

THE JOURNAL OF MALAYSIAN ARMY

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Lt (Dr) Tengku Natasha Eleena bti Tengku Ahmad Noor, RMDC



SOROTAN DARAT

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KETERANGAN

Sorotan Darat ialah Jurnal rasmi Tentera Darat (TD) yang diterbitkan sejak 1 Mac 1983 bagi mempertingkatkan budaya ilmu di kalangan warga TD. Jangkamasa pengeluaran ialah setiap 6 bulan iaitu pada bulan Jun dan Disember. Segala isi kandungannya termasuk sebarang ilustrasi, gambar, jadual dan rajah tiada dibenarkan dicetak semula dalam apa corak sekalipun tanpa mendapat kebenaran Kementerian Pertahanan melalui MK PLDTD terlebih dahulu.

Selaku sebuah jurnal TD, Sorotan Darat adalah mewujudkan satu bertuiuan forum bagi perbincangan perkara yang boleh menimbulkan minat professional terhadap seorang perajurit. Artikel pelbagai isu dan tema adalah dipelawa dari segi peringkat dan sesiapa sahaja yang mempunyai pengetahuan khas atau minat terhadap hal ehwal ketenteraan.lsu-isu kontroversi biasanya menjadi nadi penggerak sesebuah jurnal profesional yang mana ia dapat menimbulkan pemikiran dan perbincangan yang sihat. Artikel-artikel seperti ini akan diberi keutamaan, manakala artikel-artikel mengenai operasi-operasi, idea-idea latihan atau kegunaan peralatan adalah antara topik-topik yang diidam-idamkan.

Semua pertanyaan mengenai Sorotan Darat mestilah dikemukakan kepada Kol Doktrin, MK PLDTD.

Semua idea yang dikemukakan oleh penulis melalui artikelnya dalam jurnal ini, sama ada sebahagian atau seluruhnya adalah pendapatnya sendiri. Ianya bukanlah pendapat oleh Kementerian Pertahanan Malaysia atau pihak-pihak lain yang berkaitan.

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Panduan Untuk Penulis

FROM CHIEF EDITOR'S DESK

Assalamualaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh. With the name of Allah, Most Gracious and Most Merciful.

May peace be upon you,

Praise to Allah, the first journal for year 2020 edition is successfully published to acknowledge the writers effort in enhancing the readers' mind with informative, useful and meaningful articles. The Editorial Council would like to express their appreciation to the writers who have contributed to the articles. The commitments given from the thriving writers are certainly a precious aptitude in producing a well-published journal.

Nuggets of golden wisdom in thinking and actions come in many forms as they can be extracted from various sources. Therefore, SOROTAN DARAT provides such platform for the readers' to extract the ideas shared by the writers to gain knowledge. The military professional is described as the 'manager of violence' by Samuel P Hutington. This would entail effective planning, organising, leading and control of man, machine and methods related to the application of force.

In a complex environment where security challenges are changing rapidly, the Editorial Council aims to divert readers' attentions to the capabilities of Malaysian Army to face current challenges and threats. Moreover, we should take initiatives to improvise logistics, management and development matters in order to enhance the level of professionalism and readiness to all levels of personnel's.

The Editorial Council welcomes and encourages more new aspiring writers to contribute articles for future publications. Constructive opinions, dynamics comments, and potential ideas as well as feedbacks from the readers are highly encouraged to improve the quality of the journal publication in the future. Thank you.

Reading brings knowledge to inspire.

Lt Col Hj Ilyas bin Hanafi

Chief Editor

HUN SEN: THE LEADER OF CAMBODIA

By MAJ GEN DATO' MD FUAD BIN ABD JALIL ROYAL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL ENGINEERS CORPS

INTRODUCTION

"...a strong leader of a weak nation, a figure who is flexible, adaptable, highly strategic, adept

at the manipulation of foreign interests ... a skilled illusionist, conjuring up mirages of

democracy behind which he ruled in the traditional way, through an iron fist and a canny

manipulation of his country's history and culture." (Strangio, 2014)

The quote above is a description of Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Sen by Strangio (2014) summarising his ideology, leadership style. motivations, objectives and vision. Hun Sen is the longest serving Prime Minister of Cambodia, with a tenure currently standing at approximately 34 years long beginning in January 1985. He strikes out to be a very unique figure, on the other hand famously known for bringing peace, stability, growth and development to Cambodia in this 21st century, however he is largely criticised for his authoritarian leadership, promotion of violence, rigged elections and uncontrolled corruption (Chheang, 2015). Succinctly stated, Cambodia's ups and downs as a nation today can be attributed to Hun Sen's leadership. Therefore, studying Hun Sen can provide an understanding on how one's leadership traits and style can significantly shape a nation's history and dictate the path it will take into the future. This brings us to the aim of this paper which is to analyse Hun Sen's leadership traits and style from his early years and rise to prominence and thereafter during the years when he consolidated his powers in shaping Cambodia's contemporary geopolitical landscape. Subsequently, findings from the analysis will be used to identify the key lessons learnt applicable in today's environment.



Figure 1: Prime Minister of Cambodia, Hun Sen inspecting troops at the Celebration of the 20th Cambodia Infantry Army Anniversary in Phnom Penh on 24 January 2019

Background

Born on 5th of August 1952 in Kampong Cham province, Hun Sen was the third of seven siblings in a family of peasants. He received his early education from the teachings of a communist teacher TivOI which significantly influenced his future ideological leanings and motivations (30 Years of Hun Sen. Violence, Repression and Corruption in Cambodia, 2015). He joined the Khmer Rouge at the age sixteen after General Lon Nol's Cambodian military staged a coup d'état to overthrow Prince Norodom Sihanouk's leadership in 1970 (Morris, 1999). This is where he received his early military training and became a member of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) Youth League in 1971 (30 Years of Hun Sen. Violence, Repression and Corruption in Cambodia, 2015). Later in 1975 when Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge came to power in Cambodia, Hun Sen became a military officer who rose through the ranks swiftly until he became one of the regiment commanders within the regime with nearly 2,000 men under his command (Jordans, 1992; Morris, 1999).

A couple of years prior to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1979, Hun Sen defected from the Khmer Rouge subsequently siding with Vietnam in fear of being purged by the organisation he had joined earlier, thus beginning his political career (Jordans, 1992). In no time, he rose to prominence during Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia in 1979, serving the People's Republic of Kampuchea under Heng Samrin (Morris, 1999). At a young age of only 26, he became Cambodia's Foreign Minister, the youngest minister ever at the time. Following the death of Chan Sy in 1984, Hun Sen was appointed as the new Prime Minister of Cambodian January 1985, a move orchestrated by Vietnam based on the leadership qualitie she possessed and because he was subservient to Hanoi's will(*30 Years of Hun Sen. Violence, Repression and Corruption in Cambodia*, 2015).He led the country's negotiations during the Paris Agreements in 1991 and contested in the first UN administered elections in 1993. When his Cambodian People's Party (CPP) lost the 1993 elections, he threatened to instigate violence whilst in dispute of the results, forcing the United Nations to back down from imposing any type of sanctions or other types of interventions, thus enabling him to hold on to power as the second Prime Minister (*30 Years of Hun Sen. Violence, Repression and Corruption in Cambodia*, 2015).

Hun Sen has been at the helm of Cambodian leadership ever since, leading the CPP in the continuous consolidation of power through five general elections since 1993with the most recent one in 2018. His hard and autocratic approach has resulted in the main opposition party, Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), being dissolved before the 2018 General Elections, by amending the constitution to prevent a genuine threat to his party's position, therefore cementing his position as Cambodia's Prime Minister for the years to come.

Analysis of Hun Sen's Leadership

Using the Leadership Theory and Model – Military Perspective as shown in the Figure 2 below, Hun Sen's leadership traits and style are analysed during his early years and rise to power, and during his current reign and consolidation of power. It will be shown that at different stages of his political career, he portrayed a combination of different leadership traits and styles based on situational factors.




Figure 2: Leadership Theory and Model - Military Perspective

Hun Sen's Early Years and Rise to Power

Hun Sen rose to prominence during the dark period of modern Cambodian history. When Lon Nol's regime came into power in 1975, he opposed the regime because he felt that he needed to stand up against those who challenged Cambodia's freedom (Meng, 1990). He was considered at the time as a diligent, bright young man with lofty ambitions who was seen as fighting for a cause that many Cambodians could relate and side with; and that cause was to bring peace and stability to this war torn nation by overthrowing cruel and oppressive regimes and standing up for the rights of a smaller nation powerful nations("Hun Sen: against other more Cambodia's Strongman Prime Minister," 2018). In addition, his stand here showed resolve and determination as he fought to overthrow a regime that did not serve Cambodia's best interests, even though this approach was risky to personal career aspirations. As a member of Khmer Rouge, he gained political and military experience that afforded him the skills and abilities required to propel his leadership into greater heights. Several years later, Hun Sen defected from the Khmer Rouge and sided with Vietnam in the war to outpoll Pot's regime (Meng, 1990).

Throughout this period, he displayed **transformational leadership** qualities, adjusting his leadership skills to suit the current situation whereby he was no longer a major player in the Khmer Rouge regime. He had envisioned a brighter future for Cambodia and used his charisma and people skills to inspire and influence the Cambodian people to rise against the tyranny of Pol Pot. Hun Sen also showed **survival** skills by navigating through the Khmer Rouge Cambodian genocide and thereafter also during the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, supporting the side that was favourable at the point of time (Jacobsen & Stuart-Fox, 2013; Morris, 1999).

Later during his tenure as Foreign Minister from 1979 to 1984, Hun Sen slowly built his personal power base by getting support from within the party and building relations with Vietnam (Sutton, 2018). Soon after becoming Prime Minister in 1985, Hun Sen forced on reforms that he saw fit best with his overall legacy and what he perceived to be in the best interest for the nation at the time. He ained popularity by establishing close relations with the royal family, realising that this was the way to the people's heart and minds (Jordans, 1992). He adapted well with all factions within the Cambodian society, speaking in respective languages, colloquial or high Khmer as necessary to gain respect, trust and confidence among these different sections of the Cambodian society (Jordans, 1992). In 1991, during the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement, he was lauded by the international community as a moderate leader intending to bring about positive changes to Cambodia (30 Years of Hun Sen. Violence, Repression and Corruption in Cambodia, 2015).

However later in 1997, in a power grab coup, he removed the first Prime Minister and took control of the entire Cambodian government (Sutton, 2018). Hun Sen then continued to enhance his power by increasing the strength of his personal bodyguard units and equipping them with heavy weaponry (Sutton, 2018). He even suppressed freedom of speech, controlled the media and orchestrated the coup in 1997 that provided him with absolute power in Cambodia (*30 Years of Hun Sen. Violence, Repression and Corruption in Cambodia*, 2015). This showed **ruthlessness** in his dealings and his resolve to protect his legacy and position as the Prime Minister.

As Prime Minister, Hun Sen has been described as a **visionary, adaptable** and **strategic leader**, with the ability to direct foreign interests in-line with Cambodia's benefit (Strangio, 2014). However, this was an illusion that he crafted to deceive the people into thinking that they were living in a democracy, when in reality they were subjects of an **authoritarian rule** at the backdrop of the nation's history, culture and traditions (Strangio, 2014). Hun Sen can be linked to many instances involving the breech of basic human rights of his people; this includes systematic arrests, torture and killings of those who opposed his rule, besides imposing bans on gatherings, establishment of associations and other atrocities that were aimed at intimidating and frighthening the general populace (*30 Years of Hun*)

Sen. Violence, Repression and Corruption in Cambodia, 2015). This approach gained him control over the judicial, executive and legal system of the nation and cemented his position as the unchallenged leader of Cambodia (Peou, 2018).



Figure 3: Hun Sen as a member of Khmer Rouge

Consolidation of power

The above is Hun Sen's response to suggestions on the possibility that the Arab Spring in the Middle East may occur in Cambodia should his rule come to be opposed by the people (30 Years of Hun Sen. Violence, Repression and Corruption in Cambodia, 2015).Initially, Hun Sen was expected to reinstate democracy to a war torn country, with the withdrawal of Vietnam and the signing of a peace agreement in 1991 (Giry, 2015). However, in the following years, Hun Sen began to consolidate power and enhance his position by fending off the opposition, suppressing freedom of speech and resorting to **fear** and **threat** to thwart any opposition to his rule (Giry, 2015).More recently, Hun Sen stated that he wants to rule for another 10 years, an indicator of his unwillingness to relinquish his powers ("Hun Sen: Cambodia's Strongman Prime Minister," 2018).



Figure 4: Hun Sen addressing the 73rd United Nations General Assembly

Hun Sen has been addressing insecurity over influence of outsiders by maximising political security through power consolidation (Peou, 2018). According to Eimer (2013), Hun Sen resorted to dirty political play such as imprisoning his political opponents, electoral fraud and money politics to consolidate power. For example, Hun Sen has been accused of masterminding the rigging of the 2013 elections, an accusation made based on his firm control of the media and his approach of restricting freedom of speech (Giry, 2015). He has also been accused of misusing the military and police forces to his own benefit so as to maintain his power and control of the nation (Nachemson, 2018). This is the reason why he remains relatively unopposed to this day which is attributed to his authoritative leadership styles similar to a dictator, leaving little room for consensus or discussion. However, it is argued that power consolidation through this approach may not be viable as it would incite resistance and opposition from the people (Peou, 2018). Hun Sen can be considered a **narcissist** as he was a firm believer that he was the only person who could drive Cambodia forward from the dark history it has endured over the years and the best way in doing so was through an authoritarian approach.

Apart from that, Hun Sen has been accused of maintaining power through **nepotism** (Giry, 2015; Peou, 2018). The appointment of his son as General Director of the General Directorate of Intelligence and his son in law as Deputy Chief of the National police in 2017 are signs of Hun Sen's attempts to hold on to power within his family tree for generations (Peou, 2018). Hun Sen himself has indicated the possibility of his son replacing him as the Prime Minister of Cambodia, stating that he is well educated and thus qualified for the post ("Hun Sen: Cambodia's Strongman Prime Minister," 2018).

Additionally, Hun Sen has managed to draw strength and gained international recognition from enhanced relations with China and even the US (Dunst, 2019; Giry, 2015). This move shows Hun Sen to be a **rational person** and **strategic thinker** who places much importance on **good interpersonal relations** with leaders of other powerful nations. He realises that in order to be legitimate and recognised by the international community, he must establish political alliances with both domestic and international actors, as he attempts to hold on to power for as long as possible and place himself together with other global leaders.

Hun Sen is also widely credited for the economic growth that Cambodia has seen in recent times, growing steadily amid the accusation of corruption and human rights violations ("Hun Sen: Cambodia's Strongman Prime Minister," 2018). Under his rule, Cambodia had one of the highest annual growth rate in the world at 7.7% between 1993 to 2013, largely owed to heavy investments by the China and Japan in Cambodia (Giry, 2015). Hun Sen's ability to steer the country into growth and development can be attributed to his **firm grip** and **control over decisions** and actions by his government. However, some argue that although the economy is experiencing high growth, only the top elite are growing wealthier and this growth is not balanced across the society (Eimer, 2013).

We can attribute Hun Sen's domination of the political system in Cambodia through control of the various systems and agencies within the government as a move that exemplifies his **bold** and **cunning** approach, deceiving the general public while forcefully intimidating others into supporting his policies and objectives. Through **fear** and **intimidation**, Hun Sen has been able to control and shape future Cambodia into what he perceives is best for the nation and himself in the long term; disregarding the wants and needs of the Cambodian people. Although this may not be the best leadership style for all situations, nonetheless it has been effective in cementing Hun Sen firmly as Prime Minister of Cambodia and thus enabling him to muster the development and growth of the nation.

Summary of Analysis

The analysis on Hun Sen's leadership in influencing and leading his people into achieving the long-term objectives for

Cambodia can be summarised into a leadership model based on the military perspective as shown in Figure 5 (Nixon, 2019).




Figure 5: Author's Conceptual Leadership Model Framework for Hun Sen based on the Military Perspective Leadership Theory and Model

Lessons Learnt

There are several key lessons that can be learnt from Hun Sen's leadership. Hun Sen's early years and rise to prominence required him to have vision, ambition and determination for him to inspire and influence his men to follow him in his quest for a better Cambodia. Therefore, these traits are paramount in becoming a good transformational leader. In addition to that, Hun Sen's strategic mindset and intelligent leadership were instrumental traits in bringing the remnants of Khmer Rouge back into the Cambodian government and military service thus ending the internal war and power struggles that plaqued the nation for many years. Besides that, his firm grip of power enabled him to steer Cambodia into a path that he believed suited them best, thus bringing about stability and economic prosperity in the process. However, in order to be successful authoritarian leader, one must possess the aptitude, skills and experience worthy of influencing subordinates to follow suit, something which Hun Sen had in him from his vast experience serving as a military commander and as a political member of the CPK in the early days of his career.

Hun Sen's **authoritarian leadership approach is particularly useful when the environment is volatile and ambiguous**. After years of war, Cambodia was in a fragile state affecting both its people and infrastructure and therefore required Hun Sen's **authoritative leadership to bring in peace and stability**, **security and economic reforms** to Cambodia. A different approach may not have enabled reforms in Cambodia and rather would have created more discourse and slowed the decision-making process. In support of this statement, an independent study has shown that authoritative styled leadership has been able to propel employees to work harder and more efficient to attain better growth and profitability, and such was the case with Apple during Steve Jobs time as CEO of the company (Kutsar, Ghose, & Kutsar, 2014).Therefore it can be concluded that the authoritarian styled leadership is most suitable in times of crisis and chaos.

Furthermore, rationality and intelligence are other traits vital in a leader, one that enables a leader to act out on the best method to achieve the goals or objectives set. For example, Hun Sen's engagement with leaders of powerful nations such as China and US to avoid being subject of their criticism and eventual intervention was a clear depiction of his rationality and boldness in obtaining the best possible outcome by shaping the environment to his advantage. These engagements also managed to direct foreign investments and aid into Cambodia thus enabling the economic growth and development of the nation today.

CONCLUSION

Through determination and hardship, Hun Sen managed to climb the ladder from a mere military cadre to the Prime Minister of a nation, while gaining knowledge and experience in the process. Hun Sen is a visionary, intelligent and ambitious leader who is best known for his authoritarian leadership style. His rise to prominence and consolidation of power in shaping of Cambodia's geopolitics is a direct result of his leadership qualities. Over the years, by employing both transformational and authoritative leadership approaches, Hun Sen has managed to stay in power and propel the development and economic growth of a fragile Cambodia at the backdrop of decades of war and conflicts. His authoritative leadership style suited best at times of crisis; however it may become less popular in a democracy as it entails discrimination and violation of basic human rights. In short, during his early years and rise to prominence, Hun Sen was a transformational leader with traits such as intelligence, determination, ambition, adaptability and vision, who transformed Cambodia from a war torn nation into a developing nation in South East Asia. Soon after becoming Prime Minister, he resorted to an authoritarian styled

leadership using fear and threat of force to gain absolute executive power in his quest to drive Cambodia forward.

Nevertheless, the key takeaways from Hun Sen's leadership analysis is that the authoritarian styled leadership is a form of leadership suitable in uncertain and ambiguous environment or when getting back on your two feet is more important than obtaining general consensus. Besides that, it is important for a leader to be visionary, one who has the capability to think ahead, foresight possible scenarios of the future and act upon it to ensure that the best possible approach is adopted. Finally, rationality and intelligence are key traits to survivability in this dynamic and complex world we live in today. In conclusion, although Hun Sen's leadership of Cambodia has become a source of controversy and dispute in recent times, nevertheless, there are many things that can be learnt from the leadership approach that he adopted into bringing Cambodia from the brink of collapse into a fast growing and developing nation today.

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Defence Logistic Division, MAFHQ, Chief of Electrical, Mechanical Engineers Group at Malaysian Army Logistic Headquarters and Chief Director, Army Research and Evaluation Division at Army Headquarters. As part of his career development, he attended various professional courses locally, such as at the MAFSC and MAFDC. He obtained a Diploma in Advance Engineering and a Master in Automotive from Cranfield University, UK, and a Master in Social Science from the Malaysian National University. Currently, he is the Army Logistic Commander at Army Logistic Command.

THE "STRATEGIC NEW NORMAL"POST COVID 19 – HOW SHOULD SOUTHEAST ASIA RESPOND

By BRIG GEN DATO' MD RAHIM BIN HJ MOHAMAD ROYAL INTELLIGENCE CORPS

INTRODUCTION

COVID-19 is a global pandemic increasingly seen to be one that might change the game of the already complicated geopolitical landscape. The uneasy great power relations remain under the spotlight as Washington and Beijing respectively blame each other for the origin and spread of COVID-19, and the slowdown of global trade and economy further complicates the US-China trade war. Globally, COVID-19 threatens to heighten the risks in managing refugee crises and protracted conflicts in fragile states. Concurrently, developments in the South China Sea continue to pose challenges to Maritime Southeast Asia.

What is the "strategic new normal" in post-COVID-19 Asia, and how should defense and security actors adapt? Will COVID-19 tip the balance of great power relations? To what extent can the regional security architectures, including ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms still serve as the indispensable platform for managing power relations, mitigating conflict, and maximizing cooperation in an increasingly complex security environment? Southeast Asian countries, and ASEAN can and must do more in navigating the risks of intensifying great power relations, and managing an increasingly complex security environment with potentially less resources in the "Strategic New Normal" Post-COVID-19.

Research for Social Advancement (REFSA)

During the REFSA discussion held on 12 May, three renowned security experts, who dialed in from Singapore, United States and Switzerland respectively, weighed in on the topic:

Dr. Tim Huxley, Executive Director of The International Institute for Strategic Studies-Asia (IISS-Asia) in Singapore said that while it is still early to say with certainty what the knock-on effect will be, Southeast Asia was already facing a difficult geopolitical predicament at the start of 2020. Two crucial dimensions are at place: On one hand, escalating Great Power Competition between the United States and China has made a great impact in the last decade. While Southeast Asia wants positive relations, Beijing and Washington make it increasingly difficult. On the other hand, Southeast Asian countries seem to be unable to forge consensus, even though there is the existing ASEANcentric Regional Security Architecture. Southeast Asian countries are becoming increasingly under stress as they try to maintain a resemblance of balance between the two powers. "COVID-19 will accentuate the regional predicament, but it hasn't fundamentally changed it. Any expectation that there will be a respite for strategic competition is misplaced."

In responding to the "Strategic New Normal", Southeast Asian countries must inject new life into ASEAN to make it a more effective vehicle in promoting the strategic autonomy of ASEAN Member States, for example, to consider an ASEAN minus 1 or minus 2 mechanisms in the negotiations of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

Secondly, Southeast Asian countries need to think more seriously about defense and security cooperation among themselves, particularly in threat assessments, contingency plans, joint procurement of defense equipment, multilateral military exercises, as well as establishing a Southeast Asia Defense Staff College to foster common thinking and cooperation.

Finally, Southeast Asian governments could continue to widen the mix of powers involved in sub-regional security as a way of mitigating the dangers of Southeast Asia of being caught up in a binary competition between the United States and China, and wherever practical, further development of security relations, with partners such as India, Japan, Australia, Republic of Korea, and perhaps some key European countries.

Despite these steps taken such as strengthening cooperation on security and defense within ASEAN, as well as strengthening cooperation with medium powers in regional security may seem too ambitious, but the alternative to these steps could further expose the region to the dangers of major power competitions. Ms Elina Noor, Associate Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies (APCSS) in Hawaii opined that COVID-19 will see an intensification of the old status quo. "The Strategic New Normal is actually the Old Normal on steroids".

Before COVID-19, there were already ruptures between the relations of the two big powers, especially in trade and technology, culminating in the United States' 2018 National Defense Strategy declaration of strategic competition as priority No.1 for the United States. Questions about the United States' leadership in multilateral institutions and commitment to its allies under the America First policy are also of great concern to Southeast Asia and COVID-19 has exacerbated those cracks.

Secondly, pronounced overlaps there are between conventional and non-conventional security challenges. The pandemic has highlighted how much non-traditional security can aggravate power dynamics and influence, as we see western countries calling for the investigation of the origins of COVID-19, which might only harden the geopolitical scene. Developments in the South China Sea have also seen maritime boundaries been poached with intimidation, harassment and unilateral actions. This is clearly unconstructive and places the sincerity of resolving the ongoing disputes into question. As technology grows in importance with cyberspace becoming a key domain of engagement, we will see conventional and non-conventional security elements intensify and mutually reinforce.

Thirdly, in light of this period of strategic competition, ASEAN can and must continue to champion the foundations on which it is founded – multilateralism, amity, cooperation and respect for international law. "ASEAN must not only provide a platform, but also "thought leadership" and carve a position for itself amongst these giants, instead of being subsumed by the policy agenda of major powers". In particular, as hybrid security challenges between traditional and non-traditional security increasingly intersects across domains (land, maritime, air and cyber), ASEAN must be prepared to discuss new emerging doctrinal developments such as emerging technology and the role of cyberspace, even as Southeast Asian countries are likely to have done under greater budgetary duress. Finally, ASEAN must not only matter to governments in the region but also to its people.

Dr. Hans Born, the Assistant Director and Head of the Policy and Research Division at the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), began by noting that as part of the new normal, security forces, particularly militaries, police units, and intelligence services will find themselves increasingly tasked with missions related to the health crisis that are normally beyond their scope of regular duties. In particular for militaries, this may have a knock-on effect in reducing their readiness, as social distancing requirements make it difficult to have large-scale exercises, trainings and recruitments.

It is important to remember that we will be heading for the long haul with COVID-19, where the emerging security challenge will be transnational in nature as the virus respects no borders. These security challenges however do not necessarily require a military response, even though the security sector will be expected to play a role. As such, governments must review its National Security Strategy to ensure that it has sufficiently addressed these emerging security challenges, and to ensure that its security forces are sufficiently equipped and trained to deal with the crisis, including protective gears for the personnel.

In nations which already have authoritarian tendencies, the COVID-19 crisis will only serve as a magnifier for the use/abuse of such powers. In a similar vein, as the world moves into the second phase of the crisis, it will be important to have tracing and tracking abilities that hitherto have been unprecedented, raising questions regarding effective safeguards and controls against mass state surveillance.

As such, "We need oversight more than ever, not less", said Dr Born. The crisis has also made it difficult for many of the bodies overseeing security forces to effectively perform their duties, as legislative assemblies and other oversight bodies across the world can no longer meet as often as before. These bodies must find creative ways to ensure that their oversight functions remain uninterrupted in order to continue checking and balancing executive bodies.

Objectives and Roles of the State

Back to basics, we must ask what would be the policy objective of the State.Until now; the Malaysian state has placed delivering GDP growth as its key objective in managing economics. It is assumed that

this growth would trickle down and improve the general wellbeing of the society. Bank Negara sees itself as maintaining the stability of the financial system, interest rate and inflation rate to support broadbased growth.The role of Government Linked Companies or Government Linked Invesment Companies (GLCs/GLICs) is more convoluted. Some aimed at supporting Bumiputra businesses, some just to meet KPIs, which may be of cross purposes with other objectives of the state. If it were to blindly follow this objective, in these circumstances, the government would have no choice but to make up the loss in the private sectors by increasing its own expenditure.But in this economic crisis unleashed by the COVID -19 pandemic, the Malaysian state should rethink its primary objective for the economy. I would propose that the primary objective is to create jobs that pay decently. Everything else flows from here. All other objectives should be subjected to this primary objective. The creation of decently paid jobs should be pirioritised and centre as far as economic discourse is concerned.

Major shakeups

The world and Malaysia are likely to face the following shakeups in the weeks and months to come. Some of these trends may result in long-lasting effects to our economy, perhaps for decades:

Threat to the export-led manufacturing and trading nation model

For the last fifty years, Malaysia has been highly dependent on export-led industrialisation and the trade associated with it. Malaysia produces finished consumer products to serve United States and European markets as well as intermediary goods that are parts of an elaborated global supply chain.

COVID -19 pandemic will force global and local corporations to shift from Just-In-Time (efficiency) to Just-In-Case (resilience). Developed economies are likely to focus on restoring some of the manufacturing that now happens in developing economies, and as a result, the global supply chain will shrink somewhat. The question is how and to what extent Malaysia would be affected.

An obvious first-order effect is reduced exports and reduced foreign direct investment, which will result in job losses. We may even lose technical capabilities and technological know-how if firms were to shut down en masse.

Major disruptions to services sector

COVID - 19 and the lockdowns impacted heavily on the services sector. Airlines, hotels, fine dining, mass tourism and other related sectors will suffer for many months to come if not years. Even after a vaccine is found, it may take a much longer time to restore services sector to where it was.

Again, this will lead to a decrease in exports, since tourism, conventions etc. count as export of services. We will have to be prepared for further job losses and the consequent decline in the wellbeing of those who lost their jobs and its associated living standards, which may be hard to restore. Many in the services sector are informal sector workers without the minimal formal employment protections. Their predicaments would be even more severe.

Commodity crunch

The historically low petrol prices will have a huge impact on government revenue, as well as on jobs in oil and gas. Palm oil price is also low and when petrol prices are low, there is no added incentive to switch to biodiesel. Soil in peninsular Malaysia is comparatively less fertile than those in Indonesia. Wages are much lower in Indonesia as well. The crisis will push planters to rethink whether it is more viable to go into food agriculture. But again, the big firms may be able to change quickly; it is the hundreds of thousands of small owners whom the Government will have to guide with grants, incentives and agriculture research.

Altogether, these three externally-driven trends highlighted above will have deep and long-lasting effects for our economy, first of all on the level of disposable income and private consumption, and secondly on domestic sectors dependent on private investment.

Consumption-led growth hitting a snag

For the last decade or so since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, Malaysia has been increasingly dependent on debt-fueled domestic consumption. Domestic consumption is largely debt-fueled due to the stagnation of wages in the last two decades.

The household debts have been more than 80 percent to GDP for more than a decade. If many Malaysians start losing their jobs or facing drops in real incomes, and generally fearing the uncertain

economic situations to come, they will consume less. Worse, savings rates will not increase since existing debts will have to be serviced.

Retail depends heavily on this disposable income-based consumption. The economic fallout for, say, *pasar malam* stall owners would be very serious, not to mention bigger firms such as shopping malls and businesses selling consumer goods. Further job losses would result, triggering a dangerous vicious circle.

Property glut, construction and the banks

It is mindboggling to drive though the numerous condominiums, the many shopping malls and office blocks in and around Kuala Lumpur. A property glut is also present in other states and cities. The property sector relies to a considerable extent on domestic private investment, e.g. families purchasing one or two investment units. With a decline in disposable income and indebtedness already at high levels, this model may be defunct.

Most Malaysian banks' loan portfolios heavily linked to property and car loans; and the GLCs and GLICs are holding substantial shares in major property developer companies. The construction sector is heavily dependent on private developers for works.

The burst of the property bubble would have a direct impact on GLCs and GLICs, and, worse, it would introduce significant extra risk in the entire banking and financial system, which would stress the economy further. Engineering a "soft-landing" for the property sector requires strong political will and very clear minds not bound by past glories and practices, as well as vested interests.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the scenarios described above all lead to a substantial decrease in consumption, private investment and exports, and by extension, GDP as a whole will decline. There will be huge social and political consequences if the government chooses to do nothing or do the minimal. Worse still, if the government fails to understand the magnitude of the crisis, we are all doomed.We will have to deal with heightened economic insecurity as a result of various economic stresses to individuals, families, corporations etc. Malaysians who lost their jobs in Singapore would have no choice but to return to Malaysia without a job. They would need help. There will be health consequences of losing jobs. Mental health, suicide,

substance abuses are some of the challenges on this front. People who lost their sources of income resorting to crime will be a challenge too. Next on the list, groups who felt economically aggrieved turning to violent extremist ideas and causing political instability. There is one variable that we haven't discussed yet in our simple economy, and that is the "G", or government expenditure. The government will have to act using all the policy tools available to the state to "soften the blows" of this massive once-in-a-century crisis. And only the state has the resources and the tools to act effectively. Leaving businesses to their own devices means many would pack up and fold, and millions more would lose their jobs in due course. Charities would not be able to cope with the vacuum left by the government.

While we know business as usual won't work, the government will also have to grapple with the fact that it will receive less revenue than previously, not in the least tax receipts. The government will have to make the big call of either borrowing more (expanding deficits) or do less. But it is very important to know that government financing is but one of many tools available in the government's toolkit.

SYNOPSIS

Southeast Asian countries, and ASEAN can and must do more in navigating the risks of intensifying great power relations, and managing an increasingly complex security environment with potentially less resources in the "Strategic New Normal" Post COVID -19.REFSA's Research Director, Ivy Kwek said that even though COVID-19 began as a global pandemic it is becoming one that might change the game of the already complicated geopolitical landscape in the region. The uneasy great power relations remain under the spotlight as Washington and Beijing respectively blame each other for the origin and spread of COVID-19, and the slowdown of global trade and economy further complicates the US-China trade war. Globally, COVID-19 threatens to heighten the risks in managing refugee crises and protracted conflicts in fragile states. Concurrently, developments in the South China Sea continue to pose a challenge to the region.

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MALAYSIA - THAILAND BORDER SECURITY ISSUE: THE NEED AND RELEVANCY

By BRIG GEN ROBA'I BIN RAHMAT GENERAL SERVICE CORPS

INTRODUCTION

Border security in Malaysia is an issue that always concern the government and security force. The enforcement at the border region is still not reducing the illegal activities such as the smuggling, illicit drugs, illegal immigrants, terrorism and human trafficking. These are some of the major problems facing by government and enforcement agencies due to the wide land and sea border of Malaysia. However, the issues at the boundaries still need to be tackled before it become worse and give bad consequences.

The main problem for Malaysia in controlling the border area is the geography factor as the Malay Peninsular and East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak) is separated by South China Sea. The distances between Malay Peninsular and Borneo states are about 600 to 1,200 km. The Malay Peninsular in North states is sharing the land border with Thailand about 3,147 km and south state shares maritime boundary with Singapore. The Borneo shares the land border with Indonesia and Brunei and sea boundaries with Philiphines, China and Vietnam.



Figure 1: Land Border between Malaysia and Thailand in Northern States.

Malaysia – Thailand Border

This article describes the border security situation that emphesizes land regional issues. The land borders between Malaysia and Thailand consist of four neighbouring states which are Perlis, Kedah, Perak and Kelantan which are mostly covered by primary jungle, secondary jungle and develop area such as housing and plantation. The Malaysia-Thailand borders in Kedah and Perlis usually have some population and small town in the border region, Bukit Kayu Hitam in Kedah and Padang Besar in Perlis. While, the Malaysian-Thailand border in Perak mostly covers by mountainous virgin jungle that is a natural habitat for wild animals such as elephants and tigers. In Kelantan, most of the Malaysian-Thailand border is separated by the narrow Golok River, usually become the route to cross the border for both Malaysian and Thailand citizen.

The main entrance to Malaysia from Thailand is coming through Immigrations, Customs, Quarantine and Security (ICQS) Bukit Kayu Hitam for Kedah, Wang Kelian and Padang Besar for Perlis, ICQS Pengkalan Hulu for Perak and ICQS Rantau Panjang for Kelantan. These are the legal entrances for both country, however these are many illegal entrance along the border that always been watched by the security forces guarding the border area.

Almost all towns located in border region are undeveloped and struggle with economy issues having low wages. This is due to policy development on the border region that prioritises defence and security rather than developing the economy of these towns. The policy development along border region was derived from the history and threat from the Malayan Communist Party or also known as bandits. Besides, border area also indicated as high-risk area where dangerous crime always occurred such as murder, gangsterism and drugs or weapons smuggling.

Malayan Emergency Era

Back to Malayan Emergency Era, the main threat along the Malaysia – Thailand border focused on Malayan Communist Party. The First Malayan Emergency on 1948 until 1960 can be said as the result from the action and violence done by Malayan Communist Party such as attacking the important installations and assets, attacking security force besides targeting transportation and also kidnapping and threaten peoples. The border between Malaysia and Thailand had been their main hideout which is strategic to hide and build up bases. Not to mention, it is also easier for the bandits to retreated to Thailand if they been ambushed by Malaysia's security force and otherwise.

The Second Declaration Malayan Emergency in 1968 had taught us some important lesson especially the importance to enforce the law, exercise aggressive patrol and ensure the security in the Malaysia-Thailand border. The government had come out great strategic plan KESBAN to prevent the resurrection of Malayan Communist Party. This plan combined all government agencies such as military, police force, volunteer force and also a civilian agency to give information and cooperate to fight the same enemy. It consist the effort of identify and separated enemy in a populated area and push them to the jungle and finally to the border.

New Threats and Challenges

On 4 March 1977, Malaysia and Thailand finally achieved mutual objective and cooperation to bring down and eliminate the threat from the Malayan Communist Party. Both countries agreed to sign the New Border Agreement in Bangkok, which agree on these terms:

".. brought about a new era of border cooperation between the two countries. Both signatories are determined to take effective measures to counter and eliminate the Communist Terrorists and members of their related organizations along the Malaysian and Thai border and to intensify their cooperation on other matters pertaining to their mutual interests in order to find effective solutions to problems arising therefrom."

The cooperation between Malaysia and Thailand that involved military operation in the border of both countries was a crucial part which made the Malayan Communist Party more desperate and agrees to put down their weapons.

The Peace agreement between three parties Malaysia, Thailand and Malayan Communist Party on 2 December 1989 at Haadyai, Thailand does not mean the border is safe from any threat and enemy. However, it was the beginning for both countries in facing new threats and challenges in Malaysia-Thailand border region.

Security and Threat

Security is the state of being secure or the absence from threat to predetermined values. Basically, it means how we ensure the region free from any threat and capable to handle any issues that may arise. It is always based on the terms of preserving territorial political sovereignty. However. integrity and the changing environment yet developed new perspective in the meaning and conduct of security measure. The threats had become more complex and hard to predict which can be in the form of individual, group, para military or internal struggle. Besides that, it also may involve all aspects aside from military and having international connections and network.

Traditionally, the main threat to the Malaya was focused on Malayan Communist Party with the belief that Communist ideology will be accepted and expanded in Malaya as the insurgencies was still exist even after Malaya Independence on 1957. However, after Malayan Communist Party lay their arms there was no significant military threat toward government or security force. In the absence of any threat, new challenge arise that we called non-traditional security issues which is more complex and complicated. The traditional threat and non-traditional threat can be defined as:

Traditional Threat Actor - The traditional threat is the threat based on state actor. The state will probably use their army to challenge other state with the intention to conquer or expand their homeland. This threat is more on war form between states.

Non-Traditional Threat Actor - A non-traditional threat is the threat other than traditional threat. Thus, it can come with many forms, more complex and can relate with other threat. Besides that, non-traditional security also is not based on state actor which can be an organisaton, group or individual. The threat may give impact to the unstability of politic, social and economy and threaten national security. If proper caution against the threat not taken, it may caused epidemic, chaos, disasters and panic among the citizen. Therefore, the threat needs to be assessed properly and accurately so that the effective action can be taken.

Even non-traditional threats are based by non state actor, government and security force should not look down the impact of the

threat. The instability of political, economy and social can paralyze the whole nation. The weaken government will open the opportunities for external threat to come and causes unresolved conflict. Non-traditional threat identified in Malaysia and still is as follows: Smuggling, Illicit Drug, Espionage, Illegal Immigrants, Terrorism, Health Issues (Pandemic), Natural Disasters, Illegal Border Crossing and Spread of false ideology such as ISIS.

Non-Traditional Security Issues along Malaysia-Thailand Border

Most of the active non-traditional security issues occured using Malaysia-Thailand Border such as the illicit drugs, illegal immmigrants and smuggling. These three issues are quite complex, active and had a wide spectrum of effects into human security, border security and also national security. The issues on the border usually involved local community especially teenagers and schoolgirl or boy as they will get certain amount of wages. The non-traditional security issues may disrupt social system and effect the human resource development. Other effect is it can destabilize nation political and causes internal chaos. Non-traditional security issues also can disturb the markets resulted losses in national assets and causes bankruptcy. According to a report from survey made by Havocscope on "Country Profile and Ranking" exposed that about US\$ 575 Billion in Asia losses resulted by the activities of the global black market.

Smuggling

The extensive border between Malaysia and Thailand had blow up the black market and smuggling activities in the area. In Kelantan, the main border that separate Malaysia and Thailand is Sungai Golok whih is about 29.9 miles long from Pengkalan Kubor, Tumpat to Rantau Panjang. The geography along the boundary provides opportunities for smuggling activities by the local communities. In addition, there are many illegal jetties which are used for crossing the boundary and for smuggling activities. The main things for illegal smuggling are sugar, cooking and other essential item for daily used including rice, imitation branded- clothing, fruits & vegetables, kitchenwares and others.

Eventhough there are various authority and securoty personnel patrolling the border area from time to time such as Customs Unit, Immigration Unit and Anti Smugging Unit, Malaysia Royal Police and also Armed Forces, the illegal activities still goes and not seem to stop in near future. It becomes much worse when it involve the smuggling of weapon and dangerous things. These could be related with international syndicate and local people that planned to commit crimes. It is also can be related with the terrorism as Malaysia is highly potential becoming terrorist hub and spreading and promoting the ideologist like communisme, Itte, diaspora, radical islamic state etc since Malaysia community has multiracial and more tolerance. Thus, the smuggling activities can not be overlooked as it may be a major threat for national security.

In 2018, Malaysia Armed Forces had discovered illegal weapons hidden in ground at border area in Kelantan. The success of the discovery was resulted from continous patrolling and information from local society. The weapons (AK 47) was made in Russia and imported by the weapon smuggling syndicate. The incindent prove that the smuggling activities around border area still active even with the presence of security force. The weapon discovered caused some question on our border security. Are we confident enough with our capabilities and strenght? How the syndicate cans smuggled in border area with the presence of many enforcement agencies? Thus, the governments need to give serious attention on border issues involving weapons by increasing the security at the hotspot area.



Figure 2: The discovery of weapon in border area Illicit Drugs

One of the alarming threats in border region is the illicit drugs which originated from the well known drug manufacture located at the boundary area of Thailand and Burma (Golden Triangle). The geographical factors itself provides many smuggling routes across Malaysian border. Malaysia's geography which have wide border of land and sea make it as a good transit, before the drugs will be smuggled into other countries. In 1983, Malaysia declared that illicit drugs dealing as the number one threat to Malaysia' security. Drugs issues absolutely had caused serious problems to national security. Drug addiction among the citizen of course can decrease the human resource development and reduce the good service needed. Then, government needs to spend large amount of money to rehabilitate and cure the drug users. It also included the cost of government agencies who worked at rehabilitation centre. Besides, it also contributes to health issues (HIV/AIDS) which can become pandemic if not treated with proper measure.



Figure 3: The Flow of Drug Trafficking

Illegal immigrants

Then, another non-traditional security issues that related with border region is the illegal immigrants. The long and porous border is contributed to the influx of the illegal immigrant. The prosperity and labour forces to support become the attraction for the immigrants to come to Malaysia even with the illegal route. The illegal immigrants become one of the problematic issues and can caused the instability in political, economy and social and will eventually pose to national security.

Illegal immigrant can caused the inbalance in Malaysia's Demographics besides contributed to the increases of crime cases. Some of them come with certain health issues and integrated with local peoples. If the diseases are easy to spread it will resulted new epidemic around the country and costed government to take action. The situation taken by government to fight Covid-19 is a good example for the health issues where it involved a great amount of finance and human resource from medical sector.



Figure 4: the mass grave in Wang Kelian, Perlis

The latest issues that shocked the whole nation were the revealed of the mass graves of illegal immigrant in Wang Kelian, Perlis. It is located not far from the Malaysia-Thailand border. From the discovered, there were about 150 graves of illegal immigrant belief being smugled by human trafficking syndicate. It also leads to the discovered of the camp where the illegall immigrant stay as a transit. This incident is quite exclusive as the truth never revealed besides any further arrest was made. The question is how the human trafficking syndicate is operated as they could not be traced for a long time? Then, are the syndicate connected with someone in security force? Whatever the answer we have, the only truth is our border still not secure enough and become the route for international crime like human trafficking.

Meeting the Need and Relevancy

Geographical Factor

Most of the Non-Traditional Issues as mentioned has always been disscused by high tier leader. However, the issues seem not showing any positive sign from the annual statistic be it illegal immigrant, illicit drugs or smuggling. Are we satisfied of the nation's border security? It is enough to meet the future challenge and threat that getting complex and complicated. What actually the nation's need to keep the border security relevance to prevent security issues in the border region?

Geographical factors of the Malaysia and Thailand Border are porous to threats and make the enforcement agencies facing difficulties to cover all the illegal activities. The enforcement agency on the ground has their schedule to operate any time and anywhere. The worst part comes when they also know the timing patrol done by the enforcement agencies. The example of how govenrment can reduce the problems are using the same action in Perak and Kedah State or specifically build up the fence along the border like Op Pagar II in Kedah and Op III in Perak. The issues will come around about the finance that government need to expense as the border region is very long to cover and the maintenance also need to be included. Thus, it needs to be done by make a thorough research which area are the hotspot and need the facilities. The area of Op Pagar II and Op Pagar III once was hotspot area with many smuggling activities there. The fences that build along the area reduce the smuggling activities from year to year.

Demographical Factor

Apart of the geographical factors, the demographical factors also become a problem in the border region. It is quite difficult to differentiate local people or illegal immigrant as most citizens in South Thailand are also Malay and Muslim. This is due to the history when Malay Empire was dominated almost all area in South East Asia. Then, the collapsed of the Malay Empire had caused the existence of many separated countries included the Southern Thailand. They claim to be independence and only pay a tribute to Siamese Empire but finally separated by modern border as stated in Anglo Siamese Treaty of 1909 with British.

The demography factor also contributed to the illegal cross border movement between the local communities. There are two ways to cross the border which is through the legal cross point and another one is using the illegal cross point. The legal cross point is the route passing through ICQS and will be inspected by several enforcement agencies. Local communities not prefer using legal cross point due to bureaucracy and most likely using the illegal cross point. Government had responded to the problem by deployed the Armed Forces with the objective to help other enforcement agencies 'close the gap' through operation such as Op Merpati and Op Wawasan in Kelantan.

Improvise the Authority to the Armed Forces

Since Communist Era untill nowadays, Malaysian Army had taking the responsibilities to serve as frontliners at border region between Malaysia and Thailand. Yet, the enemy and mission had changed from before makes the military personnel to be more flexible for a new mission. The focus is more on new threat and challenge aside from army of other nationsuch as illegal immigrant, smuggling activities and terrorist. However, the task given is not come along with the authority and law power to arrest, search and seizure. The only legal power to conduct operations is derived from the Internal Security Act 1960. The common legal power used by military personnel is the Section 64, Section 65 and Section 73.

Thus, government needs to revise the legal power for Armed Forces in order to prevent any legal issues in the future. The sufficient legal power also gives the confidence for the military personnel to enforce rules and regulations at the Area of Operation (AO). Besides, there will be no issues of misuse of the power as the Armed Forced will only exercise the power in limited time and place. The troop or battalion deployed to the operation for a period of time and will be hand over the operation with another troop.

Besides that, the Armed Forces need to be equipped with the equipment of latest technology so the enforcement will be more efficient. The suggested item and equipment are drone and aerial surveillance, night vision google, scrambler motorcycles and communication device that suitable with the border area.

Coordination and Cooperation between Enforcement Agencies

The establishment of Border Regiment on 29 January 2008 shows on the seriousness of Malaysia Government to enhance border security. Border Regiment beginned with the establishment of 30th Border Brigade based on Perlis and the units are situated along the Malaysia-Thailand Border from Perlis, Kedah, Perak and Kelantan. The task and role are similar with other infantry unit as "to defend Malaysia sovereignty from any threat". In addition, it also strengthens the defend in border area and become a deterrent for the enemy in border region.

Other than that, on 2 November 2015 government had taken further action by upgrading one of the main agencies at border, the

Anti-Smuggling Unit (UPP) to Border Control Agency or also known as Agensi Kawalan Sempadan Malaysia (AKSEM). The main objective is to control the border management from threat rather than to protect the security of the border. Thus, the establishment of AKSEM is relevance to manage various agencies at border area such as Royal Malaysian Police, Malaysian Department of Immigration, Royal Malaysian Customs, National Anti-Drug Agency and Malaysia Civil Defense to avoid any internal problem between agencies and improve the effectiveness in managing the border security.

The establishment of the Border Regiment and Border Control Agency proved that border security is relevant. However, the agencies should know their own task and role so there will not be overlap task between each agency and can caused internal conflicts. Thus, government may improve the border management by unite the agencies under a command or joint cooperation in any operation. Besides that, the border security also can be improved by sharing intelligence information between each agency including the International Police Force (Interpol).

Ser	Agencies	Task
(a)	(b)	(C)
1.	Royal Malaysia Police	Law Enforcement & Intelligence
2.	The Immigration Department	Employment Pass
3.	The Military	Assist the Police in Law Enforcement
4.	The National Security Divisions in Prime Minister's Department	Coordinating Agency
5.	National Vigilante Group	Assist the Police in Law Enforcement
6.	Malaysia Prison Department	Prison and Detention

Table 1: The Enforcement Agencies at Border Region

Security and Development (KESBAN) In Border Region

In terms of social and economy, most of the area and town in border region are undeveloped. Thus, it is suggested to implemented KESBAN concept which will give priority to security and development aspect. By improving the security in the boundary area, it will reduce crimes and any border issues such as smuggling, illicit drugs or illegal immigrant. However, government needs to give attention on selecting and recruiting personnel. Only personnel with good personality and high integrity should recommend working at border so they could not be bought by money. Enforcement agencies also can take example of the implementation by Armed Forces doing rotation for operation in border region. This will prevent personnel to stay too long and reduce the risk to involve in bribery. Besides that, government also can consider the idea of giving extra allowance and incentives for the enforcement agencies in border region. It will increase the morale and encourage them to do the best in their task.

Then, development also must be a priority to border area by coordinate and arrange the residence of local communities especially in Rantau Panjang, Kelantan. Some of the residence are situated besides Sg Golok and become the transit for smuggling activities. The enforcement agencies such as Armed Forces do not have legal power to raid the residence and seize the items. Besides that, the seller work in the border area should be inspected as there are many Thailand peoples also open up their bussiness in the area. This will reduce the job opportunities among local peoples and also increase the competition between local traders and Thailand traders. Thus, government can revise the rules of giving some quota for Thailand traders or build up special bussiness space for local traders.

The implementation of KESBAN will help improving the social and economy in border region. Some action need to be taken to secure the border area before the threat becomes serious and out of control. Slow progress is better than no progress at all.

Cooperation between Malaysia and Thailand

The cooperation between Malaysia and Thailand is essential to secure the border safety. The bilateral relation from defence aspect had intertwined since Communist era. In the final struggle by Malayan Communist Party, they had withdrawn to Southern Thailand and give problems to Malaysia security force to carry out the operation in eliminate the communist. Later on, a series of agreement about Border Operation were agreed between both countries such as Border Operation Agreement in 1959 and General Border Agreement (GBA) in 1965 that formed General Border Commitee in 1977.

Then, the joint operation of the security forces by both countries also established such as Op Cahaya Bena at Betong, Thailand from 4 July 1977 untill 16 August 1977, Op Selamat Sawadee at Betong, Thailand and Banding, Malaysia from 24 April 1978 untill 5 July 1980 Op Thamal in Sadao, Air Jernih and Hutan Simpan Koh Mai from December 1980 untill 21 January 1981. The

joint operation was carried out untill the surrender of Malayan Communist Party in 1989. However, both countries realise the importance of the cooperation in defence aspect as a neighbourhood countries. So, Joint Operation were changed to joint exercise for Malaysia and Thailand Army and still ongoing nowadays. The exercise known as Land Ex Thamal which held annually, Sea Ex Thamal held every two year and Air Thamal held every three year. The continuity defence relationship between Malaysia and Thailand shows both side agree the need of harmony relationship to keep the border secure.



Figure 5: Joint Exercise between Malaysia and Thailand Army

CONCLUSION

Malaysia and Thailand shared the boundary and need to cooperate and support each other to ensure the security of the border. From the history, Malaysia and Thailand had joint together in dealing with communist ideology and finally established form a strong bond in defence sector. Bilateral cooperation had helped both nations in combating common enemy effectively. The important thing is both nation need to assess the threat that shift from traditional issues in military form into non-traditional security issues that are variables and very complex. The threat can give an impact to the social, economy and political directly and may shake the national security.

The possible approach need to be taken to reduce and eliminate the threat in all means. The implementation of KESBAN concept will absolutely improve security, social and economy in the border region. It can kill two birds with one stone which is developing the town and ensure the border security is safe. The discussion and suggestion should be considered if the government wants to tackle the issues seriously. Some of the ideas involve the large amount of financial but in terms of security nothing went wasted. Government must place security as first priority to develop a good economy, political and social of this nation.

Therefore, in order to secure the border and face with the new challenge and threat, cooperation and coordination is the key to create a strong layer of defence. The border legal crossing must be strengthening at every point. The enforcement agencies such as Royal Malaysia Police, Border Control Agency or Agensi Kawalan Sempadan Malaysia (AKSEM), The Custom Unit, The Immigration Department, The National Security Divisions in Prime Minister's Department, National Vigilante Group, and Malaysia Prison Department must know their own task and cooperate with each other to ensure the security of the border in order to prevent any threat either traditional security threat or non-traditional security threat. While, Malaysian Armed Forces generally and Malaysian Army specifically need to know the task and role as the main security element for the nation. The combination of effort from government, security forces and local communities will formulate a quality strategy and resulted a positive outcome.

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THE ROLE OF TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN THE ARMY - KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AS A LEADING FACTOR IN LEADERSHIP

By COL AHMAD SUHAIMI NAVINDER BIN ABDULLAH ROYAL RANGER REGIMENT

INTRODUCTION

Transformational leadership theory is one of the most widely used theories in most organizations today. This transformational leadership has successfully managed the goals of a given organization and transformed the organization by providing clear guidance to guide the organization in that direction. Communication mediums and problem-solving methods for each leader differ for each organization depending on the behavior of the organization (Connell, Cross, & Parry, 2002).

According to the study of Leban and Zulauf (2004) transformational leadership style is positively related to the performance of a team or organization. This style of leadership requires a high degree of effort as well as strong leadership ability. Every leader who is inclined to transform leadership style has a high degree of self-motivation and thus leads to positive change in the organization. A study conducted by Victor. J (2008) found that the success rate of transformational leadership also depends on the effectiveness of an organization becoming a holistic learning organization. This medium of change helps each other to achieve the goals of change set by leaders.

In achieving the goal of becoming a learning organization, this style of leadership is very effective for other organizations that is committed in inovating innovations as well as for organizations that are either technologically advanced or professional. This was supported by J Alberto, Victor J, & Eulogio, (2007). The Malaysian Army has consistently developed the doctrine of leadership. Based on the Army's leadership development concept manual (2005) Army leaders must have professional, competent and expert characteristics in warfare. This is in line with the scientific and institutional needs of the Army in the pursuit of a holistic learning organization.

Revolution of Army Leadership compared to Transformational Leadership

The Army has given serious attention to leadership factors in the success of an operation. Various training centers have been developed not only to enhance the knowledge of their personnels whereelse the capabilities of a leader is honed in each course attended by every arm forces personnel from the subordinate to the officer level.In the Army leadership doctrine there are several leadership traits that are explained and one of it is transformational leadership. In addition, the style of leadership used such as democratic, autocratic and other theories is also explained according to global understanding. It is clear that this transformation leadership theory has been adopted in the Malaysian Army since 2005 and this approach has been taken more seriously in the Army in recent times. Transformational leadership is essential in military organizations because the transformational leadership style inspires followers. This is stated in a study by Di Schiena, Letens, Van Aken, & Farris, (2013) who found that battalion leaders with experience serving overseas missions have five qualities needed in the learning organization namely thinking, learning systems as a team, vision sharing, mental model representation and individual competence.

The changing world of military leadership as a result of global threats has made the concept of Command, Lead and Manage in the Army's leadership doctrine today. These three key elements are taken into account for the modern leadership style of the Army under the threat of manoeuvrist approach and asymmetric warfare. Resource management is also a key element in this modern leadership element. Command refers to the use of force given to a military leader to direct his subordinates while Lead refers to the skills required by a leader to influence his subordinates to perform their duties. The last element is to manage where the process of designing, coordinating, directing and controlling is practiced. The effectiveness of military organizations using transformational leadership styles has been widely acknowledged by academics and the military world. Writing on the appropriateness of military leadership using transformational leadership style, in an article by Hamad (2017) he stated that the working environment of the military requires a transformational leadership style to ensure more efficient execution of tasks and maximize the use of financial allocation to military organizations. The work environment in the military requires transformational and charismatic leadership qualities. Subordinate followers need high motivation to improve performance and work performance.

Therefore, transformational leadership styles in line with charismatic leadership styles are essential in military organizations.




Figure 1: Development of Army Leadership Theory

Relationships between Transformational Leadership and Learning Organization

The concept of organizational learning has been widely used in the industrial and corporate world. This concept makes an organization highly competitive compared to competitors who do not have the ability to learn organization. Organization learning makes science the cornerstone of the process of organizational development regardless of the field. Therefore, any organization that has the intention of becoming a learning organization should have systematic knowledge management. In addition, in order to transform an organization into a learning organization, transformational leadership is required to achieve that goal. Various studies have been conducted by academics to explain transformational leadership relationships in order to turn an organization into a learning organization such as a scientific study conducted by Imran, Ilyas, & Aslam, (2016).




Figure 2: Charismatic Leadership Relationships and Learning Organization

According to a study by Mutahar, Rasli, & Al-ghazali, (2015) the concept of organizational learning refers to the ability or competence of an organization to maintain and improve performance based on experience. New knowledge will be stored and shared within the organization and subsequently used by other members of the same organization. This knowledge will continue to grow and be enhanced over time to become a competitive value to the continuous learning organization. This process will enable organizations to stay focused on current performance. In order to introduce new ideas and knowledge, leaders as effective agents in the organization must have the quality of transformational leadership to influence subordinates to embrace the current flow of change while providing continuous guidance as effective motivation throughout.

In military organizations, knowledge sharing is crucial to the success of an organization. This knowledge is not only used in operations but is also used in logistics training and management. Implementation for all members of the military to work on knowledge and to share it with other members is the leader's responsibility to promote holistic learning processes at the subordinate or middle management level. As transformational agents play a very important role, leaders must first master knowledge to ensure that subordinates are highly motivated to embrace new ideas and to develop new knowledge consistently to develop knowledge.

There are four main dimensions of knowledge acquisition, knowledge sharing, knowledge implementation and knowledge

storage that contribute to organizational learning. This study was conducted in an organization in Jordan conducted by Ahmad & Abazeed. (2018) found that there is а positive effect of transformational leadership style and also the formation of organizational learning which is an example of the involvement of leaders in solving problems and involving subordinates in the decision-making process. studv has collective This helped organizations grow faster in their learning organization. In this study, several factors that influence the learning process in the organization to grow consistently and gain positive acceptance among subordinates is the role of transformational leadership.




Figure 3: Four Elements in Transformational Leadership

A study was conducted in Malaysia to study the relationship of transformational leadership and organizational learning. This study was conducted by Teng & Hassan, (2015) and they found that in all previous studies the essential elements of organizational learning were true and knowledge management was important in establishing organizational learning. The study also found that the role of individuals in making an organization a learning organization is more important than the role of leaders in the organization. In addition, they also found that organizational learning indirectly has a competitive advantage and is more competitive. This study indirectly reinforces that the role of transformational leadership by leaders in an organization is crucial to making an organization more competitive and forward-looking. Therefore, the most practical leadership style is the current transformational leadership style. Transformational leadership style is also very effective for military organizations.




Figure 4: Transformational Leadership Concepts and Organization Learning Concepts

Transformational Leadership Challenges Create Changes in Organization Learning

An organization that aspires to competitiveness will always face challenges. The challenge of changing in and out of the comfort zone is normal from the scope of the individual to the larger. The challenge will be more complex especially for large organizations with a long established work culture. This stream of change will always come and go as the current technology developments evolve. A study by Smith, (2015) found that transformational leadership is the best leadership style to be an effective change agent. In addition, the quality of leaders is required to guide an organization towards organizational learning which should be met with a clear vision and mission. This transformational leadership style also provides the satisfaction of working even in the early stages of resistance from several parties within the organization.

It is clear that changes made by any organization will face challenges. The challenge for transformational leadership also lies in military organization. A study was conducted by the US Army on the challenge faced by organizations in implementing transformational leadership styles among their soldiers. This study can be served as a guide for the Malaysian Armed Forces. This study by Gordon & Combs, (2007) states that the needs of transformational leadership are related to the solution of current problems as stated by Albert Einstein, that the problems faced today cannot be solved by bad thinking. Every problem you have to deal with is by thinking outside of the box. In the context of this study, there are four main challenges to transformational leadership namely the mentality, culture, system and weaknesses of the leader himself. In this study, the US Army also wants to change the old leadership style to the new and effective one. Transformational leadership is more inclined to embrace the changes and current technology trends.

On the other hand, the challenges faced by the Malaysian Army are generally the same as the case studies of the US Army as above. The mentality among the military members who is not so fond of reading and learning something new is an unprofessional mentality both for themselves and for the organization. The systems and doctrines used needs to be modified to be more transparent and systematic. The culture of Malaysian society itself that is not so fond of reading and seeking knowledge should change. Scientific studies have yet to be proven, but initial awareness of these weaknesses is being overcome by stages with some provisions for members and officers to receivie a stream of changes in order to make the Army a holistic learning organization.

A study conducted by Yadav, (2017) found that leaders who practice this transformational leadership will face great challenges, both internally and externally. In the early stages of an organization looking to implement transformation, it is inevitable that the organization will face failure which is normal. Therefore, leaders must be prepared to face such failure. Leaders also need to not only have the vision and mission to change things, but also be aware and have patient to act in a timely manner. Each change will take a long time and as a leader this must be handled well before an organization can accept the change that the leader wants to bring. Another challenge that any organization will face is globalization. This challenge is unavoidable and must be carefully managed in order for the changes to take effect. (Wadhwa, Society, & Parimoo, 2017) states that globalization is an out-of-control factor but that globalization can still be expected and overcome with some initial steps by leaders. Highability leadership is the quality that results from the quality of the leader's self rather than the appointment and empowerment. The quality of a leader will directly change an organization to accept the changes brought about by its vision and mission. This argument was also supported by Lin Chin Lin, (2004) in an earlier study in Taiwan.

Research on transformational leadership in an attempt to transform this organization was also conducted by Li (2019). This

study was conducted on 281 multinational companies in China and he found that transformational leadership and work engagement have a positive effect on innovative processes. This study is the latest study on transformational leadership and this study supports previous studies that trust between workers and employees is an important element of an organization seeking to change the old work culture into a new one. This study is conducted on a large number of multinational companies and is widely applicable as it involves companies that have a diverse workforce.

CONCLUSION

Basically, the role of the leader functions as the basis for turning an organization into a learning organization. A leader's ability to respond with their quality of leadership aided by a well-organized system of knowledge management can facilitate the process of a learning organization. The strong support of all levels within an organization is crucial to create a competitive new work environment. In terms of constraints with challenges, alternatives with solutions need to be addressed according to current circumstances and needs. In order to achieve greater goals, leadership needs to be more flexible and of higher intellectual value.

The knowledge management system which is available in the Army is quite conducive and complete. Many of the doctrines and guidelines introduced in softcopy are accessible through the use of fingerprint technology today. In addition, the highest leadership itself has created a way of sharing information that not only disseminates information and knowledge but also motivates an organization as a whole. Various allocations have been provided to members of all levels to enhance their knowledge so that the quality of officers and members of the Malaysian Army is comparable to that of regional countries. In addition, awareness needs to be instilled in the military to encourage them to accept this change in learning organization. Forced changes will not benefit the organization and will only have short-term effects.

Transformational leadership does not mean coercive leadership. If transformational leadership uses a coercive way to change an organization, then it is using the autocratic, old-fashioned way that is not relevant today. This transformational leadership uses the capabilities of a leader to have the help of a good knowledge management system. If this transformational leadership fails to change an organization in the direction it sets, there are two elements to a leader or system that is not functioning properly. However, as discussed earlier, failure in the early stages of change is normal as it requires careful and prudent management.

SYNOPSIS

Knowledge management systems used by large organizations provide high financial resources for developing computer systems. Computer simplicity needs to be developed holistically for all Army troops. In addition, free internet should be provided to the teams. These facilities will be able to encourage widespread sharing of information and knowledge development among military personnel. However, these facilities must be in control so that they are not abused by certain parties. Information and education such as short courses should be done to educate members about sharing this information. Every member should be encouraged to use this facility in their daily tasks. Moreover; a complete website with high security systems should be developed to facilitate administrative tasks. The use of the latest technology is not only necessary for day-to-day operations and tasks, but the use of technology must be practiced during training. The use of advanced gadgets and technology tools in training will have an indirect effect on military training. This knowledge is then recorded to be used in the future by the military which will be easily accessible to all members. This requires a relatively long period of time to develop other than a large budget allocation. Some small units can be experimented to use this systematic knowledge system. Any initial weaknesses can be overcome before large allocations are made for the overall renovation to take place.Leaders as agents of change must play a major role in this agenda. As noted in several studies conducted by academics and military, the Malaysian Army needs to re-examine its weaknesses based on environmental conditions and internal issues before embarking on this effort. Organization learning is a concept that needs to be implemented within the Army to ensure that its military capabilities are comparable to those of the current regional military which have moved far ahead. Today's global threat is assymmetric as coming from a non state actor where the threat can be overcome by up-to-date knowledge and accurate and timely delivery of information.

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TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY

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INTRODUCTION

Within the study of international relations, technology has always been a theme in the examination of security. For all the role of science, mathematics, and new inventions in earlier wars, no war had as profound an effect on the technologies as World War II, and no war was as profoundly affected by science, math, and technology than World War II. Numerous new inventions and scientific principles emerged during the war.During the Cold War, technology was a vital component of thinking about the threat of war. The development of nuclear weaponry and missile technology were translated into fears of missile gaps and into strategic thought contained within the concepts of nuclear rollback, mutually assured destruction, escalation dominance, arms control, and strategic defence.

The demise of Cold War witnessed the end of the major rivalry between the US and Russia (formerly Soviet) and these also included their partners and allies. The repercussion was detrimental for the former Soviet Union which ultimately disintegrated and many states broke away to establish nation state of their own. In addition to that the world also evolved from industrialized era towards the advent of technology and information era. The military all over the world had to deal with the revolution in military affairs with the inception of digitization making up the new inventory and future systems. Computers and internet were the catalyst of the information era that change the geo-strategic environment as new players emerged and technology had affected many countries both advantage and disadvantage.

In line with that development of the military hardware, majority are taking cognizance of the new perceived threat in order to mitigate effectively. The global geo strategic and security environment has become volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) making the military hierarchy to analyze and ponder avenues plus strategies to respond to these emerging vulnerabilities. The major role players like the US and European countries having experienced the setbacks from this new threat had embarked on state of art technology systems to facilitate this new challenge.

In the past decade, the swift and remarkable developments and innovations in technology, the pervasiveness of the internet and education and knowledge dissemination through online learning have outpaced most projections. As the world and its people shifts away from the archaic processes and structures that shaped our bygone, the drivers of transformation change could be from but not limited to areas such as quantum supercomputing, genomics, nanotechnology, space technology, chaos theories, etc. The countless changes in the fields of technology, innovation and science alter the future environment of international relations.

The importance of modern technology in security and world affairs has never been as convincingly demonstrated as in the military operation in Iraq of March–May 2003. The overwhelming technomilitary dominance of the US-led coalition was vividly displayed on millions of television screens across the world, albeit against an enemy without even remotely comparable military capacity. The successful application of high-technology weapons and techniques was a demonstration of how, since the end of the cold war, the sole superpower has been sharpening its superior conventional military technological strength while much of the world was wishfully looking for a peace dividend. It was with the latest in technology that the USled coalition was able to wage a high-precision war on a distant land to achieve its initial political aims with ease.

The aim of this paper is to provide an overview on the relations between technology and security and its impact towards international relations.

Conceptual Theory

Technology and security in international relations are one of the most important tools for any nation. These two elements complement each other where technology will determine a country's security architecture. Technology is fast becoming the most critical tool in promoting national security, specifically with its involvement in the development of weapons, gathering of intelligence information and ways of engagement with other nations. It has changed the scale and the efficiency of how the nations encompass in international engagements. The development of technological advances in nations can propel them higher up the pecking orders in international relations.

All countries in the world have the tendency to leverage from the advancement of technologies by protecting their national sovereignty. Highly advanced countries such as the US and China have the tendency to project their power with the use of latest state of art equipment. Today the advancement in technologies has made many countries struggling to keep pace Vis à-vis other developed nations and this in turn makes some of them to be rebellious and becomes a threat to global security.

Analysis on the Effects of Technology in International Relations

As technological innovation exponentially increases, states need to keep abreast by being at the forefront. Technology has brought tremendous changes in the security architecture that shapes the international affairs. One of the remarkable quotes by Hilary Clinton (former US Secretary of State) on technology and international relations is "Just as the internet has changed virtually every aspect of how people worldwide live, learn, consume and communicate, connection technologies are changing the strategic context for diplomacy in the 21st century." The effects technologies in international affairs are many and some of the notable ones are as the followings:

Changing the Architecture of the International System

Technological advances have also changed the critical aspects of the construction of how the international system works. It was being defined as the structure of the system itself and the relationships among the actors within the system. Technology has changed the way power is being distributed among the major nations in the world. The Soviet, which was once an undisputed super power, declined rapidly with the challenges from other nations as it fails to manage and cope with the technological advances. This shows that technology has the influence to change the overall structure of the international relationships system, which is now tilting more towards American supremacy. Within a regional aspect, the same can be said about Asia, where Japan was one the strongest nation within the region in the 90's, in terms of their economy, technology and civilisation. But with the development of technology in China and India, the power was more evenly

distributed now, resulting in a more balanced economic and political situation in Asia. With China and India, the focus was no longer solely prioritizing in developing new technologies or creations, but rather implementing the technologies developed by others in a much better way than the originator. This was their main strategy to catch up with the other big nations, especially with their limitations in terms of budgeting and technological support from the rest of the world. The continuous improvement in technology, especially within the information and communication aspects, has created new ways of breaching into previously impenetrable nations. These technological advances have made it very difficult for the nations to monitor non-traditional security threats and challenges including terrorism and extremism, transnational organised crime like drug trafficking, human smuggling and human trafficking, infectious disease, climate change and natural disasters. The way technology is being used has also increased the influence among the non-state actors within the international relationships. They have gained the initiatives to collect, analyse and use the information available among themselves and manage their actions better than ever before. For example, terrorist acts are now closely related to technologies available in the open market where they use the media and the internet to exchange information and coordinate their attacks. These are the area where it is becoming increasingly difficult for the government or local authorities to monitor and control, thus becoming a massive loophole in their attempt to thwart terrorism.

Changing of the Operational Progressions

Technology has developed many changes in the way of the progressions related to international is being handled. These progressions are predominantly divided into two, which are processes by the government sectors and by the private sectors. Within the government sectors, it includes diplomacy, policy formation, foreign relations, crisis management and information gathering. These technological developments heavily affect both parties in every progression in an international relationship. For example, in warfare, the importance of technology applies to both the attacker and the defender and between the reconnaissance units and the clandestine holders. While in public situation, the advances in technology will be crucial to both the buyer and seller in some commercial deals, between government and the citizens and also between small states and the major powers.

Information Gathering and Exchange

Within the international relationships system, technology has changed the way people around the globe making perceptions on ideas and also the relay of information. This is further supported by the advancement of mass media which is giving the people more input on issues, interests and also the general happening international the within know-what of the relationships. Apart from that, there are also technological advancement that are providing very critical information that are related to essential situation which then in turn, affected the overall international relationships between nations. For example, remote sensing capabilities of the United States have provided crucial information regarding missile-related activities in Cuban territories, which led to the crisis in 1962.

Produce Rivalry Effects among Nations

Science and technology have also influenced the elements that are mainly involved in international relationships. Although the effects are not entirely dependent on technologies alone, it further diversifies the issues that are related to international relations, creating new constraints, creating penetrating opportunities for foreign elements and also modifies the scope of relationships among nations. US has reassured their commitment towards defence and security together with Japan and Koreain particularly enhancing their geopolitical position in the Pacific. One of the main agenda was the proposal on the placement of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in order to protect Japan and Korea from overgrowing missile threat from North Korea. The idea of the missile defence system was well received by both the Korean and Japan leaders. THAAD is considered the state of art technology to date as the missile system is capable of intercepting and destroying incoming missile precisely. China however is not convinced with the placement of the system and they have raised concern on deployment of THAAD in South Korea will subsequently provide surveillance on its mainland. THAAD has the capability to destroy incoming missiles using 'hard-kill' measures and the X-Band RADAR that comes together with the system has the capability to conduct deep surveillance (up

to 2000km) into China. If it can intercept incoming missiles from North Korea, of course it can do the same thing with the Chinese missiles and it would act as a shield against Chinese missiles where it can encircle China. The latest action by the US indicates that they are trying to balance power with China in the Pacific and this perhaps could trigger China to increase its nuclear warhead missiles arsenal.

The Control of Technology

The relevance of technology to security is manifold and the role of 'technology controls' as an important tool for national security strategies is significant. The control of technology is exercised through either 'arms control' agreements or 'export control' regimes. The arms control initiatives of recent decades have proved fairly successful in reducing the proliferation of potentially dangerous technologies and weapons. However, the export control regimes have not prevented the creation of additional imbalances and may have accentuated certain regional conflicts, thereby adding to the causes of proliferation. The impact of some of the new technologies on international security and stability will be even more pronounced in the future. Changing perceptions of national security and the new dimensions of global technology diffusion will demand a fresh approach to arms control in general and export controls in particular. The four broad objectives of arms control are: (a) to manage the techno-economic balance; (b) to reduce the possibility of war; (c) to reduce the consequences of war, if it happens; and (d) to optimize resources for defence so that economic development does not suffer unduly.

New Technologies and New Concerns

Another major new technological trend will be the increasing use of outer space for defence and security. In the past, most of the new and exotic technology developments in this field were oriented towards providing protection from ballistic missiles. Twenty years later, many of those fiction-like technologies are close to realization and the impact of these technologies on future security strategies is likely to be profound and long-lasting. Space is already being used for military purposes, mostly for surveillance and communication technology support, and these activities have had a significant impact on defence and security perceptions. The expected introduction of directed energy weapons (DEW) and possible increase in the military exploitation of satellite systems for combat purposes will revolutionize the future trial of strength between powerful nations. The latest trends in technology development for military purposes also indicate a move towards miniaturization, improved efficiency and greater fungibility. As weapons become smaller and more efficient, deployment strategies and operational scenarios become more flexible, making a larger variety of options available to the user. The shrinking size and weight of strategic warheads are a classic example of how technology has made the attacker's job easier and the defender's job more difficult-creating more demand for newer technology options to meet the new level of threat. The worldwide spread of terrorism and religious fundamentalism has added a serious twist to security and vulnerability in modern society. These extremist elements act as criminals with no accountability to any national or international norms. As explained above, some states have misguidedly aided them with funds, arms, training and so on, but advances in technology have also contributed to the efficiency of these terrorists and their sponsors. Another twist of technology is that some states, considering themselves protected by the deterrent effects of WMD, may feel emboldened to clandestinely support terrorism across borders to settle regional conflicts. It is these alarming trends and the potential for misuse of technology that must draw the immediate attention of the international arms control community, before they lead to new trends in asymmetric lowintensity warfare that could upset international security in unpredictable ways.

* The Changing World Order

Perceptions of threats to the national security of a sovereign nation are made up of a complex set of parameters. While border security is crucial for all sovereign nations, perceived threats from neighbours can vary enormously depending on the balance of power between nations, which is largely based techno-economic balances. The weapon system on capabilities and the techno-military strengths of adversaries are the prime factors that influence threat perceptions. However, external factors, such as the political and security environment in the region and relations between neighbours, as well as internal parameters, such as economic stability, the quality of governance and self-reliance in critical technologies, are also important factors influencing security perceptions. Technology has made possible reductions in the size and weight of weapons and increases in their efficiency, range and accuracy. Future nuclear weapons may not even have to depend on ballistic missiles, although at present these may still pose the most threatening delivery system.

Strength and Weaknesses of Technology in International Relations

The development of technology has greatly influenced the international relations, especially in the way the nations are now using it to gain better understanding on the security landscape that they are in and also the events involving others within their region. Previously, most of the nations are in silos where theyare unable to know what are the happenings in their neighboring countries, thus limiting the actions that can be taken, that will either pose a positive or negative effect on the neighbor and also their own selves.

However, with the latest technologies, surveillance can be achieved in timely manner with high rate of accuracy. The ability to gain deep insight and knowledge on the occurring around them has significantly improved their chances of making the right decisions for their own benefits. This has reduced the possibility of taking the wrong steps, especially in making verdicts that will be resulting in a major consequence towards them and also the overall stability of the region.

Within the international relationships being fostered between nations, it is not strange to see them being involved in many actions together, whether economically, politically or defense-related activities. Therefore, the advancement of technology in recent years have really step up the capability to facilitate better coordination in their cooperation in these activities, thus resulting in a better and higher-yielding end states for all parties involved.

Although the benefits of technology can hardly be disputed, there is definitely the downside of it when it comes to its usage. Certain countries are well-known in their attempt to strictly control and limit their citizens of the information available through technology, claiming that the move is solely to maintain the secrecy of the nation and also further preserving their sovereignty against others. This oppression against the human rights has seen greater tension in the international relation between those involved and also the overall regional stability.

Missile test by North Korea and Iran has raised concern among the international community especially the US. While Iran is selfproclaiming that the tests is only for defensive purposes and they only used non-nuclear war-head, the US is not convinced with the statement and has imposed new sanctions to Tehran. The UN Security Council Resolution 2231 is found to be loose where it requires Iran to avoid nuclear based ballistic missiles activities without prohibiting them. From the missile tests, Iran also could use the findings to further develop long-range précised missile or ICBM that can be employed beyond in its country. Till now no one knows what Iran's real intention behind this missile tests is. There are rumours spreading that North Korea and Russia believed to be linked with Iran's missile program. If UN Security Council does not take any quick action on the tests, it is feared that Iran will be another North Korea in the near future.

CONCLUSION

In the modern world of today, technology is fast becoming the most critical tool in promoting national security, specifically with its involvement in the development of weapons, gathering of intelligence information and ways of engagement with other nations. It has changed the scale and the efficiency of how the nations encompass in international engagements. The development of technological advances in nations can propel them higher up the pecking orders in international relations.

In summary, technology has caused a new paradigm shift in the international relations. It plays a pivotal role in shaping international politics where it enables countries to enhance its security with the leverage of the latest state of art in order to safeguard their national interest, sovereignty and up lift the wellbeing of the people. Besides that, technology also is a key determining factor for confidence building and fostering of better ties between state to state relations and people to people relations.

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THE RISE OF POWER (US-CHINA) IN SOUTH EAST ASIA REGION

By COL ZAMRI BIN MAT ESA ROYAL ARTILLERY REGIMENT

INTRODUCTION

"It was the **rise** of Athens and the **fear** that this instilled in Sparta that made war **inevitable**." – Thucydides.

The words of Thucydides above are an ancient phrase that remains relevant till today. The world has witnessed the unending approach of violence in disputes involving great powers, and this has made other nations in it to be affected badly. Beginning with Cold War when the German Nazi surrendered in May 1945, and saw the wartime alliance between the United States and Great Britain on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other began to show signs of animosity. By 1948 the Soviets had installed left-wing governments in the countries of Eastern Europe that had been liberated by the Red Army. The Americans and the British feared the permanent Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and the threat of Soviet-influenced communist parties coming to power in the democracies of Western Europe. The Soviets, on the other hand, were determined to maintain control of Eastern Europe in order to safeguard against any possible renewed threat from Germany, and they were intent on spreading communism worldwide, largely for ideological reasons. According to Blank (2000), the Cold War had solidified by 1947-48, when U.S. aid provided under the Marshall Plan to western Europe had brought those countries under American influence and the Soviets had installed openly communist regimes in eastern Europe. (Blank, 2000) During World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union fought together as allies against the Axis powers. However, the relationship between the two nations was a tense one. Americans had long been Soviet communism and concerned about Russian wary of leader Joseph Stalin's tyrannical rule of his own country. For their part, the Soviets resented the Americans' decades-long refusal to treat the USSR as a legitimate part of the international community as well as their delayed entry into World War II, which resulted in the deaths of tens of millions of Russians (J.S. Nye and Welch 2013).

After the war ended, these grievances ripened into an overwhelming sense of mutual distrust and enmity.

Pivot to Asia Policy

The increase in the involvement of the United States (U.S.) in Asia especially in ASEAN countries has been a topic of concern after the Cold War. It is assumed that this can be due to the territorial and jurisdictional disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) that continuously affect the relationships between China and other countries in Southeast Asia (SEA). This also has a risk of hostile actions and has escalated into military clash off late. The U.S. has sought to uphold freedom of navigation and support other nations in SEA that have been affected by China's growing assertive territorial claims and land reclamation efforts ever since 2009. It is also in recent times that China increased efforts to reclaim land in the SCS by physically increasing the size of islands or creating altogether new island. China also relentlessly is piling sand onto existing reefs, pursuing on construction of ports, military installations, and airstrips particularly in the Spratly Islands (Watkins, 2015). Being an important commercial gateway for a major portion of the world's merchant shipping, the SCS has become a crucial strategic and economic sub-region of the Indo-Pacific. It is currently also the area in which complex territorial disputes is constantly occurring, thus creating conflicts and tension not only within the region but throughout the Indo-Pacific. Such a dispute is no surprise as the control and exertion of influence over the world's busiest and most strategic shipping lanes have always been the major focus of colonial powers and other major economies which include the Dutch. British and the Chinese. It is also noted through history that the Chinese traders once dominated this region with their trade ships and merchants, thus controlling the SCS (Fravel, 2012).

The U.S. Asia strategy portrays a major alteration in the foreign policy of the Obama's administration. Following these development, at the beginning of 2010, Obama administration swiftly impressed upon the U.S. resolve in pursuing a policy of re-engagement. (Castro, 2011). This policy 'pivot' or later known 'rebalance to Asia' entails expanding and upgrading the U.S. relations with SEA and ASEAN itself (Congressional Research Service. U.S. relations with the Assosiation of SEA Nations, 2009). The re-engagement policy involves enhancing the credibility of the U.S. security, economy and diplomatic commitment by actively pursuing bilateral alliances and regional multilateralism with confidence participating and in dynamism. Speech by Hillary Clinton (2010) on the titled, America's engagement in the Asia Pacific, re-engagement should not be misconstrued as something totally new or foreign, this basically encompasses strengthening U.S. leadership, increasing relationship, engagement an putting into practice new ways of projecting ideas and influence throughout this changing region, new breadth of fresh air (Clinton, 2011).

These 'rebalance to Asia', is aimed at creating a greater involvement of the U.S. in the Asia region especially, and enhances trade and military relations (Rudd, 2013). Although the U.S. highlighted the need to have the continuous support of China, recent events that occurred in the SCS region prove otherwise. As these issues prevail, the concern of the existing relations between the U.S. and the ASEAN countries becomes central. As this region has multilateral relations in the form of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asia Summit (EAS), a direct connection between these organizations and the U.S. is not formally established. Although the Philippines and Thailand are known allies to the U.S., the other countries, though having economic and defense relations, does not have a platform to discuss and decide on regional security and trade issues as yet, especially in the context of the SCS.

Glaser & Billingsley (2012) in journal article *U.S. Pivot to Asia Leaves China off Balance*, mention that none of these strategy measures was presented as being aimed at containing, encircling, or counterbalancing China. Rather, they were billed as a necessary rebalancing of U.S. attention to advance U.S. interests, exploit opportunities, and reassure allies and friends of U.S. staying power and commitments. They also denied that the U.S. and other countries fear China or are seeking to exclude China from regional agreements. The Chinese has to "play by the rules on the road" and rise "into the global rules-based order." They also mention that China should bear some responsibility for the resurgence of U.S. influence and power around its periphery. China has not been good enough when it comes to diplomacy with its neighbouring countries. Therefore, they should not blame the U.S., Japan, Vietnam or the Philippines, and reflect first on its own diplomatic blunders.

The Pivot Strategy is reflected as a core value of U.S. foreign policy, national security and economic interest that's being realigned towards Asia. Thus, in my opinion, U.S. needed to prioritize its future actions so that economics and military activities performed parallel toward its goal. Increase in numbers of U.S. forces in Asia-Pacific region doesn't mean of economics reason. Therefore, it is related to security reason which to my view, the U.S. is trying to contain China.

In policy terms, the rebalance involve three sets of initiatives such as security, economic and diplomatic elements. Revolutionize in the US military force structures are highly perceptible and paying much attention. The US is changing significant military power from previous theatres of operation to the Asia-Pacific and reorganization its regional security engagements to create additional extensively disseminated the US forces across the region. This attitude has integrated high-profile new military deployments to the Philippines and complement by prolonged security engagements with regional partners, which stress superior military arrangement. The rebalance also engage economic invention, which intend to develop bilateral and multilateral economic collaboration among the US and the Asian determined on TPP, and a planned FTA that at the moment engage the US and 11 other nations, but does not at present involve China. The rebalancing also has perceived; (1) deepening engagement with multilateral institutions, (2) managing the US-China relationship building, (3) a very much exaggerate the level of US diplomatic commitment in the region concerned corroboration the US alliances and (4) deeper interaction with partners such as Singapore (Schott, 2013). Although much attention focused on the military part of the US rebalance to Asian, the mostly observable and arguable feature of the significant to identify that the policy. lt is rebalance is multidimensional.

Why the Focus on South East Asia

According to Tay and Michael (2011), the United States has vital economic and strategic interests in the South China Sea. The free flow of maritime trade through the SLOCs that traverse it are crucial to the U.S.'s economic well-being as well as those of its friends and allies in both Southeast and Northeast Asia, while U.S. energy corporations are heavily involved in exploration and exploitation projects in the littorals. At the strategic level, those same SLOCs allow the U.S. Navy to transit between the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans, greatly facilitating America's global military posture. Their basic policy position is that freedom of navigation. Ensuring freedom of navigation is critical interest of the United States and other regional states. Although China claims that it supports freedom of navigation, its insistence that foreign militaries seek advance permission to sail in its two-hundred-mile EEZ casts doubt on its stance (Walter, 2015). China's development of capabilities to deny American naval access to those waters in a conflict provides evidence of possible Chinese's intentions to block freedom of navigation in specific contingencies. China's growing assertiveness

and resulting tensions have increased the potential for those interests to be undermined, and have thus led Washington to articulate a much clearer policy position on the South China Sea.

McCormick (2009) stated that the U.S. does not take a position on the competing claims of the six parties in the South China Sea. The United States has important interests in the peaceful resolution of South China Sea disputes according to international law. With the exception of China, all the claimants of the South China Sea have attempted to justify their claims based on their coastlines and the provisions of UNCLOS. China, however, relies on a mix of historic rights and legal claims, while remaining deliberately ambiguous about the meaning of the "nine-dashed line" around the sea that is drawn on Chinese's maps. Failure to uphold international law and norms could harm U.S. interests elsewhere in the region and beyond. The six parties overlapping claims in the South China Sea should be resolved peacefully, without recourse to force or the threat to use force, and in accordance with international law. In the 1990s, Washington noted with concern the growing instability in the South China Sea, and therefore, welcomed the easing of tensions in the first half of this decade following the issuing of the Declaration of the Conduct (DoC) (Hun and Tony, 2011). As friction intensified after 2007, however, U.S. officials once again began to voice concern. United States supported a negotiated settlement in the dispute, rising tensions over the past few years had prompted the Pentagon to reinforce measures designed to enhance stability in the area. This strategy consists of a continued U.S. military presence in the region, operations by the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea to assert freedom of navigation rights, and the expansion and deepening of defense diplomacy and capacity-building programs with regional states such as Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia to prevent tensions in the South China Sea from developing into a threat to U.S. interests. (Campbel an Andrews, 2013)

The U.S. allies and friends around the South China Sea look to the United States to maintain free trade, safe and secure sea lines of communication (SLOC), and overall peace and stability in the region. Claimants and non-claimants to land features and maritime waters in the South China Sea view the U.S. military presence as necessary to allow decision-making free of pressure. If nations in the South China Sea lose confidence in the United States to serve as the principal regional security guarantor, they could embark on costly and potentially destabilizing arms build-up to compensate or, alternatively, become more accommodating to the demands of a powerful China.

Neither would be in the U.S. interest. Failure to reassure allies of U.S. commitments to the region could also undermine U.S. security guarantees in the broader Asia-Pacific region, especially with Japan and South Korea. At the same time, however, the U.S. must avoid getting involved into the territorial dispute by regional nations who seek U.S. backing to legitimize their claims. In short, the U.S.'s military presence in South China Sea helps provide a stable environment for the claimants to pursue a political solution and encourages the ASEAN states to increase defence cooperation among them at the same time (Fravel, 2012). Increased U.S. focus on the South China Sea has also been animated by China's increased military capabilities in the area. The Sanya Naval Base, construction of which began in the early 2000s, is now home to advanced power projection assets such as nuclear submarines and surface combatants, and will likely be the home port for China's future aircraft carriers.

The build-up of naval forces at Sanya has led the U.S. to increase surveillance of the PLAN in the South China Sea, a development that the Chinese government considers provocative and illegal. A number of confrontations between U.S. and Chinese's vessels took place in early 2009, culminating in the standoff between the surveillance vessel USNS Impeccable and five Chinese-flagged vessels 75 miles off Hainan Island in March.

This was followed a few months later by an incident in which a Chinese submarine damaged a U.S. destroyer's towed array sonar in international waters off Subic Bay in the Philippines. To that end, the U.S. and Chinese officials held a special session under the 1998 Military Maritime Consultative Agreement. Although the two sides agreed to continue discussions, given their differing interpretations of international maritime law, and the build-up of military forces in the area, incidents such as those involving the Impeccable are likely to become more frequent. Chinese officials reiterated their country's legal right to restrict foreign military activities in their EEZ and called on the U.S. to end its surveillance activities of China's coast. (Larter, 2016)

China's Assertiveness in South East Asia

Between 2009 and 2010 the SCS emerged as a potential regional hot spot as a result of an increase in Chinese assertiveness in pressing its sovereignty claims. During this period China imposed its annual unilateral fishing ban with unusual vigor targeting Vietnamese fishing craft in particular. Vietnam, as Chairman of the Association of Sean Nations (ASEAN), used its position to internationalize this issue. The U.S. responded to lobbying by Vietnam and other concerned regional states by raising the SCS issue at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore and at the 17th ARF meeting in Hanoi. The SCS quickly emerged as another irritant in Sino-American relations. By October 2010, the tensions that had arisen earlier in the year appeared to have abated. China resumed military-to-military contacts with the U.S. suspended in response to arms sales to Taiwan. China and ASEAN revived the Joint Working Group to Implement the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DoC) (Sarman Bahrom 2012).

This assessment appeared to be borne out by testimony in April 2011 given by Admiral Robert Willard, Commander of the US Pacific Command, that the PLAN had adopted a less aggressive stance in the Pacific. Events during the first half of 2011 have witnessed a pattern of behavior on the part of China that has not been seen before and this has contributed to a rise in regional tensions. In particular, China began to aggressively interfere in the commercial operations of oil exploration vessels conducting seismic testing in waters claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam. Diplomatic protests by both states were routinely dismissed by China. This article assesses developments affecting the security of the SCS in the first half of 2011 (Sarman Bahrom 2012).

Prior to that in May 2009, China protested submissions by Malaysia and Vietnam to the United Nations Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf by officially submitting a map of China's claims. This map contained nine dash lines in a U-shape covering an estimated eighty per cent or more of the maritime area of the SCS. Having staked its claim China began to demonstrate that it had legal jurisdiction over the SCS. China therefore challenged any and all assertions to the contrary by the Philippines and Vietnam. Recent announcements of joint oil and gas exploration by the Philippines and Vietnam were viewed in Beijing as a challenge to China's tolerance (Le Mière 2011).

In relation to this, in order to develop a better understanding of China's strategic thinking and policy choices in regard to the SCS disputes, we must first clarify two things. The first is what China is trying to achieve, in other words its strategic goal, in dealing with these matters; the second is what measures and approaches the Chinese government believes to be the most effective in pursuing this

goal. Once these two things have been established, it will then become possible to evaluate the available policy options for the Chinese government and why and how a particular course of action has been taken in a specific political context. An examination of Chinese foreign policy considerations on these lines promises to yield more useful insights than an approach that asks simply whether or not Chinese diplomacy has become more assertive or whether or not China's intentions have changed. China's strategic goal in dealing with SCS territorial and maritime disputes is determined in part by its overall diplomatic aims and how the SCS fits into this larger picture, and in part by how China reads the changing international environment and its room for maneuver in determining policy on this issue. These factors, of course, are not static, but are constantly evolving. An analysis of China's changing approaches to the SCS disputes can yield at best only a superficial interpretation if it does not take into consideration both the evolution in Chinese diplomatic strategy and policy thinking and the shifting locus of these disputes on the Chinese foreign policy agenda (Weatherbee Daniel, 2014).

Since the introduction of the reform agenda in 1978, with its new openness to the wider world, the goal of China's diplomatic work has been to secure a peaceful and favourable international environment for economic development. The result of this policy has been that China has usually chosen to refrain from assertive pursuit of its own interests with a view to maintaining peace and stability and preventing any deterioration in its international environment. This approach to foreign policy has often been referred to as 'keeping a low profile'. After 2010, with the rapid increase in China's economic power and growing concern and vigilance in the U.S. about China's rise, the policy of keeping a low profile became markedly less effective. China's confrontations over territorial disputes in the SCS with other claimants, notably the Philippines and Vietnam, have not only prompted the adjustment of this policy, but also reflect and put to the test a more proactive foreign policy approach (Thayer, 2010).

Several important points can be drawn from this outline of China's changing strategic thinking in dealing with the SCS territorial and maritime disputes. First, the changes in Chinese foreign policy towards these disputes have occurred in the context of the US pivot to Asia, rising tensions in the SCS, and China's own rapidly increasing power and capacity. China's policy shift has not come about as a result of the wishes of any particular leader, but can instead be seen as a contingent development. More specifically, having long been guided by the principle of keeping a low profile, Chinese diplomacy needs to go through a period of 'becoming assertive' in order to establish the level of deterrence necessary for China to be in a position to defend its sovereign rights and national interests in the SCS. The Chinese government has learned from experience that during a process of conflict and confrontation, a unilateral policy of moderation will not achieve stability, and may even whet the appetite of the other side. As the situation in the SCS has become increasingly heated, Chinese government and academic circles have gradually come to understand that although China hopes to maintain peace and stability there, this goal cannot be achieved simply by adopting a consistently moderate approach, or only by applying self-restraint in its diplomacy (Le Mière 2011).

The ASEAN Response and Alignment

After the President Obama announced the Pivot to Asia, much has been done and agreed upon in the context of the presence and influence of the U.S. among ASEAN nations. The U.S. is no stranger to this region. Since 1977, the U.S. has established mutual relations with this region and trade deals that benefited both parties. Today, the U.S. is a regular participant in some of the multilateral activities in the region such as the ARF, APEC, AMS and the recently anchored TPPA (Tay & Kulma 2011). However, before the shift of policy, the participation in the multilateral sphere was regarded as incomplete as there exist a perception that in the early post-Cold War era, less focus was given to this region. This led to the ventures of ASEAN countries with every other nation including those from the Eastern European Block, having greater regional multilateral interaction, to the extent of the exclusion of the U.S. (Tay & Kulma 2011).

It was not until the Obama's administration and then the U.S. began to give greater attention to this region as part of its foreign policy, specifically in the context of the pivot. Among the notable action are senior-level bilateral trips to the region, even by the President himself, engagement and increased commitment to regional multilateral efforts, and policy statements. The U.S. has also committed to attend, the EAS at the end of 2011 for the first time. The Obama administration also utilized its platform as host of the APEC meetings for 2011 to entice and encourage U.S. ties with the region and to support the TPPA negotiations (Campbell & Andrews 2013). The success of the summit opened new avenues for multilateral and bilateral engagement between the U.S. and specifically ASEAN countries. Nevertheless, it is even more evident that the involvement of the U.S. in this region is seen timely specially in providing a lifeline

for ASEAN nations in addressing the growing assertiveness of China is SCS. It is important to remember that it was after the exit of the U.S. from Philippines, that China occupied Mischief Reefs in 1995 (Fravel 2012). As such the presence of the U.S. is highly anticipated and apt to address this issue and provide leverage to ASEAN in dealing with this issue. This chapter will look into the U.S.-ASEAN cooperation and relations in the context of dealing with China's assertiveness.

Effects and Approach by ASEAN

In November 2009, the first ASEAN-U.S. Leaders' Meeting issued a Joint Statement on the "ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership for Enduring Peace and Prosperity," reflecting their commitment to enhance cooperation to further promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region (Lohman, 2015). This Plan of Action, which mapped out the key priorities and measures to strengthen the ASEAN-U.S. partnership in the four pillars of politicalsecurity, economic, socio-cultural, and development cooperation, was successfully implemented. It was at the Joint Statement on the ASEAN-U.S. Strategic Partnership at the third ASEAN-U.S. Summit, on November 2015 in Kuala Lumpur, that Leaders announced the elevation of the ASEAN-U.S. dialogue relations to a strategic level. Their goals and vision for this Strategic Partnership will be realised through the implementation of the Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-U.S. Strategic Partnership 2016 to 2020. As this Plan of Action will continue to support the ASEAN Community in its three pillars, the five priority areas of economic integration, maritime cooperation, transnational challenges including climate change, emerging leaders, and women's opportunities were highlighted.

In the context of political security cooperation, ASEAN-U.S. have sustained their regular engagements at all levels, including the ASEAN-U.S. Summit, the Post Ministerial Conferences (PMCs), the ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue, and the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) Meeting. Before the institutionalization of the ASEAN-U.S. Summit, the Leaders of ASEAN and the U.S. met on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit to discuss various issues related to ASEAN-U.S. cooperation and exchange views on international and regional issues of common interest and concerns. The PMC mechanism offers an opportunity for the U.S. Secretary of State and the ASEAN Foreign Ministers to review existing cooperation and exchange views on regional and global issues. Periodic dialogues are held at the senior officials' level to provide a more in-depth review of cooperation across

the pillars and discuss the future direction of the partnership. In addition, the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN (CPR) and the U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN meet annually at the ASEAN-U.S. JCC Meeting to review status of implementation of the ASEAN-U.S. Plan of Action, with a focus on particular projects and programmes. (The White House, 2005)

In the context of economic cooperation, ASEAN and the U.S. utilised the ASEAN Economic Ministers - U.S. Trade Representative (AEM-USTR) consultations and the Senior Economic Officials Assistant USTR (SEOM-USTR) Consultations to promote trade and investment flows between ASEAN and the U.S, as well as to exchange views on a range of economic issues. The ASEAN-U.S. E3 initiative was launched at the fourth ASEAN-U.S. Leaders' Meeting on November 2012 as a new framework for economic cooperation designed to expand the ASEAN-U.S. trade and investment ties and create new business opportunities and jobs in all eleven countries (Chachavalpongpun, 2012).

Within these frameworks, ASEAN-U.S. has strengthened cooperation in trade facilitation. Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) development. and harmonization of standards and conformance, among others. In the Technical and Economic Cooperation ASEAN-U.S. have forged cooperation on trade facilitation, standards and conformance, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), and Public-Private Engagement (PPE). The U.S. has been ASEAN's primary partner in moving forward the ASEAN Single Window (ASW) initiative and has provided technical assistance on standards and conformance for priority sectors, including electrical and electronic equipment, medical devices, and automotive.

In the area of socio-cultural cooperation, environment, climate change and disaster management has been promoted through the City Links Pilot Partnership, an 18-month technical exchange programme that was launched in March 2013 to improve climate adaptation readiness in ASEAN cities. Phase II of this Partnership began in April 2014, which involved Legazpi City of the Philippines and Fort Lauderdale City of Florida, the U.S.A. The programme aims to develop tailored solutions to the climate adaptation challenges of ASEAN cities. The U.S. is exploring cooperation with ASEAN in marine environmental protection and conservation within the framework of the new Plan of Action for 2016-2020. The U.S. has also proposed with Singapore an ARF Statement on Strengthening Cooperation on Marine Environmental Protection and Conservation. The Statement was adopted at the 22nd ARF on 6 August 2015 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. On disaster management, the U.S., through the ASEAN-U.S. Partnership for Good Governance, Equitable and Sustainable Development and Security (ASEAN-U.S. PROGRESS) programme, is currently supporting the implementation of priority projects under the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) Work Programme Phase 2 (2013-2015).

CONCLUSION

ASEAN members might realize it is almost impossible to stand against the military might of China alone and that a negotiated settlement of the SCS dispute is unlikely. As The Philippines' government indicated in its statement to the Arbitration Tribunal in early 2013, in its claim against China, 'over the past 17 years of such exchanges of views, all possibilities of a negotiated settlement have been explored and exhausted'. Initially, The Philippines' effort received little support from ASEAN and its constituent members. However, a March 2015 statement from the current ASEAN Secretary General might be interpreted that ASEAN supports The Philippines' decision to file arbitration against China, with Le Luong Minh reportedly saying that the nine-dash line is 'not binding on any claimant and that ASEAN supports The Philippines' efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution in its own territorial dispute with China'. Notwithstanding the gloomy prospects for a possible settlement, ASEAN should be encouraged to continue making concerted efforts to settle the dispute, as there is every prospect that a failure to do so will adversely affect peace and security in the region. There can be different options on behalf of the involved parties as they seek a peaceful settlement of the issue, namely pursuing legal avenues, diplomatic or political negotiations, and joint development.

Pursuing legal avenues to solve the SCS disputes will not be an easy pathway but arguably is the most well-founded option. The Philippines initiated its legal effort against China in January 2013 and after six hearings of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, on July 2016 the court issued a highly anticipated award favorable to the Philippines. However, China has repeatedly stated that it will neither accept nor participate in the arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines. Therefore, predicting how this issue will play out in the legal field is difficult, particularly as China has ruled out using legal arbitration as the basis for dispute settlement. Another reason is that the status of the sovereignty of the Paracel and Spratly Islands has been unclear since the dispute first emerged many decades ago. When colonial states such as the U.S., France, the Netherlands and Spain ruled littoral states around the SCS, the area was an important part of their economic activities. At the end of colonial rule, four international documents regarding the settlement of sovereignty and borders, namely the San Francisco Treaty, the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration and the Joint Communiqué between the People's Republic of China and Japan, failed to generate any clarity regarding sovereignty of the Paracel and Spratly Islands (Buszynski 2014).

A second possible response in pursuing a settlement is the continuation of political negotiations, although this route too is likely to have problems in the coming decade. Most ASEAN states lack the political resolve to mount a serious counter-challenge to China, because of their economic dependency on China, resulting in a disunited ASEAN view on the issue. So reaching a political settlement with China using diplomatic efforts is unlikely to be successful for ASEAN claimant states in the coming decade. However, as stated in its charter, ASEAN follows the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, so ASEAN will continue to try and exploit diplomatic efforts through consultation and negotiation. ASEAN has long been aware that China is reluctant to discuss the SCS issue solely on a multilateral basis and, even when it does, there is a lack of consistency and commitment in any political negotiations. The creation of the DoC, and internal meetings between ASEAN and China to discuss implementation of the declaration and a code of conduct, have not resulted in any concrete advancement on the issue, particularly because China seems to have adopted a 'hedging strategy (Buszynski 2014).'

The final possible ASEAN response is to promote joint development of SCS resources. This could be undertaken even while international arbitration is proceeding because it is consistent with Article 74(3) of UNCLOS, which allows such activity during transition periods before an agreement is reached. The arrangement for joint development normally defines the limits of disputed areas and includes a means to share the resources in a way that is independent of the relative strengths of the claims (Alice, 2014). There is some prospect that in the next decade, in the absence of a sovereignty dispute (as distinct from a territorial claim) over islands, joint development ventures could be considered by claimants. In addition, joint development may be possible in areas which are subject to competing claims but which have not been claimed or occupied previously and therefore have no specific historical attachment for the

claimant countries. Joint development initiatives would create benefits not only in promoting peace, security and stability to the region but also by providing economic prosperity to the countries concerned. As Zou Keyuan argues, a form of joint development among the disputants would significantly enhance the prospects for long-term peace and security in the SCS (Alice 2014).

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SECURITY THREAT IN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: FORMATION OF FORCE INTERVENTION BRIGADE

By LT COL WAN MUHAMMAD KAMAL BIN WAN YUSOFF ROYAL MALAY REGIMENT

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) is a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) which was established by the United Nations Security Council in resolutions 1279 (1999) and 1291 (2000) of the United Nations Security Congo War, though much of its focus subsequently turned to the Ituri conflict, the Kivu conflict and the Dongo conflict. The mission was known as the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) until 2010.

The initial UN presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, before the passing of Resolution 1291, was a force of military observers to observe and report on the compliance on factions with the peace accords, a deployment authorised by the earlier Resolution 1258 (1999).Resolution 2348 (2017) provides the authority for the current MONUSCO mandate. Since 1999, about US\$8.74 billion has been spent to fund the UN peacekeeping effort in DRC. As of October 2017, the total strength of UN peacekeeping troops in DRC is approximately 18,300. More than thirty nations have contributed military and police personnel for peacekeeping effort, with India being the single largest contributor. In June 2011, it was reported that India is preparing to gradually scale back its military commitment to MONUSCO.

The following nations contributed with military personnel: Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia. In addition, the following nations have contributed with police personnel: Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guinea, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Romania, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, Russian Federation, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and Yemen.

The United Nations Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) is a military formation which constitutes part of the MONUSCO. It was authorized by the United Nations Security Council on 28 March 2013 through Resolution 2098. Although it is not the first instance in which the use of force was authorized by the UN, the Force Intervention Brigade is the first UN peacekeeping operation specifically tasked to carry out targeted offensive operations to "neutralize and disarm" groups considered a threat to state authority and civilian security. In this case, the main target was the M23 militia group, as well as other Congolese and foreign rebel groups. While such operations do not require the support of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), the Force Intervention Brigade often acts in unison with the FARDC to disarm rebel groups.

The violence in the Congo has been largely contained in the east of the country, most notably in the North and South Kivu regions. Although there have been cases of conflict-related violence across the country, rebel presence in the east is especially prevalent, especially due to its proximity to the Rwandan border. These regions are largely characterized by mountainous terrain that is both difficult to control and to navigate. Many reports suggest that these rebel groups are funding their activities by exploiting the mineral-rich land in the eastern Congo and by participating in the mineral smuggling trade.

MONUSCO Mandate

MONUSCO took over from an earlier UN peacekeeping operation MONUC on 1 July 2010. The original mandate of the mission was established by Security Council resolution 1925 of 28 May to reflect the new phase reached in the country. It was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate relating, among other things, to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.

The Council decided then that MONUSCO would comprise, in addition to the appropriate civilian, judiciary and correction components, a maximum of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 members of formed police units. Future reconfigurations of MONUSCO would be determined as the situation evolved on the ground, including: the completion of ongoing military operations in North and South Kivu as well as Orientale provinces; improved Government capacity to protect the population effectively; and the consolidation of State authority throughout the territory. The mandate of MONUSCO was further detailed in resolution 2053 adopted by the Security Council on 27 June 2012. On 28 March 2013, faced with recurrent waves of conflict in eastern DRC threatening the overall stability and development of the country and wider Great Lakes region, the Security Council decided, by its resolution 2098, to create a specialized "intervention brigade" for an initial period of one year and within the authorized MONUSCO troop ceiling of 19,815. It would consist of three infantry battalions, one artillery and one special force and reconnaissance company and operate under direct command of the MONUSCO Force Commander, with the responsibility of neutralizing armed groups and the objective of contributing to reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities.

The Council also decided that MONUSCO shall strengthen the presence of its military, police and civilian components in eastern DRC and reduce, to the fullest extent possible for the implementation of its mandate, its presence in areas not affected by conflict in particular Kinshasa and in western DRC. On 28 March 2014, the Security Council, by its resolution 2147, extended the mandate of MONUSCO until 31 March 2015 and decided that the renewed mandate would also include MONUSCO's Intervention Brigade within the authorized troop ceiling of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers and staff officers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 formed police units. At the same time, the Council noted the need for a clear exit strategy and decided that the Mission's further reconfigurations and mandates should be based on the evolving situation and progress towards several objectives set out in accordance with its three priorities; protecting civilians, stabilizing the country, and supporting implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region. On 30 March 2016, the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) for another year, warning that the humanitarian situation

remains of great concern, as well as the delays in preparing for the November presidential elections. In a resolution unanimously adopted on 31st March 2017, the 15-member body decided to keep the UN Organization Stabilization Mission (MONUSCO) until 31 March 2018, but approved 16,215 military personnel, 660 military observers and staff officers, 391 police personnel, and 1,050 personnel of formed police units.

On 27 March 2018 the Security Council adopted resolution 2409 extending until 31 March 2019 the mandate of MONUSCO in the DRC, including its Intervention Brigade. The Council also authorized a troop ceiling comprised of 16,215 military personnel. 660 military observers and staff officers, 391 police personnel, and 1,050 personnel of formed police units. MONUSCO Strategic priorities are to protect the civilians and to support the implementation of the 31 December 2016 agreement and the electoral process. MONUSCO current mandate is found in the resolution 2502 adopted by the Security Council on 19 December 2019, by which the Security council decides to extend until 20 December 2020 the mandate of in the DRC, including its Intervention Brigade. MONUSCO MONUSCO's authorized troop ceiling comprises 14,000 military personnel, 660 military observers and staff officers, 591 police personnel, and 1,050 personnel of formed police units, further agrees to a temporary deployment of an additional 360 personnel of formed police units provided they are deployed in replacement of military personnel. The strategic priorities of MONUSCO are to protect the civilians and support to the stabilization and strengthening of State institutions in the DRC and key governance and security reforms.

Formation of the Force Intervention Brigade

On 24 February 2013, the "Framework for Peace, Security and Cooperation for the DRC and the Region" was established to combat the root causes of the conflict and to encourage decentralization, security sector reform and the consolidation of state authority. The concept of the Force Intervention Brigade was first introduced at the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), during which the failures of MONUSCO to end violence in the eastern Congo were highlighted and addressed. Concerns were expressed that this instability was also a threat to regional stability. In response to these concerns, Uganda, with the support of South Africa, proposed the establishment of the Neutral Intervention Brigade, a small offensive force composed of troops from countries in the region. Unfortunately, given the lack of experienced troops and funding to complete the estimated \$100 million deployment of these troops, the effort could not be completed on a strictly regional level. As a result, the concept was adopted by the UN and made into an international effort under the MONUSCO mission. Ultimately authorized after 14 years of MONUSCO presence in the Congo, the Force Intervention Brigade was embraced as a radical change in UN efforts to "break the persistent cycles of violence in DRC," and as a shift away from traditional peacekeeping and towards peace enforcement.

As per the 2013 mandate of the Force Intervention Brigade, the operation consists of three infantry battalions, an artillery and one Special Force and Reconnaissance Company. When first deployed, the Force Intervention Brigade consisted of 3,069 troops, with the first 2,550 hailing evenly from Tanzania, Malawi and South Africa. Artillery, Special Forces and reconnaissance made up the remainder of these original troops. The original troop ceiling, according to the 2013 mandate, was 19,815 military personnel. However, this figure has since been lowered as part of the UN's overall exit strategy from the Congo. As of Resolution 2348 (2017), the MONUSCO troop ceiling was lowered to 16,215, marking a reduction of 2,600 military personnel. While many UN representatives expressed support for the reduced troop numbers in the most recent resolution, others strongly opposed the mandated change in troop numbers from the original mandate. The representative of the Russian Federation suggested that the situation in the Congo is so complex and so urgent that a reduction in military personnel could not be justified.

The FIB was first headed by General James Aloizi Mwakibolwa of Tanzania. Mwakibolwa had had previous experience in the region. He served as commander of the Military Assessment Team of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in October 2012 to assess the military situation in eastern Congo and come up with a concept of operations. Mwakibolwa handed over command to his successor in April 2014.



Figure 1: Insignia of the Force Intervention Brigade

Rebel Actors and the Race for Resources

There are several main factors of the conflicts that happen in the Democratic Republic of Congo explained below:

Conflict Minerals

One of the main drivers of conflict in the DRC is its plethora of valuable minerals and resources, including cobalt, copper, diamonds. aold. tin. Indeed, tantalum, Congolese and the government's inability to control the entirety of its territory has allowed rebel armed forces to exploit these resources and fuel the continuous conflict in the Congo. Many of these minerals are exported to electronics companies worldwide, and rebels not only keep the profits of this illicit trade, but also rape women as a means of invoking terror in mining zones. Elsewhere, the Congolese government has also been involved in the exploitation of conflict minerals.

Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)

The FDLR, made up of Rwandan Hutu extremists who entered the Congo following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, has repeatedly attacked civilians, such as in January 2012, when it killed twenty-six people in South Kivu. It has also been involved in the recruitment of child soldiers. Human Rights Watch further notes that between April 2012 and May 2013 alone, the FDLR murdered 314 civilians in various attacks. Thus, though it has been weakened in recent years, the FDLR remains an important element of the conflict in the DRC. In October 2013, Oxfam reaffirmed that the human rights abuses committed by the FDLR, as well as other rebel groups, could not be forgotten in light of the sudden defeat of the M23 rebels.

Maï-Maï Sheka

The Maï-Maï Sheka has contributed to the violence in the DRC by attacking not only civilians, but also UN peacekeepers. The group, which was formed in 2009 by mineral resources businessmen, was also involved in the increased October 2013 rebel conflict experienced in the eastern DRC. Earlier, the Maï-Maï Sheka had gained notoriety for an exceptionally violent episode of sexual violence in 2010.

Indeed, during the period of 30 July to 4 August 2010, the mass rape of more than 240 people was carried out in the eastern Congo by members of both the Rwandan FDLR and Maï-Maï Sheka rebels. In addition, homes and shops of many who would also be raped were looted. These crimes occurred within miles of the UN peacekeepers' base, but the MONUSCOwas unable to protect Congolese civilians. UN headquarters only became aware of the violence days later, when the International Medical Corps, which was charged with treating many of the victims of these attacks, first reported it.

Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)

The Ugandan-led ADF has existed since the mid-1990s. While relatively the ADF small. has abducted Congolese nationals known to and is have links to the terrorist networks of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. While the ADF's ultimate goal is to establish Shari'a the FARDC law in Uganda, began Operation Ruwenzori in 2010 in an effort to drive the ADF out of the DRC.

Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

The Ugandan-based LRA is led by Joseph Kony, the infamous warlord known for his notorious recruitment of child soldiers. In December 2009, LRA soldiers killed over 300 people and abducted 250 more over the course of four days in Makombo, located in northeastern DRC. Similar attacks continued in subsequent years. Additionally, given the Congolese government's primary focus on the M23, the FARDC has often been unable to protect Congolese civilians from attacks by the LRA.

March 23 Movements (M23)

On 23 March 2009, the Congres national pour la defense du peuple (CNDP, National Congress for the Defense of the People), a former rebel group led by Laurent Nkunda, signed a peace agreement with the Congolese government to reintegrate into the FARDC. Three years later, former CNDP forces, complaining about the nonpolitical-militarv integrate implementation of agreements to movements of the CNDP into the FARDC, and arguing that the government had thus only "feigned" its efforts at inclusivity, formed a called the M23. Led by Ntaganda, the new aroup M23 was comprised of ethnic Tutsis and took its name from the date of the 23 March peace agreement in 2009. Importantly, the M23 has also been allegedly backed by the Rwandan government, which, according to a 2012 Human Rights Watch report, has provided the M23 with forced Rwandan recruits, as well as weapons and ammunition. Rwanda has also been accused of training child soldiers and luring them to fight for the M23, along with granting the M23 cross-border access into its territory.

In November 2012, the M23 fought the FARDC and successfully took the major city of Goma, located in the North Kivu province, effectively forcing civilians to flee the area. According to a UN Joint Human Rights Office report on the incident, both the M23 and the FARDC committed human rights abuses during the conflict, including mass rape and arbitrary executions. Notably, in November 2013, thirty-nine Congolese officers were tried for rape and acts of sexual violence. After the UNSC condemned M23's seizure of Goma, M23 agreed to negotiate terms of withdrawal at a conference in Uganda. Unable to agree on the implementation of a ceasefire stalled however. pattern negotiations of emerged а that continued through the fall of 2013. In the wake of suspended peace talks, FARDC and M23 forces continuously clashed until a strong offensive by the FARDC, with significant assistance from the

UN sanctioned Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), caused the M23 rebels to ultimately surrender and a peace deal was signed on 12 December 2013. While this marked a significant victory for the FARDC, and underscored the effectiveness of close collaboration with the FIB, it did not signify the end of conflict in the DRC. As the FADRC focused primarily on eliminating M23, other rebel groups, such as the FDLR and Maï-Maï Sheka received much needed reprieve and were thus able to regroup and strengthen their initiatives.




Figure 2: Rebel Groups and Militias in Eastern DRC

Force Intervention Brigade Engagements

The Force Intervention Brigade faced many challenges and multiple armed engagements as mentioned below:

March 23 Movement (M23)

In what is widely regarded as its greatest success, the Force Intervention Brigade played an important role in driving out the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group in October 2013. This offensive came after intelligence reports said that, should the Kampala peace talks fail; the M23 would launch its own attacks. In response, the Force Intervention

Brigade joined the FARDC to split the M23 forces and dislodge the group from its military strongholds across North Kivu. By surrounding the rebels from the western, southern and northern fronts, the combined forces of the FARDC and Force Intervention Brigade were able to push M23 out of all its previous strongholds in only four days. Notable engagements included battles at Kanyamahoro, Kiwanga, Rutshuru and Rumangabo. As a result of the offensive, the M23 retreated into the Virunga Mountains on the border of Rwanda in what has been considered a crushing military loss for the rebel group. With the arrival of Malawian troops earlier that month to contribute to the Force Intervention Brigade, this operation also marked the first time that all components of the Force Intervention Brigade worked completely together.

Allied Democratic Force (ADF)

Following this defeat of the M23 Movement, the Force Intervention Brigade specifically targeted another rebel group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), in 2014. This group, mainly located on the border of Uganda and the DRC, was especially notorious for attacking Ugandans and Congolese civilians. The Force Intervention Brigade acted in this situation to destroy the bases of the ADF, and it was considered largely successful in this regard. However, in response to these efforts against the ADF, the ADF has specifically targeted UN officials and humanitarian aid workers in the region. In December 2017, 15 Tanzanian soldiers were killed when the ADF attacked their base.

Other Engagements

- Battle of Kibati/Triple Towers.
- Govender's Ridge, Kiwanja. In late September 2014, with the assistance of the Force Intervention Brigade, troops from the FARDC drove the M23 rebel faction to the Ugandan border and forced what has been effectively their total and unconditional surrender. The Indian Army Battalion assigned to act in a supporting role, refused to fight and sealed themselves into their armoured vehicles.

- Kitchanga. In May 2014, SANDF soldiers were involved in an engagement with Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) rebels and defended their position.
- Beni. Large-scale rebel attacks occurring nearly weekly have terrorized residents of Beni and left them uncertain where to seek safety. UN and Congolese forces need to urgently coordinate their efforts and improve protection of civilians in Beni.

CONCLUSION

The UN authorization and deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade is a milestone in UN peace operations, one which may have important ramifications for how the world seeks to protect civilians in conflict areas. It challenges some of the core notions of the traditional model of UN peacekeeping operations, and introduces the possibility of using more robust peace enforcement strategies in the UN's efforts to improve the security of civilian populations. Such strategies have the potential to improve civilian protection by deterring, disarming, or otherwise dismantling the armed groups that are the most prolific abusers of civilians. There is only one case study to examine in an assessment of the Force Intervention Brigade and their approach to peace enforcement, but their initial success in proactively combating armed groups through a more offensive mandate and military capabilities is reason for cautious optimism.

However, this military success has not been effective in reducing overall levels of violence against civilians. Like any tool, the FIB model should only be applied in cases it is best suited for. The efficacy of this policy option must be weighed for each individual case based upon the characteristics of the conflict and the armed actors being targeted. Though this new model of UN peace operations certainly has serious drawbacks if misapplied, the need to protect civilians suffering truly horrific abuses in conflict areas means that the international community must continue to consider the use of the FIB model as a tool for civilian protection where conditions for its success exist. The FIB model will not protect all civilians all of the time, but it may be the best tool available for making long-term net improvements in civilian security.

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CHINA ONE BELT ONE ROAD (OBOR): AN ANALYSIS IN SECURITY IMPACT TOWARDS MALAYSIA AND MYANMAR

By MAJ KOGILABALAN NAIR AL GUNASEKARAN ROYAL SERVICE CORP

INTRODUCTION

Economic security concerns on the ability of a state to have access to its available natural resources, funding and marketing in order to be sustainable up to certain level in running and taking care of the state welfare and build-up of the state power. On the other hand, security is pretty much about the trailing of independence from any pitfall meanwhile the states and the societies have the capability to maintain their freedom against the adversary.

With the economy and military might, China's behaviour in this region has projected China power possession specifically in South China Sea. Myanmar share in allowing the petroleum pipeline has diversified the petroleum supply routes while reduce dependence on the contentious South China Sea. With Malaysia's current issue generally the economy downturn, the conflict of interest between interdependency and national interest probably at the stake. It is the sign of more promising economy activities that going to take place which will benefit both countries. However, this will not come alone without facing the consequences that it is actually an attempt of developing greater influence of China power towards South East Asia nations. Therefore, this paper will evaluate closely upon the OBOR Initiatives, what will be the impact towards South East Asia in the security and economic domains.

The future of trade in Asia and in particular in Myanmar and Malaysia could be highly depend on the Chinese new initiative sonamed "One Belt, One Road" where it is a massive investment as well as the building of the main supply route of trading in the South East Asia which is known of being the most strategic geographical location in trade route whether by land or by sea lane. It is a regional collaboration with regards to trade where "One Belt, One Road" make up the physical route on land 'Silk Route" and "Maritime Silk" route. The outcome of this concept will witnessed the volume of trade will increase tremendously from the port of origin to the destination countries and vice versa. Myanmar was chosen in this study because of the vast investment in developing the Kyaukpyu Port where the Myanmar-China twin gas and oil pipeline which will run from Kyaukypu, Myanmar until Yunnan, China. Meanwhile, Malaysia was chosen because the vast development in promoting East Coast Railway Link (ECRL), Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP), Melaka Gateway Port and Forest City.

In the course of analysing OBOR initiative impact in Malaysia and Myanmar in terms of Security, this paper will try to unveil the following issues:

- What are the factors of OBOR Initiatives development in Malaysia and Myanmar?
- What are the security impacts towards Malaysia and Myanmar?

One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative Development in Myanmar and Malaysia

OBOR also defined as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) towards the latest development as it raked in more countries as the expansion of the project that is no more restricted in revival of the ancient Silk Road. OBOR applies as a stepping stone for China to close-up geoeconomic power and harvest its geostrategic dominance. OBOR Initiatives is seen as counter soft balancing beneath the shade of economic globalisation instrument through supplying unified and single economic trade items to inferior nations in Asia-Pacific region; successfully avoid a hard-balancing faction rising in the Indo-Pacific region. The BRI was based on known factual of the governing global free trade preservation and open economy of the world while complying in accordance to the five coexisting principle of peaceful together with the spirit of United Nations Chart listed as per following: mutual respects for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefits and peaceful co-existence.

Being among the ASEAN nations that shared its border with China that spanned 2,200km long, Myanmar remains strategic in assisting China as Myanmar access opening route to the Indian Ocean while in other means also providing southern region alternative corridor for the boosting the trade import and export activities among the two nations. China has been given Kyaukphyu port in state of Rakhine, Myanmar to be developed. As of May 2018, the development of Kyaukphyu Port has been slow but crude oil terminal constructed by China on Made Island close by Kyaukphyu Port which start operating in May 2017 with transporting capacity of 22 million crude oil straight away to Kunming, Yunnan Province. This scheme is similar to providing bypass to Straits of Malacca for direct access to Indian Ocean. Other than facility to transport crude oil, China also invested in other infrastructure project such as Myitsone Dam at Salweena and Irrawady River and copper mine at Letpadaung, Kachin State. The Myitsore Dam drew protest and clash involving Ethnic Armed Groups, environmentalists and local villagers, prompting it to be suspended in 2011.

Based from the history, China has always made vast investment trading with Malaysia which dated back in 1974 where Malaysia was among the first country in maritime Southeast Asia that bind ties with China followed by Singapore and Indonesia later in 1990. Meanwhile in 1981, Tun Mahathir's Look East Policy that effectively fortify the political-economic relationship with Northeast Asian countries. Fast forwards today, China's prominent significant venture are in railways and ports infrastructure projects. Domestically, East Coast Rail Line (ECRL) Malaysia interlinks western coast state and eastern coast state of Peninsular Malaysia by rail network line that spans from Klang Westport in Western Coast of Peninsular Malaysia to Kuantan Port of Eastern Coast of Peninsular Malaysia which eventually integrated together to the former railway line up to Kota Bharu at Northeast of Peninsular of Malaysia. After the Malaysian 14th General Election in year 2018, there has been are some worries with the bankability, quality and economic feasibility of the OBOR projects. Current Tun Mahathir ruling new government is reviewing OBOR projects inked into agreement between the previous government and China and Vietnam has some reservation in lending full support to OBOR.

Factors of One Belt One Road Initiatives Development in Malaysia and Myanmar

OBOR Initiatives is the impetus behind a recurrence of the historic Land Silk Road along Central Asia, connecting Eastern and Western hemisphere of the globe, and the Maritime Silk Road – sea routes that wind through South-East Asia to Africa and beyond (See-Yan, 2019). Nations that OBOR resonates most are the ones that suffer from resource deficits which hindered development of basic infrastructure, as the precursor to economic development. Unlike the

Marshall Plan (European Recovery Program after WWII), OBOR does not require participation in military alliance. The OBOR shall not be similiarised with Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) due to its differences. OBOR Initiatives are the early stage initiatives which is planned for the recurrence of the Historic Silk Road be it Land or Maritime. However, the BRI was the expanded version which has been lengthened to include the Europe and African continent into the China's Grand Strategy. The OBOR Map is shown as per **Figure 1**.



Figure 1: One Belt One Road Initiatives Map

Since the early years of Malacca Sultanate, China historically was an economic partner of trade with Malaysia. In the present world, the vision was still shared by Malaysia and China on East Asian Regionalism idea to be revived in successful way. This aspiration of connectivity was brainchild in OBOR Initiatives in Malaysia through The East Coast Rail Line (ECRL) and ports (Ganesan & Peace, 2018). The ECRL links the eastern coast and western coast of Peninsular Malaysia with rail line as per **Figure 2**.



Figure 2: East Coast Railway Link Malaysia Route Info graphics

Myanmar investment projects consists of strategic importance for China due to the reason that Myanmar's geopolitical location provide way to the Indian Ocean while in the meantime, gives a second corridor into the southern province of country named Myanmar. OBOR Initiatives in Myanmar focuses on building ports and gas pipeline facility. The port of Kyaukphyu located in state of Rakhine has been handed over to China for the purpose of development shown in Figure 3. There were many similar projects in Myanmar namely Dawei region that was assisted by Thailand, Sitwe region assisted by India and last but not least Thilawa port which was assisted by Japan which has been since in operational since December 2015. Therefore, foreign assistance in building infrastructure in Myanmar is not something like a white elephant project.



Figure 3: Myanmar-China Gas Pipeline

In comparison with the Thilawa Port that is developed by the Japanese, it can be said that the construction of this project was rather in turtle pace during the present environment. This is in contrast to China which has since enlarged the command of the the location said through construction of a petroleum terminal located in Made Island of Myanmar that is in close proximity. With the capability of transporting 22 million tons of crude oil from Myanmar to China, this capable terminal has started operation in 2017. This pipeline is also a grand strategy that aims to link between Rakhine state of Myanmar and Kunming of China. This project is also like a mirror image of effort to bypass passing trade goods in Straits of Malacca project made by Malaysia. There is also effort by the Government of Myanmar to sanction the Kyaukphyu area as special economic zone in a bid to gain more investment by the Chinese traders in bigger prosperous way.

Possible Theories Involved in OBOR Initiatives

Western world scholar has speculations on OBOR that it is likely to be China's Marshall Plan. Nevertheless, it is assumed that the political rationale behind two grand strategies is wholly not the same whereby the Marshall Plan tries to construct political-economic function as European liberal capitalism. In other way, OBOR Initiative focuses on principle of non-interference in local affair of country in order to reduce clash of ideology while remain to strengthen the business interest. Economically, OBOR and Marshall Plan targeted to export local overproduced products where U.S prolonged assistance to Europe due to result of proven yearly overtly capacity amounting to \$14 billion that eventually caused sharp reduce on export.

One Belt One Road Initiative Economic Impact in Malaysia and Myanmar

The OBOR Initiatives will have enormous effect on the global monetary system, amounting the related investments to hundreds of billions or even trillions of USD. The financing comes from several channels of funds which are provided by financial institutions created by China's established international monetary institution. The state owned Silk Road Infrastructure Fund began its task with a USD 40 billion capital investment back in year 2014. China's established The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) started its work in 2015 with USD 100 billion capital investment with mission to support OBOR Initiatives investments. Despite the values of non-intervention and disowning of impact expansion, the developments are funded by financial institutions close to the China and state owned funds. New investment in infrastructural project can positively stimulate the economy. In addition, the state can intervene with its significant currency reserves. Therefore, a special fund has been launched named China Ocean Strategic Industrial Investment Foundation (COSIIF), which aims at promoting the local companies alongside OBOR Initiatives. The primary aspects of the initiative, in conjunction with the economy policy goals, are to assist Chinese companies in expanding OBOR Initiatives to the partnering nations. Effective transportation infrastructure promotes industrialization.

The One Belt One Road (Obor) Security Impact in Malaysia with Myanmar and Applications of Realism with Balance of Power Theory.

The OBOR Initiatives are expected to face various national security threat based on China open economy game plan. The impacts of dual-security include major power rivalry, territorial and island dispute, and regional political unrest, as well as non-traditional threat such as terrorism, piracy, and transnational organized crime. OBOR regional security cooperation currently has a multi-level model including bilateral collaboration. collaboration. of multilateral cooperation and regional collaboration. The established ASEAN region security forum already addressed the possible threat emergence through ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which is the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asian Pacific (CSCAP) and others, which uplift its status domination in security affair of the region. Without money (economy) and energy, a modern military

cannot be developed, while stable geopolitical international security landscape is important for Beijing to guarantee the undisturbed growth of the OBOR initiatives to achieve economic advantages and energy supply. The string of pearl initiative by China is seen as strategic siege and doubt arise as to whether India will allow implementation of Silk Road through Indian Ocean because powerful geopolitical and security variables. OBOR shall be analysed based on the perspective of national security threat posed towards the affected country. National security is widely accepted as including non-military dimensions economic security, such as enerav security. environmental security, food security, cyber security, human security, health security, political security and etc. Among the possible measure to apprehend national security are such as political, economic, military and diplomacy. Security condition could also be built regionally and globally by decreasing transnational causes of insecurity such as climate catastrophe, economic imbalance, political exclusion and proliferation of nuclear power. Slowly based on geopolitical growth in the region, China is increasingly deepening its military commitment to guarantee its interest overseas, which may threaten host or neighbouring countries' sovereignty. This can be seen at the South China Sea where reclamation project and also possibility of Chinese navy vessels making port calls at China owned Hambantota Port of Sri Lanka.

In the OBOR region, traditional and non-traditional security is intertwined, involving a big number of sovereign-state disputes that no nation can deal with and resolve alone. Malaysia and China has active issues on South China Sea disputes due to the presence of vessels. China only needs to develop a more transparent and collaborative idea to mobilize the region to engage actively in OBOR execution. Local Small, Medium Enterprise (SME) is also concerned about China's tendency to regulate the complete supply chain in its outbound investments and to pricing out local SMEs in the construction of OBOR infrastructures. Human Security is being touched due to the labour migration in large quantity. The influx of Chinese labour into the Malaysian territory may pose a security threat to immigration department such as Malaysia China Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP) where Malaysian authority were given limited access to the area also pose a question of if there is an illegal activity happening in the area. In other way, we are concerned that the China investors will take along their own manpower, technical knowledge and equipment to Malaysia, rather than using local resources. Unpublished immigration authorities' data induce Chinese foreign employees to be the biggest in building and utilities and comparatively

small in production and agriculture, showing a growing trend over the years, although Chinese employees are not yet the biggest group of foreign employees and expatriate in the state.

Environmental Security wise, ECRL will cross significant river system and cut through 357 hectares of protected forest where elephants, Malayan tapir and tiger roams where it will certainly affect the ecosystem. Even though ECRL shift traffic from roads and seas to rail, but it also contributes to the loss of habitat and fragmentation of the peninsular Malaysia forest core. The Forest City in Johor also bounded to Environmental Security as it based on the reclamation project which was seen affecting the livelihood of the local fisherman at the area. This further strengthens the deduction about environmental security on the Forest City project if it has not analysed in depth and scrutinised. Military security is in the form of intelligence activity that might be conducted from inside the premise with the advantage of technology by the China. This is a threat to sovereignty of Malaysia. Knowing the South China Sea dispute where Malaysia and China has its stake might be used discreetly by China to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance in area of Peninsular Malaysia East Coast confronting the South China Sea. China being the leader in the information technology has caused much ruff in the Western country due to allegation that 5G technology that afraid to be used for spying activity. This eminent in 2019 where U.S saw Huawei, 5G and China as security threat due to possible espionage and influence operations.

Societal Security is also paramount due to Malaysia being a nation with Islam as national religion might face threat from possible terrorist. Uyghurs whom formed alliance with the terrorist group of China based East Turkestan Islamic Movement have connection with al-Qaeda and have penetrated South East Asia in latest years and have allied with Sulawesi-based area group of terrorist pledging supporting to Islamic State (IS). The One Belt, One Road Initiative has provoked security specialist to examine the threats that the initiative currently poses to Chinese companies of OBOR with trains, buses and subways which are less fortifies to be the target.

The OBOR Initiatives Security Impact towards Myanmar

The China project has seen objection by the people of Myanmar being so strong until the authority have to cancel the project. Due to massive protest by local residents, a huge railway project worth US\$20 billion in Myanmar has been stopped. Due to the strong former military influenced government, much political unrest has not become threat towards Myanmar. However, other security impact such as human security, environmental security, military security and societal security might and have impacted Myanmar.

Several news outlets have noted that Myanmar locals are frustrated that China-backed projects employ Chinese citizens for management positions, and that Myanmar local are only used for labour intensive works. This poses the question of human security as the inflow of Chinese workers that might change the human landscape of the Myanmar. This was evident through the examples of OBOR projects in Port of Gwadar, Pakistan and Laos Railway project. This is serious manner as local capacity of Myanmar should be addressed by China and Myanmar government by establishing training programs for young Myanmar engineers in order for them to work in these dignified positions, and earn the same wage as the Chinese. Environmental Security Other than that, environmental and health security might also be affected due to the oil and gas pipeline. The 771km long crude oil pipeline might negatively affect the health and livelihoods of local populations in Kyaukphu port. There are two components to the environmental impact of pipelines: construction and activities, but the building period has greater impact on the ecology of the impacted region. The installation of the pipeline inevitability contributes to ecological disruption, as vegetation clearing, excavation, soil compaction and other things are present. Furthermore, due to linear pipeline arrangements, various natural and climatic regions with distinct geological, hydrological conditions are affected by techno genic effect.

Military security wise, The Arakan Army which is fighting force for the plight of Rohingya people is also another security threat towards the pipeline project. Rohingya ethnic of Myanmar are Muslim who are claimed to be attacked by Myanmar military. This attack has caused them to flee Myanmar and become refugee in neighbouring country like Bangladesh and Malaysia. The Arakan Army could easily retaliate with attack towards development projects that prosper Myanmar as the objection to the atrocities done to the Rohingya people. Long stretches of pipeline provide wealth of soft targets for extremist or terrorist to attack high profile symbols such as transportation infrastructure. Societal security wise, the prospective fear on debt crisis might provoke tensions among Myanmar citizens that outcome in chaos and riots. Earlier phase of OBOR initiation has caused societal unrest among normal citizens whom chose to street protest towards the Myitsone Dam project which fall under OBOR initiative. This protest was conducted by almost 8,000 residents of

Waingmaw town in State of Kachin against Chinese-backed US 3.6 billion hydropower Myitsone Damn project on Irrawady river of Kachin. This protest has been going on since the inception of the project in 2009 which then stalled in year 2011.

CONCLUSION

The OBOR Initiatives development in Malaysia and Myanmar truly focuses in building of railway system and ports to improve the connectivity of the nation while providing access to local resources and trade possibility for China. Meanwhile, Myanmar is neighbouring country to China with trade and political bi-relations for years with also its people originated from China. The OBOR Initiative was contrasted with The Marshall Plan after World War II as the possible theories of its inception. Both Theories of plan were said to have similarity in not political but in economical factor. Economically, OBOR and Marshall Plan aim to improve the trade connectivity among the participating nations. However, politically OBOR promotes neutrality and non-interventionism while Marshall Plan promotes to stop the spread of communism after World War II.

The economic benefits of the OBOR Initiatives have been identified in positive and negative effects. Among the positive effects shared by both Malaysia and Myanmar based on economic trade are such as expanding connectivity and creating economic corridor through the railways and port projects, develop port cities and maritime connectivity, increased foreign direct investment boosting economic development and job opportunity for the local citizens of either Malaysia and Myanmar. However, based on the example of Sri Lanka and Kenya currently, there also possible negative effects such debt crisis that impacts the national economy making debt-for-equity, risk of neo-colonialism that reduce country's sovereignty and threat to energy security loss.

OBOR initiatives are deemed to be consequence with traditional and non-traditional security hazard based on the open economy that is boosted by China. The impacts of dual-security are based on powerful rivalry, territorial and island conflict and regional political unrest, as well as terrorism, piracy and transnational organized crime. ASEAN being a valid platform to address multi-spectrum cooperation via ARF, CSCAP and others. It is essential to remember that strategic drivers composed of financial, power and global security operate in vacuum but strengthen each other instead. Without money (economy) and power, a modern military cannot be

created, while a stable geopolitical international security landscape is vital for China to guarantee the undisturbed growth of OBOR initiatives in order to achieve financial profit and energy.

Malaysia and China has active issues on South China Sea disputes whereby the nation's only need to develop a more open and cooperative concept to mobilize the region to participate actively in the implementation of OBOR. Security issues in Malaysia consist of MCKIP and ECRL which poses health security, environmental security, economic and military security. The security issues were raised current government (previously opposition party) and nongovernmental organization. The adverse effects also have impacts on economic security by the employment of Chinese national and import of Chinese raw materials and related machineries. Myanmar has not security disputes with China over the border but has other national security element issues such as economic security, health security, and environmental security. Lack of employment of local Myanmar creates frustration on job opportunity as economic security while the ill-treatment of Rohingya Muslim might trigger attack from ARSA towards BRI infrastructure. The building of oil and gas pipeline poses environmental and health security. Meanwhile, the prospect of Kyaukphyu port might poses economic such as debt crisis like in Sri Lanka.

On the theories of Realism and Balance of Power in OBOR initiatives, Neo-realism was taken into consideration where military capability (material power) is no longer measured by strength. Neorealism accounts for distinct type of power such as economic prowess, population and so on (tangible, latent power). Balance of power protects the independence of states from absorption by a preponderant power/ state and also prevents the rise of a hegemonic power.

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SEEKING STABILITY IN THE SHADOW OF THE DRAGON: CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE DEVELOPING ASIAN REGION

By CAPT NIK AHMAD AZAMUDIN BIN AHMAD SHUKRI ROYAL SERVICE CORP

INTRODUCTION

China's emergence within the Asia Pacific region as an ideological and social unit has important consequences for the political and economic way forward for South East Asia. This reshapes the balance of power and presents a big economic challenge to a rustic that up until the 1990s, in terms of economic process, geographic area had been ahead of China. China is emerging within the economic arena both as a chance and a challenge. The implications of China's military build-up within the security arena are the most regional concern, but few see it as unavoidable as rising China will communicate mere expansionism or a pursuit for strategic supremacy. Moreover, though recognizing the US countervailing position rectifying China's threat to global power balance, China's perceptions of geographic area, supported claims about economic interdependence, also are independent of the US element from a standard normative orientation and institutional linkages. Of course, the longer term position of China in geographic area is more likely to be influenced by its domestic growth and its relationship with other major players, especially the US, than South-East Asia. Yet acting multilaterally, Southeast Asia also has a capability to handle any future threat from China's security role within the region.

Southeast Asian nations have looked to do as such by seeking after a methodology of hostility against China, given many challenged regional and financial issues in their relationship. Such a strategy is opposed out of dread of mixing Chinese patriotism and inciting Beijing's forceful reactions to its southern neighbors. What's more, ASEAN nations don't wish to lose the chance to profit by China's financial development. Except if and until China is unequivocally expansionist, Southeast Asia must help China and reject a control position bolstered by parts in the US. Simultaneously, the significant Southeast Asian states would evade the inclination to adjust deliberately with China, careful about its erratic development as a rising force and the political expense of such arrangement. Rather, they see a methodology of contribution better serving their inclinations. China needs Southeast Asian assets and markets to support its financial turn of events, and a stable local condition which ASEAN can add to.

China additionally needs the help and collaboration of South-East Asia to understand its administration goals in Asia and the world. Its coalition with ASEAN is a presumed experiment of Beijing as a devoted, helpful world power. Despite the fact that Beijing stays careful about the weight from ASEAN's battle about South China Sea and a professional US resistance position of numerous individuals from ASEAN, there are clarifications for Beijing also to consider Southeast Asia to be as a generally "secure" and "amiable" area where valuable and commonly useful connections can be developed. Beijing additionally remembers that an antagonistic South-East Asian ties could drive a large number of them into closer arrangement with Chinese contenders, including Japan and the US. This offers Southeast Asian expresses an opportunity to extricate Chinese key restriction and set up helpful security approaches, if they can stay joined together and intentional.

There are a couple of things to clarify at the start. To start with, there is little reason for pondering a particular "ASEAN position" on the ramifications of expanding Chinese impact or techniques to adapt to their difficulties. This is not really astonishing, be that as it may. During the Cold War, Indonesia and Malaysia saw China as an increasingly serious long haul peril to South-East Asia, essentially locally, than Thailand and Singapore (for which Vietnam was the primary risk). Presently, Malaysia and Thailand will in general have an all the more benevolent China's view rather than the Philippines, which considers it to be a "bleeding edge state" against South-East Asian waters attack by China. These inconsistencies additionally make "China-ASEAN relations" hard to sum up. Second, even China's national yearnings of South-East Asian states and their way to deal with Beijing connections are once in a while a onedimensional or unequivocal. In any event in the monetary circle, China is considered both to be both a test and a chance.

The Dynamics of China-Southeast Asians Relations in Terms of Security

The ordinary determinants of China's relations with Southeast Asia have been provincial nearness, ethnic and political household complexities, philosophy and geopolitics of the Cold War. Specifically,

China's help for the area's socialist uprisings (this stopped in the mid-1980s, when Beijing joined ASEAN in its restriction to the Vietnamese intrusion in Cambodia) was a key factor in creating negative sentiments and hatred among Southeast Asian non-socialist states toward Beijing. The relationship is affected by a more extensive scope of components during the post-Cold War period, remembering the ascending of financial and military quality for China, and contending monetary reliance and serious weights. The finish of the Cold War created new worries with China as the central driver over the changing local perceived leverage. An assortment of intra-local clashes have addressed provincial request, for example, the regional questions in the South China Sea. The reorientation of military collusions including the US and changes in the US and other forces' stances of power have impacted the local force balance. A related factor is the Taiwan issue, which emphatically impacted the US key commitment in East Asia and the general local request elements in East Asia. In addition, there has been a checked increment in multilateral monetary and security collaboration in the Asia-Pacific area, a lot of which is outfitted to drawing in the rising China in which ASEAN individuals have assumed an instrumental job. The Asian monetary emergency has debilitated Southeast Asian nations versus China, adding fundamentally to China's financial test to the previous. The effect of 11 September 2001 could be added to this rundown of determinants: however this isn't yet the situation of majorly affecting relations among China and Southeast Asia.

Likewise, China's security relationship with South East Asia is affected by geopolitical and financial contemplations as well as by an assortment of non-conventional security issues. These incorporate the earth; medicate dealing, robbery and human dealing. Such issues have given grating focuses yet in addition open doors for conversation and collaboration.

The Contention and Argument on South China Sea

The first is the Spratly Islands strife. Soon after the Cold War reached a conclusion, South China Sea regional question came into feature. What's more, China's security relationship with South East Asia is impacted by financial and geopolitical issues as well as by various non-conventional Spratly Islands commitment (tested by Taiwan, China, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam) was viewed as the most recent flashpoint in Southeast Asia. It was viewed as a key trial of China's acceptable neighborly expectations and introduced a significant test to the Asia Pacific's rising multilateral security activities. While the contention in Southeast Asia has brought intermittent pressures and tensions about the Chinese hardheadedness and regional extension, it has so far presented just a little danger to territorial request. Struggle arrangements, led by legitimate discoursed, (for example, the China-ASEAN dealings) or non-official gatherings, (for example, the Canadian supported 'Overseeing Future Conflicts in the South China Sea' gatherings) concentrated not on tending to the issue of sway, however on making compromise structures that would forestall the utilization of power by any inquirers.

Since 1992, talks among China and ASEAN over the Spratlys have advanced gradually, when ASEAN gave a South China Sea Resolution encouraging all petitioners to seek after tranquil settlement of the contention. After a period of Chinese restriction, in 1995 ASEAN has figured out how to protect Beijing's pledge to manage this issue. Resulting endeavors to arrive at a shared opinion, damaged by occasional claims of Chinese military develop in the locale by ASEAN individuals (particularly the Philippines), fixated on the foundation of an implicit rules. Such endeavors prompted the understanding of an 'announcement' on a set of principles in the South China Sea at the ASEAN highest point in Cambodia in November 2002. The affirmation's most significant terms allude to a responsibility by the gatherings which will practice poise in the direct of exercises that would fuel or strengthen clashes and influence harmony and soundness, including, however not constrained to, the activities of individuals on the as of now uninhabited islands, reefs, shores, cays and different qualities, and to manage their differences in a network. The Philippines offered an understanding yet China declined.

China has opposed Vietnam's interest to extend the proposed code to the Paracel Islands (guaranteed by Hanoi yet now involved by China), in spite of the fact that the issue was settled by tolerating a Philippine activity which recommended dropping any reference to the presentation's geological limits, in this way empowering Hanoi requests security of the whole South China Sea. Malaysia interceded to drive this transitional measure through in the midst of the Philippines' emphasis on an all the more restricting framework. Such deficiencies can be seen against the significance of the affirmation as an approval of China's slow push towards a multilateral way to deal with managing ASEAN on an issue that it had recently demanded respectively settling. The presentation additionally speaks to China's impression of a military clash to the Spratlys as unsafe to their inclinations. China's substance with the understanding may likewise have to do with the prohibition of Taiwan as a member to the Agreement. This could be viewed as supporting the "One China" strategy of ASEAN, including the Philippines, which presented the possibility of a Regional Code of Conduct in 1998 and whose knowledge organization had portrayed the Spratlys for instance of "China's expansionism in Southeast Asia" in July 2002 and as "the greatest flashpoint for struggle" in the area.

China's Threat on Economy to the Southeast Asia: Myth versus Fact

Financial in nature is an additionally squeezing issue for the ASEAN nations that manage China. Consequently, while considering China-Southeast Asian relations, financial issues can't be isolated from geopolitical ones. China's reaction to the Asian monetary emergency, specifically Beijing's refusal to cheapen its money, a move that would have put extra weight on Southeast Asian economies, has broadened its worldwide political weapons store.

However China's financial danger to ASEAN has been a subject of conversation. Worry warts underline that the ASEAN and PRC economies are serious, not integral. The low work expenses of China and the wide market draw outside speculation away from South-East Asia. In that unique situation, ASEAN has just lost outside speculation to China. They feature the sharp decrease in ASEAN outside direct venture from 27 billion dollars in 1997 (preceding the Asian financial crisis) to 16 billion dollars in 1999 and 10 billion dollars in 2000. In 1990, all out FDI streams to China added up to US\$ 3.4 billion, in 1993 US\$ 28 billion and in 1997 US\$ 44 billion. By examination, FDI to ASEAN-5 added up to US\$ 12.4 billion of every 1990, US\$ 27 billion out of 1997 and US\$ 11.4 billion out of 2001. China represented 46 percent of Asia's internal FDI aggregate in 2001. A few eyewitnesses have accused the decrease in FDI for China's rising engaging quality as a goal for FDI in Southeast Asia.

However the invalid total perspective on exchange and speculation among China and ASEAN has been tested. FDI streams are a genuine case of this. A report by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in Singapore provides reason to feel ambiguous about the discernment that ASEAN is missing out on China in drawing in outside direct venture. As she would see it, China pulls in more FDI than ASEAN since it is Asia's second-biggest economy. A great part of the FDI to China is from the more extensive locale of China. Despite the fact that East Asian FDI to ASEAN declined comparative with China, Western nations (EU, US and Japan) really spent more in ASEAN than China when the Asian emergency. FDI decrease for ASEAN 5 - Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapor - was unexpected; in this manner, it doesn't show up firmly connected to China's rising engaging quality as an increasingly steady FDI goal. Moreover, outside venture has risen and dropped in corresponding to both China and South-East Asia. Somewhere in the range of 1989 and 1997 both China and ASEAN experienced quick development in FDI.

During this time, FDI streams to China rose from US\$ 3.4 billion to US\$ 44 billion while FDI to ASEAN-5 rose from US\$ 7.6 billion to US\$ 27 billion. The examination likewise takes note of that both ASEAN and China encountered a decrease in FDI during the Asian money related emergency and that couple developed again in 2001 with FDI to ASEAN and China. Be that as it may, on account of China the post-emergency lull has been increasingly progressive and the ongoing recuperation has been heartier than in ASEAN.

The positive point of view on China-ASEAN monetary ties holds that "ASEAN could ride on China as a development motor as opposed to considering China to be a danger." Trade offers one such open door for common advantage. The arrangement to make a China-ASEAN organized commerce region takes on significance in this specific circumstance. The proposition speaks to the developing association of the monetary linkages between Sino-ASEAN. Be that as it may, ASEAN ought not to overestimate the extent of these financial linkages. Two-way exchange rose from about US\$ 8.5bn in 1992 to around US\$ 39.5bn in 2000. Be that as it may, China's ASEAN exchange is less cutting-edge than its Northeast Asia exchange. In 2000, China just took 3% of ASEAN-6 fares, contrasted with a fourth of Taiwan's fares and in 2000; China represented 5% of ASEAN-6 imports, contrasted with a fifth of Japanese imports.

Further advancement of reciprocal exchange for common advantage is one of the primary explanations for the possibility of an unhindered commerce area among China and ASEAN. ASEAN and China have consented to an arrangement to make what will be charged as the world's biggest organized commerce zone. ASEAN-China Free Trade Region (ACFTA) will have an all-out populace of 1.7 billion individuals and a yearly GDP of around 2 trillion USD. The ACFTA's point is to slice and evacuate levies by 2010 for China and ASEAN-6, and by 2015 for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. As per a few figures, ACFTA could help ASEAN and China's GDP by 0.9 percent and 0.3 percent individually. It would likewise expand ASEAN fares to China by 48 percent and 55 percent of China's ASEAN trades.

Advocates contend that a FTA with China with its enormous household market will make more exchange and speculation open doors for ASEAN part states. Since China was first to focus on the decrease of levy rates on numerous ASEAN items, ASEAN can bring down its levies on the products from China at a later period.28 Furthermore, a China-ASEAN FTA sets a model for comparative concessions from future FTAs with Japan, Korea and India. Cynics note that Beijing has barred two of Southeast Asia's significant fares, rice and palm oil from the "early reap" of tax decreases; and that the items canvassed in the "early gather" plot added up to under 2.1 percent of all out China-ASEAN exchange.

The China-ASEAN facilitated commerce region is driven by both financial and political estimations on the two sides. Confronted with proceeding with financial downturn and with a developing psychological militant danger (in the wake of being named as global "fear based oppression's subsequent front"), ASEAN states are anxious to stay away from further monetary minimization. For China, ASEAN's market of 500 million individuals and rich normal assets are significant contemplations. What's more, changing exchange with ASEAN is likewise mostly conceived out of political contemplations.

In fact, the acknowledgment of China's political and vital additions from the FTA with ASEAN may have provoked Japan to propose its own organized commerce activity not long after the ASEAN-China FTA was declared. China's enthusiasm for a FTA with ASEAN is additionally of worry to the US, which has tried to advance organized commerce through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Self-assured people further expectation that a China-ASEAN unhindered commerce region would make ASEAN progressively appealing as a FDI goal. It would likewise help ease political pressures in East Asia. To cite one expert: "From a political point, the acknowledgment of a China-ASEAN organized commerce zone understanding demonstrates that recorded fight and political conflicts between ASEAN part states and the PRC are not, at this point one of the most significant elements affecting ASEAN-PRC relations."

Projection of Power from China and Critical Significance in Southeast Asia

Various Western and Asian investigators have cautioned of generous advancement being made by China in extending its key authority over Southeast Asia. As per the American expert Robert Sutter, "as of late, China's relations with all the powers around its fringe, with the conceivable special case of Japan, have gained ground. Lately, Beijing's essence in South-East Asia and Korea has developed extraordinarily. Indeed, even monetary tasks, for example, the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area and the arranged US\$ 2.5 billion Singapore-Kunming rail interface venture, a 5,500 km track going through the mainland ASEAN states, are viewed as "instruments" through which Beijing can build its essence in the South-East Asia." Given these states' shortcoming and relative closeness to China, China's relations with Indochina nations are viewed as an especially significant part of its quest for impact.

The issue of vital Chinese control is attached to the general development technique of China. Beijing claims that it requires a steady territory to concentrate on monetary development which is without a doubt it's most noteworthy need. To this end, it is set up to put aside its regional clashes with neighbors and affirm a "common protection" procedure under its "cutting edge security definition." But what occurs after a specific level of development has been accomplished in China? Pragmatists guarantee that a financial advancement unavoidably follows the quest for military quality and geopolitical control. They additionally state that China is as of now being obstructed by the Taiwan issue and its goals (regardless of whether by arrangement or power). The Chinese force will be activated against Southeast Asian states in response to its regional cases. Just the Chinese pundits themselves have loaned belief (maybe incidentally) to such a situation. Shen Dingli, a notable Chinese vital issues master, stated: "If the Taiwan front is shut we may go toward the South China Sea."

In Southeast Asia, nearby security issues, including the Asian emergency, intra-ASEAN pressures and psychological warfare, have dominated the worry over China's military development and blue water desire apparent in the early and mid-1990s. Be that as it may, long haul questions remain in regards to the projection of Chinese force. China's military technique has changed from battling a significant atomic war with the Soviet Union to improving territorial fighting abilities and this doctrinal change is especially clear in the development of its naval force and flying corps (particularly the previous). However the key objectives of China's military develop, as noted in a July 2002 Pentagon report is to "broaden its utilization of power alternatives against potential targets like Taiwan and confuse U.S. contribution in a question in the Taiwan Strait." The examination reports that powers being worked against Taiwan can be utilized against other Asian states like the Philippines.

The general ability of China's capacity venture profound into South East Asia is constrained. The endeavors to build up the projection power fixated on the securing of air refueling capacities for its 100 Su-27 and Su-30 fighters and on the progressive development of its surface armada, especially with the obtaining of Sovremennyclass destroyer. In any case, the Chinese surface naval force is powerless against air assaults outside the waters of China, lacking involvement with working aircraft carrier warships and with the vast majority of its weapon being of confined range. That makes China's submarine power the key component of their long-run power projection. China currently holds the world's third-biggest submarine armada. With low-level availability however, a lot of it remains innovatively in reverse condition. China does not have any underwater battle experience. Their atomic-fueled submarines are loud and helpless against identification, an outgrowth of its submarine rocket program. The operational availability of China's initial nonatomic submarines, duplicated from the 1950s Soviet variations (the Soviet Romeo-class of the 1950s), is assessed to be less than impressive. Its recently assembled household made diesel-electric submarines are guicker and calmer, for example, the Type 035 'Ming' class and Type 039 'Song' class; the latter can fire anti-ship missiles towards enemy ship during fully submerged condition. Moreover, China is building an armada of 12 Russian 'Kilo' class submarines, which denotes a noteworthy advancement in its long-extend submarine strike ability. The 'Kilo' submarines coordinate well with the neighboring Western submarines of China, including Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, India, and Singapore, yet are obviously less proficient than Japanese and Australian submarines. Along these lines, China's cutting edge submarines "don't beat powers accessible to numerous other Asian naval forces, also the huge, advanced submarine armadas of the US and Russia." However, vital control and force projection might be sought after by implies other than the utilization of military power, specifically by gaining influences and keeping up close security relations with more fragile states.

China's security relations with unique ASEAN states stay negligible. The proposed activities target building trust and

responsibility, as opposed to cooperating against explicit dangers, (for example, psychological warfare). Security relations with Vietnam have fortified since the outskirt understandings were marked between the two nations (a land limit understanding in 1999 and a concurrence on the delimitation of the Tonkin Gulf and a Fisheries Cooperation Agreement on 25 December 2000). Most recent joint explanations including China and Singapore and China and the Philippines have remembered calls for trades for protection. In the previous, this scope of proposed exercises includes "exchange of high level visits, courses conducted between both military organizations, participation in the bilateral meeting, [and] connections between various military gatherings and port calls." The last revelation proposes exercises including "associations and joint effort in harmony and improvement."

CONCLUSION

China's ASEAN relationship opposes direct arrangement through division, known as 'focus outskirts' and 'hegemon-customer.' Similarly, ASEAN's way to deal with China predominance cannot be adequately portrayed utilizing conventional security ideas, for example, 'adjusting against bandwagoning' or 'hostility versus arrangement. China's Southeast Asian ties have been, and will keep on being, portrayed by a blend of contention and participation. ASEAN states should intend to mollify China for the time being and attempt to exploit monetary linkages with China's blasting economy. Simultaneously, China's rising force will stay a worry, and ASEAN will seek after roads through a mix of discouragement and helpful security procedures to handle a grave security danger from China. Many negative situations identifying with security ties among China and Southeast Asia, including those identifying with financial security, require cautious thought as, as expressed in this paper, the proof is a long way from authoritative and the potential for error is ever present. The forces that structure the security relations among China and Southeast Asia stay in a condition of motion. Beside China's local development, the fundamental drivers for the drawn out relationship are the substance of Sino-US competition, the structure of provincial financial reliance and the advancement of agreeable security principles in the area. Southeast Asia may have an influence in forming the last two forces, yet this requires more noteworthy attachment and goal in ASEAN than has been apparent since the Asian financial crisis of 1997.

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THE FACTORS INFLUENCE PERIODONTAL (GUM) HEALTH STATUS AMONG MILITARY PERSONNEL

By Lt (DR) TENGKU NATASHA ELEENA BTI TENGKU AHMAD NOOR ROYAL MEDICAL AND DENTAL CORPS

INTRODUCTION


A study has been carried by Esaet al., (1996) revealed, among 188 personnel of Royal Signal Regiment of Fourth Division Malaysian army, 95.7% of military personnel had some form of periodontal disease with 86% of them had calculus according to CPITN score. Thirteen years later, another study by Ruzawaniet al., (2019) reveals that most of army personnel have a degree of periodontal disease. The combination of stress, environmental factors, lack of good oral hygiene and even less motivation can lead to increase the incidence of periodontal disease among military personnel (Thankappanet al., 2019). It is essential to prevent periodontal diseases and promote oral health for this special group of the population. The success of periodontal health therapy depends primarily on patient compliance with both home care and supportive, or maintenance, periodontal therapy (Wilson, 1998; Novaes and Novaes, 1999). Without regular professional intervention, patients may be incapable of maintaining oral hygiene in preventing plague accumulation and/or disease progression (Becker et al., 1984). However, because of the multifactorial causes in destructive periodontal diseases, even frequent regular oral prophylaxis may be insufficient to prevent (Tatakisand Kumar, 2005). The increase of the proportion of periodontal diseases among military personnel has implications on health care services. Study shows that advance in oral health care and treatment have resulted in reduced number of tooth loss individuals (Upadhyayaand Humagain, 2010). An increasing number of military personnel who have decay, periodontal disease and severe tooth loss can affect their preparation for deployment. Hence, they are in need of both preventive and curative oral health care continuously. The success of periodontal therapy depends primarily on patient compliance with both home care and supportive, or maintenance, periodontal therapy. Without regular professional intervention, patients may be incapable of maintaining oral hygiene at levels to prevent plaque accumulation. However, because of the multifactorial nature of destructive periodontal diseases, even frequent regular oral prophylaxis may be insufficient to prevent.

A lot of study was done assessing the periodontal health of the military personnel in relation to their general health condition, smoking and alcohol consumption habit, socioeconomic characteristics and dental attendance. Therefore, to maximize therapeutic benefit, it is critical to identify the factors influence periodontal health status. The failure to identify and solve health concern of army personnels has potentially serious consequences for their health and well-being including their families and general public, as unfit personnel reduces contribution to serve in the community.

Periodontal health plays important role in Malaysian Armed Forces military personnel health status as it is included in the DENTAP Assessment and measured by using Basic Periodontal Examination (BPE) (MAF, 2016). DENTAP is an acronym for "Dental caries, Efficiency in mastication, Neoplasm, Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ), Anomalies and Periodontium". Each quality of this standard of dental status is recorded by the figures 1 to 3 that are known as 'degrees' (Appendix A-Table 1). DENTAP minimum degree is different in to conditions which are for recruitment purposes (Appendix B-Table 1) and for Dental Readiness Classification DRC (Appendix B-Table 2). Only army personnel with DRC class of I are deployable while DRC of class II and III require to be treated.

Military readiness in Malaysia Armed Forces is determined by two factors which are the firepower (manoeuvre elements) and the manpower. Health readiness of army personnel is the manpower factor which reflexes the operational ability of a combat unit to secure national sovereignty from all kinds of threats (MAF, 2013). Therefore, in order to serve in Malaysian Army, army personnel are compulsory to be mentally and physically fit which under the responsible of Royal Medical and Dental Corps (RMDC) (MAF, 2016).

The mission of RMDC in Malaysian Armed Forces is to provide medical and dental services thus, conserving the fighting strength of the Malaysian Armed Forces. RMDC uses a health readiness grading system known as 'PULHEEMS System of Medical Classification' and 'DENTAP Assessment' for dental to ensure army personnel meet a minimum standard of health. This system should be updated every two years for every army personnel and yearly for 35 years of age and above (MAF, 2016).



Determinants of Periodontal Health

The periodontium or gum is made up of specialized tissues in the oral cavity that surround and support the teeth, maintaining them in the maxillary and mandibular bones together with the alveolar bone, gingival (gums), the root cementum and periodontal ligaments. (Mohd-Dom et al, 2013). The infection of pathogenic bacteria, the intergrity of these tissues is impaired hence resulting in inflammatory condition causing gum pain, swelling, bleeding, abscesses, tooth mobility and tooth loss (Mohd-Dom et al, 2013).

Periodontal disease can no longer be considered simple bacterial infections as they are complex diseases of multifactorial nature involving the subgingival microbiota, the host immune and inflammatory response, and environmental modifying factors (Lang and Bartold, 2018; Bartold and Van Dyke, 2000). It is well noted that different bacterial species in the subgingival biofilm as well as microbe-host interaction is the primary aetiological factor in periodontitis (Mira et al., 2017). However various risk factors do influence and modify this interplay which is modifiable risk factors and modifiable risk factors. (FDI, 2018; Genco and Borgnakke, 2013). Non-modifiable risk factors include genetic profiles, gender, age and systemic conditions (such as leukemia and osteoporosis) and for modifiable risk factors are lifestyle factors, metabolic factors, dietary factors, socioeconomic status and stress (FDI, 2018). In addition, local factors such as level of plaque root anatomy, dental restorations and, tooth position and crowding (Lang and Bartold, 2017).

✤ Genetic Profiles

Theoretically, risk of periodontal diseases is not borne equally by all individuals (Johnson *et al.*, 1988; Jenkins and Kinane, 1989). A variety of microbial, environmental, behavioural, and systemic disease factors is reported to influence risk for moderate to severe periodontitis (Page and Beck, 1997). Based on Khoury *et al.* (2003), evident that genetic variance is a major determinant of the differential risk for many human diseases. However, the effect of allelic variant to a disease can vary from being deterministic to having only a minor on the etiology (Kinane and Hart, 2003).

✤ Home Care

Personal oral hygiene and periodic professional care remain the best choice to prevent periodontal diseases (Burt, 1998; Glavind and Nyvad, 1986). The American Dental Association (ADA) recommends that brushing and flossing be performed thoroughly at least twice a day, with brushing duration optimally about 2 minutes per whole mouth as thirty seconds per quadrant or about 40 seconds per tooth (American Dental Association, 2019). Plaque is established cause of caries and a tooth which is completely free of plaque will not decay (Kidd, 2005).

However according to Jasmin and Jaafar (2010), total plaque removal is almost impossible especially in less than ideal situations such as army exercises or in war. This study was proven by Taha (2006) with crews of Royal Malaysian Navy ships that are working in extreme working condition (where soldiers need to be at working place for long period), only about one third brushed their teeth twice or more a day. Similar result was reported, tooth brushing was found to be a common oral hygiene behaviour whereby almost 98.2% claimed to brush their teeth at least once a day (Jasmin and Jaafar, 2010). Regular tooth brushing and other mechanical cleaning procedures are considered the most reliable in controlling plaque (Löe, 2000).

Professional Care

Dental plaque is known as the main factor in the initiation and progression of a variety of oral diseases including periodontal disease (Berezow and Darveau, 2011; Marsh,

2012). In gingivitis, increase in plaque mass can provoke the inflammatory response by the host (Marsh,2012). If unresolved, by-stander damage to the periodontium can occur from an inappropriate and exaggerated host response to subgingival bacteria and their metabolites (Marsh, 2012).

Supragingival debridement in removing plaque and calculus is phase before subgingival scaling the initial and essential and/or advanced periodontal procedures, and it is the first step of routine dental care and maintenance visits (Fardal and Hansen, 2007). Mechanical non-surgical therapy, or scaling and root planning (SRP), is the most commonly used procedure for treating ainaivitis and periodontitis (Sanikopet al, 2011). Hence, making professional visit as part of the importance in oral health maintenance.

Smoking

In 2015, approximately 22.8% (4,991,458) of Malaysian population aged 15 years and above were smokers, 43.0% (4.85 million) of men and 1.4% (143,566) of women smoked manufactured cigarettes, hand-rolled and smokeless cigarettes (MOH, 2015). Studies evaluating smoking is a significant risk factor for the development of periodontal disease (Amarasena*et al.*, 2002; Thomson *et al.*, 2007; Van Dyke and Sheilesh, 2005). Smokers have 2.5 to 3.5 time's greater risk of severe periodontal attachment loss (Bergström, 1989).

Periodontitis in smokers appears differently compared with non-smokers with deeper probing depths, more deep pocket (Feldman.1983: Beraström*et* al.. 2000) and more attachment loss, including more gingival recession (Grossiet al., 1994; Haffajee and Socransky, 2001). In addition, smokers appear to have more alveolar bone loss and more teeth with furcation involvement (Bergströmet al., 2000; Grossiet al., 1995; Linden and Mullally, 1994). Study by Grossiet al., (1994) shows smokers tend to have a higher level of tooth loss than non-smokers after adjusting for oral hygiene, age, gender, and socio-economic level.

Alcohol

According to a research lead by World Health Organisation (WHO) in 2011, there were 2 billion people worldwide consuming alcohol beverages and 76.3 million had an

alcohol use disorder (WHO, 2011). Alcohol consumption, like smoking, may be related to periodontal disease independently of oral hygiene status. Alcohol gives effect on periodontal tissues through different mechanism including adverse effect on host defense with complement deficiency, defective neutrophil function and increased frequency of infections (Christen, 1983; Drake, 1995).

Besides, alcohol has a toxic effect on the liver that may affect the prothrombin production, vitamin K activity and clotting mechanism that disrupt haemostasis (Tezal*et al.*, 2001). In vitro studies suggest ethanol stimulates bone resorption and blocks the stimulation of bone formation directly increasing the severity of periodontitis (Farley *et al.*, 1985). Study by Tezal*et al.* (2001) shows alcohol gives strongest effect on the gingiva, followed by periodontal ligament, and finally alveolar bone.

Cardiovascular Disease

There is an association between periodontal disease and the prevalence of cardiovascular disease (CVD) with growing evidence suggesting that periodontal disease is a risk factor for artherosclerotic cardiovascular disease (ASCVD) (Beukerset al., 2017; Tonetti and Dyke, 2013; Papapanou, Sanchez et al, 2019). Bacteria that caused 2015: periodontitis can enter the blood stream leading to a systemic host-mediated inflammatory response, which contributes to atheroma formation, maturation and exacerbation (Tonetti and Dyke, 2013). A number of medications used for the treatment of ASCVD can exacerbates by causing adverse effects in oral cavity such as xerostomia or dry mouth, hypo salivation and taste disturbances (Torpetet al., 2004; Demmeret al., 2013).

International consensus however recognise the relevance of the association between periodontal disease and ASCVD and recommend preventative oral health approaches to be adopted in cardiac care settings and all that patients with CVD engage in preventive oral health practices and attend regular dental care to reduce cardiovascular risk (Tonetti and Dyke, 2013; Friedewald*et al.*, 2009; Bouchard *et al.*, 2010; NSW Ministry of Health, 2013).

✤ Hypertension

Hypertension is a major global health disorder affecting about 972 million adult populations in year 2000 and this number is expected to grow to 1.56 billion by the year 2025 (Kearney *et al.*, 2005; Leong *et al.*, 2014). Hypertension is defined when a patient has an elevated systolic blood pressure greater than 140 mmHg and/or diastolic blood pressure greater than 90 mmHg (Chobanian*et al.*, 2003). Over the past years, studies carried out in patients with periodontal disease have related hypertension with chronic periodontal disease in the gingival tissue (Bullon*et al*, 2009).

The association between hypertension and periodontitis has pathways including inflammation. several possible linking Periodontitis is a chronic infection that leads to inflammation and has been proposed as an important factor that may exert adverse effects on the regulation of blood pressure (Leong et al., 2014). Periodontal bacterial infection may also be involved, in the development of hypertension which may directly invade the arterial wall and lead to vascular inflammation artherosclerosis (Panagakos and and Scannapeico, 2011).

Diabetes mellitus

Diabetes has been undeniably confirmed as a major risk factor for periodontitis (7-9). The risk of periodontitis is increased by approximately threefold in diabetic individuals compared with non-diabetic individuals (Mealey*et al.,* 2000). Study by the US National Health and Nutritional Examination Survey (NHANES) III, adults with an HbA level of >9% had a significantly higher prevalence of severe periodontitis than those without diabetes after controlling for age, ethnicity, education, sex and smoking (Tsai *et al.,* 2002).



The mechanism that link diabetes and periodontitis are not completely understood, but involve aspects of inflammation, immune functioning, neutrophil activity and cytokine biology (Casanova *et al.*, 2014; Taylor *et al.*, 2013). Both type 1 and type 2 diabetes are associated with elevated levels of systemic markers on inflammation (Casanova *et al.*, 2014).Diabetes increases inflammation in periodontal tissues by elevating levels of inflammatory mediators such as interleukin-1 β (IL-1 β) and tumor necrosis factor - α (TNF- α) (Engebretson*et al.*, 2004; Salvi *et al.*, 1997).

Drug-induced problem

According to Seymour (2000), the effect of systemic drug therapy on the periodontium can be categorised in three; an adverse effect on the periodontal tissue, affording some degree of protection against periodontal breakdown and causing an increased risk of periodontal breakdown.

Numerousstudy has shown systemic medications such as anticonvulsant, immunosuppressants and calcium channel blockers can affect periodontal health specifically gingival overgrowth (Marshall and Bartold, 1998; Dongari*et al.*, 1993; Sharma and Sharma, 2010; Ono *et al.*, 2010). An appraisal of the various investigations into the pathogenesis of drug-induced gingival overgrowth supports the hypothesis that it is multifactorial (Seymour *et al.*, 2000; Dongari*et al.*, 1993; Dongari-Baqtzoglou, 2004). The accumulation of plaque and gingival inflammation appear to exacerbate the expression of drug-induced gingival growth (Bharti and Bansal, 2013).

Abused drugs such as opiates and amphetamines can lead to xerostomia and reduce the saliva production that protects against dental decay and periodontal diseases (Laslett*et al.,* 2008). In addition, regular use of cocaine have been studied to have severe orofacial effects such as gingival lesion, perforation of nasal septum, palate and erosion of tooth surface (Brand *et al.,* 2008).

Stress

Since 1976, DeMarco has used the term "periodontal emotional stress syndrome" to describe the impact of the stress suffered by the soldiers involved in the Vietnam War on the progression of periodontal disease. Stress is a specific human reaction in response to a trigger, and is characterized by three successive phases: alarm, resistance, and general coping syndrome (Selye, 1973). Stress can be distinct into two types which is acute and chronic stress. Acute stress is the sudden and temporary response of the human body to as stressor which has a defines beginning and end while chronic stress is the response to intermittent and repeated exposure to a stressor over a continuous period (Bindushree*et al., 2014*; Juster*et al., 2010*).

A number of pathways have been proposed to explain the stress-periodontal disease association (Rosania*et al.*, 2009; Stabholz*et al.*, 2010). According to Stabholz*et al.*, (2010), mechanism have been grouped into 2 broad categories: 1) 'health-impairing behaviors' associated with stress, such as increase in tobacoo and alcohol consumption, poor oral hygiene and poor nutritional intake 2) 'pathophysiological factors' that lead to increase in stress hormones which can indirectly influence inflammatory and immunological profiles and increase the susceptibility to periodontal disease.

Level of Education

To establish good oral habits, the use of educational strategies is necessary, which will enable that the patient become motivated to cooperate with both dental treatment and oral hygiene measures prescribed (Arnet and Worley, 1999; Freeman, 1999). Several studies in the past have revealed an association between socioeconomic factors and oral health (Freire Mdo*et al.,* 1996; Whittle and Whittle, 1998; Al-Hosani and Rugg-Gunn, 1998; Jorgensen, 2000). The knowledge on

dental caries and periodontal health etiology is of fundamental importance for the prevention (Gomes *et al.,* 2015).

Celeste *et al.*, (2007) found the greater probability of nontreated caries lesion in low educated people. This data is parallel to the study by Gomes *et al.* (2015), which shows the higher the education level of the patients, the higher the knowledge on periodontal disease thus the more frequent dental visit.

Household income

Lower socioeconomic status documents higher dental decay and periodontal health due to their poor oral hygiene practices, lack of awareness, improper food intake, and parents education level (Kaur *et al.*, 2015). According to Hallett and O'Rourke (2006), children with lower parental socioeconomic status has been shown to contribute more active decay and missing teeth as compared children from higher socioeconomic status. This could be due to better privileges of taking preventive measures, early diagnosis and specific treatment which are affordable to them (Sogi and Bhaskar, 2002).

CONCLUSION

Periodontal diseases are one of the divesting conditions which lead to early loss of teeth and compromise the quality of life. The military service is a typical field where the individual undergoes a lot of risk while performing the duty. It is mandatory for the quick recovery from this disease and return to professional activities in the service. Many studies was undertaken to assess the prevalence of periodontal disease among military personnel and the results suggest that the tremendous amount of factors can affect the periodontal health of military personnel when the individual perform the duty. It is recommended to diagnose the diseases in an early stage to facilitate better response to standard periodontal therapy and the more predictable outcome. The annual medical check-up must include a thorough check up by a dental officer or periodontist and an appropriate radiological examination. The screening exam used is suggested for use as part of each military personnel's annual dental examination.

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PEMENANG ARTIKEL TERBAIK SOROTAN DARAT EDISI 75/2019 DAN 76/2020

Pemenang Artikel Terbaik Sorotan Darat Edisi Disember Siri 75/2019



<u>Artikel Terbaik</u> AN ANALYSIS OF LEADERSHIP ON TUN DR MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD Lt Kol Ir Mohd Shahnaz bin Sani, RER



<u>Artikel Kedua Terbaik</u> CYBER THREATS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA REGION Lt Col Sharizat bin Ahmad Nawawi, RSR



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Pemenang Artikel Terbaik Sorotan Darat Edisi Jun Siri 76/2020



Artikel Terbaik THE "STRATEGIC NEW NORMAL" POST COVID 19 – HOW SHOULD SOUTHEAST ASIA RESPOND Brig Gen Dato' Md Rahim bin Hj Mohamad, RIC



Artikel Kedua Terbaik THE ROLE OF TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN THE ARMY -KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AS A LEADING FACTOR IN LEADERSHIP Col Ahmad Suhaimi Navinder Bin Abdullah, RRR



<u>Artikel Ketiga Terbaik</u> THE FACTORS INFLUENCING PERIODONTAL (GUM) HEALTH STATUS AMONG MILITARY PERSONNEL

Lt (Dr) Tengku Natasha Eleena bti Tengku Ahmad Noor, RMDC

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- Risya Zu. (12 Feb 2014). Etos Kepahlawanan Tentera Darat. Utusan Malaysia, ms 9
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