jadi kita perlu meneliti peringkat individu dahulu, baharulah pula beralih ke pasukan, formasi dan seterusnya ke peringkat DTD, iaitu matlamat kita yang terakhir – *Perpaduan Tentera Darat.*

d. **Peringkat Individu.** Gejala-gejala di peringkat individu yang boleh dan menasabah dikaitkan dengan kemudaratan atau kemunduran semangat setiakawan beberapa tahun kebelakangan ini diantara lain-lain adalah:

BULATAN SEMANGAT SETIAKAWAN DAN PERPADUAN TENTERA DARAT



- **Kualiti Pegawai-pegawai Muda dan LLP.** Ini dikaitkan dengan pembesaran TD di mana kuantiti menjadi keutamaan. Semangat *'Honour and Glory'* dan *'King and Country'* atau semangat *The Three Musketeers 'All for one and one for all'* adalah kurang jelas sekali. Kemerosotan tatatertib didapati berleluasaan.
- **Kenaikan Pangkat.** Mungkin individu-individu yang kurang serba kelayakan terpaksa dinaikkan pangkat dan tidak berkeupayaan serta berpengalaman untuk menyandang pangkat mereka dengan berkesan.
- **Kekurangan Peralatan dan Kemudahan Asas.** Ini juga satu gejala yang memudaratkan prestasi individu dan menjejaskan moral serta tatatertib mereka.
- **Kekurangan Kemudahan Asas Latihan.** Ini juga telah menjejaskan moral serta prestasi individu serta kegagalan dalam latihan dan operasi.
- **Akibat-akibat.** Tidak perlu saya mengulangi lagi disini kerana kita tersedia maklum kejadian-kejadian yang telah dan sedang berlaku.

e. **Peringkat Pasukan.** Ekoran dari masalah-masalah yang dihadapi oleh individu yang saya sebut tadi, maka terjejaslah perpaduan di peringkat Pasukan/Rejimen pula, umpamanya:

- **Sikap Negatif Terhadap Pertubuhan.** Rasa kasih sayang, 'Esperit de Corps', keagungan serta kecemerlangan dan kemegahan terhadap asal-usul, tradisi, sejarah, keistimewaan, Panji-panji Rejimen, pencapaian Rej tidak dipedulikan langsung. Kepentingan peribadi dan famili menjadi keutamaan. Semangat dan identiti Rej/Kor sudah reput dan hampir luput, umpamanya 'SINGA BERJUANG' RAMD hanya tinggal dalam kenangan dan impian. Begitu jua kaedahnya Rej/Kor yang lain. Cap Badge itu kecil dan murah tetapi maknanya tidak ternilai.
- **Organisasi Tidak Seimbang.** Segala organisasi, sama ada di peringkat Seksyen, Pelatun, Kompeni dan Batalion, oleh kerana kekurangan anggota-anggota tidak dapat dipenuhkan. Jadi segala tindakan latihan, operasi, sukan dan olahraga, dan lain-lain aktibiti berpasukan tidak dapat dikendalikan dengan jayanya. Perpaduan tidak boleh dicapai 100%. Kelemahan pemimpin-pemimpin dan daya pimpinan mereka lebih ketara.

f. **Peringkat Bde/Div.** Apa juga masalah yang dirasai diperingkat individu dan Rej, juga berjangkit ke Bde dan Div. Panglima-Panglima merasai resah dan gelisah serta amat kecewa bukan disebabkan tidak berkeupayaan memerintah, akan tetapi kecewa kerana masalah-masalah yang dihadapi adalah luar dari keupayaan mereka menyelesaikannya. *'The source of those problems are not from them, and neither of their own making'.* Apa juga 'improvisation' dapat dibuat secara terhad sahaja. Tetapi Panglima-panglima tidak dapat 'improvise' senjata dan peluru untuk bertempur, 'improvise' ruang pejabat dan berek-berek serta rumah keluarga yang selesa didiami, 'improvise' kenderaan-kenderaan untuk bergerak, 'improvise' pakaian-pakaian dan peralatan untuk dipakai. Penglibatan Bde/Div di dalam tugas-tugas pesat latihan, operasi, pentadbiran adalah satu aspek pengendalian tugas-tugas harian. Tetapi, keutamaan masa perlu juga ditumpukan kepada segala kegiatan yang dapat menyatupadukan anggota, dan pasukan di bawah arahan. Kesuntukan masa adalah alasan yang lemah. Apa yang dikehendaki ialah usaha yang lebih gigih. Staf-staf yang terlatih, dedikasi, jujur dan tidak mementingkan soal peribadi dan keluarga harus di perjawatkan. Ada juga staf-staf yang kurang sensitif kepada masalah yunit-yunit bawahan. Staf mestilah bersikap sebagai hamba abdi dan bukannya sebagai Tuan Besar kepada pasukan bawahan.

g. **Peringkat Tentera Darat.** Departmen Tentera Darat juga terlibat secara langsung dan tidak langsung mengkukuhkan perpaduan serta memupuk semangat setiakawan, untuk seluruh Tentera Darat. Apa yang berlaku atau dilakukan di peringkat atasan akan dirasai oleh peringkat bawahan. Segala dasar yang tidak dihalusi maksud atau matlamat akan membawa reaksi negatif dan kurang sambutan oleh peringkat bawahan. Segala arahan yang bercanggah akan memberi suasana kelam-kabut kepada peringkat bawahan. Segala kelakuan atau tingkah-laku bertentangan dengan tatatertib tentera tidak disambut baik oleh peringkat bawahan. *Kata yang tidak dikota* dan *cakap tak serupa bikin, tutup mata sebelah, 'double-standard', sikap pilih kasih, 'lembu punya susu, sapi dapat nama'*, sikap bongkak dan sombong dan lain-lain lagi, kesemuanya ini akan menjejaskan perpaduan seluruh Tentera Darat.

Kesimpulan. Saya menekankan di sini bahawa kita tidak perlu merasai kecewa atau berdukacita amat sangat tentang kedudukan perpaduan dan semangat setiakawan dalam Tentera Darat sekarang ini. *'Its not too late, and all is not lost'.* Kita masih berkebolehan dan berkemampuan di segi masa dan usaha untuk bersama-sama berikhtiar dan bertungkus lumus memperbaiki suasana serta keadaan perpaduan dan semangat setiakawan dalam Tentera Darat. Walaupun Field Marsyal VISCOUNT WILLIAM SLIM pernah berkata:

('In the Army, after a good many hundred years of experiment, we have reached a con-

clusion that the way to achieve team work is to get the right chap at the top and the right people below him as the junior leaders'.)

"Dalam tentera, setelah menyelenggarakan ujian-ujian buat beberapa ratus tahun, kami telah mencapai kataputus iaitu bagi mencapai kerjasama berkumpul, kita mestilah menempatkan pemimpin yang mahir dipuncak kepimpinan dan orang-orang yang benar-benar aktif di bawahnya selaku pemimpin remaja."

Apa yang kita tidak ada kini, ialah 100 tahun untuk melaksanakannya, kami akan melaksanakannya lebih baik dari Angaktan Tentera British dengan memendekkan waktu. Apa yang kita ada kini ialah orang yang berkelayakan dipuncak kepimpinan; jika begini, ayuh mari kita melaksanakannya.

LANGKAH ATAU STRATEGI

Saya tidak boleh menafikan bahawa kita dapat mengondol 1001 cara langkah-langkah untuk mengwujud kekukuhan semangat setiakawan dan perpaduan Tentera Darat. Tetapi apa gunanya itu semua kalau kita gagal mencapai hasrat dan matlamat pencapaian kita. Kita perlu berhati-hati dan tidak bertindak secara optimis atau bersikap tamak. Kita seharusnya memilih langkah-langkah yang boleh menjamin perpaduan dalam jangkamasa yang pendek. Yang lain-lain itu bolehlah dimasukkan dari masa kesemasa apabila keadaan mengizinkan sebagai tindakan jangkamasa panjang.

Pada hemat saya, ajensi-ajensi atau sasaran tumpuan tindakan kita adalah diarah kepada:

a. **Rejimen.** Ini termasuk:
   (1) Semua individu-individu.
   (2) Seksyen, P1, Komp.
   (3) Batalion/Rejimen.
   (4) Kor/Rej Tentera Darat.

b. **Formasi**
   (1) Bde/Div.
   (2) Kor TD.

c. **Markas Atasan.**
   (1) Departmen Tentera Darat.

Langkah-Langkah Yang Perlu Diambil.

Di Peringkat Rejimen.

Memupuk Semangat Kemegahan Pasukan.

- Semua peringkat hendaklah di indoktrinasikan dengan unsur-unsur sejarah Pasukan, yang mengandungi di antara lain-lain segala kecemerlangan, pencapaian pertempuran, pengenalan pejuang-pejuang atau pahlawan-pahlawan yang gagah berani, pencapaian dibidang sukan dan olahraga dan lain-lain pencapaian semenjak tertubuhnya Pasukan. Bahan-bahan untuk mengenali Rej/Kor, pengenalan Kol Yang DiPertua serta pegawai-pegawai atasan, SMR, anggota LLP yang telah menyumbang bakti kepada Pasukan/Rejimen hendaklah juga dipamirkan untuk pengetahuan dan pujaan ramai. Sebuah Bilik Pamiran/Bilek Kemegahan Batalion/Rejimen hendaklah diadakan untuk mencapai matlamat ini. Di dalam Tentera Darat INDIA umpamanya, perkara ini diadakan.
- Bekas-bekas anggota Rejimen ditukarkan kembali ke pasukan bersesuaian dengan pangkat dan jawatan yang lebih tinggi supaya mereka ini akan menjadi pendorong utama serta daya penggerak ke arah pencapaian perpaduan dan semangat setiakawan. Bekas-bekas anggota samada pengawai atau PTT Kanan yang telah bersara dijemput dari masa kesemasa untuk memberi syarahan atau dialog berkaitan dengan segala pengalaman-pengalaman mereka sewaktu berkhidmat dengan pasukan.
- Segala pencapaian cemerlang individu dalam bidang-bidang latihan, operasi, kerjaya, sukan dan olahraga hendaklah disebar berleluasan supaya jasa-jasa mereka diiktiraf dan disanjung tinggi oleh seluruh pasukan atau Rejimen. Hadiah-hadiah yang bersesuaian termasuk pencalunan untuk Bintang/Darjah, Surat-Surat Kepujian perlu diadakan.
- Sistem 'buddy-buddy' di peringkat seksyen, pl, komp hendaklah diadakan. Ini akan menjamin perjalinan semangat setiakawan di antara satu

dengan lain terutama semasa dalam berek, medan pertempuran, latihan dan medan kesukanan. Pendekatan diantara Peg/LLP dan LLP/Peg hendaklah diperhebatkan di dalam keadaan atau suasana yang sesuai.

Kecekapan Di bidang Kerjaya Untuk Mencapai Matlamat Berpasukan.

- Semasa latihan, umpamanya Masa Perdana, setelah tercapai matlamat sistem 'buddy-buddy' ini, percantuman diperingkat seksyen, pl dan komp pula dapat diwujudkan hinggalah keperingkat Batalion supaya semangat tim (atau team spirit) diperolehi. Dengan ini juga anggota-anggota bersedia berjuang sebagai sek, pl, komp atau batalion.
- Taraf kecekapan dibidang kerja sebagai berpasukan hendaklah dilatih dipengkalan dan dipraktikkan di medan perang nanti.

Kecekapan Memimpin/Daya Pimpinan/Pengurusan.

- Pemimpin-pemimpin yang cekap, dinamis dan serba kebolehan disetiap peringkat hendaklah benar-benar berkelayakan. Pemilihan calun-calun yang sesuai hendaklah diutamakan tanpa mengira taraf kekanan. Kepimpinan yang efektif dapat mewujudkan kepercayaan dan taat setia yang tidak berbelah bagi dalam suasana harmoni dan hormat-menghormati.
- Setiap pemimpin dikehendaki mengenali dan memahami semua anggota-anggota mereka secara menyeluruh. Pendekatan, persefahaman, hakikat *'firm but fair'*, hormat menghormati di antara pemimpin dengan yang dipimpin tanpa menjejas kedudukan dan taraf masing-masing adalah perkara yang mustahak. Semua pihak baik dari segi atasan mahupun bawahan seharusnya kenal mesra diantara satu sama lain. Adalah menjadi kewajipan utama bagi semua pemimpin dari semua lapisan peringkat mengenali anggota bawahannya. Tidak kurang pentingnya anggota bawahan juga perlu mengenali gulungan pemimpin mereka. Hanya dengan keadaan yang demikian terjalin persefahaman dari segi komunikasi dan pemikiran untuk perlaksanaan tugas dan tanggung jawab yang berkesan.
- Setiap pegawai mestilah setia dan jujur kepada anggota-anggota mereka. Mereka juga dikehendaki berdamping rapat dan erat dengan anggota LLP dalam semua bidang tanpa menjadi *'familiar'*. Pegawai-pegawai yang bersikap sombong atau bongkak perlu disingkirkan.
- Pemimpin-pemimpin harus mengutamakan kepentingan anggota LLP lebih dari kepentingan mereka sendiri.
- Pemimpin-pemimpin dikehendaki mempunyai kecekapan dan kebijaksanaan mengurus, mengawas, memeriksa, menegur tanpa menjejas perasaan anggota-anggota mereka. Dalam aspek pengurusan anggota, perlu diambil kira bahawa sebilangan besar anggota Tentera Darat kita hari ini, terdiri dari jenerasi muda yang mempunyai potensi dan kemampuan. Sumbangan perkhidmatan mereka tertakluk kepada kebijaksanaan para pegawai melaksanakan tugas masing-masing untuk melatih, menguji dan menilaikan kebolehan mereka disamping berusaha membimbing mereka dengan sedaya upaya. Kejujuran, minat dan usaha serta keazaman para pegawai merupakan garis panduan bagi sumbangan perkhidmatan mereka.

Memupuk Semangat Setiakawan dan Perpaduan Melalui Sukan dan Olahraga.

- Sukan dan Olahraga secara berpasukan dengan penglibatan pegawai dan LLP hendaklah dipertandingkan secara meluas di peringkat Rejimen.
- Sukan bercorak ketenteraan seperti berkawad, merentas desa, merempuh halangan, jalan lasak, UKM termasuk lorong hutan hendaklah dipertandingkan.

- Di peringkat Rejimen, tim-tim hendaklah dipileh khas untuk bertanding di peringkat Bde, Div, Kor dan Tentera Darat sebagai simbol perpaduan Rejimen berkenaan.
- Segala aktiviti sukan dan olahraga hendaklah dirancang selaras dengan jadual pertandingan anjuran Bde, Div, Kor dan Tentera Darat dan bukannya secara tergesa-gesa seperti selalu berlaku. Ini akan melemahkan semangat setiakawan anggota-anggota yang terlibat.

Memupuk Semangat Setiakawan Melalui Majlis-Majlis Pasukan.

- Berbagai Majlis pasukan hendaklah dianjurkan seperti berikut:
  - i. Pegawai – Wisma Perwira.
  - ii. PTT Kanan – Wisma Bentara.
  - iii. PTT Rendah dan LLP.
  - iv. Majlis Rejimen – untuk semua peringkat termasuk keluarga.

(b) **Wisma Perwira.**

  - i. Cara hidup seharian di Wisma Perwira hendaklah mengandungi unsur-unsur perpaduan dan setiakawan yang akan menghasilkan pertalian persaudaraan yang rapat dan erat dikalangan pegawai-pegawai. Ini juga boleh menghapuskan sikap setengah pegawai terhadap Wisma sebagai Rumah Kedua mereka dan bukannya Rumah Rehat/Persinggahan.
  - ii. Majlis-majlis rasmi seperti Mess/Guest/Ladies Night, Majlis Perpisahan, Majlis menyambut hari-hari tertentu hendaklah diadakan mengikut kesesuaian. Kerjasama AJK Wisma dengan semua ahli dengan pengawasan serta minat oleh semua pemerintah terhadap perjalanan Wisma akan menjalin semangat setiakawan dan perpaduan dikalangan pegawai.
  - iii. Acara-acara sukan dan olahraga di antara ahli-ahli juga perlu dianjurkan oleh Wisma.
  - iv. Pegawai-pegawai kanan seharusnya menjemput pegawai-pegawai lain ke kediaman mereka sekali-sekala. Ini jarang dibuat sekarang.

- **Wisma Bentara.**
  - i. Cara hidup seharian di Wisma Bentara bukan sahaja dapat memupuk pertalian persaudaraan dikalangan ahli, tetapi juga menyatukan semua ahli-ahli serta memberi kesedaran kepada mereka bahawa merekalah tulang belakang Rejimen.
  - ii. Majlis-majlis yang sama dengan Wisma Perwira untuk mencapai matlamat yang sama juga perlu di adakan di Wisma Bentara.
- **Lain-Lain Pangkat.**
  - i. Nilai-nilai kehidupan seharian di berek-berek perlu diubahsuai melalui usaha mencantikkan kawasan secara bergotong royong, menyediakan Peti TV, Video, Radio dan lain-lain kemudahan hendaklah disediakan untuk membaiki suasana tinggal di berek dengan lebih selesa serta hilang kepuasan, kerana kepuasan akan membawa kepada masalah peribadi dan lain-lain.
  - ii. Majlis-majlis keramaian serta jamuan juga perlu dianjurkan dari masa kesemasa.
- **Majlis Rejimen – Percantuman.**
  - i. Perbarisan-perbarisan seperti perbarisan Komp, SMR, Ejutan, Peg Rintah, mengarak Panji-Panji Rejimen, Paluan Berundur hendaklah diadakan supaya mutu dan taraf disiplin sentiasa ditingkatkan selaras dengan semangat setiakawan dan perpaduan Rejimen.
  - ii. Majlis-majlis keramaian jamuan hendaklah diadakan diwaktu tertentu dengan melihatkan semua anggota didalam perancangan, perlaksanaan dan penyertaan cara menyeluruh.

Memupuk Semangat Setiakawan Melalui Akitivti Keagamaan.

- Aktiviti-aktiviti keagamaan yang sesuai dan yang terpimpin sahaja hendaklah diadakan bagi membantu fungsi pemerintahan. Ajaran atau fahaman sesat agama perlu dihapuskan kerana ini akan menjejas perpaduan Rejimen.
- Majlis-majlis Tahlil, Sembahyang Jumaat, Maulud Nabi perlu dianjurkan mengikut masa. Unsur-unsur semangat setiakawan dan perpaduan ummah hendaklah dipetik dari Al Quran dan Hadis untuk disalurkan kepada anggota melalui syarahan/Kelas Agama, Khutbah Jumaat supaya nilai-nilai ini dapat ditanam didalam jiwa setiap anggota.
- Bagi pasukan berbilang bangsa pula, anggota-anggota bukan Islam, diberi kemudahan dan kesempatan untuk menganuti agama masing-masing.

Peranan BAKAT Dalam Usaha Memupuk Semangat Setiakawan Dan Perpaduan.

- BAKAT hendaklah dijadikan satu jentera penggerak untuk menolong anggota-anggota yang berkeluarga mencapai keselesaan dan ketenteraman rumahtangga di dalam masyarakat keperibadian ketenteraan.
- BAKAT hendaklah, di antara lain-lain kegiatan, berusaha memupuk semangat setiakawan dan perpaduan dikalangan keluarga dengan mengutamakan sifat kejiranan diantara keluarga di bawah teraju pimpinan isteri Peg Rintah dan dibantu oleh isteri-isteri SEMUA, pegawai kerja atau tidak.
- Selain dari aktiviti-aktiviti yang sentiasa diadakan, BAKAT perlu juga berusaha mengendalikan aktiviti-aktiviti yang benar-benar akan memberi munafaat kepada ahli-ahli terutama isteri LLP.
- Isteri-isteri Peg Rintah semua pasukan mesti berada bersama suami-suami mereka di pengkalan. Delegasi tanggung jawab tidak memuaskan.

Di peringkat Bde/Div/Kor TD.

- **Di kalangan Markas-Markas.** Walaupun Markas-Markas Bde, Div dan Kor TD dianggotai oleh anggota-anggota berbilang Kor/Rej, namun segala aktiviti-aktiviti yang dapat memupuk semangat setiakawan dan perpaduan seperti di peringkat Rej boleh dianjurkan.
- **Semangat Setiakawan Dan Perpaduan Diantara Markas Formasi Dengan Pasukan-Pasukan Dibawah Perintah.** Dari masa kesemasa Markas-markas Formasi, apabila mengadakan aktiviti di Wisma-wisma atau LLP, digalakkan menjemput anggota yang tertentu dari pasukan-pasukan di bawah perintah sebagai tetamu. Ini sudah tentu akan mengeratkan lagi pertalian rapat diantara individu, pasukan dan semangat setiakawan dan perpaduan dapat dicapai.
- **Pengawasan Markas Atas.** Markas-markas Formasi perlu juga mengawasi setiap masa segala aktiviti-aktiviti yang diadakan di pasukan bawah perintah supaya mereka tidak menyeleweng dari apa juga dasar-dasar atau arahan-arahan yang dikeluarkan oleh mereka atau DTD.
- **Sukan Dan Olahraga.** Markas-markas Formasi perlu juga menganjurkan pertandingan-pertandingan acara sukan dan olahraga antara pasukan, antara Briged dan antara Divisyen.
- **Latihan Hari Pegawai Dan Seminar-Seminar.** Hari-hari Pegawai dan Seminar-seminar berunsur latihan, operasi, pentadbiran yang dihadiri oleh pegawai-pegawai semua pasukan bawah perintah perlu dianjurkan. Ini bukan sahaja memahirkan professionalisme pegawai-pegawai tetapi juga memupuk semangat setiakawan dan perpaduan. Aktiviti yang sama perlu dianjurkan untuk PTT Kanan dan Rendah.

Diperingkat Kor/Rej Tentera Darat.

- **Aktiviti Kor/Rej.** Segala aktiviti tahun yang pernah dianjurkan oleh masing-masing Kor/Rej perlu diteruskan dengn lebih hebat lagi. Perkumpulan serta pergaulan anggota dari masing-masing Kor/Rej akan membawa ertikata di makna yang besar terhadap pencapaian perpaduan di dalam Kor/Rej. Pertandingan acara sukan dan olahraga diantara Kor/Rej perlu diperhebatkan.

- **Pakaian Seragam.** Persamaan pakaian seragam sedikit sebanyak telah menjejaskan ketaatsetiaan anggota-anggota masing-masing. Tiap-tiap Kor/Rej perlu menggesa supaya Cap Badge dan lain-lain keistimewaan masing-masing digunakan kembali untuk menjamin perpaduan Kor/Rej. Cap Badge TD bolehlah dipakai sebagai Collar Dog dan ini bukan bermakna perpaduan TD tidak dapat dicapai.

Diperingkat Tentera Darat.

Dasar Pengambilan Baru Tentera Darat.

- Dasar-dasar pengambilan anggota baru, iaitu Pegawai dan LLP perlu dikaji segera untuk menentukan dan mementingkan kualiti sahaja. Penelitian dengan cara lebih mendalam dan efektif perlu diambil ke atas tiap-tiap bakal calon-calon kedet dan LLP disegi latarbelakang mereka dan aspek-aspek keperibadian mereka serta kesesuaian mereka berkhidmat dalam Tentera Darat dan bukan hanya mereka yang semata-mata mencari makan atau percubaan terakhir. Segala usaha meliputi proses pengambilan anggota dan perjawatan hendaklah dilaksanakan dengan lebih teliti agar mereka yang tidak mempunyai minat, kesanggupan, ketabahan dan keazaman untuk berkhidmat, berjuang dan berkorban untuk Negara dapat diketepikan.
- Tindakan yang lebih tegas terhadap anggota-anggota perlu diambil sekira mereka didapati menjadi penghalang kepada perpaduan kita. Dasar-dasar pemberhentian perlu dikaji.
- Cadangan perukaran dasar dan matlamat latihan tentera dan pengajian akademik keat kedet di MTD perlu diubahsuai dengan menaikan taraf MTD kepada Akademi Tentera.

Memenuhi Perjawatan Pasukan.

- Tindakan perlu diambil untuk memenuhi semua perjawatan terutama di pasukan-pasukan Infanteri. Kekurangan anggota-anggota masih dialami disemua peringkat kumpulan. Pengendalian tugas secara tim dalam seksyen, pl, komp mahupun batalion terjejas dibeberapa segi. Jika perlu seluruh Tentera Darat diperkecilkan. Apa yang perlu disini ialah pasukan-pasukan mengandungi organisasi/perjawatan yang penuh, terlatih serta mampu menjalani tugas.
- Perlantikan anggota-anggota memenuhi perjawatan dari Peg Rintah hinggalah Pl Sjn hendaklah dititikberatkan dan yang berkelayakkan sepenuhnya hendaklah dilantik tanpa mengira faktor-faktor lain, umpamanya taraf kekanan.

Mengadakan Alat-Alat Serta Kemudahan Asas Secukupnya.

- Untuk menjamin semangat setiakawan dan perpaduan, segala pemberian alat-alat serta kemudahan asas hendaklah diusahakan dengan lebih hebat lagi. Ini termasuklah rumah keluarga, kemudahan latihan dan pengangkutan diantara lain-lain kemudahan.
- Kalau kita berkehendakkan hasil maksima dari semua aggota-anggota, kita tidak seharusnya mencapai matlamat ini semata-mata dengan cara 'improvisation' dan 'ad-hoc'.

Mengadakan Pertandingan Di Peringkat Tentera Darat.

- Tentera Darat hendaklah meneruskan dengan penganjuran pertandingan-pertandingan acara sukan dan olahraga serta pertandingan unsur-unsur ketenteraan. Acara-acara sukan telahpun ditetapkan. Ini adalah satu cara yang boleh menyatupadukan anggota dan pasukan diseluruh Tentera Darat.
- Departmen Tentera Darat bukan hanya mengeluarkan dasar dan arahan sahaja, tetapi seharusnya mengambil peranan aktif disegi pengelolaan dan organisasi pertandingan termasuk kemudahan kewangan yang mencukupi dan material yang sesuai.

PENUTUP

Segala cadangan-cadangan yang dibentangkan, sepertimana yang diterangkan awal-awal lagi bukanlah menyeluruh. Malahan langkah-langkah tersebut boleh diambil kira atau boleh dibuat sebagai garis panduan atau pedoman untuk menentukan semangat setiakawan dan perpaduan dikalangan Tentera Darat. Sekiranya cadangan-cadangan dianggap sebagai basic, ini memang benar. Akan tetapi perkara-perkara yang dikatakan basic inilah yang kurang mendapat perhatian, tindakan serta minat yang berkenaan. Masalah-masalah kita memangnya basic kerana kita belum berkemampuan meningkat lebih tinggi dari basic disebabkan sikap 'tidak apa' dan pemikiran negatif. Sekiranya tiap-tiap individu memainkan peranan mereka dengan sikap jujur dan bertanggungjawab, semangat setiakawan serta perpaduan Tentera Darat akan menjadi lebih kukuh serta menjadi satu kenyataan dan bukannya satu impian kosong. Kalaulah tadi saya membuka selera dengan sepotong amanat dari PTD, begitu juga saya menutup dengan satu lagi amanat beliau untuk tindakan semua, iaitu:

> *"kemuncak perpaduan yang saya idamkan ialah satu suasana cinta-kawan sehingga setiap anggota tidak akan teragak-agak walau sejenak sekalipun untuk membantu satu sama lain untuk menghasilkan perlaksanaan tugas yang sempurna tanpa mengira untung rugi".*

Mejar Jeneral Nik M.F. Kamil, Panglima IV Divisyen, setelah menjalani latihan tentera di PLR Port Dickson pada 1956 dan Cawangan Kadet pada 1957, dihantar menghadiri latihan di Akademi Tentera DiRaja Sandhurst dari bulan September 1957 hingga September 1959 dan ditauliahkan ke dalam RAMD. Pada tahun 1968 beliau telah menghadiri Maktab Turus Pertahanan Wellington, India. Di antara lain-lain jawatan staf dan pemerintahan, jawatan-jawatan penting yang beliau pernah menyandang adalah Penasihat Tentera di Singapura, Komandan MTD, Pengarah Infantri, Ketua Staf Perancang Pertahanan, Panglima 1 Bde and 9 Bde dan Timbalan Ketua Staf Lojistik. Kini beliau menyandang tugas Ketua Staf Jawatan Anggota di Kementerian Pertahanan.

MY VIEW-POINT ON GOOD LEADERSHIP

By Mej Jen Dato' Mohd Yusof Din

"The world looks for leaders, it looks for men who are original, able and practical; and all I have to say to a young man is simply to find out clearly all about a need in a certain direction, and then lead to the alleviation of it. Money, influence, honour will all follow along after, to help".

DR FRANK W GUNSAULUS

INTRODUCTION

The success of any military operation is always determined by the unit's overall ability to perform its whole mission and bringing it to a successful completion. A unit like any other entity can function only through its human agents and these agents are the commanding officers. The officer in charge is unique in that he commands men and provides guidance and service. To this end, the 'officer in command' being the top hierarchy in the organization assumes personal responsibility as a leader in ensuring success. He is entrusted with the authority, responsibility and the manpower to see it through. In most cases, his personal leadership will dictate the success or failure of a given mission. It has been said that, "while wars can be lost through lack of management, they can only be won through leadership." Whether the unit is good or bad, the morale high or low, the command effective or not largely depends on the one who leads. Leadership consists of certain fundamental positive personal qualities which can be acquired and applied by all officers.

TRAITS FOR GOOD LEADERSHIP

The aim of this article is to articulate from my point of view, some of the important aspects of personal traits required for Good Leadership.

A great deal of research has been made by many people in trying to determine the list of qualities a good leader should posses. In fact, when we talk about personal traits to good leadership, the position is not all that clear. For a start, we must be clear in our mind what is meant by 'good leadership'. In the Armed Forces, the prime requirement as a true leader, is that, he should have the knowledge, the confidence and the backing of those he is to lead. Without this, he cannot really be said to be an effective leader. It is also true to say that anyone given the right circumstances and who perseveres can attain his goal. Perhaps, the definition by Field Marshal Montgomery on the subject is more valid, in that "leadership is the will to dominate and the confidence to inspire". In other words, we can judge good leadership in two ways:

a. The ability to command and to gain acceptance and confidence of those being led.
b. The ability to acheive the mission of the unit as a whole.

Leadership means, leading a unity of people in a sincere and free cooperation towards a common goal, taking into consideration the human, economic, political and technical factors in their correct perspective.

In the Armed Forces, in order to be an effective leader, the officer must fulfil the basic function of 'giving out orders' and taking in impressions and messages from his environment, which he must allow to influence the orders he gives. In order to achieve this, the Commanding Officer must have the following attributes:

a. A high level of professional knowledge, to enable him to understand the practicability of the orders and its implications.
b. A well balanced personality, so that you do not use the power and your position to compensate for your own inadequacies.
c. Understand the sensitivity of the requirements of your Supporting Unit Commanders, so that you are aware of the effect of the orders on them and the troops.

Leadership can be defined as the art of organising, coordinating and motivating the individuals in the organization to achieve the desired goals. It is the relationship in which you as a Commanding Officer influence your men to work together willingly on a given task. In this respect, we see the leader being able to identify himself with the unit and make deliberate planned efforts to accomplish those objectives. Leadership in the Armed Forces deals with command which involves initiative, judgement and exhortation. An officer who can arouse command, serve and lead, and put an undertaking through with confidence, gain support and backing from his superiors and subordinates alike, will rise above the others. He is a good leader.

LEADERSHIP STYLE

Basically, there are three types of leadership style:

a. Laissez – Faire Leadership.
b. Democratic Leadership.
c. Autocratic Leadership.

In the Laissez-Faire type of leadership, the leader gives the group complete freedom in determing activities of the organization. The democratic leader solicits suggestions from his subordinates. He frequently acts upon their advice and gives them a range of discretion in performing their activities. The autocratic leader, on the other hand, makes all decisions without any subordinate participation. It is to be noted that while the Laissez-Faire and the autocratic types of leadership dominate the two extreme ends of the continum, it is the democratic type of leadership which is generally thought to be the most appropriate in the civil organization. From research made, it is found that the effect of the three leadership style when employed in industry tends to show that:

a. The Laissez-Faire group tends to produce uninterested workers with no definite aim in mind. They work as they please and not according to the plan.

b. The democratic group seems to work well because they are able to identify with the management. They seem to have achieved some sort of 'esprit de corps' due to recognition and the establishment of good communication all round.

c. The autocratic group produces an aggressiveness towards the leader with certain feelings of hatred and dislikes. They become resentful and would therefore not use their initiative fully.

However, in the Armed Forces, discipline is one of the most important aspects of command. From discipline comes leadership. Following 'Charles de Gaule's statement, "Men are of no importance. What counts is who commands". In the Armed Forces, the autocratic type of leadership at unit level blended with the democratic type of leadership at a higher level seems to be the answer. Indeed this is so because the measurement of effectiveness in the Armed Forces evolves round the achievement of your given mission at whatever cost. To this end, the authoritarian leader by far is the best, principally because orders issued must be obeyed which goes with the saying, "Do first and complain later".

GOOD LEADER

The general traits that goes to make a man a leader are many. The leadership behaviour of an individual is an amalgam of many factors and is a complex phenomenon. It can be described in many ways and at various levels of abstraction. So to define a good leader as having a sense of justice, a good sense of humour, organising ability is looking at it in a narrow sense. It is only a conceptual analysis.

The basic structure of what one may term as 'leadership' apart from those mentioned in above can be classified under two dimensions. These are:

a. Consideration which includes behaviour indicating mutual trust, respect and a certain warmth and rapport between him and his men. This dimension deals with his concern for his men's needs and includes such behaviour as allowing his fellow officers participation in decision making and encouraging two-day communication from top to bottom and vice versa.

b. Structural behaviour in which he is a leader organises and defines unit activities and his relationship to the group. He is a man who is able to define the role he expects each member to assume, assign tasks, plan ahead, and establish ways of getting things done.

The above two factors are some of the attributes necessary for good leadership. However, to narrow it down further, we can say that the job facilitation dimension plus the structure dimension which is indivisible is more specific in terms of good leadership behaviour.

The word discipline has been used by the Army too harshly at the expense of self-respect. It means punishment, restrictions and enforcement of authority. Mention the word 'discipline' you began to think in terms of something you have done wrong. It is so imposed to the individual resulting in the destruction of self-respect. Dutifullness is a two-way street, you can be strict in enforcing the discipline but at the same time you must also be strict in looking after their welfare. Hence, the famous saying, "The safety, honour and welfare of your country comes first, always, and every time. The honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command comes next. Your own ease, comfort and safety comes last, always, and every time."

It must be realized that the deepest need in human nature is the craving to be appreciated. Some say, ten pats on the back for each kick on the shins is a good ratio for a commander to adopt. Most soldiers, do not seek lavish praise but certainly wish to be assured as to their continued ability. There are four virtues of fundamental importance that a leader should practise. These are:

a. Wisdom.
b. Justice.
c. Courage, and
d. Temperance.

We seek to be wise which is knowing what is good, bad or just — which means giving to every soldier his due courage which is the enduring of pain and affection and temperance which is being moderate in all things. If an officer fails to balance up the requirements of discipline and that of welfare, the soldier will live in fear. With fear, he learns to worry; with suspicions he learns to be doubtful; with hatred he learns to fight back; with jealously he learns to condemn; with shame he learns to be guilty. Whereas with encouragement, confidence, and trust he learns honesty; with love he learns to be friendly; with understanding he learns to appreciate his leader with respect. He learns to have faith and with praise he learns to like himself. If this is achieved, we will have a soldier who will be physically, mentally and morally strong. After all, the greatest gratification in a person's life is to be fulfilled and to accomplish all that he has it in him to do so. Discipline without love begets resentment; it is the devoted and skilful blending of physical, mental and moral 'courage' that developes a cadet into an officer and a gentleman who is able to cope with the environment in self-reliance and self-mastering. Whatever you do with regards to command and control, there are three phases of life which you as a leader must always bring into balance. These are: physical, mental and moral fulfilment. The principal on which you as a leader manage your men is to set up that one standard of common 'courage' as mentioned in above which all must reach. If this is achieved, feeling of adequacy, accomplishment, usefullness and 'esprit de corps' will be achieved.

To me, the role of the officers corps as 'leaders of men' bears a large responsibility for what is right or wrong in the Armed Forces today. Lack of cohesion amongst the officers, ignorance of command and management functions can lead to poor leadership. Several behavioural and ethical tendencies towards self-interest can also weaken the organization. To overcome this, the following code of conduct can help all officers to enhance their qualities of leadership:

a. "An officer's sense of moral integrity is at the centre of his leadership effectiveness. The advancement of one's career is never justified at the expense of violating one's sense of honour.

b. Every officer holds a special position of moral trust and responsibility. No officer should ever violate that trust or avoid his responsibility for any of his actions regardless of the personal cost.

c. An officer's first loyalty is to the welfare of his command. He will never allow his men to be misused or abused in any way.

d. An officer will never require his men to endure hardships or suffer dangers to which he is unwilling to expose himself. Every officer must openly share the burden of risk and sacrifice to which his men are exposed.

e. An officer is first and foremost a leader of men. He must lead his men by example and personal action. He cannot manage his command to effectiveness . . . . they must be led; an officer must therefore set the standard for personnel examplary leadership and military ethics.

f. No officer should wilfully conceal any act of his men that violates discipline and military ethics.

g. No officer should punish or in any way discriminate against a subordinate for telling the truth about any matter.

h. All officers are responsible for the actions of all their brother officers. The dishonourable acts of one officer diminishes the corps; the actions of the officer corps are only determined by the acts of its members and these actions must always be above reproach."

MILITARY VALUES

The remark we often hear that "The Army is not what it used to be" – is to be taken with a pinch of salt. In fact, it never has been. We must understand that the past is important to us today, as its study casts light on the military future. This is so because of the modern changes in technique, equipment and human behaviour and expectation. The past is alwasys full of delusions. There can be no direct translation of past relationship today's equation based on modern requirements. Rightly, the past should only be expressed as pure principles and it is these principles that must be applied to modern values and conditions. These values of the past are what we call 'tradition', must be upheld in the Armed Forces. Secondly, for the modern generation; do not try and run your unit as a leader of a business corporation based on computers design decision. This will destroy military values and traditions. Good business practice can only be applied to the designs and purchases of military hardwares and not to command men. The functions of command are not the same as the functions of a departmental store management. Here you are dealing with lives and not toys. Between the two, try and preserve the old traditional but at the same time learn the new.

Lastly, as a leader, in order to lead you must know your soldiers, yourself and your profession and once acclaimed you must never abandoned the responsibilities to lead. Today in the Armed Forces, we are searching for men, characterised by positive qualities, personal initiative, prompt decision, superiority, force of character, kindness and consideration of others, the ability to plan and put an undertaking through to the finish. Let that officer be YOU.

Mej Jen Dato' Mohd Yusof Din was commissioned into the Royal Malay Regiment on his graduation from Eaton Hall and RMA Sandhurst between the years 1955 – 1956. Since his commission he has held various staff appointments including the post of Military Adviser Vietnam, and Director of Inteligence at Mindef. Currently he is the Chief of the Logistics Staff.

In 1945, Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery described leadership as "the will to dominate and the confidence to inspire". If commanders are to be successful in the future, they will have to dominate and inspire their subordinates in peacetime because there will be precious little scope for it during the crucial initial stages of the war. A commander is only going to be able to dominate subordinates by impressing on them his personality and views beforehand. Whereas "inspire" could be understood to suggest developing a relationship of mutual trust and self-confidence which would be expected in any successful team, be it in war, in business or sports.

Colonel Ian R. Cartwright, British Army

THEORY OF LEGAL OBLIGATION

By Kol. Haji Wan Nordin Bin Haji Wan Mohammed

There are many theories of the analytical positivists[1]. Here, the writer injects the idea that the critical aspect of any such theory of obligation is how the theory itself furnishes a meaning for the "ought" of law. It is because of what we are obligated to do, we ought to do, that obligations bind us. The concept of "ought", is essential in order to elucidate the binding force of law.

Analytical positivists usually attempt to discover and apply techniques – logical, practical or functional – in their analysis of legal concepts. They do so by applying and studying actual rules governing the operation of the system and the legal processes involved.

In the particular problem about the binding force of law, this brief analysis is based on the concept of legal obligation arising from the notion of 'ought' binding the subjects as having the force of law.

As always in any legal analysis, the 'open texture' of words creates varying shades and varying meanings to a word. A word's only true meaning can only be gauged in the context in which it is used, and in analytical jurisprudence we are principally concerned with the analysis of the principles of law without reference to their historical origin or even ethical significance.

It deals with the position of law in a human society, that is, it deals with the intellectual content of the law as it exists (law as it is, and not law as it ought to be, or such ought to be the law) and not its moral content.

Human activities are fraught with ideas – competing and balancing – concerning the interrelationship of law and morals to produce the notion of obligation, either as a binding force of law or as positive morality.

The analytical positivists approach to law is to distinguish strictly the distinction between what are legal norms and what are non-legal norms (eg moral norms) in a social order. This raises the idea of validity of norms; if they are valid, an obligation follows. In this way, the word "ought" binds the subject as a binding force of law because they are legal norms.

The separation of law as it is, from law as it ought to be, enables the subjects to obey and to critisize without enmeshing themselves into their own private concepts of what law ought to be, and if such and such ought not to be law, they can disregard it, that is, it has no binding force of law to oblige them to obey it.

As a corollary, there is also the danger of mixing law and morals, using law to judge moral standards of behaviour.

For example, since such and such is the law, it is what it ought to be. Although it raises a sense of obligation, it is a moral one, not having the binding force of a legal norm.

Of course, there are areas in which legal and moral obligations overlapped, but the positivists e.g. Kelsen[2], do not concern themselves with the coincidental moral contents of law.

The idea of obligation can be seen via the concept of sanctions or coercions, or the evil that would befall law-breakers imposed by the state (sovereign) directly or indirectly.

Austin's theory of obligation[3] is that every command or prohibition is sustained by its own obligation. Such obligation consists in the influence on a person's mind of the possibility of evil consequences to himself in an event of disobedience.

However, sanctions are necessary only for those marginal cases of error, for, human nature is "naturally obedient to law", obedience being a social habit. Hart's idea is based on this and he therefore distinguishes between "being obliged", and "under an obligation"[4].

Thus, we ought to do something because we are obliged or because we are forced to (the gunman's situation) or because it is a legal norm binding on us, not because of the threat of sanction, but because it is a valid legal norm (Kelsen[5]) satisfying the rules of recognition (Hart[4]).

The concept of ought is therefore quite essential to isolate the legal from the non-legal 'ought' for only the legal ought will carries with it the binding force of law, and, as explained earlier, the legal 'ought' must qualify the criteria for legal validity and must be separated from the other types of 'oughts', for example, the ethical ought (a soldier saluting his superior), the religious ought (good Muslims giving alms) and the moral ought (that children ought to obey their parents). Each of these oughts carries with it an obligation, obligations which are different in nature and quality.

The legal ought stands on its own, but in each case, it seems that the effects of non-compliance (as a deviation from the ought-obligation concept) are always undesirable legally, morally, ethically or religiously depending on the type of ought being applied in each situation.

Thus, we are obligated, and we therefore ought to do things, for different reasons.

The analytical positivists must therefore highlight their concept of 'ought' in their theory of legal obligation in order to clarify their legal theories. This avoids confusion as to the type of obligation imposed within any legal system.

As in the primitive society, there is no "law" without obligations and there are no obligations without legal validity of norms practiced in a social order.

If norms are not legally valid, there is no obligation in the sense of law binding on their members irrespective of their personal views about what law is as opposed to their views of what law ought to be.

Colonel Wan Nordin bin Hj Wan Mohammed is presently the Director of Manpower at the Ministry of Defence. He has written many articles which he publishes, both incountry and aboard. This abridged essay was one of many written assignments for his University degree.

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1. The word "positivism" means "laws as laid down" or "posited". Hence the word "deposit".
2. See Kelsen, "General Theory of Law and State", Havard University Press, 1945.
3. See Austin, "Province of Jurisprudence Determined", 1832.
4. Hart HLA, The Concept of Law, 1961, Chapter 5.
5. Kelsen, "Pure Theory of Law", 1967 Chapter 1, Page 4.

ENHANCEMENT OF HF RADIO COMMUNICATION

Lt Kol Mushardin Bin Mohd Said

This article is based on a communication study sponsored by the Director General Joint Communication Electronics — Australia, involving the characterisation of 2400 bits/sec data transmission over skywave hf radio links as well as investigating methods of improving hf radio performance.

THE NEED TO IMPROVE HF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

There is an INCREASED DEPENDANCY on hf radio communications, particularly considering our country geographical layout and the current lack of a satellite facility. One of the prime reasons for improving hf radio performance is the requirement for SECURE DIGITAL VOICE transmission over hf links at 2400 bits/sec or better.

A lot of work on both digital voice techniques and suitable modems is being done with the aim of improving the quality and reliability of digital voice over hf radio links. The introduction into the battle field of new ESM sub-systems and other computer and data handling equipment has brought with it an INCREASE IN THE AMOUNT OF DATA to be transmitted between sites. Some of that data will be transmitted over hf links. The need to increase data rates and the circuit availability is essential to meet these increased demands.

THE PROBLEMS WITH HF RADIO COMMUNICATION

The ionosphere is a VARIABLE MEDIUM changing from year to year, season to season, and in fact minute to minute. Such phenomena as travelling ionospheric disturbances (TIDs), blackouts and the ever varying changes in height and electron density within the ionosphere gives rise to instability of the received signal.

NATURAL AND MAN MADE INTERFERENCE is often a limiting factor in the ability to communicate over hf radio (eg lightning, electric machinery).

At night time the useable frequency span of the ionosphere is significantly reduced resulting in the number of communication signals occupying a smaller amount of the available spectrum. This often gives rise to adjacent and co-channel interference by virtue of the SPECTRUM CROWDING and can cause disruption to communications.

MULTIPATH PROPAGATION

The factor which causes the most problems with medium speed data (2400 bits/sec) transmission at hf is MULTIPATH PROPAGATION. Transmitted signals can reach a receiver site by more than one path resulting in the same signal being received more than once with small time delays between them. See Diagram 1.

Tests conducted confirmed earlier claims that good quality data could be obtained by selecting operating frequencies which would avoid or minimise multipath propagation. These tests were carried out using an oblique ionosonde to sound the ionospheric path to determine the mode structure present.

METHODS USED TO MINIMISE PROPAGATION EFFECTS

FIRSTLY the use of DIVERSITY TECHNIQUES can greatly enhance the performance of



Typical ionogram



Typical multimoded propagation at frequency f_1



Typical single moded propagation at frequency f_2

Typical daytime ionogram and propagation modes

Diagram 1

With digital data the time delayed multiple signals "run together" causing a distortion of the data called Intersymbol Interference.

both low speed and medium speed data traffic. Most fixed strategic hf communications stations use SPACE DIVERSITY RECEPTION. Little or no use is made of FREQUENCY DIVERSITY due to the large equipment and antenna overhead required for relatively little (if any) improvement over space diversity. TIME DIVERSITY is a valuable technique for low speed telegraph circuits and claims that it is a much more effective technique than space or frequency diversity.

In the past, and even now, communications have relied upon IONOSPHERIC PREDICTION CHARTS to identify optimum working frequencies based on historical data for different times of day, year and sunspot number. This data however does not identify the day to day variations which exist in practice.

The use of REAL TIME CHANNEL EVALUATION TECHNIQUES to select the optimum frequency on which to operate in real time is generally accepted by most hf communication researchers as a major step towards enhancing the performance of hf radio circuits, particularly those using medium speed digital data.

Some of the parameters monitored to provide an estimation of the channel's likely performance are:

SIGNAL TO NOISE RATIO
NUMBER OF PROPAGATION MODES
TIME DELAY DISPERSION
DOPPLER SPREAD
PHASE STABILITY
CHANNEL PERFORMANCE MONITORING and
COMBINATION OF THE ABOVE

a. Unlike morse and analog voice communications the maximum SIGNAL TO NOISE RATIO is not necessarily the best criteria for selecting a channel on which medium speed data is to be placed. This is because often the reason for the high signal to noise ratio is the contribution of the received energy from the wanted signal from several different paths. This is undesirable because, as state earlier, the simultaneous reception of signals from different paths involves intersymbol interference. Signal to noise ratio however should be considered as a boundry condition in deciding what frequency to use ie a minimum signal to noise ratio must be present on the selected frequency for the receiver demodulation equipment to work satisfactorily.

b. The measurement of the NUMBER OF PROPAGATION MODES and the TIME DELAY SPREAD are parameters obtained from an ionosonde unit and the frequency selected for use should have both a minimum number of modes and time delay spread. The "Chirpsounder" ionosonde unit is used by the Defence communications of several countries to select the optimum available frequency in real time.

c. DOPPLER SPREAD. As the radio signal traverses the ionosphere the movement within the ionosphere imparts a small Doppler shift to the wanted signal. If the signal travels to the receiver via more than one path, each will add its own Doppler shift thus the measurement of the spread of the Doppler shifts on the received signals is an indicator of the presence of multipath. Tests carried out have shown a correlation between received Doppler spread and Bit Error Rate on an hf communications circuit carrying 2400 bits/second.

d. Tests have been done to study the effect of PHASE STABILITY on the circuit Bit Error Rate. The current and future generation of hf modems use phase shift keying of modulating tones and consequently phase stability of the received signal is important. Initial investigations have shown that the monitoring of the phase of received test transmissions on all available frequencies shows a good deal of promise as an indicator parameter for real time channel evaluation systems.

e. CHANNEL PERFORMANCE MONITORING requires short transmissions of test data on all available frequencies and the evaluation of the received performance. This technique requires the use of transmitting and receiving equipment as well as modems similar to that being used for the main traffic channel and consequently is an expensive technique, but it has the advantage of the fact that the parameter being monitored (BER) is the same as that to be optimised.

f. COMBINATIONS OF SEVERAL OF THE ABOVE parameters can be and are used to implement real time channel evaluation of an hf circuit. For example the Chirpsounder system combines the measurement of Signal to Noise ratio, time delay spread and the number of received modes into a system.

MODEM TECHNIQUES are another method of minimising the effects of propagation on data transmission over hf radio links.

a. As discussed earlier the TIME DIVERSITY technique it should be remembered that this involves the use of redundancy and naturally high speed data cannot be transmitted using this technique.

b. The KINEPLEX modem is the standard at this time. It use 4 level differential phase shift keying of 16 tones within a 3KHz bandwidth to allow data transmission at 2400 bits/second. Each tone is keyed at a rate of 75 baud to minimise intersymbol interference.

c. A new generation of ADAPTIVE Modems are reaching production status. Rather than use 16 individual tones to transmit the data one tone is used with 8–ARY phase shift keying and adaptive equalisation to overcome the effects of multipath.

ADAPTIVE NULL STEERING ANTENNA ARRAYS are the subject of some research. Nulls in the vertical angle of an antenna array are formed so that attenuation of all but the dominant component of a multicomponent wavefield is received, thus minimising the effects of multipath propagation.



(b) Oblique ionogram



(c) Spectrum of 605 Hz tone in 52 s interval arrowed in (a)

Diagram 2

PILOT TONE SOUNDING

The relationship between the Doppler spread of the received signal and the bit error rate was studied and a correlation was found to exist between these two parameters.

The Doppler spread of the signal is due to the movement of the ionosphere. A Doppler shift (less than 1 hertz) is imparted to the rf signal as it transits as it transits the moving ionosphere. Each different path taken by the rf signal has a different Doppler shift and consequently multi-path conditions may be identified by the analysis of the spread of the received Doppler signal. The degree of multipath in turn determines the bit error rate, hence the correlation between Doppler spread and bit error rate is a significant one for communicators.

In diagram 2 the relatively narrow Doppler spread of a signal at 9.0MHz is shown on the lower portion. The oblique ionogram shown at the top shows that at 9.0MHz the propagation path was single moded.

Diagram 3 and 4 show the Dopplers spread of a single F mode propogated signal to be quite narrow (0.15Hz). In contrast to that the lower diagram shows the Doppler spread of a multi-moded signal (3 modes) to be very wide (0.4Hz). By measurement of the Doppler spread an indication of the presence and degree of multi-path propagation and consequently the likely circuit bit error rate performance can be made.

A real time channel evaluation system based on the received Doppler spread and signal to noise ratio of a test cw transmission has been developed and consists basically of a transmitter and a receiver system located at opposite ends of the path to be evaluated. The transmitter has a continous wave cw output of 50 watts which is transmitted for 30 seconds on each of the frequencies allocated for use on the path. At the receiving end the frequency of the receiver steps in synchronism with that of the transmitter and the received signals is analysed by the spectrum analyser. The desktop computer analyses the spectral data from the spectrum analyser, while



Diagram 3

TIME 22: 0 DATE 24/11/83

CHAN	FREQ (KHZ)	NOISE LEVEL LSB (DBM)	NOISE LEVEL USB (DBM)	S/N (DB)	DOP SH (HZ)	SP BW (HZ)	FOM INST	FOM AVE	ERROR COUNT 1	ERROR COUNT 2	SIGNAL
0	6831	-73.0		-.6	.04	1.43	1	1	150	1	
1	8190	-90.1		28.0	-.44	.14	86	46	5	58	
2	10400	-87.8		20.2	-.28	.37	60	55	7	199	
P3	12245	-110.0	***	43.6	-.12	.55	66	72	95	7	-44.6
4C	14620	-110.0	***	32.9	-.44	.78	43	56	8	24	-53.3
5	16360	-99.6		22.8	-.12	.49	53	46	11	2	
6	17485	-109.2		25.7	-.76	.96	26	45	85	10	
7	19060	-115.8		45.6	-.92	.22	91	74	4	55	
8	23130	-104.2		-2.5	0.00	5.00	1	1	0	0	
9	25440	-125.0		17.4	0.00	5.00	2	3	6	27	

PTS CHAN 3 : FOM 72 *** CS CHAN 4 : FOM 56
MAX. FOM 74 --- CHAN. NO. 7 ATTEN 0 REC 55

TIME 22: 5 DATE 24/11/83

0	6831	-72.3		-2.3	-.60	1.62	1	1	23	10	
1	8190	-90.4		16.1	-.12	1.83	1	29	21	88	
2	10400	-89.1		16.7	-.20	.88	21	38	34	30	
P3	12245	-110.0	***	44.5	-.36	.66	58	64	35	18	-47.9
4C	14620	-110.0	***	36.3	-.12	.60	58	56	90	2	-54.4
5	16360	-101.6		16.4	-.04	.79	26	38	45	91	
6	17485	-110.5		25.5	-1.00	.79	35	38	6	23	
7	19060	-116.1		45.1	-.84	.14	98	90	8	11	
8	23130	-99.9		-1.8	0.00	5.00	1	1	109	42	
9	25440	-125.0		22.4	0.00	5.00	7	5	61	62	

PTS CHAN 3 : FOM 64 *** CS CHAN 4 : FOM 56
MAX. FOM 90 --- CHAN. NO. 7 ATTEN 0 REC 56
..........PTS RECOMMENDS QSY TO CHANNEL 7

Diagram 4

the channel occupancy receiver allows the signal to noise ratio to be measured. The Doppler spread and signal to noise ratio are combined to produce a figure of merit for each allocated channel. The optimum channel for the data communications is subsequently identified.

The technique of using test transmissions on allocated frequencies and measuring one or more received parameters is called PILOT TONE SOUNDING and commonly refer to the system just described as a PILOT TONE SOUNDER.

A TYPICAL PRINTOUT of the Pilot Tone Sounder is shown in diagram 4 where for each frequency sounded the noise floor, SNR, Doppler Spread and Figure of Merit value are recorded. A change of frequency is recommended when the FOM of the channel currently being used for data traffic is no longer the highest of all channels sounded.



Diagram 5

ADVANTAGES OF PILOT TONE SOUNDER TECHNIQUE

Unlike the ionosonde equipment no operator interpretation of the data is required since the recommended frequency can be made to appear on a display or printout.

In addition, through the use of an interface unit it should be possible to integrate the Pilot Tone Sounder equipment into a communications system thus giving the opportunity for full automation of the link if required.

SHORT RANGE COMMUNICATION— CONCLUSION

Diagram 5 identifies the real need for additional work to be done for short range hf communications. The plot is BER on the horizontal axis versus the cumulative percentage of availability of a particular BER on the vertical axis. These results relate to the use of parallel tone modems at 2400 bits/second with no coding, interleaving or error correction and detection and show that the circuit availability dramatically improves with distance. Of particular significance is the poor circuit availability over 200km and 35km circuits. The new generation modems may be a possible solution to short range communications problem.

Lt Kol Mushardin Bin Mohd Said was commissioned into the Regiment of Signals in 1968. While in service, he had attended a telecommunication engineering course in the United Kindgom and he is also a graduate of the Staff College, Haigate, Mindef. Currently he is the Co TC Regt; attached to Defence Planning Directorate, Ministry of Defence.

DEFENCE OF A BATTERY POSITION



By Lt. Kol. Haji Mohd Aris

Defence of a battery is not a new subject. To many it may be a subject too basic for any lengthy discussion, let alone for an Army Journal. As a result of the "Gonzales" series of brigades and later on battalion level exercises, certain aspects of local defence of the battery position need to be highlighted.

From the many "Gonzales" exercises there appeared to be 3 schools of thought on the subject of local defence of the battery position.

These are:

- That the battery is capable of defending the battery position.
- That the battery has insufficient resources to defend the battery position.
- That the battery just has to defend itself.

Since the "Gonzales" exercise were againts unrealistic enemies, therefore it is difficult to say which one of the 3 views are more rationale.

This paper aims to present some facts and figures upon which the reader can formulate his own views and subsequently makes a rationale decision when faced with the problem of the defence of a battery position.

A battery position is a location where a battery of guns, normally 6 guns, is tactically deployed to carry out its primary role. For a close support battery, its primary role is the provision of intimate fire support to the supported arm. In a direct support role, this fire support must be made available at all time. Generally there are 5 types of gun positions[1], namely a main position, an alternative position, a temporary position, a roving position and a future position. The differences bewteen the various positions are in the degree of preparation and the duration of stay. Irrespective of the types, battery position must be selected to meet certain technical and tactical requirements[2]. These requirements are:

- Guns deployed must be able to engage effectively the zone of fire allotted to the battery. Currently our gun positions cover a 6400 mil arc of fire. To meet this requirement considerable amount of tree clearing need to be done in order to clear obstacles that could crest the trajectory.
- The position must be concealed from both ground and air observation. This is a very difficult requirement to achieve. The necessity to clear crest alone makes concealment difficult.
- The position selected need to be accessible to the survey party. Survey is an important aspect of gunnery.
- The battery frontage should be between 110 to 135 metres through the arc of fire. Guns therefore need to be sited in depth. This frontage, coupled with the beaten zone of the guns, would enable the battery to effectively neutralise an area 150 metres by 150 metres. Any frontage bigger than this would decrease the effectiveness of the battery fire and any frontage smaller than this would be considered as under utilization of the battery's capability.
- Battery positions must be accessible by road, whereever possible. This is to facilitate tactical redeployment and logistic movement of rations and more important, of ammunition.
- The ground must be hard and level enough to enable efficient operation and serving of guns, related equipments and vehicles.
- The battery position must have depth for local defence purposes. In an open area, individual guns and command post must be at least 40 metres apart. This dispersion will minimise the effect of enemy shell fire and aerial attacks.
- If mortar locating radar is co-located with the battery, the radar need to be sited behind a "good radar crest" of between 40 to 60 mils. Even without radar a battery position requires some low crest to provide concealment against enemy ground flash spotters.

Based on the requirement of siting and layout as stated above, a battery position would be something like this:

- A reasonable level area surrounded by small hill features.
- An area of about 75 metres radius within which the guns, command posts and vehicles are sited. This we called the inner ring.
- Outside the inner ring is an outer ring 30 metres from the circumference of the inner circle. Along the circumference of this outer ring, the perimeter wires are sited.
- Outside the outer ring, there is an area which should be free of any high crest. This is to ensure that the guns can engage targets at low angle. This area extends 50 metres outwards from the outer ring.

Diagrammetically the battery position looks like in diagram 1.



Diagram 1.
Diagrammetic layout of a battery position.

From the diagrammetic layout in diagram 1, the immediate area to be defended is the area within the outer ring which has an area of 34650 square metres and a circumference of 660 metres. Within this outer-ring, the battery has tactically deployed a minimum of 6 field guns, 6 guntowers, 4 land rovers, 3 ammunition carrying vehicles, 900 rounds of gun ammunition, 8 radio sets, gun optical equipment and numerous other optical and technical instruments. It is estimated that the monetary value of all the major equipment to be about 10 million ringgit.

A gun battery when deployed has at the most 90 officiers and men at the battery position. When engaging a battery target a minimum of 56 officers and men are utilised to manned the command post, guns and ammunition point, leaving about 40 men to cover the battery perimeter of 660 metres. Each men would have to cover 17 metres of perimeter without any depth at all. There is no reserve for any other contingency.

A gun battery cannot defend itself effectively against aerial attack and counter battery fire. The best form of defence against such attacks is concealment of both position and intention. If concealment becomes ineffective, then the battery just has to redeploy to an alternative position. The most serious threat to the battery position is an attack from enemy ground forces. Such attack may be to achieve the following objectives:

- To capture the battery position and use the guns, equipment and vehicles against us.
- To completely destroy the battery position, men and material.
- To harass the battery position so that the battery could not fire, thus depriving forward troops of close artillery fire support.

An infantry company defends a tactical feature. In most cases the features selected are features that can be defended. Should the enemy attack be so intense, making the position untenable, the company can always tactically redeploy at short notice. The company is always supported by the mortars or the guns. The battery position, as we have seen earlier, is a piece of level ground about 105 metres in radius surrounded by low hills. It is in fact the most untactical piece of ground to sit on. The men have to defend not only that piece of ground but also the guns, ammunitions, vehicles and other equipment. When under enemy attack the battery cannot redeploy as quickly and silently as a company of infantry.

A battery position is a very vulnerable position by virture of its size and nature and also very easily detected. Just to prevent interference by enemy ground forces, an area up to 400 metres outside the other ring must be continuously dominated. The criteria of 400 metres is used because that would be the average effective range of an enemy's small arm fire. This domination of the ground is in the form of patrolling, ambushes, laying of obstacles, mines and booby traps and also by defensive fire tasks. A battery is made up of men trained in specific trades. Any deployment of men to do ground domination task means that guns or command post will be operating with a very much reduced detachment. A gun has an establishment of 6 men. The minimum number of men required to operate the gun effectively is 5.

To withstand a determined enemy ground attack, the battery position needs to be dug in. Apart from individual trenches, the 96 officers and men in the gun battery position has to dig:

- 6 gun pits each measuring 4 metres in radius and one metre in depth.
- 2 command posts each measuring 2½ metres by 4 metres by 2 metres.
- Pits for the storage of a battery's first line ammunition.
- Vehicles pits for a minimum of 13 vehicles.
- 50 two-man trenches.

All in all, a battery has to dig out about 1000 cubic metres of earth — an equivalent of 250 one-man trenches using standard issued pick-axes and shovels. Digging of gun, ammunition and command posts pits are priority jobs. Using standard issued digging equipment it is estimated that a battery would need about 50 hours of uninterruped work.

It can be seen, therefore, that a battery position is not an easily defendable position. It is selected more to meet the technical requirement in order to fulfill the battery's role effectively. The manpower establishment of a battery is just enough to man the guns and the associated equipments. The battery's local defence capability is extremely limited.

During the initial period of occupation of the battery position, the battery has insufficient manpower and tools to dig up all the required pits and trenches. Given time the battery can prepare a good defensive position but time is not always available. Close support batteries, more frequently than not, are subjected to a great number of enemy actions.

The battery is organised primarily to fulfill its primary function. It can only defend itself for short period of time against small enemy groups. Against a determined enemy, the battery requires infantry and engineer support. When the security of the gun positions is guranteed only then can the battery provide the guaranteed fire support that the supported arms require.

Lt Kol Hj Mohd Aris was commissioned into the then, Federation Artillery in January 1964 after graduating from the Royal Military College, Sungai Besi. Lt Kol Hj Mohd Aris had served in various appointments including a tour of duty at the Armed Forces Staff College as a Directing Staff. Presently he is serving as Chief of Staff 1 Malaysian Infantry Brigade.

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1. Artillery Training, Volume II, Handling of Units in the Field, Pamplet No. I, Field Artillery, 1964, Page 21.
2. Ibid. Pages 36 to 40.

Once formulated, doctrinal principles shape our military education, training and combat development. But the formulation itself is a demanding and multifaceted task. Anticipation of the nature and dynamics of future combat, integration of new concepts and technological advances, identification of unavoidable and irreducible planning assumptions – all these things and more are expected of the authors of doctrinal publications. Their mission is, in essence, to envision, organize and manage-ahead of time-the military's role in an uncertain future world.

Major John. M. Oseth, US Army

"Tracks in the Doctrinal Forest" – Military Review Feb 1981

KEMALANGAN JALANRAYA dalam ANGKATAN TENTERA cara MENGURANGKANNYA

Oleh Lt. Muda Abd. Halim Samad

TAMPARAN HEBAT

Memandangkan pembangunan negara kita yang begitu pesat dan menggalakan tidak dapat kita nafikan pertambahan penduduk dan kemampuan mereka untuk memiliki kenderaan masing-masing begitu banyak sekali. Oleh kerana ini kepadatan penguna-penguna jalan raya makin bertambah dari masa ke semasa. Perkara kemalangan ini lumrahnya terjadi dari segi lojiknya tiada siapa yang mahu terlibat dengan sebarang kemalangan jalan raya tetapi ianya tidak dapat dielakkan. Jika ditinjau dari rekod-rekod dari tahun-tahun yang lepas kemalangan jalan raya semakin meningkat ini bukan saja dari pihak awam malah di pihak tentera juga. Yang lebih tidak menyenangkan peratus kemalangan yang dialami oleh pihak tentera lebih tinggi dari pihak awam jika dibandingkan dari segi pegangan kenderaan pihak tentera. Ini adalah satu tamparan yang hebat yang telah diterima oleh pihak tentera kerana pihak tentera yang lebih terkenal dengan pentadbiran yang berdisplin dan mempunyai semua kakitangan yang terlatih tidak seharusnya mengalami jumlah kemalangan yang sebegini banyak. Di manakah kesilapannya? Adakah dari segi pentadbiran, latihan, guru atau individu itu sendiri atau ada tekanan-tekanan sampingan yang menyebabkan bertambahnya kemalangan ini.

KELALAIAN ATAU SIKAP

Perkara ini saya bincangkan adalah bertujuan untuk kita sama-sama renungkan dan menganalisa di manakah kelemahan-kelemahan selama ini yang telah menyebabkan kita menanggung kerugian harta benda dan nyawa akibat kemalangan jalan raya yang kita alami. Di atas keputusan yang sama-sama kita fikirkan kita akan dapat menyedarkan semua pihak. Semoga dengan tekad ini kita dapat memperbaiki dan mengurangkan kemalangan jalan raya pada masa-masa akan datang ini bererti sekiranya kita dapat menapis segala kelemahan ini, maka kita akan hanya menekan pada satu-satu sebab saja di atas seseorang pemandu iaitu sama ada atas kelalaiannya memandu atau atas sikap lainnya yang engkar pada panduan jalan raya.

ASPEK-ASPEK YANG MEMPENGARUHI KEMALANGAN

Apa yang ingin saya sarankan di sini adalah beberapa aspek yang boleh kita fikir secara munasabah berpunca dan seseorang pemandu yang boleh melibatkan dirinya dengan kemalangan jalan raya.

* **Kesihatan.** Kesihatan adalah amat mustahak bagi setiap individu bagi ia menjalankan tugasnya tidak kira tentera atau pun orang awam. Kesihatan bukan saja mempengaruhi pemikiran dan fizikal tetapi ia juga mempengaruhi konsenterasi seseorang itu, apatah lagi seseorang pemandu yang memerlukan kesemua pancainderanya untuk mengendalikan sesebuah kenderaan. Aspek ini saya bangkitkan kerana adanya pemandu-pemandu yang terlibat dengan kemalangan menyatakan tidak sihat, mengantuk, pening dan lain-lainnya yang bersangkutan dengan kesihatan. Mereka ini hendaklah ditanya dan ditentukan sihat sebelum keluar menjalankan tugas mereka, apatah lagi jika tugas mereka memakan perjalanan yang jauh dan lama.

* **Ketidak Seimbang Pemerintah.** Ini boleh juga dikaitkan dengan pilih kasih. Aspek ini saya tujukan kepada ketua-ketua pelatun yang membuat detail tugas-tugas harian. Pengawasan dan pemeriksaan kepada sipembuat detail haruslah dilaksanakan kerana tidak dapat dinafikan jika seseorang ketua itu tidak menyukai seseorang itu maka dialah yang menjadi sasaran tugas yang bertalu-talu di mana ini akan mengakibatkan pemandu merasa tidak puas hati dan kurang rihat yang cukup ketika menjalankan tugas dan secara otomatik akan membabitkan kosentrasinya ketika memandu.

* **Pengawasan.** Banyak terdapat ketua-ketua platun atau ketua-ketua kenderaan yang takut dan tidak mahu membuat teguran ke atas sikap pemandu yang mana pekara-pekara yang dilakukan oleh pemandu boleh mengakibatkan kemalangan. Di samping pemandu memandu dengan laju lebih dari hadnya pemandu juga engkar kepada panduan-panduan jalan raya seperti memotong di selekoh, di garisan dua selari, tidak berhenti di tanda berhenti dan berbagai-bagai lagi kesalahan yang sepatutnya ditegur oleh ketua kenderaan untuk menyedarkan pemandu-pemandu. Sikap indah tak indah ketua yang hanya mementingkan diri sendiri bukan sahaja boleh melibatkan kemalangan malah ianya juga boleh menjatuhkan kehormatan Angkatan Tentera dari kaca-mata pihak awam. Seperti kata pepatah 'Indah Khabar Dari Rupa' segala laungan kita tentang disiplin tentera tidak akan bermakna lagi bagi mereka.

* **Tindakan Tatatertib.** Memang wajarlah pihak ketua memberi hukuman ke atas pemandu-pemandu yang sabit kesalahannya tetapi, kalau boleh yang kita mahukan adalah hukuman yang memberi kesedaran dan keinsafan untuk pengajaran sipesalah. Umpamanya kesalahan kecil sipesalah dihantar kesatu-satu yunit untuk menjalani latihan semula seperti yang dijalankan sekarang manakala kesalahan yang besar boleh digantung lesen dan dihantar ke yunit Infantri atau lain-lain unit yang terkenal dengan kepayahan dan merbahayanya untuk tumpangan sementara; atau lain-lain hukuman yang boleh difikirkan membawa kebaikan kepada sipemandu.

* **Kebajikan.** Kebajikan soldadu juga amat perlu diperhatikan kerana pekara ini bukan saja menyentuh emosi soldadu, tetapi dari segi saikologinya pekara kebajikan boleh memudaratkan sipemandu umpamanya jika sipemandu perlu cuti rihat atau ada apa kecemasan dan sipemandu berhak di atas cutinya sepatutnya pekara ini janganlah ditahan lagi kerana tiap kali sipemandu mengemukakan apa juga masalah untuk cuti sama ada ianya betul atau direka-reka bearti sipemandu inginkan cuti sama ada mempunyai masalah yang perlu diselesaikan atau masalah peribadi ataupun untuk berihat. Oleh itu jika cutinya kita tahan dan dia tentu diberi tugas memandu bererti sipemandu akan melakukan tugasnya dengan tidak sepenuh hati; kerana rasa ketidak puasan hati dan rasa hampanya akan meluputkan ketenangannya ketika memandu dan ini bererti kemalangan sentiasa terbuka bagi sipemandu pada bila-bila masa sahaja, atau keadaan sipenumpang yang dibawa berada dalam bahaya.

* **Lebih Masa.** Cuba elakkan pekara ini terjadi

pada pemandu kerana sekiranya pemandu letih dan mengantuk dengan memandu terlalu lama maka kemalangan dengan mudah akan terjadi. Dari itu tugas ketua kenderaan adalah menentukan rihat pada pemandu-pemandu, sekiranya menjalankan tugas yang jauh dan memakan masa yang lama.

PENDAPAT

Dari topik-topik yang di atas dapatlah kita tafsirkan dan renungkan sedikit sebanyak di atas kebenarannya di mana kesilapan dan perhatian yang harus kita tegur ke atas pemandu-pemandu dan tindakan kita selanjutnya. Di bawah ini saya cadangkan pula beberapa perkara untuk sama-sama dihakimi kebenaranya agar dapat kita mempertingkatkan prestasi pemandu dan dapat pula kita mengurangkan kemalangan jalan raya.

1. **Kempen Keselamatan Jalan Raya.** Kempen ini memang sewajarnya diadakan kepada pemandu-pemandu dari masa kesemasa. Kita boleh memberi pengajaran kepada semua pemandu dengan cara menayangkan wayang gambar menunjuk slide filem demonstrasi dan ceramah-ceramah dari badan-badan yang bersangkutan dalam hal ehwal keselamatan jalan raya. Mungkin mereka dapat merasai di mana kesalahan yang sering mereka lakukan yang boleh mengakibatkan kemalangan atau mereka akan takut dan insaf apabila melihat sendiri akibat-akibat dari kemalangan yang terjadi. Seelok-eloknya dapatkan gambar-gambar mayat-mayat atau orang-orang yang cedera akibat kemalangan dari jabatan-jabatan Polis dan ditampal di platun-platun mereka atau di mana-mana yang mudah dilihat agar mereka senantiasa mahu menjauhi kemalangan.

2. **Hadiah-Hadiah.** Cuba diadakah piala-piala atau apa jua hadiah bagi pemandu terbaik yang tiada sebarang rekod kecacatan dan sipemenang jika lebih dari dua atau tiga kali dia berjaya diberi pula satu hadiah yang berharga buat mereka. Dengan cara ini mudah-mudahan mereka akan mempunyai sikap ingin memperbaiki prestasi mereka bagi memperolehi hadiah-hadiah itu. Jika sikap ini lahir dari semua pemandu mungkin kita akan dapat mengurangkan kemalangan jalan raya.

3. **Pentadbiran Adil.** Semua ketua haruslah bersikap tegas dan adil dalam pembahagian tugasnya semoga dengan ini pemandu akan terancang dan sentiasa puas hati, dan dari itu mereka akan sentiasa cukup rihat sebelum menjalankan tugas harian mereka. Di samping itu kebajikan mereka haruslah diperhatikan juga kerana tugas yang baik adalah datangnya dari hati yang tenang. Jika pemandu sentiasa diburu masalah dan tertekan maka selagi itu jugalah kita akan berhadapan dengan kemalangan demi kemalangan kerana tiada manusia yang boleh mengawal dirinya sendiri jika dia sendiri tidak tahu siapa dirinya. Dalam perkara ini kosenterasi dan kesedaran memainkan peranan apabila kita bertugas. Kosentrasi dan kesedaran hanya akan datang dari perasaan yang bersih, tenang dan ikhlas ketika menjalankan tugas.

KESIMPULAN

Bagi mengurangkan kemalangan jalan raya buat masa ini kita memerlukan kerjasama dari kedua-dua belah pihak, iaitu dari pihak ketua atau pentadbir dan juga pemandu-pemandu. Persefahaman dalam menjalankan tugas dan juga kepimpinan adalah pokok utama baik memperbaiki moral dan identiti semua pihak. Sekiranya ada tahap-tahap pemisah dalam menjalankan tugas maka hasilnya adalah kerja yang sentiasa tidak selesai dan tidak berpuashati, dari itu kerja kita antara satu sama lain haruslah 'Bagai Aur Dengan Tebing' saling bantu membantu, faham memahami dalam semua aspek. Hanya dengan cara ini sahajalah kita dapat mengurangkan kemalangan jalan raya di dalam Angkatan Tentara kita.

Lt Muda Abdul Halim Bin Samad dilahirkan pada Tahun 1958. Beliau telah ditauliah ke dalam Kor Perkhidmatan dan kini ditempatkan di Departmen Tentera Darat, Kementerian Pertahanan (Bahagian Tadbir). Minatnya dalam bidang penulisan telah lahir dari masa beliau dibangku sekolah lagi.

ELEMENT OF SURPRISE

US Army

The United States Army defines surprise as:
Striking an enemy at a time and place and in a manner for which he is unprepared. It is not essential that the enemy be taken unaware, but only that he becomes aware too late to react effectively.

USSR Army

Surprise consists of the attempt to begin and conduct military operations unexpectedly against the enemy with the most expedient grouping of combat effective troops against the weakest or the strongest but poorly trained enemy groupings, and at the time when they least expect it, making them incapable of offering organized resistance and forcing them to fight in an extremely unfavourable situation.

Australian Army

* Creating a situation for which the enemy is unprepared.
* forcing the enemy into hurried or unconsidered action.
* dislocating or dispersing him,
* deploying in unexpected strength,
* assault from an unexpected direction,
* use of unexpected timings,
* manoeuvre or assault in an unexpected place, and
* use of unexpected speed.

THE CONCEPT OF LIGHT INFANTRY in the MALAYSIAN ARMY



By Mejar Zulkapli Bin Abd. Rahman

While a sailor has his ship, a Gunner his gun, a Cavalryman his tank, the Infantryman has nothing to keep him to the sticking point in battle except his morale, which he derives solely from his Regiment. The colossal task of explaining morale has been tried by all ranks in the army, both academically and professionally and with success as well as failure. Napolean phrases it "Morale is to material as three is to one".

EARLY IDEAS

The word Infantry rings the bell of an organization of straight leg Infantryman capable to capture and hold ground, to seek and destroy the enemy during the day or night and in any weather condition. The Royal Malay Regiment is a regiment of infantry based on infantry of the line, basic or heavy infantry as the Regiment of Guards in the British army.

Since time immemorial when the first man armed himself with a wooden club and organized a raiding or hunting party, the infantry was formed. Time changes and battle demands more tehniques and skills where the heavy shield and long spears of the infantryman crumbles under the charges and shock of the chariots and cavalry. In the 18th Dynastry (1555 – 1350 BC) the Egyptian army was divided into 3 parts, the light infantry, heavy infantry and chariots. The Egyptian light infantry was armed with bow, slings and daggers. Their tactics were to move forward in advance so as to soften up the enemy with hail of missles, moving swiftly from one position to another. Then at a given signal the heavy infantry laid their long pikes in rest and pressed onward with their whole unshakable weight driving like a wedge in the enemy centre. The chariots provided the coup de grace along with their shock action against the already disorganized enemy. With the introduction of heavy calvary this tactic changed especially so during the campaign of Alexander The Great who managed to cripple the mighty army of Persia consisting mainly of heavy cavalry, heavily armed and armoured Infantrymen, with the combination of his cavalry and light infantry, known as *hypaspists* at the Battle of Issus. The Romans in the 50 BC had in their military system an organization of light infantry known as *Speculatores*. Their main deployment in battle was to provide skirmishing and missiles harrasment apart from protecting at the rear and flanks of the *Legionire*. They were also used to salvages all usable javelines and darts. Their roles as reconnaissance squad benefits the *legionire* greatly. The most distinguished of the speculatores was those from Liguria in the Asipine.



BUGLE HORN – A UNIVERSAL SYMBOL OF LIGHT INFANTRY

Light Infantry has been mentioned but not introduced, it refers to high quality infantry units with specially selected and trained men lighter in formations and equipments than standard infantry units. Principal characteristic of light infantry are as shown in the chart above.

Characteristic	Light Infantry	Standard Infantry
Defensive tactics	Does no hold ground	Holds ground
Offensive tactics	Seeks on its own, targets of opportunity within the scope of a given mission. Stalks the enemy.	Unit usually employed at the direction of higher commander against a prescribed target
Command and Control	Decentralized decisions made by small unit commanders	Centralized. Fight en masse.
Organization	Intergrates different weapons within small units.	Individual units employ large number of similar weapons.
Discipline	Demands initiative	Demands obedience.
Quality of personnel	Intelligent capable of independent thought. Highly skilled in field craft and tracking.	Obedient
Method of operation	Fluid in ever-changing situations.	Set piece with accustomed drill.

Historically the light infantry had been used extensively by most European nations. For example the British used them to counter the effective manoeuveribility of Napoleons cavalry. The Prussian Army under Fredrick the Great used his Jaeger units to protect the flanks and rear of his close order drill tactics of his standing armies. The Europeans and British light infantry are manned by selected personnel armed and equipped to operate as a weapon of precision, trained to act in extended orders as a corp of fighting, thinking soldiers and most of the time using their own initiative. The thorough training and experience moulds the light infantryman as an intelligent, resourceful, fast moving and fast thinking marksman accustomed to act in separation to a common purpose or goal.

A pipe major and drummer of the 6th Queen Elizabeth's own Gurkha Rifles, a unit organic to the Light Division.

The light infantry are also known as Rifles (Gurkha Rifles), Royal Green Jackets and Light Infantry of the British army, and Rangers (the American Rangers). Some of the British army current units for example the Royal Green Jackets was formerly the 60th Rifles and the Royal Irish Rangers were the 86th and 87th Foot and Royal Master Rifles before 1920.

The American Rangers originated in 1855 under captain, later Major Robert Rogers who raised a company of Rangers also popularly known as Rogers Rangers. They were used extensively by the British then to fight against the Indians before the War of Independence. These frontier men were skilled trackers and marksmen, able to live of the ground and operate singly or in small groups to inflicts heavy casualties on the enemy.

During the Napolienic war and the American War of Independence it was acknowledged that until light infantry was established the regular army, was never safe on its march. They were always harrassed and despirited by the irregular troops of their enemy's light infantrymen. Usually the light infantry then were deployed as advanc and flank guards during advance and rear protection during withdrawal.

During the Second World War the British 22nd Armored Brigade of the 7th armored Division, popularly known as the *Desert Rat* had in its order of battle apart from the various elements of the *Royal Tank Regiment* units were the 1st Rifle Brigade, a motorized light infantry battalions. This motorized infantry element supported the armoured brigades as reconnissance and anti-tank elements carrying the traditions or their ancestors to counter the manueverbality of the Panzers.

There are moves now both in the west and the communist blocks of equipping their standard infantry either as mechanized or light infantry battalions. This is to cater for the fluid and ever-changing battles. The 7th Infantry Division of the United States Army a light infantry division of helitroops and paratroops specialising in functions of the Rangers, are geared to provide the main men on the feet against mechanized forces in general and against tanks in particular.

TO-DAY'S LIGHT INFANTRY

British Army

The Light Divisions of the British Army consists of Battalions of the Light Infantry Regiments, The Royal Green Jackets, The Parachute Regiments and the Brigade of Gurkhas. Even though the battalions of the Light Infantry and the Royal Green Jackets are also trained as mechanized infantry battalions but emphasis is still sought for them to be equipped and employed as airmobile anti tank elements of the 6 Airmobile Brigade. The roles of the Parachute Regiments and the Gurkha Battalion during the Falkland Campaign need no elaboration either in their tactical deployment or traditionally acclaimed espirit-de-corp and reputation.

Tactically the Parachute Regiments were deployed along with the Royal Marines (RM) as light infantry during the Falkland Campaign. They formed the intermediate force between the special forces of the Special Boat Section of the RM and Special Air Service (SAS) and the heavy/standard infantry of the Guards Regiment and troops of the Light Brigade that is the Gurkha Battalion.

During the First Emergency, the Brunei Rebellion and the Confrontation the presense of the British Army's SAS, elements of the Parachute Regiment, the Gurkha Brigade, the Royal Green Jackets and the Light Infantry was most appreciated. Deployment of these troops along with trackers of the Sarawak Rangers in their small group long range patrol tactics demand the capability of its personnel who are highly skilled in field craft and tracking to enable their small unit commanders to make independent and decentralised decisions. In close country operation especially against communist terrorist the deployment of highly trained and skilled troops in small groups is most logical for they will not only be able to eliminate the enemy but is capable to gather informations and intelligence.

A US Ranger personnel executing a river crossing during Ranger course training in Florida.

United States Rangers

In the United States (US) the term light infantry is commonly applied to infantry units which are lighter in equipment and support and they are not mechanized and are usually airmobile or airborne. The closest resemblence of European's light infantry are the Rangers. The US Rangers are trained, equipped and conventionally organized as light infantry battalions. Tactically they are deployed for limited sustained operations such as combat raid patrols or attack against enemy rear area targets. The men are trained for entry into denied bases by air, land and sea, and employment against time sensitive and tactical or strategic tragets in all types of terrain and weather. All US Ranger personnel are qualified airborne and majority are path finders. In recent development the Rangers strength are of a light brigade to cater for the need of a light and mobile intervention force.

The first battalion was assembled in June 1942 and was generally based on the British commandos, under the command of Lt Col William O Darby. The battalion grew to the size of a light brigade and was extensively deployed for amphibious and special operations in the European theatre which included the Normandy Landings on D Day. In August 1944 the Rangers were disbanded and revived in Korea where they performed long range patrols and raiding parties. Later in 1968 to answer for the requirement of the Vietnam campaign they were raised again and along with the Green Berets (the US Special Forces) become a cohesive formation specializing in psychological warfare and civil affairs. They organized, trained and led indigenous guerilla forces and waged unconventional warfare tactics against the Vietcong.

The US Rangers and the Green Berets which was founded in 1950s were amalgamated into the Special Operation Command (Airbone) in late 1982. Comparatively the Green Berets operations are quite similar to the Rangers for they are trained and qualified for small unit operations that include long term, behind the line missions to organize and direct actions striked against selected strategic targets.

Singapore Guardsmen

The reorganization of the Singapore Armed Force saw the birth of the Singapore Guardsmen the elite of the Singapore infantry. They are organised for light infantry roles in shock troop fashions. The personnel are given ranger type training for the duration of 2 months. The concept is based on the US Ranger course. It emphasises to train leaders to lead small units on mission that require exceptional darings. In achieving the concept of having a small formidable force the Guardsmen who are well equipped, trained, organized and motivated elite troops may be deployed as airmobile, airborne or seaborne units, demanding tremendous physical and mental capabalities of their personnel. Most of the candidates for the Singapore Commandos come from the Guardsmen.

Indonesia

The elite units of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) includes the commandos of the three services and various other airborne, Raiders and Marines units of various strength. The airborne (lintas udara) and the raiders are organized as per the Ranger and airborne battalions of the western countries and deployed for light infantry roles. The personel are highly trained both physically and technically and are able to operate by air, land or sea, to parachute, paddle or walk to their operational areas and objectives. They are capable to operate in small groups, isolated from higher command and totally self relient for long periods of time. This demand that every soldier is physically fit, possesses a high degree of intelligence and common sense, individual self reliance and psychological compatibility.

Thailand and Phillipines

In Thailand the Royal Thai Army has in its organization Ranger battalions based on the American organization. They are trained, equipped and organize for light infantry roles to support the army or their Special Forces in various roles as their counter parts in the American Ranger. These troops are deployed in cross border operations in raids and long-range patrol fashions. The eliteness of the units is well reputed and the experiences in counter insurgency warfare were gathered during their tours with the US Army in Vietnam.

The training of the Ranger personel emphasis on junior leaders capabilities of commanding squads and making independent decisions.

Patrolling is much emphasised in their tactics along with raids and small arm skills. All the Ranger personnel are airborne and most of the officers are trained in the United States Ranger School at Fort Benning. In the Phillipines the equavalent of their light infantry units are also based on the US Rangers These units along with other elite forces formed the Special Action Force and are geared to be deployed in operational areas demanding for such troops. The personnel in the Special Action Forces are airborne or airmobile. They specialize in operations in close countries against the communist terrorists either in urban or rural areas.

Selections for entry into this force is very stiff nd the personnel are of an extraordinary breed who apart from being trained soldiers, might be skilled demolition, mechanic, and exceptional trackers and if need be linguists.

Soviet Union and the Communist Block

The Soviet emphasize the use of light infantry in the form of airborne forces for operations in enemy rear areas. Apart from the motorized infantry, the other infantry organization includes airborne and *Spetznaz* the Soviet Special Forces. The Soviet army maintain eight airborne division supplemented by two combat helicopter regiments in East Germany. They have the capability to lift a number of motorized rifle air landing battalions ahead of the main Soviet strike force to seize and hold key river crossing. In each motorized rifle division there is a company trained as a commando company called *Vysofniki* whose personnel are elite airborne troops.

The tactics of the Soviet special forces are not intended to fight decisive battle but rather to break the cohesion of an enemy to bring chaos and disorganization to achieve the shock actions. The main battle will be fought by the armour and motorized infantry heavily supported from the air. The Soviet are quantitatively superior in tactical forces and they plan to complement their conventional attack with variety of supporting attack in the rear. The Soviet recognize the validity of special operation forces which are highly manuevered by air, lightly equipped and organized and personneled by elite soldiers.

Some of the Special Operation Forces of the Warsaw Pact to backed up the Soviets are:

a. East German 5th and 40th Parachute Battalion.
b. Polish 6th Airborne Division.
c. 7th Airborne Special Regiment of Czecholevakia.

Soviet airborne troops accompanied intimately by a BMD which is capable of being dropped by parachute.

Malaysia

What do we have in our arsenal of light infantry and special forces, apart from the few regiments of the special forces either airborne or Special Service the rest of the Infantry are line or basic infantry. They are neither light nor heavy or mechanized. The organization of the Royal Malay Regiments and the Ranger Regiments are identical except that the personnels in the Rangers are multi racial and their regiments tradition and origin differs.

The Royal Malay Regiment as has been mentioned was formed and organized as infantry of the line. The affiliation of certain battalions to the British army's infantry battalions especially to some of the Regiment of Guards indicated so. Most of the seconded British officers during the pre and post independence days are from the Guards Regiment or other infantry of the line regiments. Traditionally the Royal Malay Regiments are standard, basic or infantry of the line and this is reflected in their regimental life, tradition, discipline, deployment in operation and even their motto of 'TAAT SETIA' (OBEDIENCE AND LOYALTY) the two strong characteristics demanded from a standard infantry unit.

The Ranger Regiment orginated from the Sarawak Rangers formed by Raja Brooke of Sarawak in the year 1862. Since then, this unit has been actively involved along with the British troops especially the SAS, Royal Marines, Royal Green Jackets and the Light Infantry Battalions in operations during the First Emergency, the Sarawak Emergency, Brunei Rebellion and later the Confrontation with Indonesia. Please note that apart from the Confrontation all the other activities occured before the formation of Malaysia.

In forming the Ranger Regiment the British retained the tradition and identity of the Rifle Regiment or the light Infantry to the newly born regiment. This is indicated by the uniform with black buttons, rank insignia, black piping on the No 1 slacks, black stable belt and black hackle. The head gear either beret or peak cap was rifle green in colour. The marching step was 160 steps per minute. In 1966 the 1st Battalion was presented the Truncheon, another symbol of light infantry, for until today all regiments of Light

A drum/pipe major of the Sarawak Rangers taken in the year 1929. Note the Bugle horn cap badge, a symbol of light Infantry.

Infantry and Rifle Regiment in the British army, does not carry any colour except for truncheon or its equivalent. The tradition of the light infantry in the Ranger Regiment has slowly and steadily dying off especially when in the early 1970 the move for standardization in the army took place. Rich traditions are being discarded without prior consideration is a common happening in a young nation especially the army which is trying to forget its colonial heritage. There are even moves by certain commanding officers seconded to the Regiments to change the colour of the rank insignia from black to white and the lower ranks to be called private instead of rangers.

Tradition

Some of the traditions of the light infantry which is still being practiced in the battalions of the Royal Green Jacket, the Light Infantry, the Brigade of Gurkhas and in certain 'old' Battalion of the Ranger Regiments are:

a. The marching pace is 160 to 180 paces per minute and in extended marching order the arms/rifles always trailed.

b. The colour of the uniform and headgear retains the old field green or rifle green.

c. Rank insignia and leatherwork, are black and stable belt are either black or green.

Passing out parade of A coy, 4th Battalion Regiment of Rangers in 1966. The rifles ware trailed to denote Light Infantry tradition.

d. The privates are known either as riflemen or rangers and never as privates for there is far too much respect for the men in the ranks to give them such a common sounding name.

e. The bugle horn has always been the symbol of light infantry and may be worn as cap badges or collar dots.

f. The officers ranks are minitures, the epaullette and equallette are black and the cross belt are that of the cavalry.

The interest of the care for his men and the very exact execution of all duties are the main consideration of an officer in the Ranger Regiment. The feeling of belonging among the officers and men form part of a large family.

Tactics and Employment

Before tanks took over the role of horses and the cavalry were king of the battle the light infantry were deployed to curb the manoeuvrbality of the cavalry. Each company of the battalion were formed upon the principle of being separated from and totally independent of another. The battalion's tactics depended much on the subunits and men acting on their own and often in isolation, while coordinated to a common purpose.

In any battle the tactical orders from the headquarters mean nothing if they are not carried out by the troop/platoon, squad or section leaders, who play a tremendous role in keeping their troops in good shape, well disipline and combat ready. Quality small unit leadership is now and always has been the foundation on which the rangers or light infantrymen was built.

Employment of light infantry in the modern battle field has now replaced conventional infantry because the latter is suited neither to modern nor contigency warfare. Infantry can no longer survive through the mere expedient of digging in, for known static position can be neutralized by heavy artillery. Positional infantry can be outflanked in the open terrain by armour and mechanized infantry and in close terrain by light infantry.

Non-mechanized infantry on the modern battlefield can survive and attack only through dispersion elusiveness and ambiguity – conditions that require light infantry. Light infantry fights best in forest, close terrain, mountains, ravines and built up areas. This capabilities enable them to be deployed to defend key mountain passes, conducting anti tank defence, tank killer team, conduct raids, protect rear areas, clearing and defending urban areas, either deployed or as reserve for tactical or strategic troops.

Removing the need for rigid plans, elaborate preconceived movements and detailed coordination meant that junior officers on the spot had to make immediate tactical decisions. This could only be acquired through intensif, systematic, physical and psychological training. By custom, soldiers grow habituted to action and familiarized to danger.

It is most unprofessional to dictate what role can Malaysian light infantry be tasked unless a detailed doctrine of such force is available. The most likely roles or task for them are as follows:

a. To cover the flanks of defending mechanized or heavy forces inclusive of armour.

b. As tank hunters, they are to conduct offensive actions at medium and low tactical levels particularly at night, serverly reduced visibility and close country. The team are 3–4 men and are airmobile.

c. Surveillance and forward observation party to perform task of either tactical or strategic troops. The personnel are capable to provide fire correction in target engagement.

d. Cross border light reconnissance party either working closely with the fifth columnist or in pairs on highly mobile military motor bikes.

e. Close country anti-guerilla operation in section strength closely monitered by the company. This enabled a battalion of highly trained and motivated light infantry man to cover the area of operation of an Infantry Brigade.

f. To train indigenous people for counter guerilla and unconventional warfare tactics. This could be acquired through detailed plan and execution to train personnel such as the Orang Asli company who are natural stalkers and trackers.

g. An airborne or amphibious force for special operation to assist the Special Forces Group as an intermediate force. The deployment of the US Rangers and 82nd airborne during the Grenada Campaign is a current example.

h. Intelligence gathering as part of combat surveillance force to assist field formation commander in applying their combat power to outmanoeuvre their respective adversiries. Light infantrymen trained as unit combat intelligence squad (UCIS) are deployed based on this concept.

US Rangers rappel from a helicopter during infiltration training.

Training

It may sound too ambitious to train our infantrymen as light infantry as unanswered question will arise that most of the task mentioned are that of the Special Forces. Nevertherless a small nation as ours is financally and logically not able to train, equipped or organized a Division or more of special forces unit. Even the US Army in their Special Operation Forces need to include the Battalions of Rangers along with the Green Beret to form that organization. Numerous facalities are available to train the men and the initial serious move should begin from today, for the mere stroke of the pen does not make a unit elite. A well appreciated plan and executed training with utmost sincerety and commitment will bear fruitful results. Some of the suggested training are as follows:

a. UCIS training for all officers and men.
b. Airborne, airmobile and small group long range patrol.
c. Free fall if possible.
d. Language courses especially of our neighbouring countries.
e. Anti-tank and tank killing task both mounted or dismounted.
f. Surveillance either assisted or not assisted by various surveillance equipments.
g. Sniper course.
h. Anti guerilla or unconventional warfare tactics both for close country and built up areas.

Manpower and Equipment

There will be no extensive demand of manpower as the existing ten battalions of the Ranger Batallions will provide the personnel. Massive reorganization, selection, training, and equipping will happen. A concrete doctrine of light infantry has got to be produced. The current holding of small arms and vehicles less the armoured personnel carriers remains but additional military motor bikes of the scrambler type and long range land rover should be included. The suggested organization of a light infantry battalion is as follows:

a. One anti-tank coy —
Fully airmobile.
b. One Surveillance coy —
Equipped with motorbikes and longrange land rovers or equivalent.
c. Two airborne light infantry coys —
Capabale to operate in CIW operation and counter guerilla operation either in close country or built-up areas.
d. Support coy and a Battalion Headquaters —
All officers and ranks are qualified airborne.

The requirement of a genuiuely man portable or those that can be broken down into reasonable manpack loads of antitank equipment for tank hunting force must be provided. An Operational Reserach Centre which keeps abrest of the latest developments in weapons and equipments should be formed and if need be colocated at the Special Warfare Training Centre (SWTC). This will enable the force to have access to the most up to date weapons, surveillance devices, communication equipment, clothing, survival equipment and transportation to be adopted without having to go through the long wearsome procurement machinery which deals with the rest of the army. Weapons should possess the combination of light weight and potent firepower irrespective of what the standard issue may be. With the suggested reorganization and tactic the Malaysian infantry in particular and the army in general will be able to participate, sustain and survived the conflict of the future. An unaggresive infantryman is like a clerk who can't type, he can be accounted for but can't do his job. An aggresive fully trained infantry man has the resolve and determination to come out on top of any situation no matter how difficult it may be.

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> The training of armies is primarily devoted to the developing efficiency in the devoted execution of the attack. This concentration on tactical techniques tends to obscure the psychological elements. It fosters a cult of soundness, rather than of surprise. It breeds commanders who are so intent not to do anything wrong, according to 'the book', that they forget the necessity of making the enemy do something wrong.
>
> Liddell–Hart

Focus On Southeast Asia

THE SOVIET-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS and the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

By Kolonel Che' Md Nor Mat Arshad

The article will appear in FOUR parts. Part ONE of the article which appears in this edition of Sorotan Darat deals mainly with an analysis of events that had forced the USSR to focus its attention on Vietnam.

INTRODUCTION

Southeast Asia, a region situated to the east of the Indian subcontinent, south of China and to the north of Australia, is made up of nine states namely Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The region's importance in terms of geography and rich natural resources has been recognised even as far back as the 14th century. Except for Thailand, all the states in the region had been colonised in one form or other until after the Second World War. But of all the major powers that had competed for influence in the region after the Second World War, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) seemed to be the only power by which its influence had not been felt. This was mainly due to the fact that the region was considered as not a primary importance to the defence of the Soviet homeland. Another reason perhaps, was because the USSR had recognised through the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, that Southeast Asia would continue to be the People's Republic of China's (PRC) sphere of influence.

This situation however changed as a consequence of the Sino-Soviet conflict which came into the open from the mid 1950s. In the Soviet perspective, Southeast Asia being part of the Third World had to be won over, if the People's Republic of China was to be prevented from challenging the USSR as leader of world revolution. But because of its relative weakness and of its fear of provoking confrontation with the western powers, Soviet efforts to compete with the People's Republic of China for influence in the region had to be confined to countries where western powers were not present. Thus Soviet attention was directed to Burma initially and later Indonesia and it ignored other countries where western powers were present.

While the elimination of PRC's influence in Indonesia in 1965 must have been greeted with great relief, the USSR's loss of a foothold in the same country must have forced the Soviet leadership to look for a new target elsewhere that could similarly serve the same purpose of preventing China's influence in Southeast Asia. This new foothold was the reunified Vietnam (renamed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam – SRV) whose relationship with the USSR at the end of the Second Indochina War and since 1975, has attracted great interest among observers who have been following Soviet involvement in Southeast Asia in the context of the latter's attempts to prevent China's influence in the region. Whether or not the USSR is able to prevent China's influence in Southeast Asia following the establishment of a foothold in Vietnam, is a matter for this paper to explore. Since a background understanding is essential before venturing into the discussion concerning the development of the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship, a scene setting will be presented in Part I dealing mainly with an analysis of events that had forced the USSR to focus its attention on Vietnam. Part II will then analyse factors and developments that contributed to the concretisation of the relationship which has since persisted. The implications of this relationship for Soviet policy especially with regard to Soviet object of preventing China's influence in Southeast Asia, will be evaluated in Part III, while the final Part IV will speculate the future prospect of this Soviet policy, and whether the relationship will last or not. Lastly a conclusion will be drawn as to what situation would most favour Soviet interests, in terms of its relationships with Vietnam and expansion of its influence in Southeast Asia.

PART I
SOUTHEAST ASIA IN SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

In contrast to other major powers such as Britain, France and the US, who had their colonies in the region, the USSR's experience in the region could be regarded as negligible. Historically, the only significant connection that the Russians had with the region was when their Baltic fleet took shelter at Cam Rahn Bay in 1904 before proceeding northwards only to be sunk by the Japanese in the Straits of Tsushima.[1] China on the other hand was traditionally a power with considerable influence in the region, as illustrated by the fact that since the 15th century, the Ming Dynasty had continuously despatched a series of Naval expeditions into the Nanyang as far as Malacca to demonstrate its continuing concern that no Southeast Asian states should become excessively powerful as to challenge its dominance.[2] If the future could be based on experience of the past China perhaps would want to continue exercising such influence, as history had shown that only through such measure that the security of its southern border could be guaranteed.

The Soviets were of course not unaware of the existence of colonies in Southeast Asia, but the lack of experience in the region as shown above, must have caused them to produce no clear cut policy on the Eastern question, which in Bolshevik's writing, simply referred to 'colonies or semi-colonies in Asia', and the alleged right of these colonies to seek independence from the oppressors.[3] Lenin gave only broad guidelines on the question of national liberation movements, but left unresolved as to whether revolution in the East was essential to revolution in the West, or would necessary precede it. This unresolved 'Eastern question' eventually became an issue in Stalin-Trotsky rivalry from 1920 to 1926, such that because of the absence of efforts to make contacts with the revolutionary movements in the East for fear by Stalin that this would give an advantage to Trotsky, since Trotsky believed in revolution in the East to paralyse the West, communist uprisings in Southeast Asia such as the one in Indonesia in 1926–1927 all ended up in disasters.[4]

When Stalin emerged as the undisputed leader of the Bolsheviks in the late 1920s, a new concept of foreign policy emerged. Stalin maintained that the time then was not ripe for the USSR to adopt a role of operational headquaters of world wide revolution against the established order, because the country was isolated and encircled, particularly after the failure of revolutionary movements in Europe and the rise of rival dictatorships in Germany, Italy and Japan.[5] This 'socialism in one country' policy consequently led again to the Soviet's inattentiveness to revolutionary movements' activities in Southeast Asia throughout the thirties. Nevertheless the Communist movements in Southeast Asia were not without external support, for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in concert with COMINTERN that operated from Canton remained active in giving necessary policy guidelines. Given the fact that most communit parties in Southeast Asia were off-shoots of CCP or formed on its direction, CCP's influence on them was of course obvious. The USSR's behavior [illegible] the late thirties arising from its desire to avoid war, particularly the signing of the Soviet-German Treaty of 1939, and the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 1941, further alienated communist parties of Southeast Asia from Soviet incluence and pushed them closer to CCP.

After the war, Zhdanov's 'two-camps' speech at Wiliza Gora on 22nd September 1947 intensified communist activities throughout the world, and perhaps reaffirmed the course for world domination already set.[6] By this the USSR saw the world divided into two: an imperialist and anti-democratic side headed by US which literally aimed at strenghtening imperialism and choking democracy; and the other a democractic and anti-imperialist led by the USSR that would seek to eliminate imperialism. No third camp was mentioned, but Indonesia and Vietnam were singled out as former colonies associated with anti-imperialist camp. The speech marked the founding of COMINFORM to replace COMINTERN, and consequently the latter's headquarters in Canton lost its role. It was not known whether the reason for the holding of the Southeast Asian youth conference in Calcutta in February 1948, was motivated by the USSR's desire to avoid China being regarded as centre of communist influence in Asia, but the fact remained that communist uprisings that occured in the late forties were all inspired by Zhdanovism expounded in this conference.[7] Except for Vietnam, the rest of uprisings in Southeast Asia failed to bring Communism into power. Stalin's Eurocentric policy that tended to neg[illegible]ect support for insurgent movements in Southeast As[illegible] seemed to be the cause of this failure, and indeed the [illegible] failure of Madiun Rebellion in Indonesia in 1948 was a consequence of this policy.[8] Moscow's reluctance to give support to Ho Chi Minh's initiative to launch rebellion in 1948 would long be remembered by the Vietnamese, as it reflected the USSR's willingness to sacrifice communist movements' interest in the East for the sake of gains in Europe, just because at that time Stalin feared that support of Communist movement in Vietnam would jeopardise French Communist Party's interest in France. Even after Ho Chi Minh had declared Vietnam's independence in late 1949, USSR's recognition came only in 1950, after the People's Republic of China (PRC) had already done so. But this time, the USSR's excuse was that the delay in recognising the Democractic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was necessary to avoid jeopardising revolution in China. In any case the above events had given sufficient reasons for communist movements in Indonesia and Vietnam to be more inclined to PRC. For that matter, the USSR's inability to establish diplomatic relations with Indonesia until 1954 (four years after China had its mission in Jakarta) was mainly due to the influence of pro-Peking Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) who at that time shared power with Indonesia's Nationalist Party (PNI) in ruling the newly independent Indonesia.

Perhaps the USSR's inattentiveness to Southeast Asia was also due to geography in that the region, unlike Europe and Northeast Asia, was too far to be considered of any security importance for the defence of the homeland. Also, this inattentiveness could be due to the perception that communist movements in Southeast Asia were subordinate to CCP as confirmed by the Sino-Soviet Treaty fo 1950 that placed Southeast Asia under PRC's sphere of influence.[9] But most important, was that this inattentiveness was mainly due once again to the USSR's desire to avoid confrontation with the West, especially the US, perhaps as a consequence of experience in Berlin and Korea. This affected North Vietnam painfully, for through the Geneva Agreement of 1954, North Vietnam was forced to accept the temporary division, so as to cause it to fight two decades of bloody war in order to achieve reunification.[10] This event also demonstrated again that the USSR was willing to sacrifice Vietnamese interest for the sake of the Soviet goal in Europe, by which at that time the USSR was attempting to prevent West Germany's absorption into NATO.

But Soviet perceptions of Southeast Asia suddenly changed in the 1950s causing a shift in policy from inattentiveness to that of an activist one. This shift was brought about by its concern of certain changes in international system. Stalemate had been reached in Europe in that the USSR could no longer expand beyond the range of its forces achieved at the end of World War II, arising mainly out of US containment policy. But aware of its newly acquired strength, in terms of military and economic capability, the USSR sought to break out from the isolation imposed by 'socialism in one country' to embark on a policy of peaceful co-existence, expressed in terms of peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism in the Third World without risking nuclear war. In this respect, newly independent states who became non-aligned or followed a policy of neutralism became the targets. As a matter of fact, the policy of neutralism by Third World states was regarded by the USSR as an advantage in terms of its long term goal, if this was based on the definition that 'neutralism was a transition to socialism'. This revised policy which was also expressed in terms of 'many roads to socialism' was opposed by the PRC who was stuck to the belief in "the inevitability of war" and that war of national liberation was the only means to achieve world revolution.[11] This difference of views over the way by which world revolution was to be achieved acted as catalyst that exacerbated the relationship between the USSR and the PRC in the years to come. From then, both the communist powers fought for influence, and the Third World became their arena for competition.

The first of this fight for influence in the Third World took place in Bandung conference of non-aligned states in April 1955, in which the USSR had to watch helplessly by the sidelines as the PRC seized the opportunity to label the USSR and the US as the two nuclear superpowers that sought to pursue their selfish interests without due regard to the survival of mankind.[12] The manner by which Chow En-lai led the conference was perceived by the USSR as indicating that PRC could later emerge as the leader of the Third World, hence challenging the USSR as the leader of the revolution. This challenge by PRC was unacceptable, and consequently the strategy that the USSR pursued later was not only to get rid of western influence among the Third World states, but also to undermine PRC. This strategy led to the dual contradictions of establishing relations with the non-communist states and concurrently promoting revolutions in those countries without danger of military confrontation with the US. In the long run the USSR hoped to expel western influence in the Third World and to absorb the latter into the socialist camp under its leadership, rather than under the Chinese. The instruments used to penerate the Third World were either in the form of economic and military aids or a combination of both.

In Southeast Asia, by virtue of its contiguity with PRC, and that the region had traditionally been the PRC's sphere of influence, the targets of the USSR's revised policy were the neutralist Burma and the anti-imperialist and nationalistic Indonesia. Thus the visit by Khrushev and Bulganin to these countries later in 1955. But in Burma the USSR found that the Burmese government had already signed a non-aggression and peace treaty with PRC, and hence was not interested in establishing closer relations with the USSR. In Indonesia on the other hand, Soviet overtures were well received.[13] Nevertheless, still in a typical behaviour of avoiding confrontation with the US, because this could jeopardise its interests to seek detente whith the west, the USSR refrained itself from supporting the liberation struggle in the Indochinese states such that it agreed on a compromise over Laos and Cambodia at Geneva in 1962. Similarly it avoided Philippines and Thailand because these states were members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), and it ignored Malaysia (Singapore included) because this state was tied down to Britian under the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. Thus from 1955 to 1965 the USSR had directed its effort only in Indonesia by providing economic and military aids, and to undermine PRC's influence, the USSR exploited the oversea Chinese issue which at the time was a sensitive matter in Indonesian domestic politics. In this aspect, it was not surprising to discover that Soviet-Indonesian relations reached its peak in 1959–1962 because this period coincided with the exacerbation of the oversea Chinese issue in Indonesia which in turn led to tense periods in Sino-Indonesian relations.[14] But as the Sino-Indonesian relations began to warm up as a consequence of pro-Peking PKI's influence in Soekarno's regime, Soviet-Indonesian relations began to wither. Consequently, the failure of PKI's instigated coup in 1965, that led to the destruction of pro-Peking PKI, was applauded by the USSR because this coup marked the end of Peking's influence in Indonesia. In Soviet perspective, it seemed that a loss of $1.5 billion worth of military and economic aids did not matter if the end result was the eradication of PRC's influence. The USSR also seemed to accept as a fait accompli of a pro-western regime in Indonesia from 1966, so long as it was not pro-Peking or anti-Soviet as evident from the USSR's clamour to restore diplomatic relations which it subsequently achieved in 1967.

The loss of Indoneisa was a blow to Soviet policy of attempting to establish a foothold that could counter-posie PRC's influence in Southeast Asia. Experience in Indonesia had taught the Soviets that future policy in Southeast Asia had to be proceeded with cautiously. If Khruschev was the bold entrepreneur, that sought opportunities and coming up with new ideas, but in doing so was courting disaster, then Soviet projection under Brehznev would follow that of a sober manager who accepted the goals set by others but knew better how to implement them while avoiding excessive risks. Thus without abandoning the goal set out earlier, a new target elsewhere in Southeast Asia had to be found. Turning to Malaysia and Singapore by which the USSR was able to establish diplomatic relations by 1967, it found that both states remained as anti-communist as ever, not just because both states had a painful experience of twelve years of communist inspired insurgency, but also because both saw that Indonesia's confrontation policy against Malaysia from 1963–1965 would not have been carried out without the Soviet and Chinese support. Philippines and Thailand on the other hand, became strongly entrenched in US camp as Second Indochina War escalated. But at the same time, it was the escalation of the same war from 1965; that provided the USSR the opportunity to find new ally in Southeast Asia to replace Indonesia. This time the new ally was to be found in Indochina.

As the USSR began to turn away from non-communist states of Southeast Asia, it also found that even in Indochina, it had to confront certain problems that were perculiar to each of the Indochinese states. Cambodia under Sihanouk preferred to be a Chinese satellite rather than under the control of expansionist Vietnamese for historical reasons. Laos had to be left on its own for fear of breaching the Geneva Agreement of 1962, thereby inviting Soviet-American confrontation. Besides, the USSR could not afford to distrub the existing status quo in Laos, as a fall in the present neutralist regime could pave the way for a left-wing take-over that consequently would benefit PRC.[15] Even with Vietnam, the USSR was treated with suspicion mainly because of the USSR's own ambivalent policies towards the Vietnamese communist in the past. Nevertheless the USSR was aware that despite this suspicion, the Vietnamese would welcome Soviet aids in addition to those they were already receiving from PRC, because such support would help to reinforce existing standing in its struggle to drive the US out of the area. At the same time, the USSR had never failed to recognise the very fact in history, that the Vietnamese had always wanted to be independent of China, no matter what amount of assistance the Chinese had been providing. The opportunity for influence in North Vietnam thus existed: and it came when the North Vietnam decided to change its war strategy following the US start of air war in North Vietnam in early 1965. Involvement on North Vietnamese side viz-a-viz the Americans carried a great risk, but in terms of competition with PRC as leader of world revolution, the costs of non-participation could be too high to bear. So the change of strategy from Mao's model of protracted guerilla warfare to Giap's model of compressed version moving from guerilla war to positional warfare and set piece battles was welcomed by the USSR, for such strategy would mean that the North Vietnamese would have to rely heavily on the USSR for supply of tanks, aircraft and air-defence equipment which PRC was unable to provide. Hence from 1965 to 1970, the USSR, and East European aids to North Vietnam came to about $3.5 billion.[16] Despite all these aids the USSR was still unable to wean the North Vietnamese completely to its side away from PRC, for the

North Vietnamese leaders' skilful diplomacy enabled the latter to stay out of the Sino-Soviet dispute and hence influencing both the communist powers to support the common objective of driving the US out of Indochina especially after the American sponsored coup against Sihanouk in Cambodia in 1970. The USSR thus had in this period, to be contented with just sharing influence with PRC in North Vietnam, hoping for the best that after the war, the North Vietnamese, through new approach, could be won over.

Several developments in the international scene in Asia in general and Southeast Asia in particular in late 1960s and early 1970s further forced the USSR to intensify its activities in Southeast Asia. Firstly, after the cultural revolution and perhaps as a consequence of the Sino-Soviet armed clashes at Ussuri, the PRC emerged in 1969 with a new policy from single-minded confrontation with major powers, to seeking cooperation from other governments without much regard for their revolutionary character.[17] PRC's subordination of 'party-to-party' relations to 'state-to-state' relations in dealing with non-communist states, attracted a flurry of visits by leaders of non-communist states of Southeast Asia to Peking, such that by 1974, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand had established diplomatic relation with PRC.[18] At the same time trade between PRC and non-communist states increased enormously indicating again Peking's increasing influence in the region. Secondly, Britain's announcement of its withdrawal East of Suez that coincided with the US proclamation of Nixon Doctrine in 1969, were perceived by the USSR that a power vacuum would eventually exist in Southeast Asia. To prevent a new power filling in this vacuum, the USSR proposed the establishment of "Asian Collective Security System" involving all states of Asia, but which the USSR deserved to be involved because it now regarded itself as an Asian power. The proposal received poor response from all Southeast Asian states including North Vietnam, while PRC on the other hand called it as a design by the USSR to impose hegemony. And when the ASEAN states (a regional organisation composed of Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand called Association of Southeast Asian Nations) proposed the establishment of Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971, the Chinese were quick to support it, for such a scheme would exclude any of the superpowers from the region. The USSR was silent on this proposal. Finally, the Sino-US reapproachment that culminated in the Chou-Nixon communique in 1972, and the establishment of the Sino-Japanese relations later in the same year, were interpreted by the USSR as if PRC was pioneering the creation of Sino-US-Japanese axis to oppose the USSR. In relation to this, and as inherent in the Nixon Doctrine, the USSR viewed that the US acceptance of a separate Asian regional power, automatically would legitimise a primary role for PRC in Asia and a guarantor for peace in Southeast Asia.[19]

These developments of course were intolerable in the Soviet perspective. It appeared obvious that PRC was aspiring to fill the vacuum left by the US and to attain political and ideological leadership in Southeast Asia.[20] Thus the Soviet objective from early 1970 was to forestall Peking from achieving any position of exclusive advantage, or dependency on China among any of the Southeast Asian states. china was the main adversary, and it was in Soviet interest where possible to prevent an accretion of China's prestige and power.[21] In this respect, in order to exploit the regional fear of China, the USSR propagated the presence of oversea Chinese as China's fifth columns, and PRC's refusal to cut off links with communist movements in Southeast Asia, as PRC's long-term design for conquest of the whole region. Now that the USSR was a global power equal in status to that of the US, naval activities were increased to project Soviet image. Commercially, the Soviets intensified their shipping and trading activities into the region.

Interestingly however, the USSR's success in non-communist Southeast Asia, had been limited. In Indonesia, the USSR's offer to complete the projects abandoned after 1965, and to supply spare parts to the Indonesia armed forces, received cold response from Soeharto's regime. Perhaps the only visible gain was the USSR's ability to negotiate with the Indonesian government for rescheduling of debt payment of $1.5 billion incurred by Indonesia before 1965.[22] With regard the Philippines, the USSR was able to establish diplomatic relations in 1972. Commercially, trading activities with non-communist states increased by 1973, such that the USSR in the same year imported $750,000-00 worth of copra from the Philippines, became a major importer of natural rubber from Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, and was able to establish a branch of Norodny Bank in Singapore. Strategically the USSR was granted berthing and servicing facilities in Singapore for Soviet navy and merchant shipping.[23]

In contrast however, PRC by doing little seemed to gain more. As most commercial activities in Southeast Asia were handled by businessmen of Chinese origin, PRC's increased trade was obvious. Chou En-lai's statement to Ne Win that the "oversea Chinese should obey the laws of the country in which they reside" and that "Peking opposed the concept of dual nationality and exploitation of oversea Chinese capitalist and money-lenders", was most welcomed by leaders of non-communist Southeast Asian states.[24] Consequently, the USSR's attempt to continue exploiting the oversea Chinese issue seemed to lose ground. Against the USSR's accusation that PRC was seeking domination of the region, PRC was quick to explain that the USSR's objection to Indonesia-Malaysia's claims for right of control of passage through the Straits of Malacca in the conference on the Law of the Sea (which PRC supported) was an illustration that it was the USSR that sought an hegemonic position in the region rather than the Chinese.[25]

The above scenario seemed to suggest that desipite all those efforts by the USSR, the gains that it chieved in Southeast Asia would in no way help to achieve its long term goal of being a substitute for the US after the latter had withdrawn from the region. As the war in the region was reaching its finale, the USSR perceived that as a leader of world revolution, its position would be undermined if it did not accelerate help to Vietnam to ensure quick achievement of victory over the Americans. Reviewing again the future in Vietnam, the Soviets realised that Vietnam had several qualities. Its location, was contiguous to China, having frontiers that measured almost as long as from Vladivostok on the Ussuri, to Khadborosk. This could act as a second front should hostilities with PRC occur. To serve the Soviet aim of expanding its influence southward into the rest of Southeast Asia, Vietnam could act as a springboard just the way that the Japanese used it in 1941. Vietnam also had the solidity, in the sense that the country had the greatest industrial capacity in the region. Historically, the Vietnamese was a well established race possessing powerful communist party leaders of global revolutionary stature. Strategically Vietnam has long coastline with the best anchorage. The availability of facilities for servicing, repair and replenishment of its Pacific Fleet, could solve its logistical problems which had since plagued its navy when operating in the Pacific. In Soviet perspective, it would be a mistake not to capitalise existing opportunities, seeing that this would serve its long term interest. Thus of immediate concern to the USSR was to help the North Vietnamese win the war. Soviet military aids consequently poured into North Vietnam putting the latter in a state of dependency on the former. Such a situation obviously was seen as conducive to serve as leverage for further influence into Vietnam once the war ended.

An ex-putra of the RMC, Kol Che Md Nor Bin Mat Arshad was commissioned into the Royal Malaya Regiment in 1963. Kol Che Md Nor who holds a Master Degree in International Relations & Strategic Studies from the University of Lancester, had held several senior appointments (including being the CO of 19 RAMD) before assuming his present position as the Head of the Strategic Planning Staff. Joint Services Division, Ministry of Defence.

FOOTNOTES

1. Peter Lyon, *War and Peace in Southeast Asia* (Oxford University Press, London, 1969) p. 138.
2. Charles A. Fisher "Geographical Continuity and Political Change" in Mark W. Zacher(ed.), *Conflict And Stability in Southeast Asia* (Anchor Books, New York, 1974) p. 10.
3. Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia* (Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1966) p. 4–6. The 'Eastern question' referred in Bolshevik's writings included Southeast Asia and South Asia.
4. *ibid.*, pp. 80–102.
5. J.M. Mackintosh, *Strategy And Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Oxford University Press, London, 1962) p. 2.
6. McLane, op. cit, p. 352.
7. *ibid.*, pp. 357 to 362.
8. Guy J. and Ewa T. Pauker "Southeast Asia" in Kurt London(ed.), *Soviet Imparcts on World Politics* (Hawthorn Books Inc, New York, 1974) p. 140.
9. Harold C. Hinton "East Asia", in Kurt London(ed.), *The Soviet Union In World Politics* (Westview Press, Colora 1980) p. 147.
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11. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global* (Little Brown And Company, Boston, 1981) pp. 120–121.
12. Guy J. and Ewa T. Pauker op. cit. p. 142.
13. *ibid.*, p. 143.
14. R.C. Horn "Soviet Influnce in Southeast Asia: Opportunities And Obstacles" in *Asian Survey* Vol. XX No. 8, August 1975, p. 661.
15. Guy J. and Ewa T. Pauker, op. cit, p. 147.
16. Melvin Gurtov, "The Soviet Presence In Southeast Asia" in Mark W. Zacher(ed.), *Conflict And Stability in Southeast Asia* (Anchor Books, New York, 1974) p. 278.
17. Frank Langdon "China's Policy in Southeast Asia" in Mark W. Zacher(ed.), *Conflict And Stability in Southeast Asia* (Anchor Books, New York, 1974) p. 293.
18. Guy J. and Ewa T. Pauker, op. cit, p. 153.
19. Sheldon W. Simon "Southeast Asia in Soviet Perspective" in W. Raymond Duncan(ed.), *Soviet Policy in The Third World* (Pergamon Press, New York, 1980) p. 239.
20. R.C. Horn "The Soviet Perspective" in Sudershan Chawla(ed.), *Southeast Asia under the New Balance of Pow* (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1974) p. 32.
21. Bernard K. Gordon "Southeast Asia" in Kurt London(ed.), *Soviet Union in World Politics* (Westview Press, Colorado, 1980) pp. 173–174.
22. Guy J. and Ewa T. Pauker, op. cit, p. 152.
23. *ibid.*, p. 154.
24. R.C. Horn, in Sudershan Chala(ed.), op cit, p. 47.
25. Guy J. and Ewa J. Pauker, op. cit, p. 154.

Part II of this article will appear in the next issue of Sorotan Darat.

Editor